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ART. I.—THE NEW TESTAMENT AND
PROFESSOR SALMON'S INTRODUCTION.

An Historical Introduction to the Study of the Books of the New Testament; being an expansion of Lectures delivered in the Divinity School of the University of Dublin. By GEORGE SALMON, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity. (London, 1885.)

IN the thirteenth lecture of this learned work the reader will find an interesting discussion of the literary question whether the Apocalypse in language and style gives evidence of identical authorship with the other Johannine books. A future critic might well illustrate this or a kindred point from the works of Dr. Salmon himself. Inhabitants of the sublime regions of mathematical science—which, alas, we contemplate from the lowest plains below—accept him as their peer. What manner of utterance should we have expected from such a man if he turned his attention to the precarious and disputable questions of ancient testimony and critical probability? Surely, something severe and oracular: a steady march from proposition to proposition, in which the more delicate shades of moral and literary evidence should meet with little regard, and, above all, no grace of writing but that of a stern simplicity of style should be allowed. The very thought of laughter should be repelled as far as when a university assembles in its church to hear a sermon on the most solemn of themes, from the most awful of its dons.

The fact is so extremely different, that the German professor in a future time, who sets himself to prove that the work on *Conic Sections* and the *Introduction to the New Testament* are by two quite different authors, will have a task below

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his genius and ridiculously easy. Our contemporary, the *Guardian*, in its genial review of the present work, is able to promise readers of it the enjoyment of many a hearty laugh: a pledge which that long-established journal has, perhaps, never before been able to make for any work of theology or biblical criticism—except in the case of works which could be laughed at. But it seems to us that the humour of the book is more than an occasional decoration. It pervades the style, and in one form or another is present throughout. And, though to some persons this may seem a strange and doubtful recommendation of a book of the kind, we shall not hesitate to assert that those who think so know very little about literary form. Logic of the kind that is effective in life, holding up assumptions and errors to the common view, and presenting its own conclusions not merely to the intellect but to the imagination, has the closest alliance with humour. And it is not only consistent with the most reverential faith, but may be more so than that ceremonious solemnity which is not familiar because it is not sure enough of its footing. 'Perfect love casteth out fear' is a phrase which may have its application not only to God but to God's book. But, however this be, we can promise the student that he will find in Dr. Salmon as unfailing *esprit* as in Veuillot, though with no tinge of his abusiveness, or as in Renan, though historical truth be never sacrificed to literary interest. He will find that the whole learning of the subject both new and old is at the author's command. But the mind has mastered the learning—not, as too often happens, the learning the mind. Common sense and practical faculty still move freely under all the weight of books. And as some Puritan, who happens upon a choral service and a lively sermon, feels as if he had not been to church at all, because the familiar element of pain and grief was all awanting in his devotions: even so the laborious student, arriving at the end of Dr. Salmon's work, feels as if it must be wicked to imbibe so much Biblical learning so pleasantly. The Professor is like a skilful cook, who makes good food palatable without unwholesome sauces.

But a specimen (which must not be too short) will be the best earnest of the truth of our judgment. What thinks the gentle reader, in whom the capacities of humour and faith are both alive, of the following?—

'It is a satisfaction to me to escape from the quaking sands of apocryphal legends, and step on the firm ground of the Pauline Epistles. Of these there are four which, as you know, Baur does not question; and later critics, who have no bigoted attachment to re-

ceived opinion, find themselves obliged to make further acknowledgments. Hilgenfeld and Davidson agree in owning Thessalonians, Philemon, and Philippians; Renan positively rejects none but the Pastoral Epistles, but has doubts besides concerning the Epistle to the Ephesians. But Baur is far from marking the lowest point of negative criticism. He found disciples who bettered his instruction until it became as hard for a young professor, anxious to gain a reputation for ingenuity, to make a new assault on a New Testament book, as it is now for an Alpine Club man to find in Switzerland a virgin peak to climb. The consequence has been that, in Holland, Scholten and others, who had been counted as leaders in the school of destructive criticism, have been obliged to come out in the character of Conservatives, striving to prove in opposition to Loman that there really did live such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, and that it is not true that every one of the Epistles ascribed to Paul is a forgery. And certainly it is not only to the orthodox that the doctrine that we have no genuine remains of Paul is inconvenient; it must also embarrass those who look for arguments to prove an Epistle to be non-Pauline: I leave these last to fight the battle with their more advanced brethren. I have constantly felt some hesitation in deciding what objections it was worth while to report to you. On the one hand, it is waste of energy to try to kill what if let alone will be sure to die of itself; on the other hand, there is the danger that you might afterwards find notions which I had passed by as too contemptible for refutation, circulating among half-learned people as the "latest results" which "eminent critics" had arrived at in Germany. But in the present case I think I am safe in deciding that it is practically unnecessary for me to trouble myself about the opinions of those who carry their scepticism to a further point than Baur. Let me say this, however, that I think young critics have been seduced into false tracks by the reputation which has been wrongly gained by the display of ingenuity in finding some new reason for doubting received opinions. A man is just as bad a critic who rejects what is genuine as who accepts what is spurious. "Be ye good money changers," is a maxim which I have already told you was early applied to this subject. But if a bank clerk would be unfit for his work who allowed himself easily to be imposed on by forged paper, he would be equally useless to his employers if he habitually pronounced every note which was tendered him to be a forgery, every sovereign to be base metal. I quite disbelieve that the early Christian Church was so taken possession of by forgers, that almost all its genuine remains were corrupted or lost, while the spurious formed the great bulk of what was thought worth preserving. The suspicions that have been expressed seem to me to pass the bounds of literary sanity. There are rogues in this world, and you do well to guard against them; but if you allow your mind to be poisoned by suspicion, and take every man for a rogue, why the rogues will conspire against you and lock you up in a lunatic asylum.' (P. 450.)

It will be seen by this extract that Dr. Salmon treats with scant respect some of the witty inventions which pass for

discoveries in Biblical criticism. It is to be confessed with sorrow that this is the general character of his book; he is actually guilty of taking a tone of assurance in support of the ancient traditions of the Church, almost as positive as that which any German professor assumes in revealing to the world his brand-new theory. And this characteristic of the book has drawn upon its author some very solemn reproof from those ultramontanes in Rationalism who believe in the infallibility of the latest criticism, even when it contradicts the previous infallible. For our part, we highly approve the tone in which Dr. Salmon writes. We do not see why readers of an orthodox book should be denied that help to persuasion which is found in the writer's assurance that he knows all about it, and that those who think differently from him are wrong. Unbelief, heaven knows, has worked this source of power over the common mind often enough and with sufficient effect. Many Rationalistic writers—notably the author of *Supernatural Religion*—have gained vast credit as Biblical critics upon very little stock-in-trade except their assurance alone. And we are not at all sorry that, after all the weak-kneed antagonists whom the higher critics have encountered, they should come across a combatant—we suppose it is in the nature of things he should be an Irishman—who responds to 'There's for you,' with 'Why, there's for thee, and there, and there, and there.' There is the confidence which disdains the fight, and there is the confidence which, like King Richard, levels its man: our author's is the latter. If anybody expects to find in this work a defence of the New Testament which cries 'hands off' to the Rationalists, he will be totally mistaken. The method of the book is itself Rationalistic, if Rationalism be taken, as surely it ought, to denote a free application of reason, and not any particular class of results to which the application leads. No one can accuse Dr. Salmon of ignoring any important argument of his opponents, or of meeting it otherwise than in fair fight. His 'hands off' is addressed not to Rationalist critics, but to religious persons who would withdraw the books which they regard as inspired from the ordeal which ordinary books, whose authorship is questioned, must pass, or who would interfere on the ground of Inspiration to stop the contest. There may well be persons who will find it painful to their faith to subject their Bible to such free handling, even for argumentative purposes. It is not among the teachers of the Church, who ought, above all things, to desire to be furnished with weapons fit for the contests of the time, that such timorous religion should be found. But,

whoever they be, let them confine themselves to the devotional study of the Bible, and the works auxiliary thereto. It is the highest kind of Biblical study: it is that to which every other is introductory, and we hope before we conclude to show that we are not forgetful of its claims. But let us well understand that, if it be pursued alone, it will present the clergyman, to those of his flock who have picked up any of the new views which thousands of publications, both learned and popular, press upon them, in the light of an amiable and devout anachronism, only fit for a museum of religious antiquities.

When free views of the criticism of the Bible first presented themselves in the Church, they were met by the method which we may describe as that of pious horror. We are old enough to remember the appearance of Dr. Donaldson's *Book of Jashar*, a work which nowadays would be received with perfect calmness. And it happened to us to be present at a meeting where Dr. Singer, a predecessor of Dr. Salmon in his Divinity chair, denounced, in sesquipedalian words and the tones of deeply wounded piety, the aberrations of this strange man. And whom did such talk persuade? Its benefits at the best were confined to the edification of the orthodox, and we sorely fear that what was supposed to be edification was often but self-satisfaction. For our own part, it impressed us with the feeling that Dr. Donaldson must have had something to say for himself, since the religious world was so afraid of his reasoning; and we retain the feeling to this very day.

Our plea for fighting free criticism with its own weapons rests therefore partly upon the fact that other methods are generally ineffective. It is true that if our own point of view be a good one, and the advantages which we gain by taking it very great, it ought to be sometimes possible for us to induce an adversary to transfer himself to it, and allow us to point out to him how it is that we see things. But the chances are against our success in this attempt. He has his own habits of mind, and is filled with the views which these habits have brought to his notice. He attributes our imperfect sympathy with his arguments to ignorance or sluggishness of mind. We shall have the better prospect of success with him if we can take him on his own ground. But it is not merely for the sake of success in argument that this method recommends itself. No great movement of the human mind, such as the free investigation in all subjects, which characterizes our time, may well claim to be, has ever prevailed without some deep ground of truth and some real adaptation to the mind of man. There is a possibility, therefore, of genuine sympathy with it on

every man's part, and there is a necessity for sympathy with it on the part of all who would comprehend the whole truth. When S. Paul is made all things to all men, he is not acting a part. He is sympathizing with that truth which furnishes the recommendation of imperfect systems to their adherents. He is trying to lead on inquirers to the full truth as the proper issue of that which they already confess, and in so doing he is enlarging his own views, and deepening his hold upon the faith.

If anyone doubts whether the sympathetic method of controversy (if such a phrase may be allowed) is or is not the best way of dealing with Rationalism, let him consider how it has answered with Romanism. As long as the method of pious horror was the only treatment which we had to deal to Romanism, it carried off many from our ranks. But since Romanism and its methods have been sympathetically studied among us, and its practices adopted so far as truth allowed, the tide has turned, and Romanists themselves confess their failure. The best minds among us are learning that the same is the case in our dealings with science in every department. Those alone shrink from the admission who are averse to the intellectual effort of considering new views, and mistake their indolence for attachment to the faith.

Dr. Salmon deserves our hearty gratitude for showing how little believers need fear literary criticism, provided it is thoroughgoing, and not that of smatterers whose aim is novelty. And as we have used the Roman controversy for an illustration, we shall so far wander from our immediate subject as to say that he would do a priceless service to the Irish Church, *if he would teach it the same lesson concerning Romanism which he has taught it concerning Rationalism.* The method of pious horror is still the method of Protestantism towards Rome. The *true* doctrines and the *good* practices which recommend Romanism to so many religious minds are as little adopted, and indeed as little understood, by your true Protestant, as the methods of free criticism were by the last generation of Churchmen. When the Church of Ireland shall have learnt and practised what Rome has to teach in worship, in doctrine, and in constitution; when her quarrel with Rome shall rest upon the contention—alas! too well justified now—that Rome is false to her own principles of religious stability and moral authority, an era of anti-Roman power will arrive for the Church of Ireland like that which arrived for the scholarship of the Church when it learnt that invectives were useless, and that the errors of Rationalism

were only to be met by a Rationalism which better deserves the name.

In considering how to give an account of Professor Salmon's way of treating his subject, one is naturally attracted to Lectures XI.-XVII., which deal with the Johannine Books. The subject is distinct in itself, and, as is well known, it includes some of the most difficult and hotly-debated matter in the range of New Testament criticism.

For the fact that the Fourth Gospel and the First Epistle of S. John are by the same author, Dr. Salmon does little more than refer to the ample discussion of the subject by Professor Westcott and the Bishop of Derry. The identity of the authorship of the two books disposes of certain theories about the Gospel, *e.g.* the notion that it spiritualizes away the conception of the Second Advent—a notion hard to maintain in view of the 'if I will that he tarry till I come' of the Gospel, but which vanishes wholly when the Epistle exhorts men so to live that they 'may not be ashamed before Him at His coming.'

The effect of the long critical battle which has raged about the Fourth Gospel has not been to oblige its defenders to put further forward the date which they assign to it. Rather it has compelled the assailants to concede a date so much earlier than they named at first, that it has gradually come very close to what orthodoxy allows. Baur would have it that this Gospel belongs to the latter half of the second century. But now the beginning of the second century, or even the end of the first, is the fixture of the critical world; and M. Renan even attaches to the Fourth Gospel a singular value. He accepts its narrative as nearer the truth than that of the Synoptics, while rejecting its discourses as inventions of the narrator, a theory the acceptance of which would require as much faith in the critical acumen of M. Renan, as the most ardent bibliolater ever placed in the inspiration of the Bible.

The external evidence for the genuineness of S. John's Gospel is considered by Professor Salmon to be quite as satisfactory as that for any of the other three. Dr. Sanday, in his work on the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, hardly goes so far: he states the battle upon this side to be a drawn one. Here we feel persuaded that Dr. Sanday displays an excess of concession; but there is no doubt that it is upon the internal evidence that the question chiefly depends. If it had not been for internal objections, no suspicion as to the authenticity of the Gospel would ever have been expressed. What, then, are these internal objections? Firstly, the clear declarations of

the Divinity of our Lord which the Gospel embodies. But, setting aside all inquiry whether that doctrine be true or not, the question whether it proves a book which asserts it to be spurious depends entirely on the question whether Jesus, as we know Him from other sources, made such claims for Himself, or not. And Dr. Salmon gives a list of sayings from the Synoptists which are quite decisive on this point. The single instance afforded by the declaration for which He was adjudged guilty of blasphemy by the Jews (S. Matt. xxvii. 65; S. Mark xiv. 62; S. Luke xxii. 69) would suffice.

The Apocalypse is now held by a very large and weighty body of Rationalistic authorities to be the genuine work of S. John; a fact which they are wont to turn against the Gospel on the ground that the two books were certainly not written by the same man. However that be, it is certain that no one who holds the Apocalypse to be S. John's can stumble at any exaltation of the Lord's Person which the Gospel displays, for the Apocalypse can parallel the very highest. And the very same Christology is taught in the Epistles of S. Paul—documents which are earlier than either the Apocalypse or the Fourth Gospel.

As to the identity of the authorship of the Revelation and the Gospel, Professor Salmon gives an interesting account of the arguments of Dionysius of Alexandria (A.D. 247–265), the successor of Origen at his catechetical school. This prelate urged with much force the variety of style and diction of the two books as his proof that the Apocalypse cannot be by S. John; but he never thought of questioning the Gospel as genuine. Later critics take up his arguments with the converse object. Professor Salmon, however (pp. 277–282), shows that the closest affinity exists between those two books. 'The Word of God;' 'The Lamb of God;' 'They also which pierced Him;' 'The hidden manna;' 'Let him that is athirst come:' the reader's memory will at once parallel these Apocalyptic expressions with corresponding ones found in the Fourth Gospel, and nowhere else in the New Testament. The strongest of Dionysius' arguments is that which rests upon the solecisms in language of the Apocalypse. There is no doubt that the Gospel is written in better Greek; but that of the Revelation corresponds very closely with what we might expect from a writer whose ordinary language was Aramaic, and whose knowledge of Greek was sufficient for colloquial purposes, but unequal to meeting with perfect correctness the extraordinary strain which the nature of the Apocalyptic subject imposed. In the Gospel, there is, no doubt, less varia-

tion from the propriety of the Greek grammatical forms; but this may be because less has been attempted. And in this Dr. Salmon is able to quote an independent confirmation from Canon Westcott's *Introduction*, which says that the Gospel 'is free from solecisms, because it avoids all idiomatic expressions.'

A second consideration which may serve to extenuate the difficulty raised by Dionysius, is that of possible assistance rendered to the author of the Gospel by some amanuensis, or other friend, better acquainted with Greek. And the conclusion arrived at upon comparison of the books is, that the Apocalypse and other Johannine books clearly belong to the same school. If the evidence from language be regarded alone, we are not in a position either to affirm or deny that the same man wrote the books. Their resemblances make it very credible that he did; their differences are such as to make it sure that if the author was the same, he must have written them at different periods, and under different circumstances (p. 287).

Then comes the question of the date of the composition of the Apocalypse. Professor Salmon declares himself well inclined to adopt that proposed by Renan, viz. a period soon after the death of Nero (p. 302). But this agreement as to date is tempered by very free treatment of Renan's interpretation of the book, an interpretation which has obtained the concurrence of some orthodox scholars in England. In this chapter the reader receives from Dr. Salmon valuable exegetical helps for the study of the Revelation; albeit more of a negative than of a positive kind. For the author plays great havoc with M. Renan's and Archdeacon Farrar's applications of the prophesy to events then expected—which events, if they had been really referred to, must have falsified the predictions almost as soon as uttered—and revels in exposing their confident reading of the number of the beast. But he declares himself unprovided with a rival system of his own.

If Lecture XIV. trenches upon the province of the expositor, Lecture XV. affords valuable help to the student of ecclesiastical history in its discussion of the Quartodeciman controversies of the early Church. The succeeding lecture is an exceedingly interesting one, pursuing the conclusions above derived from the comparison of the Apocalypse and Fourth Gospel to the proof that the author of the latter was not only of the same school with the author of the former, but was the same man. The substance of this lecture is acknowledged by Dr. Salmon, with a somewhat excessive modesty, to be repro-

duced from the excellent works of Dr. Sanday and Canon Westcott. It demonstrates (in the same successive steps as Canon Westcott's *Introduction*): (1) That the author of the Fourth Gospel was a Jew; (2) a Jew of Palestine; (3) who lived near the time of the events which he relates; (4) an eye-witness; and therefore (5) the Apostle John. But the reader must not suppose that if he has mastered his Westcott and Sanday he will find the study of this Lecture superfluous. The study of the minor epistles of S. John, which Canon Westcott passes over somewhat lightly, and which neither Dr. Sanday nor Luthardt touch at all, yields to Dr. Salmon results of the greatest interest and weight. Lecture XVII. compares the Fourth Gospel with the Synoptists; and the nature of the subject brings out many exegetical hints of great value. Notably, we find Dr. Salmon's observations (pp. 355-8) upon the sacramental doctrine of S. John far more satisfactory than those of Canon Westcott. The latter expositor is of opinion that what is dealt with in S. John vi. is 'not the outward rite, but the spiritual fact which underlies it.'¹ But Dr. Salmon is of opinion that—

'it is not possible satisfactorily to explain John vi. if we exclude all reference to the Eucharist. If both the Evangelist knew and his readers knew that our Lord had on another occasion said, "Take eat, this is my body; drink this, this is my blood," they could hardly help being reminded of these expressions by that discourse about eating His flesh and drinking His blood. . . . If the result of the previous investigation has been to establish that this Evangelist habitually relies on the previous knowledge of his readers, we cannot doubt that, in this as in other cases, he speaks words *φωνᾶντα συνειροίαι*, and that he gives no formal account of the institution of the Eucharist only because he knew that his readers had other accounts of it in their hands.'

For ourselves we have never been able to understand how any expositor who combines the applicability of S. John iii. to Baptism, and of S. John vi. to the Eucharist, first with each other, and secondly with the undoubted fact that these two sacraments were in use when S. John wrote, can avoid the conclusion that the references to them were intentional.

And now we propose to devote such space as remains to us to a question of very vital importance which Dr. Salmon does not directly deal with, but which we feel constantly and irresistibly forcing itself upon our mind as we peruse his work. What is the bearing of his conclusions upon the maintenance of the New Testament in that sacred position which the Church

¹ *Speaker's Commentary*, S. John, p. 113.

ascribes to it? The reader of this admirable book lays it down with the sense that something most important has been gained for the faith. Whatever be said of this or that detail, the antiquity and authenticity of the New Testament in general have been proved for him with a force which he feels is not likely to be seriously weakened. It is a great service, for which the student must express his hearty gratitude to the author, and proportionate respect for the methods by which the end has been attained. They are the methods of fair literary discussion and competent learning, put to practical use by common sense. The very humour which pervades the work has its purpose, not only in brightening a discussion which in other hands has seldom failed to be dull, but in persistently maintaining the ground of common sense and warning off, as no power but humour can do, all unreal sentiment, and all the unpractical dreams of conceited erudition. The reader might have shrunk from subjecting his Bible to such an ordeal, but he feels thankful to the scholar who has ventured to do it; and while others declined to treat the New Testament as Virgil or Horace have been treated, has shown that if such a process be only applied to it with genuine fairness, the Sacred Book comes out triumphant.

This is much, but it is not all. It does not prove the inspiration of the New Testament, nor justify those uses of the New Testament which depend upon its Inspiration. And although we have sufficiently declared how fully we approve Dr. Salmon's tone and method, we shall venture to confess that it is not easy, without some help beyond what we find in his book, to transfer ourselves at once from its manner of treating the New Testament to that reverential regard which the holy volume claims in the Christian church and home; for the characteristic of the one method lies in regarding the Testament like all other books, and that of the other, in regarding it differently from all others. We cannot complain of this difficulty in itself. It may be due to our own imperfect power of taking a certain attitude of mind, when another has been for a long time persisted in. If some friend of ours were subjected to a long judicial inquiry, we might—be its conclusion never so triumphant—find it hard all at once to forget the habit of inquisition which we had been so long obliged to adopt toward him, and resume the feeling of unsuspicious love again. Yet we should know at once that our weakness was to blame for this difficulty, and that in restored intercourse with our friend it would soon pass.

But we have very serious doubt whether the question of

Inspiration can really in all its bearings be kept so distinct from the question of authorship and date as Professor Salmon seems to believe. 'It is,' he writes, 'clearly one question: At what date and by what authors were certain books written? Quite a different question: Is there reason to believe that the authors of these books were aided by supernatural guidance, and if so, what was the nature and extent of that supernatural assistance?' (p. 3). Undoubtedly the two questions are quite distinct, yet it by no means follows that the treatment which you apply to the one may not deeply affect the discussion of the other; and, in fact, it will be found that while external evidence of authorship has nothing to do with Inspiration, you cannot touch the internal characteristics of style and contents without affecting that question very nearly. Dr. Salmon's next paragraph affords an instance—

'Suppose it to be alleged that there are plain contradictions between the First Gospel and the Fourth: if we were engaged in an inquiry as to the inspiration of the Gospels, it would be of the utmost importance to examine whether and how far this allegation is true. But it may be quite possible to set it aside as entirely irrelevant, when we are only inquiring whether or not both Gospels were written by Apostles.'

Yes; but if in discussing the question of genuineness you recognise the existence of discrepancies, how can you prevent this fact from standing good for the after discussion as to Inspiration, whatever the effect of it in that point of view may be? The trial of the New Testament cannot be conducted upon the principles applied in a late notorious cause, where the same fact was regarded as proved in relation to one party in the cause, but unproved in relation to the other!

In a subsequent Lecture, Professor Salmon warns off all persons from introducing the question of Inspiration into the discussion of the origin of the Gospels. Mr. Sadler must not argue that S. Luke, believing SS. Matthew and Mark to be inspired, could not have made alterations in their narrative if he had had them before him. 'For,' says Dr. Salmon, 'we are not to decide offhand on any solution according to the measure of its agreement with our preconceived theory of inspiration' (p. 156). Here, we venture to think, he somewhat misconceives Mr. Sadler, who (be he right or wrong) is not arguing as to what differences God would be likely to allow between inspired books, but as to the way in which a man, namely S. Luke, would be likely to treat books which he knew to possess that character; and if Inspiration be proveable at all, or if it is a quality having any ascertainable effects, can

we exclude Mr. Sadler's argument as essentially illegitimate? Is Inspiration a quality which implies historical accuracy? If it be, then it cannot be pronounced irrelevant or improper to bring it forward at any stage of the argument at which accuracy comes into question. And why should the fact of Inspiration, recognized as it is by the Church, be linked with the reproachful epithet 'preconceived.' It may indeed be better as a matter of forensic prudence not to urge it on persons not likely to be affected by it. But if, not for the sake of forensic prudence but of logical truthfulness, we refrain from introducing the fact of Inspiration where accuracy is in question, the reason must be either that we are doubtful of the Inspiration or doubtful how far accuracy is involved in Inspiration. And we cannot possibly divest that doubt of its importance when the problem of Inspiration comes up, whenever that may be.

But the question of the relation of historical accuracy to Inspiration, elementary though it seems, is one to which a plain man will find it harder than he could anticipate to obtain an answer from divines. There can be very little doubt that religious people in general, and especially Protestants, whose religion is 'the Bible only,' conceive that the Inspiration of the Bible is a fact from which they are to deduce the consequence that the statements of the Bible are accurately true. How else should it be their rule of faith? And yet when we look into the works of divines, we are left in great uncertainty whether the proof of the truth of the Bible statements does not rest merely upon the opportunities of their authors, as in the case of secular historians. For instance, the Bishop of Carlisle gives us, in the *Contemporary Review* for February last, an interesting article upon the gospel history of our Lord's Birth. The proofs which he adduces of its accuracy are found in S. Luke's truthfulness, and his opportunities of acquiring information, especially from the Blessed Virgin Herself. But we think we are not mistaken in saying that in no part of the article is the Inspiration of S. Luke offered as any reason for attaching credit to his narrative. Has the Church then an esoteric method of proving facts for her own members by the Inspiration of scripture, the force of which cannot be made plain to ordinary mankind, and must be altogether suspended and left out of sight when we are dealing with them? Or are we giving our Sunday-school children proofs which are not real and logical proofs at all, when we refer them to texts of scripture as final and decisive evidence of every Article of the Creed?

In the judgment also of Professor Salmon it would appear that the proof of the truth of the New Testament precedes the proof of its Inspiration. The latter question, he says,—

‘only admits of discussion among those who are already convinced of the historic credibility of the New Testament books, and who, because they believe what those books relate about Jesus of Nazareth, find no difficulty in believing also that He endowed with special powers those whom He commissioned to write the revelation which He brought into the world.’ (P. 3.)

In which sentence the words ‘find no difficulty in believing’ must, to give a practical meaning, denote actual belief, and historic credibility must, for the same reason, mean historic truth. Belief then in the historic truth of the New Testament books leads us on to believe in their Inspiration. Not, we may be sure, that a book might not be true without being inspired. We conceive the author to mean that the divine gifts and promises which the New Testament announces are of such a nature that they assert and imply the Inspiration of their first recipients. It is a very comprehensible argument, but even because it is so, it hangs all together, and we cannot consider one stage or part of it, independently of the other. If at that stage in which we are busy upon the historic truth of the Testament, we should be obliged to allow that this historic truth does not imply literal exactness in the incidents or the sayings related, it will not be legitimate afterwards to turn round and prove literal exactness of incidents from that fact of Inspiration, to which we have been led on the ground of the historic truth of the narrative. But, if we are not mistaken, a process of argument very like this is to be found in no less a book than the late Archdeacon Lee’s *Lectures on Inspiration*.

It is no small glory for the Divinity School of Trinity College, Dublin, that within a single generation it should have produced in Archdeacon’s Lee’s *Lectures* the book which has been widely accepted as the best existing treatise on Inspiration; and in Dr. Salmon’s, the book which (we think we may say) will be recognized as the best upon the authenticity of the New Testament. But of the two tasks, the more difficult, to our thinking, was that of Dr. Lee. The work which we are at present reviewing, great though its intellectual demands must have been, yet moves equably in the sphere of human history. It is an inquiry into earthly facts, and the author takes good care that he shall not be tempted beyond these limits. But the Archdeacon’s work forces him into the region of theology and metaphysics. And instead of having to de-

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Professor Salmon's Introduction.

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fend a plain thesis, which the Church lays down in every catalogue of the books of the New Testament, he has to deal with a subject on which the Church has issued no definition, and on which the minds of a great many excellent people are both extremely sensitive, and extremely uninformed. It seems to us, therefore, no wonder that amidst the abundance of the learning which will render Archdeacon Lee's book a repertory of information for all future students, he cannot be pronounced to have said the last word on the subject. We consider his discussion of the nature of Inspiration as far more satisfactory in that part which treats of the process within the spirits of the authors, than in that which treats of the tangible effects of it upon their work as we have it; if, indeed, the latter point is seriously touched by him at all.

It is excessively difficult to know whether in Archdeacon Lee's view the truth of the New Testament is a fact which must be independently proved in order to lead us to belief in its Inspiration, or a conclusion to be inferred from its Inspiration. On the one hand we find him saying that—

'the present investigation has taken for granted the entire array of Christian evidences: embracing, together with proofs of supernatural agency, the vast extent of antiquarian and grammatical criticism, the profound argument from the analogy of nature as well as a comparison of our sacred records with the whole range of profane history and with the present aspect of the world. On such evidence we are entitled to assume the genuineness, the authenticity, and the perfect truthfulness of the several books to which the name of Holy Scripture has been assigned.'¹

We are indeed sensible of the value of these various external evidences of the truth of the Bible, but we do not think it can be seriously maintained that they go the length of proving its 'perfect truthfulness.' General truthfulness they do indeed prove, but that, as readers of the passage will confess, would not suffice the purpose of the argument. Be that, however, as it may, we here find perfect truthfulness laid down, not as a characteristic which the general body of Christian evidence prepares us to attribute to the Bible when the proof of perfect truthfulness shall have been given by means of the fact of Inspiration, but as a characteristic which is to be attributed to the Bible, prior to any proof of inspiration at all. But if we proceed to the last Lecture in the volume, we find the entire truthfulness of the Scriptures regarded as an inference from their Inspiration. 'I have endeavoured to lay down principles

¹ Lee, *On Inspiration*, 2nd edit. pp. 93-4.

from which the Divine authority, the infallible certainty, the entire truthfulness of every part of the Scriptures must necessarily result.¹ And this is the natural application of a principle which has been previously laid down, 'were it possible to prove that God had issued to chosen individuals a special commission to compose certain narratives, no one, it may perhaps be presumed, would venture to assert that the sacred penmen were left unaided in the performance of that duty, or that any imperfection could possibly exist in the work so produced.'²

We infer from a passage previously referred to, that Dr. Salmon would not feel himself justified in deciding *a priori* whether God would or would not allow any imperfection to exist in the delivery of a message which He had commissioned men to impart. And if we are right in attributing to him this hesitation, we must also confess that we share it ourselves. We may indeed feel certain that God will never allow any imperfection in the degree in which the means which He appoints attain the ends which He designs. But to say how much human perfection of one particular kind this perfect adaptation to God's ends may require, implies a claim on our part to know God's ends better than we really do. Human imperfection there certainly must be somewhere or other in the human execution of any commission, however divine. And we do not see how we could be antecedently certain that a perfection would be found in the writing down of the message, which certainly will not be found in the distribution of it, after it is written, to the mass of mankind for whose benefit it is intended.

The result of what we have ventured to say is this: that the work of Dr. Salmon and of the other excellent writers who have treated of the genuineness of the books of our Canon, requires a supplement upon Inspiration which has not yet been written. The very success with which these books have been traced back to Apostolic writers, only moves us to ask with greater earnestness—and what then? What inferences as to their authority for our minds and souls follow from the date and authorship to which you have assigned them? We see of ourselves that this date and authorship gives them the natural authority of contemporary history, and that the agreement of their testimony upon certain great matters is quite enough for our spiritual support, while we are waiting for something more. But the Church has always

¹ Lee, *On Inspiration*, 2nd edit. p. 379.

² *Ibid.* p. 313.

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taught that there is something more—tell us what it is ; and prove it.

We do not forget the valuable treatises of Bishop Wordsworth and Prebendary Row, nor that of Mr. G. Warington—the best in our judgment of them all—nor yet the contributions to the subject from without the Church, such as the works of Dr. Bannerman and Mr. Henry Rogers. But, somehow, none of them fill the gap. Either they are too abstract and meet the phenomena timidly and incompletely, or else they are wanting in that authority which bishops and universities can stamp upon a book, even where synods do not speak. Certainly the minds of thinking people are left without the help which, in such a matter, their Church ought to give them.

We do not, therefore, anticipate contradiction when we say that a treatise upon Inspiration, thorough, candid, reverential, and scientific in the best sense, is a desideratum in the Church. The time would seem to be ripe for it. Long experience ought to have accumulated sufficient materials both of mental and spiritual phenomena within the Church's own province, and of scientific phenomena outside it, to show her what Inspiration is and what it is not. And if the task be a possible one, it may well be made a reproach to the Church that it is not attempted. To every deacon ordained in our communion the question is put in the most solemn service in which he has ever hitherto taken part—'Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?' Unless this question be answered in the affirmative, the Church refuses to accept the services of the candidate. But we venture to believe that there is not a single bishop on the Bench, not a single divine of any party in the Church—or any other Church—who would not permit to an honest and devout candidate explanations of his affirmative answer, which its literal import does not include, and which were not anticipated when the Ordinal was composed. There cannot be a doubt that when this question and answer were placed in the Ordinal, they were meant to express an inherent claim of the Bible, *quod* Bible, to an exact belief. And if they now are used to express a belief in the truth of the Bible which has limits and reservations, and is not founded upon its Inspiration, there has been a change which requires altered language in the Ordinal to express it. An instance of this very licence allowed by a bishop was made public some time since in the pages of a contemporary without, so far as we know, calling forth protest in any quarter. It is perfectly fair and honest that men

should put upon the words of a public document a meaning universally allowed by the public body which issues it. But it is an undeniable anomaly, that the consciences which are not content to avail themselves of a non-natural interpretation, tacitly acquiesced in, should be left without help, and that consciences which are willing to stretch the concession beyond fair limits, should be left without reproof. If the condition of the Church's government renders conciliar dealing with the subject impossible, her prelates, divines, and university faculties ought certainly to deal with it thoroughly, and without delay.

But now that we have frankly uttered our petition to the natural teachers of the Church, we feel bound to add a few words of explanation on our own part. We do not imagine that a treatise on the Inspiration of the Bible ever will or ever can be written which shall deal with the subject independently, and establish the authority of the Holy Book, considered alone, with its limitations and explanations, as if one were dealing with the properties of a plant, or the limits and productions of a province. There are, indeed, teachers among the sects to whom such an independent proof of the authority of the Bible would seem to be absolutely necessary. For them, the Bible and the soul stand face to face, with no intermediate link. The history and traditions of the Church which lie between the writing of the Bible and the soul, as it stands in the present, are nought. The Bible stands alone, and must be proved alone. But to the Church's children it is not so.

What is the reason which the Church gives to her children for believing her faith? What is the argument by which she invites aliens into her fold? Does she simply say to them, My authority is divine, therefore believe; or, Believe, because the authority of the Bible is divine. Other Christian bodies may say one of these; but it is not so that, according to our conception, the Church of England delivers her message. She presents the Gospel as the Apostles did, as in itself so fitted to the wants of human souls that apart from questions of authority, it contains its own proof within itself for all who will make trial of it, as they make trial of the love of a father or mother. But since the human soul in this earthly tabernacle is often slow to discern its own real wants, and easily raises doubts about the truths which ought to be most welcome to it, she supports the inherent authority of her message by facts well fitted to give it emphasis. First, her own existence and her institutions; her worship, her sacraments, her faith; the example of her saints, and the beneficence of her work. These

are the first and nearest influences by which a soul in doubt whether the Gospel preached to it is not either too good or too severe to be true, is strengthened in its faith. It is bidden to look without and see its own wants reflected in others, and the power of the remedy which is recommended to it exemplified in others. Example, and the nameless influence of a community, are the helps to faith which come next after the spiritual necessities and aspirations of the individual soul.

Even if the Church, and the faith of the Church, were products of the present time, they would have a powerful effect upon souls seeking strength and hope. If amidst the perplexities and miseries, the moral weakness and the short-lived hopes of natural man, the Church with her faith and works appeared as an invention of the hour, offering her prescription for the diseases of man, and recommending it by the evidence only of cures visible to all in the hopeful and righteous lives of those who use it, she would not want for converts. For what are the systems of philosophy which compete with her but growths of the time, without any of the actual proofs of present power for good, which the Church so abundantly displays.

But the Church presents herself not as an invention, but as an institution; not as a conclusion to which man has been driven in these latter days by the stress of his wants and the growth of his spiritual powers, but as an old prescription tried for near two thousand years past—yes, and for long ages before that—upon the evils of man's life. It has displayed its power upon many various races in various stages of their cultivation, and amidst all kinds of exigencies, in peace and war, in growth, stability and decay. It has asserted its power over individuals of all dispositions and endowments. And if in the course of this eventful history it has somewhat changed its character and aspect at various times, partly through its own admirable power of adaptation, and partly through the additions which human error has forced upon it, we yet must recognize that the secret of its power, underneath all differences, has been as essentially the same, as its historical succession has been continuous. It is found in the Catholic Creed to which all sections of the Church have consented, and in which all alike confess that the essence of their belief is contained.

That which imposes upon the Church the character of an institution, as distinguished from an invention, and upon the Creed the character of a statement of fact, as distinguished from a philosophy, is that the Church and the Creed both

originated in a revelation. They sprang together from an act of God, which was at once an unveiling of Himself to mankind, and a creative interference with the history of man's life. The Church's Creed is the breath of her life, her statement to herself of the reason of her own existence, of the facts by which she came into being, and by which she is for ever maintained. The Creed in which she finds her own life is also the source of spiritual life to every one of her members. Each and every one of them is, like the Church their mother, 'in Him that is true,' and lives by the truth.

What we call the Creeds of the Church are compendious statements of the truth on which she is founded. The use she has ever made of such forms is an immemorial witness to her conviction that she is based upon revealed facts, and must build her children's spiritual life upon the same sure ground. But another testimony to the same fact—and a still more ancient and universal one—is found in her use of Holy Scripture.

Holy Scripture gives us the revelation of the Divine truth on which the Christian life is founded; it also gives us the living and breathing example of the first operations of the great open secret, and of the powers which it reveals, upon the life of man. Holy Scripture is therefore the first constituent part of the Church's tradition, the record of that which she was commissioned to teach, and of the manner in which she began to execute the task. It was written, as one of its authors phrases it, that the Church's children might know 'the certainty of those things wherein they had been instructed;' the 'traditions,' as they are elsewhere called, which the first teachers 'delivered.' We feel convinced, therefore, that no treatment of the question of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture can be complete which does not regard it in connexion with the institution of a living Church, having a commission to teach. We shall find in it no powers and no elements, whether on the side of God or of man, which do not exist, though it may be in a very different degree, all through the Church's past history and in her present life. In what degree and in what form these elements mingle in Holy Scripture, is the question which the coming writer on Inspiration must set himself to explain. He must argue it not on the basis of any abstract notions of perfection, but on that of facts. He must prove it not as an independent phenomenon, but as a necessary part of the work and the power of Christianity in the world.

We do not, therefore, believe that Professor Salmon's excellent work can be separated to the degree that he himself

supposes from that general consideration of the claims and position of Holy Scripture in the Church which constitutes the question of Inspiration. It is no small matter to have proved, as he has done, that the Church's tradition as to the date of the sacred books is true. That fact leads us naturally on to another: that Holy Scripture has been in living, spiritual touch with the living Church from the first, and has ever been regarded as containing the secret of her power. There are not wanting many passages in Dr. Salmon's book which recognize the existence of the Church, busy at spiritual work and jealous of spiritual truth, as one of the most important elements in the decision of the case. The question how false books, or false accounts of the things in which she had been instructed, could have been palmed off on such a body, is a most obvious and practical argument, and might well have been presented, even to men of all opinions, by the Bishop of Carlisle, in his discussion on the Nativity, as one of his strongest points.

But though we cannot accuse Dr. Salmon of ignoring the existence of the Church and of her tradition, yet it is perhaps inevitable that sometimes the literary argument should predominate in his treatment of the matter, and the beginning and end of the consideration of every book should appear to lie in the question who wrote it. 'Authorship,' says Mr. Warrington, 'was *not* the true ground on which they held the Canon ought to be, and in fact had been, decided.'¹ Consider the case of 2 Peter: the genuineness of this book, though maintained by Dr. Salmon with abundant literary talent, to the confusion of Dr. Abbott, cannot be regarded as decided by his argument. Does, then, the whole question whether the book contains a Divine message, and is rightly commended by the Church to her children, or is an ordinary human composition, with *no* authority, depend upon this difficult and doubtful balance? Or might we supplement the probabilities (if such they be) of the literary argument, by adding that, whoever wrote the book, it has its place and use, by the Church's prescription, among the documents which state her tradition. The Epistle to the Hebrews, the Inspiration of which has never been held dependent on its authorship, might afford a precedent in the case.

But our space is exhausted. We recommend the work before us as learned and interesting in every page. It is a new bastion of formidable power in the Church's defences; or rather let us say it is a new buttress to the old house of God, in which the Church's children live at peace.

¹ *The Inspiration of Scripture: its Limits and Effects*, p. 29.

ART. II.—THE MYSTICAL INTERPRETATION OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

1. *The Types of Genesis, briefly considered as revealing the Development of Human Nature.* By ANDREW JUKES. Fourth edition. (London, 1882.)
2. *The Mystery of the Kingdom, traced through the Four Books of Kings. Part I., the First Book of Kings.* By ANDREW JUKES. Third edition. (London, 1884.)
3. *A Commentary on the Psalms, from Primitive and Mediæval Writers.* By JOHN MASON NEALE, D.D., and R. F. LITLEDAL, LL.D. 4 vols. (London, 1860-74.)

WE all recognize in certain personages and transactions of the Old Testament history *types*, having their antitypes in the Christian dispensation. Every well-taught child is instructed that Joseph and Joshua, David and Solomon, are in different ways types of our Blessed Lord. Everyone is familiar with the idea that the sacrifice of Isaac is a type of the Sacrifice upon Calvary, and that the sale of Joseph for twenty pieces of silver is a type of the betrayal of Jesus Christ. But most persons refuse to go beyond a certain ill-defined limit. They accept a few well-worn types as unquestionable, but dismiss all the rest as fanciful and visionary.

Now, a very little consideration will show this to be illogical. If a typical relation may be rightly traced in some cases, why may it not in others? How are we to draw the line? And, on the other hand, if all except a few familiar types are to be discarded, the question suggests itself, whether these too are not fanciful? On what principle do we admit any if we do not admit all? Are these types, which we do acknowledge, based, after all, upon anything more than chance resemblance?

It is well known that early Christian and mediæval writers for the most part approached the interpretation of Holy Scripture from a point of view, widely divergent from that of modern critics. Their conception of the plan and teaching of the Bible was a radically different one. Where we find matter for antiquarian discussion, or interesting problems of ethical philosophy, they found types of Christ and the Church. They deduced from the narrative of the days of creation, lessons as to the work of God in the successive dispensations of history and the development of the spiritual life in the Christian soul. They saw in the scarlet thread which Rahab fastened in her

window, a significant reference to salvation through the precious Blood of Jesus Christ. They recognized in the wars of Israel with the nations of Canaan, the conflict of the Saints with wicked spirits in high places. They even discerned in the narrative of Bathsheba's relations with David, a history of the Church, which forsakes the Evil One, to whom human nature has been bound, and becomes united to Christ.

It is hardly necessary to point out the gap which lies between such interpretations as these, and those which are now most common and most popular. Since the time when 'Greece rose from the grave with the New Testament in her hand,' the critical study of the Bible has progressed with ever-increasing precision of scholarship, amplitude of historical research, and abundance of archæological illustration. On the one hand, the text of the sacred writings has undergone the closest scrutiny, and a science of textual criticism (of the New Testament at least) has grown up, which has absorbed the labours of some of our foremost scholars and theologians. On the other hand, efforts have been made on every side to picture the characters of the Old and New Testaments amid the actual circumstances of their time and place, and to present them vividly before us in their habits as they lived. This is the age of popular Lives of Christ, and of romantic Histories of the Jewish People. We are accustomed now to hear Abraham spoken of as a powerful Bedouin sheykh, and Isaiah described as a statesman who adopted a policy in opposition to the party of the Egyptian alliance. We are familiar with the Korahite guild of Temple-musicians, and the royal body-guard of Philistine and Carian mercenaries. We picture the Anakim as the remnants of a tall race of Palestinian aborigines, and are prepared with a theory as to the precise skirmish celebrated in any given lyric of the Psalter. Our artists take pains to depict the exact kind of saw which was probably used in the carpenter's shop at Nazareth, and to indicate the particular breed of the ass which the Holy Family may be supposed to have made use of in their flight into Egypt.

In all this there is much that is good and helpful. It is a great gain to have come to think of the persons of the Bible narratives as men and women, with warm blood and living interests, moving amid the actual affairs of everyday life in this world of ours, having the virtues and the ignorances, the habits and the prejudices of their age and country; and not as lay-figures serving only to sustain gracefully a conventional drapery of pious platitudes. It is certainly an

advantage to have realized that the revelations made by God to His people in times past, were not addressed to an abstract humanity, but were made to men as they then were, and that (speaking generally) they were given for the purpose of their guidance amid the perplexities of their own consciences and under the actual conditions of their own conduct, and that it is for that very reason—viz. that their appeal was made to real, living and breathing men and women—that their lessons are profitable for all time. But it is surely worthy of thoughtful consideration whether, in adopting the modern scientific and realistic methods of Scriptural exegesis, we have done well to discard, as completely as most of us have done, the ancient methods. Is it so clear that our failure to perceive the typical significance of the Old Testament generally is not due to our own blindness—to the fact that we, in a materialistic age, accustomed to look chiefly at the outer aspect of facts, are unable to discern also the hidden spiritual meaning, which nevertheless is there? A few modern writers, indeed (such as those named at the head of this article), have attempted to preserve the older methods, but they are in a small minority, and their exposition is received by most persons, if not with scorn, at least with a half-amused incredulity. It is felt to be out of harmony with the spirit of the age.

‘The system of exegesis we particularly demur to,’ say Messrs. Jennings and Lowe in the *Prolegomena* to their work on the Psalms, ‘is that espoused by the Christian Fathers, who, with two or three exceptions, were disqualified as exegetes, not merely by the uncritical character of their age, but by absolute ignorance of the language in which the Psalms were written. It is commonly known as “mystical exposition,” and is the system adopted throughout in Dr. Neale’s *Commentary* and viewed with favour in that of Bp. Wordsworth. . . . Surely in days when criticism has so vehemently asserted its sway, and so definitely shifted the point of view from which we regard the Old Testament, such a method of treatment is at least dangerous. Would anything be more likely to upset the faith of a critical student in the Messianic character of the Psalter than to lead him to believe that it depended upon, or necessarily involved, a system which common sense abhors?’¹

Now it surely ought to startle us to be told that ‘the system of exegesis . . . espoused by the Christian Fathers’ was one ‘which common sense abhors.’ No doubt we are accustomed to the comfortable reflexion that we are the people, and that wisdom will die with us, but it is a little rash to assert also that wisdom was born with us. Men of former

¹ *Prolegomena*, chap. iv. p. xxxii.

ages had understanding as well as we, and on the whole seem even to have been hardly inferior to us. We have, doubtless, learned many things of which they were ignorant, but it seems somewhat presumptuous to reject offhand their whole method of studying the sacred writings. No doubt, to many persons at the present day, patristic authority, if it is to have any great weight, requires to be supported by considerations which appeal to the reason, but at least it ought to be recognized as affording some *prima facie* ground for further inquiry. It ought to be difficult for anyone who believes in the Divine mission, and the Divine guidance of the Church, to acquiesce without hesitation in the view that till quite recent times her greatest saints and teachers were, with few exceptions, under a complete delusion as to the sense of Holy Scripture: that they not only made mistakes as to the inner meaning of the sacred writings, but that they made a great fundamental blunder in supposing them *to have any inner meaning at all*. Let us remember that we find the principle of mystical interpretation recognized, not only in one school, or at one time, but throughout the Church, and during successive periods. Earlier and later Fathers concur in this. We find such interpretations not only in Origen and Clement of Alexandria, but in Clement of Rome, in Justin Martyr, and in Irenæus. The method was that of Jerome and Augustine no less than of the author of the so-called Epistle of Barnabas. No doubt some great Christian teachers used it sparingly, or not at all. No doubt it was developed in some schools more than in others. But it cannot be denied that, broadly speaking, the principle of Mystical Interpretation was universally recognized as valid until modern times. To say the least, a method sanctioned by such authority demands serious and respectful attention.

Nor can we reject the method, as some would do, on the plea that it is merely a survival of Jewish exegesis.¹ It is certainly true that the Jews did interpret their Scriptures mystically from very early times. But to say that a method is Jewish does not prove it to be false. The Jews in seeking for a mystical sense in Scripture may have evinced a truer apprehension of its spirit than some of us who disdain such a search. And besides, the very fact that the Jewish mind was

¹ Dr. Ginsburg, in his essay on the Kabbalah, says: 'Nicholas de Lyra, the celebrated commentator and forerunner of the Reformation, . . . distinctly espouses the Jewish four modes of interpretation, which he describes in the following couplet,' &c. It is hardly necessary to say that the four modes of the couplet in question (for which see below, p. 33), whether founded upon Jewish ideas or not, were long anterior to Lyra.

so ready to allegorize may serve to explain the presence of allegories in writings intended for their use. Probably if the Apocalypse had been written by an inspired Englishman, and addressed primarily to modern readers, the mystery of the name of the Beast would not have been indicated by the number 666. To the persons who were its first readers, the symbolism adopted by the Jewish author would not appear at all surprising or unusual. Indeed the Jewish tendency to allegory alone explains the admission into the canon of such Psalms as the xlv. and lxxii.¹ Modern critics, who triumphantly demonstrate to their own satisfaction that the former relates solely to the marriage of Joram and Athaliah, and the latter to the reign of Solomon, forget that, in their place in the Psalter, *i.e.* in the Anthem Book of the Temple services, they must always have had a deeper spiritual significance. But the Jewish tendency we are discussing at once explains how poems, which may at first have had only a secular reference, came (perhaps in a slightly altered form) to be used as acts of profound devotion, and as expressing the highest anticipations of the glories of the future Messianic kingdom.

But, whatever the origin of the system may be, we who are Christians are estopped from using this as an argument against it, for the simple reason that the Old Testament is again and again interpreted mystically in the New. Few persons, indeed, realize the extent to which this is the case. But it is not too much to say that a recognition of the fact will at once give the clue to the greater part of the difficulties which beset the use of the older Scriptures by the Apostles and Evangelists.

Our Blessed Lord Himself asserted that Moses wrote of Him,² and that the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms (*sc.* the three great sections of the Jewish Scriptures), were all to be interpreted as referring to Himself.³ We read that he opened the mind of His disciples that they might understand the Scriptures,⁴ implying that their meaning was not wholly such as lay upon the surface. He rebuked those who trusted in the letter of the Scriptures, and who thought that in them they had eternal life, pointing out that their true function was to testify of Him.⁵ He repeatedly declared that all that was

¹ The case of the Song of Songs might also perhaps be cited, although some critics (*e.g.* Dr. Delitzsch) have contended that its presence in the canon can be accounted for without recourse to allegory.

² S. John v. 46.

³ S. Luke xxiv. 44.

⁴ S. Luke xxiv. 45.

⁵ S. John v. 39. This is the sense of the passage, whether *ἑρμηνεύειν* be taken as an indicative or an imperative.

written must be accomplished, *sc.* that it looked forward to a future fulfilment.

Thus our Lord quoted the prophetic doom of those to whom Isaiah was sent, as finding a fresh fulfilment in the persons of those who listened unmoved to His own parables: 'And in them is fulfilled (*ἀναπληροῦται*) the prophecy of Esaias, which saith, By hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand,' &c.¹ And He said significantly to the Pharisees and Scribes, 'Ye hypocrites, well did Esaias prophesy *of you*, saying, This people draweth nigh unto Me with their mouth, and honoureth Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me.'² In speaking of the traitor Judas, our Saviour quoted the forty-first Psalm: 'I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen: but that *the Scripture may be fulfilled*, He that eateth bread with Me, hath lift up his heel against Me.'³ There seems to be no reason to doubt the authenticity of the inscription which refers this Psalm to David, or the accuracy of the interpretation which assigns it primary reference to the treachery of Ahithophel. Any attempt to make out that the Psalm was originally and exclusively prophetic of the crime of Judas would be beset with insuperable difficulties. But, if so, our Lord must have quoted it as having a *secondary* application to His own circumstances.⁴

In the same way our Lord appropriated to Himself types from the *historical portions* of the Old Testament. The incident of Jonah's deliverance from the sea monster was a type of His resurrection.⁵ The water from the rock in the wilderness was a type of His gift of the Holy Spirit.⁶

When we turn to the use of the Old Testament by the Apostles and Evangelists, we find a continued recognition of a mystical sense. S. Matthew quotes in his first two chapters, not only the direct prophecy of Micah as to the birthplace of the coming Christ,⁷ and Isaiah's prophecy of Immanuel (which many think had both a primary and a secondary fulfilment),⁸ but he also applies to our Lord a passage unquestionably referring in the first instance to the Jewish nation: 'Out of Egypt have I called My Son.'⁹ And, in connexion with the slaughter of the Innocents, he quotes as being 'fulfilled' the passage in which Rachel is represented as wailing over the Chaldean captivity.¹⁰ And the principles thus suggested are carried

¹ S. Matt. xiii. 14.

² S. Matt. xv. 7, 8.

³ S. John xiii. 18.

⁴ Cf. Dr. Westcott's *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, p. 410.

⁵ S. Matt. xii. 40.

⁶ S. John vii. 37 *sqq.*

⁷ Mic. v. 2; S. Matt. ii. 6.

⁸ Isa. vii. 14; S. Matt. i. 23; cf. Westcott's *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, pp. 411 and 29, *note*.

⁹ Hosea xi. 1; S. Matt. ii. 15.

¹⁰ Jerem. xxxi. 15; S. Matt. ii. 17, 18. The reference in S. Matt. ii.

throughout the New Testament. S. Paul finds a parabolic significance in the story of Jacob and Esau (Rom. ix.); and in that of Hagar and Sarah (Gal. iv. 21 *sqq.*); in the history of the Wanderings (1 Cor. x.); in the veil of Moses (2 Cor. iii. 14); in the law of muzzling oxen (1 Cor. ix. 8-10; 1 Tim. v. 18). He refers to the institution of marriage as a great mystery, having reference to Christ and the Church (Ephes. v. 22-32). He affirms that 'whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning,' in connexion with the appropriation of Psalm lxix. 9 to Christ (Rom. xv. 3, 4).

The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews declares that the law had only 'a shadow of the good things to come, and not the very image of the things' (x. 1). And he not only works out very fully the typical character of some parts of the Jewish ritual, but indicates that all of it has such a character (cf. ix. 5, xiii. 11-12). And he treats the history as significant, no less than the ritual. The case of Melchizedek in particular he deals with at length, following the Psalmist in recognizing in him a type of the Messiah.¹

S. Peter expressly declares that the prophets were aware that it was not to themselves, but to a future Church, that their prophecies in their fulness applied.² And he treats the deliverance of Noah 'through water' as typical of the Christian sacrament of Baptism.³

S. John, in the Apocalypse, takes up the details of the Old Testament narratives, and applies them mystically, as a matter of course. He speaks thus of the tree of life (ii. 7); of the hidden manna (ii. 17); of Jezebel (ii. 20). He describes the fall of the mystical Babylon in the very words which Isaiah had used of the historic city (xiv. 8; cf. Isa. xxi. 9). He speaks of a 'great city, which spiritually is called Sodom and Egypt, where also our Lord was crucified' (xi. 8).

Here and there we find the histories of the Old Testament referred to in the New as instructive, in their literal sense,⁴ but it is not too much to say that this is not the most useful treatment of them. If we study the quotations in the New Testament as a whole, it is difficult to resist the conclusion

23, to that 'which was spoken by the prophets, that He should be called a Nazarene,' is not easily, as is well known, assigned to any definite passage in the Old Testament. Dr. Westcott regards it as 'a deduction from prophetic language,' and refers to Psalm xxii. 6, and Isa. liii. 3. See *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, pp. 29, 30, *note*.

¹ Psalm cx. 4; Heb. vii.

² 1 S. Pet. i. 10-12.

³ 1 S. Pet. iii. 21, ὁ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀντίτυπον τοῦ σώζειν βάπτισμα.

⁴ E.g. that of Elijah (S. Jas. v. 17; Rom. xi. 2, 5); of Job (S. Jas. v. 11); of Noah, Lot, &c. (2 S. Pet. ii. 5 *sqq.*).

that the Scriptures must have a much wider and deeper application than that which lies upon the surface.

It has been said, however,¹ This is all very well so long as we have an inspired commentary on the sacred text, but we cannot safely venture on such mystical expositions, except where we have this guidance. The fact is that thoughtful students of Holy Scripture feel the want of some intelligible principle, upon which to base such interpretations. They accept, indeed, a few types, because the resemblance between these and their antitypes is so clear and so familiar, that they can hardly help seeing it. But they cannot see any *reason* for a general adoption of the mystical method, and in the absence of such a reason, they shrink from going further. And they would probably urge that the results of this system of exegesis have not been satisfactory. They have been trivial and fanciful, and, not seldom, they have exhibited a disregard of the literal sense: not only, that is to say, an absence of critical knowledge and judgment, but also a tendency to play fast and loose with the Bible narratives, as records of actual facts. On all these grounds, they would say, they distrust the method, and prefer to adhere to the safer and more intelligible principles of the modern critical school.

What, in short, is wanted, is to find the basis of a *reasonable* mystical exegesis. If this could be done, the two schools could be reconciled. Suppose we concede unreservedly, as Mr. Cheyne would have us do,² 'the full supremacy of the grammar and the lexicon,' so far as the literal interpretation of the Bible is concerned, may it not be possible to find some rational foundation for a deeper spiritual meaning, which may not only be entirely free from anything like a contradiction of the literal sense, but may be quite in harmony with the modern scientific spirit? If so we shall be able to say to the literal and mystical interpreters: 'Sirs, ye are brethren: why do ye wrong one to another?' No doubt, interpretations based on ignorance must be given up. No doubt, vagaries of a fanciful allegorism cannot be defended. But the possession of such a principle as we have suggested would enable us to feel that we are treading on firm ground whether in rejecting or accepting interpretations offered to us. We may perhaps be led to see that the instinct of the patristic writers often led them to a right conclusion, though they reached it by a different road from ours. And we ourselves may possibly be led to discern a deeper sense in passages of Holy Scripture

¹ E.g. by J. A. Ernesti, *Elements of Bibl. Criticism*.

² *The Prophecies of Isaiah*, vol. ii. p. 172.

in which we had previously seen nothing but the more obvious and superficial meaning of the words.

We confess to thinking that it would be hopeless to attempt to justify, on any rational grounds of sober criticism, the method adopted by Drs. Neale and Littledale in their Commentary on the Psalms. It is, however, only fair to remember that on the very front and forehead of the work, in the opening pages of the Preface, Dr. Neale warns his readers that the Commentary '*is not in the slightest degree critical*' (vol. i. p. viii); he anticipates 'that very much in the following pages will appear beyond measure wild and unreal to persons who are not used to primitive and mediæval commentators. To those who are, he would merely state that *not one single mystical interpretation throughout the present Commentary is original*' (*ibid.*). Intended as it is to be a vast repertory of the mystical meanings to be found in mediæval commentators, it would be obviously unjust to measure it by a standard at which it never aimed, or to treat it as the outcome of independent and original exegesis. We therefore content ourselves with a general protest against the extraordinary vagaries which are occasionally met with in this Commentary, not without a certain amount of injury and discredit to mystical interpretation, rightly understood.

On the other hand, the works of Mr. Jukes commend themselves to the mind by their own intrinsic value and suggestiveness. He is indeed guided (as we shall see hereafter) by principles which have no doubt kept him from extravagance. But even if we could not discern these principles, it might fairly be urged that works such as *The Types of Genesis*, or *The Mystery of the Kingdom*, like Origen's Homilies on Joshua (to compare an example from an ancient writer), carry with them the conviction that they cannot be all due to fancy. The very applicability of the narrative to such detailed typical interpretation, is an argument that it must be meant to be typical. If satisfactory results were yielded in one or two cases only, we might put them down to chance, just as the fact of a key fitting a simple lock does not prove that it was made for it. But the application is so deep and intricate, that it is like a key which fits a very complicated lock, where the idea of chance is precluded.¹ Without pretending to endorse every one of Mr. Jukes's interpretations, we cannot resist the conclusion that he is using a right method.

¹ This illustration is used by Mr. Jukes, *Types of Genesis*, Preface, p. xv.

The systematization of the modes of interpretation used by the early Christian Fathers, was due to Origen. He recognized, as is well known, a triple sense in Scripture corresponding to the threefold nature of man. Thus, in an oft-quoted passage of his treatise *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, he says:—

‘It behoves us to transcribe the meaning of the Holy Scriptures into our souls in a threefold way: in order that the more simple may be edified by the flesh (as we may call it) of the Scripture, for this we name the obvious (literal) acceptance; and again, that he who has attained to a certain height may be edified by the soul of it, so to speak; but that the man who is perfect and resembles those spoken of by the Apostle (“Howbeit we speak wisdom among the perfect, yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, who are coming to nought, but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the worlds unto our glory”), that such may be edified out of the spiritual law which has a shadow of the good things to come. For as man consists of body, soul, and spirit, so does the Scripture, which has been given by a Divine dispensation for the salvation of men.’¹

Elsewhere Origen describes the three senses by the terms ‘historical,’ ‘moral,’ and ‘mystical.’² By the ‘moral’ sense (corresponding to the *ψυχῇ*) he appears to have understood a mystical significance having reference to the individual spiritual life.³ The ‘spiritual’ sense he explained as referring to the

¹ Book IV. § 11, p. 168. Origen’s language bears a remarkable resemblance to that of the Jewish Kabbalah: ‘What is under the garment of the Law? There is the garment which everyone can see, and there are foolish people who, when they see a well-dressed man, think of nothing more worthy than this beautiful garment, and take it for the body, whilst the worth of the body itself consists in the soul. The Law, too, has a body: this is the commandments, which are called the body of the Law. This body is clothed in garments which are the ordinary narratives. The fools of this world look at nothing else but this garment, which consists of the narratives in the Law; they do not know any more, and do not understand what is beneath this garment. But those who have more understanding do not look at the garment but at the body beneath it (*i.e.* the moral); whilst the wisest, the servants of the Heavenly King, those who dwell at Mount Sinai, look at nothing else but the soul (*i.e.* the secret doctrine), which is the root of all the real Law, and these are destined in the world to come to behold the *Soul of this Soul* (*i.e.* the Deity) which breathes in the Law.—*Sohar*, iii. 152 a, cited by Ginsburg, *The Kabbalah*, p. 47.

² See Homily V. on Leviticus, § 5, p. 209.

³ See, for example, Homily I. on Exodus, § 4, p. 131, where (on chap. i. 6-7) he first explains the increase of the children of Israel after the death of Joseph of the increase of the Christian Church after ‘our Joseph’ had tasted death for every man; and then he adds: ‘Sed et *moralet* in his non omittamus locum. *Ædificat enim animas auditorum. Igitur et in te si moriatur Joseph, id est si mortificationem Christi in corpore tuo suscipias, et mortifices membra tua peccato, tunc in te multiplicabuntur filii Israel. Filii Israel sensus boni et spiritales accipiuntur,*’ &c. &c.

spiritual world. But this may be understood either of the history of the Church on earth, or of the heavenly world of spiritual existences. To the former Origen applied the term 'allegory' (when employed in a strict sense), and to the latter the term *ἀναγωγή*.¹ Origen's use of terms is somewhat loose; but, however he described his methods, there can be no doubt that he practically recognized the fourfold system of interpretation, which was afterwards commonly adopted.²

We may describe the four senses thus:—

(1) Literal or Historical: The primary meaning of the passage, such as modern historical criticism recognizes.

(2) Allegorical: In which the narratives, &c., of the Old Testament are regarded as representing the history of Christ and of the Christian Church.

(3) Moral or Tropological³: In which the analogy is traced between these narratives, &c., and the spiritual history of each individual Christian soul. Man is regarded as a microcosm, in which the life of the Church is reproduced on a smaller scale.

(4) Anagogical: Referring to the relations of one dispensation to another, and so *leading up* to the life of the Church triumphant in Heaven.

¹ Thus, on S. Luke iii. 13, Origen applies the command to the publicans, to exact no more than was appointed them, κατ' ἀναγωγήν to evil spirits, whom he conceives as awaiting our exit from this world, and watching to see if they can claim to 'have anything in us.' Cf. S. John xiv. 30.

² Origen frequently gives a twofold or threefold interpretation of a passage without any explicit description of the senses recognized. Thus he explains the fall of Jericho at the sound of the priests' trumpets and the shout of the people, first of the final subversion of this world, when the true Joshua shall descend from heaven with the voice of the Archangel and the trump of God. But in the next homily he takes up the same subject again and expounds it of the fall of the powers of the world before the preaching of the Apostles and Evangelists, &c., and then once more refers it to the victory over the world in the individual soul: 'Sed et unusquisque nostrum debet in semetipso ista complere. Habes in te Jesum ducem per fidem, fac tibi tubas ductiles, si sacerdos es; imo quia sacerdos es (gens enim regalis effectus es et sacerdotium sanctum: de te enim scriptum est) fac tibi tubas ductiles ex Scripturis sanctis, inde duc sensus, inde sermones, propterea enim tubæ ductiles appellantur. In ipsis cane, id est in psalmis et hymnis, in canticis spiritalibus cane, in prophetis sacramentis, in mysteriis legis, in apostolicis dogmatibus cane; . . . si etiam jubilationis concentum de temetipso exigas, id est cogitationum et sensuum tuorum populus qui intra te est, concordem semper et consonam proferat vocem . . . si hæc intra te jam consonant et concordant, vocem jubilationis emitte, quoniam tibi destructus et dejectus est mundus.'—Homilies on Joshua, vi. and vii. pp. 411-412.

³ From *τρόπος*, character. Some think, however, that the *τροπολογία* was so called from the use of tropes: e.g. Davidson, *Sacred Hermeneutics*, p. 103.

S. Thomas Aquinas gives the following explanation :—

‘The Author of Holy Scripture is God, in whose power it is, not only to adjust words to a meaning (which even man can do), but also things themselves. And therefore, while in all sciences words have meaning, that science’ [sc. theology] ‘has this peculiarity that the things themselves meant by the words also signify somewhat. Therefore, that first signification by which words signify things belongs to the first sense, which is the *Historical or Literal sense*. But that signification by which the things signified by the words again signify other things is called the *Spiritual sense*, which is founded upon the Literal, and presupposes it ; but this Spiritual sense has a threefold division. As the Apostle says (Heb. vii.) the ancient law is a figure of the new law, and the new law itself, as Dionysius says, is a figure of the future glory. Also in the new law the things which are transacted in the Person of our Head are types (*signa*) of what we ought to do. In so far, therefore, as those things which are of the old law signify those which are of the new is the *Allegorical sense*. But in so far as the things which are done in the Person of Christ, or in relation to the things which typify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, is the *Moral sense* ; but according as they signify the things which belong to eternal glory is the *Anagogical sense*.’¹

The four senses are given in the doggrel lines :—

‘Littera gesta docet ; quid credas, Allegoria ;
Moralis quid agas ; quo tendas, Anagogia.’²

An example will make them clear. Durandus says :—

‘Jerusalem is understood *historically* of that earthly city whither pilgrims journey ; *allegorically*, of the Church militant ; *tropologically*, of every faithful soul ; *anagogically*, of the celestial Jerusalem, which is our country.’³

Or again, Manna may be taken *literally*, for the food miraculously given to the Israelites in the wilderness ; *allegorically*, for the Blessed Sacrament of the Eucharist⁴ ; *tropologically*, for the spiritual sustenance of the soul day by day through the power of the indwelling Spirit of God ; and *anagogically*, for the food of blessed souls in heaven—the Beatific Vision and perfected union with Christ.⁵

It is worth while to notice the exact scope of the ‘Moral’ interpretation, which is sometimes misunderstood. The ‘Moral’

¹ *Summa*, Pt. I. qu. i, art. x.

² Nicolaus de Lyra, *Prolog. I. in Sacra. Script.*

³ Quoted by Neale and Littledale, *Psalms*, vol. i. p. 429. Cf. Nicolaus de Lyra, who twice gives the same illustration in his Prologues to the Old Testament.

⁴ Cf. St. John vi. 31–35.

⁵ Rev. ii. 17. Cf. Abp. Trench on the Epp. to the Seven Churches, pp. 127–129.

sense,' it is said, gives 'quid agas'—what you are to do, what lesson to learn, or help to derive, in personal character. This is in a manner true, but it is misleading; for the lessons belonging to the Moral sense are *not the practical lessons to be drawn from the literal narrative*. These belong to the Historical sense. The teaching of the Moral sense is that derived from a figurative treatment of the passage, as affording a type of the Christian soul. For example, S. Gregory the Great, in the prefatory 'Epistle to Leander' prefixed to his *Morals on the Book of Job*, writes:—

'It is to be understood that we go through some passages in an historical exposition; some we examine in an allegorical sense, tracing out the typical meaning; others again we discuss, using only the methods of moral teaching allegorically conveyed (*per sola allegorice moralitatis instrumenta discutimus*). But there are a few which we search out in a threefold manner, examining them more carefully by all three methods at once.' (§ 3.)

Accordingly, under Chapter i. vv. 1-14, S. Gregory first gives the literal sense, *with its practical lessons*: pointing out, for example, how an abundance of riches is wont to draw the mind from the fear and service of God, as we are taught by the parable of the Sower; and how the holiness of Job, therefore, shines out with especial brightness in that, in spite of the greatness of his wealth, and its accompanying cares, he yet served God continually; and how his patience under the loss of his riches showed that his heart was not set on them.

Then, in the Allegorical sense, he considers Job as representing our Blessed Lord. He takes his name to mean 'grieving,' and so as indicating the Man of Sorrows. Job dwelt in the land of Uz (signifying, according to Gregory, 'a counsellor'), and so our Lord rules in the hearts of a people of wise counsels. He had seven sons, the number indicating perfection. They represent the twelve Apostles; for $7 = 12$ if we multiply three and four, its component parts. And the Apostles were twelve in number, because chosen to proclaim the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in the four quarters of the world. The three daughters represent the weaker multitudes of the faithful who yet hold with constancy the faith of the Holy Trinity; or, in another view, three orders of the faithful, (1) Pastors (whom S. Gregory connects with Noah), (2) the continent (Daniel), (3) the married (Job).

Lastly, introducing the Moral sense, S. Gregory proceeds:—

'Now because at the very outset of our exposition we said that our Lord is so set forth in the person of Blessed Job, that we may

regard both the Head and the Body to be signified by him, that is both Christ and the Church; and we afterwards showed in what manner our Head may be believed to be represented; now let us point out how His Body (which we constitute) is set forth:¹ so that since we have heard from the historical narrative somewhat to admire, and have learned from the Head somewhat to believe, we may now consider in respect of the Body somewhat to maintain in our lives.'

Hence on verse 1, he says:—

'If Job means "grieving" and Uz "a counsellor," every elect person is not unfittingly typified by either name. For, without doubt he dwells in a mind of good counsel, who hastens grieving from present things to things eternal.'

On verse 2, he says:—

'Seven sons are indeed born to us when the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arise in us by the conception of good thought' (quoting Isaiah xi. 2).

Of the three daughters, he says:—

'But without doubt, the seven sons have in us three sisters in that whatsoever manly thing these virtuous feelings effect, they unite to faith, hope, and charity. And indeed, the seven sons never attain to the perfection of the number ten unless all that they do is done in faith, hope, and charity.'

In verse 3, S. Gregory interprets Job's substance of our good works. The 7,000 sheep represent innocent thoughts fed in our breasts in a perfect purity of heart. The 3,000 camels are possessed by us, if all that is high and crooked in us is subdued to the rule of Faith, and bowed down in humility beneath the knowledge of the Blessed Trinity. Nothing, it will be seen, could be further removed from a mere extraction of practical lessons from the historical narrative.

The above example will illustrate sufficiently the general scope of the method of Mystical Interpretation, as commonly applied. And probably, too, it will be felt to exhibit its weakness. The interpretations appear to be forced and far-fetched, as well as trivial. It seems difficult to suppose that we are really meant to gather teaching about the subduing of what is crooked in us, and the knowledge of the Blessed Trinity, from the mention of Job's 3,000 camels. But a still more important question is raised when we ask how far a true narrative of actual occurrences can be reasonably regarded as typical.

¹ In view of S. Gregory's practice this does not contradict the statement that types of the Church, *as a whole*, belong to the Allegorical sense, the Moral, or Tropological, applying to Christians as individuals.

In the case of the Book of Job, indeed, the narrative is considered by many authorities to be merely *founded* on fact, if not actually fictitious, so that it is possible to suppose the details to have been accommodated to a mystical meaning. But this explanation will not hold generally unless we are prepared to resolve the whole of the historical portions of the Old Testament into a series of instructive myths. Origen, as is well known, affirmed that—

‘There are some passages of Scripture which do not possess the literal sense (τὸ σαματικόν) at all . . . so that in these cases, only the soul and spirit (τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα) as we call them, of the Scripture are to be sought for.’¹

Dr. Westcott remarks that—

‘By this he evidently means that certain passages taken literally do not *instruct* us, for no one can deny that they have a meaning. They may then be either untrue morally or untrue historically; they may contain in the letter hurtful patterns, or symbolic narratives.’²

¹ Περὶ ἀρχῶν, iv. 12, p. 169. Cf. Homily II. on Genesis, § 6.

² *Introd. to the Study of the Gospels*, p. 443. Many passages might be quoted in elucidation of this view of Origen's meaning. Thus in the context of the extract just given from the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, after referring to the Waterpots at Cana as signifying the word of the Scriptures, by which those who are ‘Jews inwardly’ are purified, he says: ‘These contain in some cases two firkins—that is to say, the Psychic and Spiritual senses (if I may so call them); but sometimes three firkins, when, in addition to the aforesaid, certain passages have also the Literal sense *in an edifying form*’ (τὸ σαματικὸν οἰκοδομησάι δυνάμενον) (iv. 12, p. 169). On the other hand, he often seems to imply that a particular passage is not to be regarded as historically true: as, for instance, when he urges the impossibility of the book Deuteronomy being literally written upon the stones of the altar which Joshua set up in Mount Ebal (Josh. viii. 32), and affirms that those who read the statement literally have yet ‘the veil upon their hearts’ (Homily IX. on Joshua, § 4, pp. 419–420). What, however, Origen is chiefly concerned to do, is to maintain the spiritual sense as more ‘worthy of the pen of the Holy Spirit.’ It is for this reason that he so constantly calls attention to the unprofitableness, insignificance, or difficulty of the literal sense. Thus in Homily VII. on Leviticus, § 5 (p. 226) he says: ‘If indeed we attend solely to the letter, and understand the things which are written in the law in the sense which commends itself to the Jews, or to the common people, I blush to affirm and confess that God has given such laws. For the laws of men will, in that case, appear to be more refined, and more reasonable—for example, those of the Romans, or the Athenians, or the Lacedæmonians.’ Dr. Ginsburg has pointed out that this is almost exactly the same as the language of the Kabbalah: ‘Woe be to the son of man who says that the *Tora* (Pentateuch) contains common sayings and ordinary narratives. For if this were the case, we might in the present day compose a code of doctrines from profane writings which should excite greater respect. If the Law contains ordinary matter, then there are nobler sentiments in profane codes. Let us go and make a selection from them and we shall

Dr. Westcott goes on to contend that 'Origen's errors lie rather in the application of his theory, than in the theory itself.'¹ But it is obvious that unless used with great caution such a principle would lead to a general weakening of belief in the historical truth of the Bible-narratives. And, on the other hand, if we accept these as literally true, in what way can we explain their relation to the spiritual meaning? What connexion can there be between a history of hard facts belonging to the real world of actual human life, and a set of ecclesiastical doctrines which appear to be read into them? If we could answer this question, we should probably be able to deal with the other difficulty to which we have referred. If we could get at a reasonable principle on which Mystical Interpretation could be based, we could better judge whether any given piece of patristic exegesis conformed to it or not. Some interpretations we might be able confidently to reject as unwarranted and fanciful, and we might see reasons for others which, apart from such a principle, we should have felt bound to put aside.

S. Thomas Aquinas, as we have seen, took refuge in the omnipotence of God:—'The Author of Holy Scripture is God, in whose power it is, not only to adjust *words* to a meaning (which even man can do), but also things themselves.'² This no doubt would be a sufficient explanation, but we have learned at the present day not to invoke the theory of special Divine interposition, except in cases where the cause appears to be adequate. Most of us would find it difficult to believe with Mr. Keble that it was ordered by special providence that the number of Abraham's household should be exactly 318 persons, with 'an eye to the benefit and consolation which the Church should long after receive on recognizing, as it

be able to compile a far superior code. But every word of the Law has a sublime sense and a heavenly mystery.' (*Sohar*, iii. 152 a, quoted by Ginsburg, *Kabbalah*, pp. 45-47.)

Yet even when Origen speaks most disparagingly of the letter of Scripture, he often leaves it uncertain whether or not he regards the passage under discussion as historically true. And he expressly recognizes the literal sense as having a distinct value. This, he says, is proved by 'the multitude of those who have frankly and simply believed' by means of it.

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 446. Mr. Keble, in *Tract LXXXIX.*, affirms that Origen had in truth a profound veneration for the letter, and the literal meaning, as is shown by his labours on the text and his devout expressions with regard to it. If he ever seemed to disparage the letter, Mr. Keble thinks it must have been only *in comparison* (pp. 44, 45, 61 *sqq.*).

² See above (p. 33); cf. N. de Lyra (First Prologue), who adopts S. Thomas's words.

were, her Saviour's cypher, in the account of the one holy family triumphantly warring against the powers of the world.'¹ Of course it is quite *possible* that God should have caused this household to be 318 in number, because He foreknew that the Greek letters, by which this number would be represented in a future translation of the narrative, would be thought by some persons to have a hidden reference to our Saviour. But for our own part, we can only say that such a conception of God's purposes does not seem to us to be a worthy one, or to be in accordance with what we know of His mode of dealing with men. There may be no harm in people amusing themselves with such ingenious fancies, if they like; but it does not follow that the course of the world in the days of Abraham was directed with a view to their doing so. Yet, if it was not, the interpretation becomes a mere fantastic conceit. And, indeed, we can hardly suppose in any case that the history of peoples or of individuals was modified merely in order to furnish types of other things for our edification. 'Men,' as Messrs. Jennings and Lowe say, 'are not appointed by God to lead good or bad lives in order that the life of Christ or Judas may be symbolized.' We must evidently take a larger and deeper view of the whole question if we are to rest the Mystical Interpretation of the Bible upon a truly rational basis.

I. And, first, we must make clear our position as to the literal sense.

(1) While recognizing to the full the dangers of allegorizing too freely, we may frankly admit that some narratives *may* be symbolical in their primary intention. Take, for example, the account of the Fall. Many perfectly orthodox writers have held that while this represents a real event, it is clothed in the language of allegory. Reflexion shows us that there must have been a first sin; and all experience confirms the profound psychological and spiritual truth of the revelation which teaches us that this had its root in a disbelief in God's love and God's truth; that it was due to the solicitations of a tempter; that it consisted in choosing the creature rather than the Creator; that it involved the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; and that its consequences were

¹ *Tract LXXXIX*, p. 21. The reference is to the well-known interpretation in the 'Epistle of S. Barnabas' which was adopted by many subsequent writers. The author of that Epistle suggests that in the 300, represented by the Greek letter τ, we are to recognise the cross, and in the ι (for 10) and the η (for 8) the first two letters of the name 'Ιησοῦς.

the loss of original righteousness, the spiritual death of the sinner, and the transmission of a corrupt and distorted nature to his descendants. But it is consistent with all this, and with the profoundest reverence for the narrative which teaches it, and with the firmest conviction of its inspiration, to hold that Paradise may have been a *condition*, rather than a *place*; that the 'tree of life in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,' were not actual material trees, nor the serpent one of a real zoological species. Thus Bishop Martensen remarks:—

'In the Mosaic account of the fall of man (Gen. iii.) we meet with a combination of history and sacred symbolism, a figurative representation of an actual event. The fact of the Fall is there represented by a consciousness to which both Paradise and the Fall are transcendental and *pre-historic*; for which reason there can be no immediate knowledge of it, but only a mediate and an allegorical one, as in a glass darkly.'¹

Origen took this position strongly against Celsus, with regard to the creation of woman. He complains that Celsus refers to the account of the formation of Eve 'without quoting the exact words which would convince the hearer that they are spoken figuratively' (*μετὰ τροπολογίας*).² Josephus says, 'Our legislator speaks some things wisely but enigmatically, and others under a decent allegory.' And he appears to reckon the account of Paradise, &c., as a case of the latter.³

(2) Even if we shrink from supposing *narratives* of this kind to be symbolical in their expression, we can hardly fail to

¹ *Christian Dogmatics* (Engl. translation), p. 155.

² *Contra Celsum*, lib. iv. § 37, p. 530.

³ *Antiquities*, I. i. 2, cf. Whiston's note. Compare Bishop Temple:— 'The writer of Genesis . . . takes men—and he could not but take men as he sees them—with their sinful nature, with their moral and spiritual capacity, with their relations of sex, with their relations of family. He has to teach the essential supremacy of man among creatures, the subordination in position, but equality in nature, of woman to man, the original declension of man's will from the divine path, the dim and distant but sure hope of man's restoration. These are not, and cannot be, lessons of science. They are worked out into the allegory of the Garden of Eden. But in this allegory there is nothing whatever that crosses the path of science, nor is it for reasons of science that so many great Christian thinkers from the earliest age of the Church downwards have pronounced it an allegory. The spiritual truth contained in it is certainly the purpose for which it is told; and evolution such as science has rendered probable, had done its work in forming man such as he is before the narrative begins.' (*Bampton Lect.* pp. 184, 185.) Cf. Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* (Papias), Fragg. ix. x.; Dr. Quarry, *Genesis and its Authorship*, pp. 121 sq.; Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection* (Bohn's ed.), p. 171, note.

recognize, as already suggested,¹ the mystical character of many of the Psalms. It is quite in accordance with the genius of Eastern minds that lyrics originally penned for secular purposes should have been adapted for devotional use by giving them a mystical meaning.² In its place in the *Psalter*, the *primary* significance of such a Psalm (e.g.) as the forty-fifth must be taken to have a mystical reference to the Messiah and His union with His people.³ It may have been originally composed for a royal Jewish wedding. But this in no way disposes of its significance as *preserved for continued devotional use*. And the occurrence in it of expressions inapplicable to any mere earthly king do not, on the one hand, prove that the Psalm had no such original history—for they may have been introduced when it was adapted to the Temple services—and, on the other hand, they confirm the inference that, as so adapted, the spiritual sense is the primary one.

In such cases there should be no difficulty in reconciling the literalists and allegorists. Let the historical student investigate with all the helps he can procure, the occasion of writing and authorship of the Psalms, but let him remember that in their place in the Jewish Anthem-book, they can never have had a *merely* secular reference. Let the mystical interpreter, on the other hand, remember that the Psalms must each have had an individual history, and that much may be learned from inquiries which throw light upon this. Believers in inspiration will find no difficulty in recognizing that those who adapted them for devotional use were guided to express by their means the deep spiritual needs of the human soul, and the profound mysteries of the coming redemption. And in this view it will be seen that a calm and sober Mystical Interpretation of many of the Psalms (based upon a duly critical examination of the original text) is, not merely a perfectly reasonable, but *the only* reasonable interpretation. In their place in the canon, the symbolic meaning of these Psalms is the primary meaning.

(3) All 'Parables' admitted to be such, are of course to be interpreted spiritually as to their primary meaning. If they had any actual historical foundation, it was not for the sake of this that they were spoken. It is possible that the story of the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and

¹ See p. 26.
² Cf. Dr. Kitto's *Daily Bible Illustrations* : 'The Song of Songs.'
³ The Targum renders verse 2, 'Thy beauty, O King Messiah, is greater than that of the sons of men.'

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fell among thieves, may have been based upon a real occurrence, but there can be no doubt that our Lord intended us to recognize, in the Good Samaritan, Himself, and in the wounded man the sin-stricken humanity which He came to succour.¹

(4) A similar remark obviously applies to ordinances of directly Divine appointment. The ritual of the Levitical sacrifices, the Passover, the Jewish Festivals, the services of the Day of Atonement, the regulations of the Cities of Refuge, and the like, are clearly to be interpreted symbolically, in detail. The ordinances were of course intended to be carried out literally, but their meaning was spiritual and typical.

(5) A special class of instances where the symbolical meaning appears to be primary is to be found in the case of numbers. A careful examination of the way in which numbers were used by the Jews will, we think, suggest the inference that they frequently employed a definite number, where we should use an indefinite phrase: that is to say, that where we should speak of 'a few,' they said 'two'; where we should say 'all,' they said 'seven'; where we should say 'a great many,' they said 'forty.' Thus the widow of Zarephath tells Elijah: 'I have not a cake, but an handful of meal in a barrel, and a little oil in a cruse; and behold I am gathering *two sticks*, that I may go in and dress it for me and my son, that we may eat it and die.'² Thus Samson directs Delilah to weave 'the seven locks' of his head with the web.³ The use of the number forty is especially remarkable. Occasionally the expression 'forty years' seems to represent an exact period, as in the case of the Wanderings,⁴ and of the reign of David.⁵ But we find 'forty years' mentioned in so many places during the period of the Judges and the Early

¹ The injunction, 'Go and do thou likewise,' by which the personal application of the parable was enforced, derives greater impressiveness when the greatness of the example given is realized. And it is no objection to this view that those who first listened to the parable most likely understood only the lesson of kindness and sympathy which lies upon the surface of the story, however interpreted.

² 1 Kings xvii. 12. Compare our use of the phrase 'two or three.'

³ Judges xvi. 13.

⁴ The forty years are given with month and day in Deut. i. 3. Also two years are mentioned with month and day in Numb. x. 11, as the period of the first journey to Kadesh Barnea, and we have thirty-eight years mentioned in Deut. ii. 14, as the period of the subsequent wanderings until Kadesh was again reached.

⁵ 1 Kings ii. 11. 'And the days that David reigned over Israel were forty years: seven years reigned he in Hebron, and thirty and three years reigned he in Jerusalem.'

Monarchy, that we can hardly suppose the phrase was meant to be taken precisely. Thus:—

Under Othniel 'the land had rest'	40 years	(Judges iii. 11).
Under Ehud	" "	80 " (Judges iii. 30).
Under Deborah } and Barak }	" "	40 " (Judges v. 31).
Under Gideon	" "	40 " (Judges viii. 28).
The Philistine oppression lasted	40 "	(Judges xiii. 1).
Eli judged Israel	40 "	(1 Sam. iv. 18).
Saul reigned	40 "	(Acts xiii. 21).
David reigned	40 "	(which appears to be exact).
Solomon reigned	40 "	(1 Kings xi. 42).

It is practically impossible that all these periods can be exact, and looking at the way in which numbers are generally used in the Bible, it seems most likely that they were not intended to be so understood. Probably by saying 'the land had rest forty years,' the Jew meant very much what we might express by saying 'the land had rest for a generation.'¹

Now a tendency to employ definite numbers to express indefinite ideas, may have been either the cause or the effect of their association with a more elaborate symbolism. It is extremely probable that the Jews learned in Egypt to attach a mystical significance to numbers, and this may have led to their common use of them in a sense not exactly numerical. Or, on the other hand, if, owing to the poverty of language, definite numbers were used to express vague quantitative notions, it would be an easy transition to associate them with more definite ideas. In either case, when once it is recognized that the Jews were familiar with the symbolical use of numbers, we can understand how numbers originally connected with some real event, or involved in some particular way in the nature of things, would take on the symbolism suggested by this association. And, again, we can readily believe that in matters of directly Divine appointment, intended primarily for Jews, such numbers would be made use of as would convey

¹ The common explanation that the numbers are given as 'round numbers' is hardly adequate, for we do not find other round numbers (*e.g.*, twenty or thirty) occurring with anything like corresponding frequency. And the use of the number twenty seems to be not unconnected with that of forty. If the interpretation suggested above be correct, 'twenty years' would convey to the Jewish mind the notion of 'half a generation.' (Cf. Judges iv. 3, xv. 20; 1 Sam. vii. 2.) It will be observed that there is no question here of historical inaccuracy. The question is as to the idiom of the ancient Hebrew language. Cf. Prof. Robertson Smith, *The Prophets of Israel*, p. 148.

to the minds of the people the suitable ideas. Thus, perhaps, seven came to be associated with the idea of perfection or completion, because of the record of creation, with the subsequent rest. But the association being once (on whatever ground) established, we can understand why eight ($=7$ with one added) should indicate the commencement of a new order of things, and why therefore it was ordered that a child should be circumcised on the eighth day. With a similar significance 50 ($=7 \times 7 + 1$) occurs in connexion with the Year of Jubilee and the Day of Pentecost. So, again, if the number 40 was connected in the Jewish mind with the notion of human life, either as representing an ordinary working lifetime, or as being the age at which a man reached the central point of his maturity,¹ or for any other reason, we can at once understand how it could become associated with other ideas, such as those of probation, and preparation, the penalty of sin, &c.²

It seems clear, moreover, that when a number had become associated with a symbolic meaning, it was often used to carry this symbolic reference rather than with arithmetical exactness. Thus twelve is manifestly connected throughout the Scriptures with the idea of the Church. And accordingly the tribes are always spoken of as twelve in number, although in point of fact there were thirteen. Ephraim and Manasseh are almost always separately included,³ and usually in enumerating the tribes, Levi is omitted (see Numbers i. 47). But in Rev. vii. Dan is omitted. Thus, too, S. Paul speaks of 'the twelve' after the defection of Judas, when the number of the Apostles was in reality only eleven: 'He was seen of Cephas,

¹ Compare Exodus ii. 11 and Heb. xi. 24, 'When Moses was grown up,' with Acts vii. 23, 'When he was well-nigh forty years old.'

² The notion of probation and preparation is appropriate to the cases of the forty days when Moses first received the Law (Exod. xxiv. 18) the thrice repeated period of forty years in the life of Moses (Acts vii. 23, 30, 36; Exod. vii. 7; Deut. xxxi. 2, xxxiv. 7) the Wanderings (Acts vii. 36), the spies searching the land (Numb. xiii. 25), the probation of Nineveh (Jonah iii. 4), the journey of Elijah (1 Kings xix. 8), our Lord's fast in the Wilderness (S. Matt. iv. 2), the forty days of preparation for the new Church after the Resurrection (Acts i. 3). (The new Church itself was inaugurated on the day of Pentecost, the day on which the *leavened* cakes of firstfruits were offered, being fifty days after our Lord's Resurrection, which occurred on the day of offering the 'Omer, the *unleavened* firstfruits.)

The notion of the penalty of sin is suggested by the waters of the Deluge (Gen. vii. 12), the intercession of Moses after the affair of the Golden Calf (Deut. ix. 25), the forty stripes (Deut. xxv. 3), the Wanderings, in another aspect (Numb. xiv. 34), the desolation of Egypt (Ezek. xxix. 11-13), &c.

³ Deut. xxvii. 12-13 is an exception.

then of the Twelve.¹ The connexion of this number of the Church with the 24 elders of Rev. iv., the 144,000 of the sealed, in Rev. vii., and the 144 cubits of the mystical Jerusalem and its 12,000 furlongs and 12 foundations and gates in Rev. xxi., is obvious.

Thus this significance of numbers is not to be confined to intentionally symbolic ordinances. And if we are right in believing that numbers were habitually associated in the Jewish mind with a symbolic meaning we can readily believe that, in the providence of God, historical events which were meant to teach the nation deep spiritual lessons, were so ordered as to involve those numbers which would suggest the desired ideas. For instance, we may see a reason not only why forty stripes should have been the authorized limit of corporal punishment, but also why the wanderings of the Israelites should have been so ordered as to extend over a period of forty years. But it is not necessary for our present purpose that we should be able to decide definitely whether any particular number occurring in the narratives is historically exact or not. What is contended for is, that in many cases it is the spiritual rather than the arithmetical significance which *we are meant to recognise*, and which may therefore be said to be primary. And specially that in the case of matters of parabolic import, in many prophecies and the like, the numbers are meant to be *interpreted* rather than *counted*.

How far such interpretations may legitimately be carried it is of course very difficult to say. When once one has come to perceive that the numbers of the Bible are to a great extent symbolical, so many curious and intricate relations between them begin to show themselves, that one hesitates to assign any limit to the symbolism. At the same time it will be observed that the significance here claimed for the Scriptural numbers, has nothing in common with the fanciful cyphers of the Jewish Gematria,² or with the patristic interpretation of

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 5.

² By 'Gematria' the numerical value of a word or words was calculated, each letter standing for a number. Then the passage was interpreted by the substitution of words having the same numerical value. Thus in Genesis xlix. יבֵּא שִׁילֹה, 'Shiloh shall come,' amounts, when the letters are taken according to their numerical value, to 358. Now, the word מָשִׁיחַ, Messiah, is of the same value. Whence it was inferred that the passage referred to the coming of the Christ. Thus:—

י = 10, כ = 2, נ = 1, ש = 300, ו = 10, ה = 30, ה = 5, total 358.

מ = 40, ש = 300, י = 10, ח = 8, total 358.

(Rosenmueller, *Hist. Interpret.* pp. 60, 61; Ginsburg, *Kabbalah*, p. 49.)

The Apocalyptic 'number of the beast' is perhaps connected with the numerical value of a name.

the three hundred and eighteen servants of Abraham referred to above (p. 37). This latter is not based upon any direct symbolism attaching to the number itself, but upon a rather far-fetched suggestiveness in the Greek letters used to represent the number.

We may then, not forgetting the need of caution in the application of our principles, recognize that the primary sense of certain passages of Holy Scripture is to be considered as symbolical or mystical. We may, if we please, say with Origen, that such passages do not possess the 'Literal sense,' meaning, of course, the Literal sense *as distinguished from* the Mystical. In other words, the spiritual meaning is that which they are intended to convey in the first instance.

II. We pass to the case of those more numerous passages of which the primary meaning is historical. And it is here, as we have already remarked, that our chief difficulties occur. It may well be conceived, indeed, as we have just seen, that a series of events intended to teach a spiritual lesson (such as the events of the Israelites' wanderings) may have been so ordered as to convey that lesson in various details. But, speaking generally, we can hardly suppose that even such history was made *in order* that we might have a series of suggestive pictures and interesting illustrations of subsequent events. All history, indeed, conveys its own moral and spiritual lessons for all time, but the deduction of such lessons is not the meaning of Mystical Interpretation.

Take, for instance, the history of Joseph. It has lessons which lie upon the surface. It teaches the blessedness of patient trust in God, the nobleness of forgiveness, the reward of steadfast integrity. It exhibits in a clear light the power for good or evil possessed by those in high places, and so on. But the question is, what is it which justifies us in seeing in Joseph a type of our Blessed Lord. Was Joseph sold for twenty pieces of silver *in order* that the transaction might be a type of our Saviour's betrayal? Was he imprisoned with two offenders against Pharaoh, and was one hanged and one forgiven, *in order* that we Christians might be interested in tracing a resemblance to the scene on Calvary and the pardon of the penitent thief? Surely men's lives are not thus ordered. But, if not, what is there in the so-called 'type' except a chance resemblance? Is there any justification for recognizing a typical significance in any such events of actual, concrete, local, and secular history? What is the rational basis of *historical* types?

The following principles may, if we mistake not, be discerned.

(1) The mystical significance, though it may not be the reason why particular things occurred, may very well be the reason why some things are recorded, and others omitted. This gives the key to much that would otherwise be difficult to understand. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, for instance (following the Psalmist), discerns in Melchizedek a type of Christ, in that he is 'without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days nor end of life, but made like unto the Son of God.'¹ It is well known that this mysterious language induced some ancient writers to conclude that Melchizedek was more than a mere man—was, indeed, an angel, or even the Second, or the Third, Person of the Blessed Trinity. But all that seems in fact to be meant is, that no father or mother, no genealogy, no beginning of days, or end of life, is recorded of him in Scripture. Melchizedek is introduced into the narrative abruptly and mysteriously, and disappears from it in the same way. And this, the writer intimates, makes him a fitting type of the Eternal Word of God, who became our great High Priest. If we had had a fuller account of him, the type would have been less complete.² It is this principle, again, which harmonizes the historical accuracy of the Gospel narratives with the significance of details in connexion with the general scope of each Evangelist. We can thus see why S. Luke was guided to record a parable in the form in which it was given at one particular time, to one particular audience, while S. Matthew relates it in the slightly different form in which it was repeated on another occasion. Each version may be equally accurate, and yet each has its own special importance in its place in the Gospel.

It will be seen without further illustration how largely this principle will account for the presence of mystical meanings in the narratives of the Bible. It does not suggest that men's lives were guided in a particular way in order that they might be typical, but that out of the constant flux and changeable current of human affairs, out of the countless multitudes of human lives, lived amid varying circumstances from age to age, holy men of old were guided by the Holy Spirit to select such incidents for record, and to record them in such a way that, over and above their direct moral and spiritual instruc-

¹ Heb. vii. 3.

² Cf. Mr. Jukes's *Law of the Offerings*, pp. 19, 20; *Types of Gen.* p. 45, note.

tiveness, they should be susceptible of a parabolic interpretation too. It is not that the *facts* were modified to this end, but that the *narrative* is to some extent controlled by it.

(2) But this principle taken alone is not sufficient. We feel at the present day that the facts are the most important things, and unless the symbolic interpretation of the very facts themselves can be justified, we shall feel that the mystical method is still left upon a somewhat fanciful and uncertain foundation. No doubt, it may be said, a selection of symbolical facts was made, but how came there to be any symbolical facts to select?

Our first answer to this question turns upon the peculiar character and position of the Jewish nation. The revelation recorded in the Old Testament was not final and complete, but only partial and preparatory. And the method which God was pleased to adopt with regard to it was to choose out a man, to educate him in spiritual truth, and to develop from him a nation charged with the special mission of guarding the deposit committed to them, and the further truths progressively revealed, and so of preparing the way for One who should come afterwards, and who should sum up and complete the revelation. But God's purpose is one and unchangeable. The revelation given in Jesus Christ was the crown and completion of all that had gone before. And, therefore, just so far as the chosen people recognized and wrought out in their lives the truth which they had reached at any given stage of their development; just so far as one by one—a prophet here, a king there, a faithful witness to the truth there—they grasped the purposes of God; so far they realized in some imperfect way the ideal which was at last to be completely realized in Christ. Every such partial realization 'fulfilled' previous anticipations, and in its turn became a fresh type. And if we recognize in Abraham and his descendants the gradual working out of an ideal, through many faults and failures, and always only partially and fragmentarily, we shall see how they were quite naturally and, as one may say, necessarily, the *typical* people.

It is this principle which explains the prophetic character of much of the devotional part of the Old Testament. The saintly men of the older Dispensation were conscious that the spiritual principles which they partially discerned were destined to a more complete expression at a future day. And so a Psalmist, in giving utterance to his spiritual experience, would oftentimes use language which entirely tran-

scended his own personal feelings. It is thus that we can best understand the Passion-Psalms. To suppose that such a Psalm as the twenty-second had no reference in the first instance to any person but our Lord, deprives it of all practical helpfulness for the time to which it originally belonged. It would in such case have been a mere enigma till the Coming of the Christ. But if we take it as the outpouring of a faithful soul in sore distress and persecution, and yet confident that out of his trouble a future glory would come, we see at once its significance and value for the Jewish Church. And at the same time we can understand how it is that the Psalm contains expressions inapplicable to the actual circumstances of the Psalmist.¹ For it seems clear that the writer was led beyond himself to anticipate the Sorrows of a more tragic Sufferer, out of Whose woe a more complete triumph should spring. And so, whilst it was his own condition which he pictured, he pictured it in hyperbolical language, not fully justified by the present facts, but destined in the providence of God to be exactly and literally fulfilled in Him Who was to come. Such a view gives additional significance to our Blessed Lord's use of the first words of this Psalm in the Agony of the Cross. His cry reveals to us that in bearing man's sin, He bore that most terrible of all its results, the hiding of the Father's face. But His expressing His consciousness of this curse of sin in the words of an ancient Psalm, brings home to us the fact that He suffered thus as the Representative Man, summing up in Himself the results of sin upon the race, in all their awfulness and misery.

It is thus, again, that the flight of the Holy Family into Egypt and their subsequent return to the land of the chosen people 'fulfilled' the word of the prophet spoken in the first instance of the whole nation, 'Out of Egypt have I called my Son.' The entire people were in their collective capacity an ideal Son of God, who should have obeyed the Divine will, though they did not: as we read, 'Israel is my son, even my first-born.'² It is thus that the weeping of the mothers of Bethlehem over their murdered babes 'fulfilled' the type of the wailing of Ephraim (personified as the tribe-mother, Rachel) over the captives torn away by the Chaldeans.³ In each case the present sorrow was permitted for a great purpose, and in each a glorious recompense was in store for those who suffered. And in the Christ, the true Object of the nation's longing

¹ Certainly David, to whom the Psalm is inscribed in the title, was never in the position described by the 18th verse.

² Exod. iv. 22.

³ S. Matt. ii. 17, 18; Jerem. xxxi. 15.

desire would come again to His own border. It is thus that in the Epistle to the Church of Philadelphia the office of the Risen Saviour is described in language which was originally applied to Eliakim, the son of Hilkiah, the faithful successor of the rebellious house-steward, Shebna.¹

We shall, in fact, fail to understand the greater part of the quotations of the Old Testament in the New, unless we have learned to look below the surface in both cases. Then we shall find that the Apostles and Evangelists discerned in the ancient history of the chosen people, in the allusions of their prophets, and in the personal discipline of their saints and heroes of old time, spiritual principles which are ever working themselves out afresh in the gradual unfolding of God's purposes towards men, and in the dispensations of His providence and His redeeming grace. They saw that the life of our Lord Jesus Christ summed up in itself the experience of all the holy men of former days. They saw that the life of the Church exemplified, in full richness and completeness, the gifts of grace, and processes of spiritual development which were only partially and interruptedly disclosed under the older dispensation. And as each hint of the Old Testament found a fresh elucidation; as each principle of God's dealings, hitherto obscurely discerned, came out into clearer light; as each incident of saintly lives was illustrated by the experience of the King of Saints, the sacred writers noted that the older Scriptures were being fulfilled.

And it was the same with the prophecies. Predictions of the Messiah's reign, and of the sufferings of the Lord's Servant, things dimly seen and vaguely understood, glimpses of future glory, and hints of strange and sorrowful mysteries, preparatory to that glory—all these were perceived to have a fuller significance than they of old time could ever have realized. Now were possessed the splendour and the joy of that Salvation, concerning which the prophets of old sought and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto us.² That Messianic kingdom was now seen to be not merely a local realm, restoring with a fresh magnificence the earthly sovereignty of the Jewish nation, nor yet a golden age of material plenty and bodily security, but a world-wide empire over the hearts and souls of men. That suffering Servant of the Lord was now perceived to be not merely a pathetic victim of His nation's misdoings, but a Redeemer and a Saviour, in the Person of none other than the Incarnate Son of God. And the conviction that what had been of old time

¹ Rev. iii. 7; Isa. xxii. 22.

² 1 S. Peter i. 10.

spoken unto the Fathers by divers portions and in divers manners, all tended to, and was explained by, the full revelation now made by God in the Person of His Son, led them to seek for, and to find, analogies, and parables, and significant hints, and symbolical teaching, in the smallest details of those lively oracles, which had been so long the glory of the chosen people.

(3) We must carry the matter, however, a step further. The Bible is not exclusively occupied with the development of the Jewish nation. It embraces within its scope the origin, the destiny, and in some sort the history, of the whole world. But, whatever it deals with, its design is always, as Bishop Butler has remarked, 'to give us an account of the world *in this one single view, as God's world.*'¹ Whether it contains personal or national history; whether it records the miracles of seers or the wars of kings; whether it embraces poetry, or prophecy, or proverb, or priestly ritual, the point of view is the same. All are to teach us about God, and His dealings with men. And it is in view of man's relation to God that his strength and his weakness, his sin and his ignorance and his wilfulness, his failures and penitence and struggles after good, are in their varied forms displayed to us.

Now, human nature is fundamentally the same at all times and places. And the causes of man's sin, and the problem of his redemption, in whatever dress they may from time to time appear, have been essentially the same from the fall until today. And God is a Being of reason and order. He does not work at random in the spiritual, any more than in the natural sphere. There are fixed principles of His action, an order and a system in His work, which we may discern if we have eyes to see.

In short, just as what we call natural law is merely our way of expressing the uniformity of God's working in the natural world, so we shall find there is a moral and spiritual law, or a uniformity of His working in the moral and spiritual world. And just as the 'law' of the falling of an apple is (not merely a *similar* law, but) the *very same* law as that of the motions of the planets, so the method of God's dealings with our first parents, or with Abraham, will be found to be the *very same* method as that of His dealings with mankind at large, or with His Church, or with any individual soul. Just so far as there is any correspondence between the problems

¹ *Analogy*, part ii. chap. 7.

involved in the different cases, so far there will be a correspondence in the methods employed.

This at once justifies the *principle* of the patristic methods of mystical interpretation. The literal sense gives us (suppose) a piece of history, but if we discern rightly the spiritual laws which underlie that history, we shall be able to apply them profitably to transactions lying upon different planes of individual and social life. The history tells us, for example, that the Israelites during their Wanderings were fed with a mysterious food. And it tells us that the *reason* for this was, that they might discern a great principle of God's dealings with men—viz. that man doth not live by bread alone; that the mere material food would in no case convey or support *life*, but that it is God's Divine energy which works by means of food, as by a sacrament, and that man in truth lives by every word of God. But this is true of the spiritual as well as the physical life. In the individual soul we learn that our own resources are inadequate to keep up the life of the spirit within us; we must feed upon the Grace of God. And in the Church we find the Blessed Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ, embodying and exemplifying the same great truth. And yet again we look forward to a more immediate nourishment of the soul in the Beatific Vision, and perfected union with our Ascended Lord, hereafter. And because the same principle runs through all these thoughts, we may with perfect reasonableness interpret the manna mystically as was done of old.

The history tells us that Abraham was moved by an instinct which he recognized as the voice of God, to sacrifice his son, the laughter of his heart, the heir of the promises. And our faith, too, must learn to sacrifice to God's glory even that spiritual fruit which it holds most dear, accounting that He is able to raise it up to us again.¹ But this spirit of absolute surrender of that which we count most precious, as an offering of love, is but a faint reflexion of the spirit which God Himself has manifested towards us, in that He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all. And, if so, if the spirit of such a sacrifice is in fact Divine, it is no mere casual analogy which has prompted the Church to direct this narrative to be read as a lesson for Good Friday. The sacrifice of Isaac was a type of the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ, not because of a certain chance similarity in the external details, but because in the inner heart of it, it was the

¹ Cf. *Types of Genesis*, ad loc.

manifestation in a dim, imperfect way of that spirit of self-abnegation which is the fundamental characteristic of Love, and therefore eternally characteristic of God, who is Love, and who commended His love towards us in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.

We need not, indeed, confine this principle to human history. Natural law and spiritual law may well prove to be everywhere akin. Mr. Drummond's book has recently suggested this afresh to us all.¹ Indeed, the parallelism between the laws of nature and the laws of the spiritual world underlies all the parables which refer to natural phenomena. The parables of the Leaven, the Grain of Mustard Seed, the Seed growing secretly, the Sower, &c., all depend upon the analogy between the processes of nature, and the processes of grace. And the use made by our Blessed Lord and by S. Paul of the springing up of a corn of wheat as a type of the Resurrection, implies the same correspondence.

One of the most interesting and instructive parts of Mr. Jukes's interpretation of Genesis rests upon this principle. The Story of Creation (Gen. i. ii. 3), he tells us, is an epitome of all God's work.

'In a man, or world, the work is one . . . Lest, therefore, our blindness should be unable to trace God's work in the inner world of man, God writes it in creation, on the broad platform of an outer universe. Lest we should be perplexed by the long detail of the gradual development of Adam and his seed, God gives us the outline of it in the work of seven days.'²

It is primarily with regard to the physical universe that we are told that 'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth; and the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep.' But in the soul of man we have also a creation of God with an earthly and a

¹ Mr. Drummond has been criticized for beginning with natural law, and seeking to extend its range into the spiritual sphere, instead of reversing the order, and trying to discover spiritual law in the natural world. But in the strict scientific sense of law, the difference is not important. We cannot always begin with the *ἀπλῶς γινώριμα*; we must begin with the things which are *γινώριμα ἡμῖν*, and which in Mr. Drummond's case are the facts of physical science. If we have discerned the *laws* rightly here, we shall find them manifested elsewhere too. Mr. Drummond recognizes the law of biogenesis. It is exactly repeated in the law that 'Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.' Mr. Drummond is not familiar with sacramental truth, and applies it to the case of conversion, where it is not so fully applicable. If he had begun from this side, he would probably have failed to trace the analogy at all.

² *Types of Genesis*, p. 4.

heavenly element. And we know too well how all has become disordered so that our spiritual experience begins with a chaos over which the Spirit of God broods, until at last light breaks in and the true life is begun. Then follow various stages of progress with evenings and mornings, darkness and light, alternating in the soul. We reach a second day, when the tumultuous passions of our nature, our desires and affections, are divided by 'the opening of our understanding'—some raised and purified, as we learn to love and long for what is good, while others still remain as the troubled sea. Then a third day comes, a day of resurrection, when the will rises above the passions and affections, a dry land, a new and solid earth, appears above these tossing waters, and then come fruit and blossom—virtues springing up in fair luxuriance within us. The second day (of division) is not blessed, but the third day twice receives a benediction. On the fourth day we reach the 'Illuminative Way': Christ is seen as our Sun, and faith shines within us with light reflected from Him; so the night as well as the day is ruled within us, and the light is divided from the darkness. Then on the fifth day, new life is quickened both in the desires and the understanding; moving creatures—as birds and fish—arise. And on the sixth day, we obtain higher gifts of life still—ox, lion, and lamb, for service and strength and sacrifice; until at length the Man appears: Christ Himself is formed in us. And so at last we may hope to enter into God's rest, that day which has no evening, that day 'which shall be known to the Lord, not day nor night, but it shall come to pass that at evening time it shall be light.'¹

Many further details will be found in Mr. Jukes's book. He traces a like sequence of ideas in the lives which furnish the principal sections of the book of Genesis. And he calls attention to the parallelism, which has been so often dwelt upon by commentators, between the six days of creation and the successive ages of the world.²

¹ Zech. xiv. 7.

² Amongst many striking points in the mystical interpretation of Genesis, it is remarkable how repeatedly throughout the book the principle is exemplified that 'that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, then that which is spiritual.' A *younger* son is the chosen one. It is thus in the case of Cain and Abel, Ishmael and Isaac, Esau and Jacob, Reuben and Judah (and Joseph), Manasseh and Ephraim. Origen remarks that it cannot be by chance that the tribes which received their inheritance from Moses beyond Jordan were all firstborn sons: Reuben of Leah, Gad of Zilpah, and Manasseh of Asenath. (Hom. III. on Joshua, sect. i. p. 402.)

(4) Sometimes things apparently most remote from each other may with perfect reasonableness be connected by Mystical Interpretation, because they involve a common principle. Nothing, it would seem at first sight, could well be more far-fetched than the patristic association of the four Living Beings mentioned in the Apocalypse, with the four Gospels. It is true that this interpretation helps to throw light upon those apparent discrepancies of the Gospels which have so long been the despair of harmonists, and the happy hunting-ground of small carping critics. It suggests to us that the Gospels differ because each presents us with a portrait of our Lord drawn from a different point of view. Some divergence of opinion has existed as to the order in which the four symbols should be allotted to the different Evangelists;¹ but taking them in the order of S. John's vision, we certainly find ourselves in possession of a clue to the variations of form in the evangelical narratives. The first Living Being, we read, was like a lion. And S. Matthew draws a picture of the Royal Messiah, the Lion of the Tribe of Judah. The second Living Being was like a calf, or young ox, the animal commonly employed for labour. And in S. Mark we have a record of our Saviour's ministry alone, a compressed narrative full of little touches vividly indicating the unwearied activity of His Life on earth. The third Living Being had a face as of a man. And S. Luke depicts Jesus of Nazareth as the Son of Adam, the ideal Representative of the human race. The fourth Living Being was like a flying eagle, a creature of the sky. And S. John soars up at the very outset of his Gospel into the dazzling light of the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'

All this is at least very suggestive. And yet it seems impossible to suppose that these mystic forms do really represent either the Evangelists or their Gospels. Such an explanation finds no support in the circumstances of the details of S. John's vision. It is more reasonable to interpret the Living Beings, as many have done, as representing the animated creation. Their number, four, supports this view; for it is the number always associated with the idea of the *world*.² They are distinguished from the twenty-four elders, in whom we can hardly be wrong in recognizing the representatives,

¹ Cf. Westcott, *Introd. to the Study of the Gospels*, p. 245; Jukes, *Differences of the Four Gospels*, pp. 13-15, where the reason for this divergence is admirably discussed.

² See Rev. vii. 1; cf. Gen. ii. 10; Acts x. 11; Rev. xxi. 16.

under the Old and New dispensations, of the Church, chosen out to be the special vehicle of God's revelation to men. And we take the Living Beings to represent the whole world of created life, which in its varied complexity, its wondrous order, its untiring activity, ceaselessly proclaims the praise of its Creator—praise in which the Church joins, giving glory and honour to Almighty God, saying, 'for Thou hast *created* all things, and for Thy pleasure *they are, and were created*.'¹

But, if we ask for a reason for the differing characteristics under which the four Living Beings are described, the answer must evidently be that they are selected as typical and representative forms. The lion is the representative of strength and ruling power; the ox suggests the complementary qualities of serviceable obedience, and the surrender of life for the good of others, in food or sacrifice. Thus these two together represent all forms of life which command and rule, and all forms of life which are subordinated and used. In the man we recognize the elements of intelligence and social capacity; while in the eagle are symbolized those higher spiritual aspirations which rise above the earth and earthly things. Thus the four Living Beings furnish us with an exhaustive classification of the different forms of conscious and sentient existence.

Now, our Blessed Lord summed up all forms of created life in Himself. He combined in his own perfect life the different characteristics, of which all other lives exhibit only partial types. His was the princely power and authority, but His was also the life of self-sacrifice and service. His was the human thought and sympathy, but His was also the Divine glory. And the four Gospels, written doubtless in the first instance for different classes of men, were intended, as we cannot but believe, to bring out the different aspects of our Blessed Lord's life and character. And it is in no way irrational to suppose that the classification of those aspects, made under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the works of the different Evangelists, would coincide with the classification of the varied aspects of created life indicated in the vision of the Living Beings. The instinct of the patristic interpreters was in that case right after all, and though we do not hold that the four mystic Beings of the Apocalypse actually represent the four Evangelists, or their writings, we may well allow them to suggest to us, as they have constantly suggested to students in all ages of the Church, the reasons for the different characteristics of the Gospel narratives.

¹ Cf. Alford, *ad loc.*

We may be permitted, before bringing this article to a close, to give one other illustration of what seems to us to be a legitimate application of the Mystical method of Interpretation.

The religious importance of the history of Israel and Judah is apt to blind us to the fact that they were really very small states, occupying a very narrow strip of country. They lay in the midst of a knot of other small states, midway between the two great civilizations of Egypt and Assyria, the power of the latter being at a subsequent period inherited by Babylon. These great powers, humanly speaking, were sure, sooner or later, to meet and conflict. And they could only meet by passing over this narrow strip of country lying between the sea and the desert. From the point of view of the student of history, the relations of the Palestinian kingdoms to Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon possess the highest interest; and we may trace God's guiding hand, as in all history, so especially here. But the significance of the whole story mystically is no less striking.

Taking as our guide the tenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, we recognize in the passage of the Red Sea, by which the chosen people were delivered from slavery, a type of Holy Baptism. The life in Egypt, then, must represent what the Christian is by baptism (potentially) delivered from, viz. the life of the natural man, the unregulated life of sense, and natural impulse, and passion—in a word, the life of the flesh. The journey through the wilderness represents the Christian's life of probation, fed with supernatural food, and at length led by the true Joshua into the true Land of Promise. But the typical significance does not stop here. Taking Israel in Canaan in another aspect as representing the Church of Christ surrounded by enemies in the world, we have a new series of types. Not only did the Israelites during the Wanderings again and again turn back in their hearts into Egypt,¹ but throughout their subsequent history, an alliance with Egypt was the great temptation of the Jewish rulers. This was the snare of Solomon, whose love of 'many strange women' began with his marriage to the daughter of Pharaoh.² It was a temptation which lasted down to the destruction of the Jewish monarchy, when Egypt furnished an asylum for the handful of trembling refugees who fled in abject terror from the vengeance of the Chaldeans.³

And the connexion of the attractiveness of Egypt with the

¹ Acts vii. 39; Exod. xvi. 3; Num. xi. 4, 5; xiv. 4.

² 1 Kings iii. 1; xi. 1.

³ Jerem. xli. 16-xliii. 7.

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temptation to trust in an 'arm of flesh' is curiously shown by the special form in which that attractiveness was manifested. The horse was the national saddle-animal of the Egyptians, just as the ass was that of the Israelites.¹ And it was the imposing array of the Egyptian cavalry which fascinated the imaginations and stirred the hopes of the bewildered Jewish politicians. A warning was given on the subject in the Law. Deut. xvii. 16 orders that the king 'shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt to the end that he should multiply horses, forasmuch as the Lord hath said, Ye shall henceforth return no more that way.' But from the time when Solomon 'had horses brought out of Egypt,'² the temptation proved well-nigh irresistible. 'Woe unto them,' cried Isaiah, 'that go down to Egypt for help, and stay on horses; and trust in chariots, because they are many, and in horsemen, because they are very strong; but they look not unto the Holy One of Israel, neither seek the Lord. Now the Egyptians are men, and not God; and their horses flesh, and not spirit.'³ And it was this which gave point to the taunt of the Rabshakeh: 'Now on whom dost thou trust, that thou rebellest against me? Lo, thou trustest in the staff of this broken reed, on Egypt. . . . Now therefore give pledges, I pray thee, to my master the King of Assyria, and I will give thee two thousand horses, if thou be able, on thy part, to set riders upon them.'⁴ The horse became in this way the symbol of a particular form of human confidence, and the determination to trust in God rather than in any human help is expressed with reference to the two great conflicting powers by which Israel was beset, in the words: 'Asshur shall not save us; we will not ride upon horses.'⁵ Thus, too, the promise of complete deliverance from all the nation's enemies and the exaltation of the chosen people to a position of entire supremacy is coupled with the assurance that 'It shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that I will cut off thy horses out of the midst of thee, and I will destroy thy chariots.'⁶ And thus, lastly, the advent of the Messianic King is predicted in the words: 'Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem: behold thy King cometh unto thee: He is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass. And I will cut off the chariot from Ephraim, and the horse from Jerusalem;' &c.⁷

¹ Cf. Gen. i. 9, Exod. xiv. 9, and xv. 1, with Judges v. 10, x. 4, xii. 14, &c.; see Stanley's *Jewish Church*, vol. i. p. 80 sqq.

² 1 Kings x. 28.

³ Isa. xxxi. 1-3.

⁴ Isa. xxxvi. 5-8.

⁵ Hosea xiv. 3.

⁶ Micah v. 10.

⁷ Zech. ix. 9, 10.

The relation of the chosen people to Egypt, thus curiously illustrated, is surely full of instruction for ourselves. In the Christian life, considered as a probation, as a progress from the state of the natural man, which is a state of bondage to the things of sense, to the life of holiness in the heavenly places, it is a constant temptation to turn back in our hearts to the Egypt from which Christ has delivered us. We are tempted by the pleasures of a sensuous life, just as the Israelites on their journey longed for the flesh-pots of which they had once eaten freely. And so when the kingdom of Christ is indeed set up within us, and the battle of detailed self-discipline, and the conflict with our spiritual foes has been begun, we are tempted to rely upon the 'arm of flesh' and to trust in our own strength rather than in the grace of God. In the same way the Church too often endeavours to subdue the enemies of Christ by using purely human agencies: the East End, forsooth! is to be regenerated by 'sweetness and light,' by exhibitions of pictures and Palaces of Delight; and the more cultured classes are to be won by disquisitions on Evolution, and by oratorios in Holy Week!

And yet the Christ must in His infancy go down into Egypt, and thus fulfil the national type. The Son of God must for a time descend into the land of the flesh and of the senses. This was God's plan for Israel, and there is a time when it is right for the Infant Saviour. And meanwhile Rachel's children are sacrificed that the Christ may not be slain by the Edomite.¹ And we, when we are babes in Christ, must not suppose that we can ignore the flesh altogether. We may have for a time to go down into Egypt. We must, for example, take pleasure wisely. We must not put upon the impulses of our nature such a strain as it cannot bear. And meanwhile we may have to give up spiritual efforts for which we are not ripe. The attempt to reach at once a lofty height of devotion may fail; the desire for great missionary enterprises may have to be surrendered. We may be physically weak, and unable to do as much work as others, or constitutionally disposed to gloom, and simple pleasures may be really needful to keep us in heart. And so the innocents must perish for a time, while we go down into Egypt. The Edomite must have his way with them. But there is hope in their end, and they shall be restored at length to their own border. The

¹ According to Mr. Jukes, Edom (representing Esau, the son of Isaac) signifies a carnal side of the elect character. Rachel represents the spiritual affections of the natural man. Cf. *Types of Genesis*, pp. 291, 324, 335.

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death of the innocents is not hopeless loss, but most fruitful sacrifice.

As for Assyria, it is to be observed that it is first called in to *help* Judah, but then turns against it, harasses it sorely, but at last falls before Jerusalem by Divine interposition, *not* by sword or spear. Assyria never takes Judah captive; this is reserved for Babylon.¹ Is not Assyria then, mystically, the 'world'; 'allegorically,' as the state, the civil power; 'tropologically,' as the force of human intellect, &c.? So long as the civil power has persecuted the Church, the Church has always been safe. And so long as clever, intellectual men assail Christianity with weapons of human reasoning, Christianity is safe too. The way to meet such assaults is not to call in the Egyptians, not to meet force with force or worldly policy, not to rely upon natural powers of mind, and the strength of our own character, but to trust in the power of God and to wait in patience and faith upon Him.

To understand the mystical significance of Babylon, we must go back to its origin. We read in Genesis xi. how after the epoch of Noah, and the renovation of the old world, the people journeying east proceeded to make a tower as a rendezvous, to unite themselves together. 'They had brick for stone' (*sc.*, as Mr. Jukes points out, in place of God's works, they had man's imitation), and 'slime had they for mortar.' And thus they set about building a tower whose top was to reach unto heaven, and which was to be a source of external unity.

The fundamental principle involved here is evidently *pride*: the setting up of self as something worthy and sufficient independently of God. And pride is the distinctively spiritual sin—the sin of the spiritual part of man. It is perhaps the only form of sin which we can understand as belonging to purely spiritual beings. It is thus the characteristic sin of the Devil.² And because the Devil is the prince of this world, the temptations of the World and of the Devil are often difficult to distinguish. In our Lord's temptations, the offer of the sovereignty over the world-kingsdoms was coupled with the tempter's condition, 'All these things will I give Thee, if Thou wilt fall down and worship me.'³ But the *special* temptation of the Devil was that to self-assertion, and did not

¹ The relation of Judah to Israel is of course important in this connexion, but cannot be discussed here.

² Hence the King of Babylon becomes a type of the Devil: Isa. xiv. 12–14.

³ S. Matt. iv. 9.

involve any acknowledgment of his authority: 'If Thou be the Son of God, cast Thyself down.'¹ And so it is that the ascendancy of the Assyrian empire passes into that of the Chaldean, without any notice or break in the Scripture narratives. But, further, the sin of pride in its most deadly form is manifested not so much in opposition to the Church and from without, as within the Church itself, or at least in what we sometimes significantly call the '*religious world*.' And hence the spirit of Babylon is shown in all attempts to set up man's systems in place of God's, as means to reach up to heaven. It manifests itself in various ways—ways, indeed, which at first seem opposed to each other. The unity aimed at by the builders of the Tower of Babel is like that aimed at by the imposing claims of the Church of Rome, and in both cases the result is a more complete and apparently hopeless disintegration. The Churches of Christendom are separated now, not only by local distance and independent rule, but, alas! by difference of belief and practice such that it may be said of them that they do not 'understand one another's speech.' And perhaps the unity of the great empire of the time of Daniel, with its assumption of rule over 'all peoples, nations, and languages,' may suggest that unity of vague comprehension, which is so much in favour at the present day. The world is not now hostile to religion, provided it appears in the guise of mere theosophy or speculation. It is only hostile to any exclusive claims on the part of Christianity. The world is all for comprehension. It will not hear of definite dogmas, or admit any duty of accepting the Christian Faith, as a Divine Revelation. But it is quite willing to recognize Christianity as a very good sort of thing amongst other good sorts of things.

And hence it is not Assyria but Babylon which takes the Church captive. And there is no danger of persecution from her; the danger is lest we should be tempted to sing the Lord's song in a strange land and so forget Jerusalem.² Daniel, indeed, is highly honoured in Babylon, and even set over all the other princes. But Daniel is always known as 'that Daniel which is of the children of the captivity of Judah.'³ And his persistence in recognizing the claims of his God, as paramount over all the authority of Babylon, gets even him into trouble.

¹ S. Matt. iv. 6. It is noticeable that in S. Matthew, as the Gospel of the Messianic kingdom, the temptation to obtain, without the prescribed suffering, the kingdoms of the world, is emphasized by being recorded last. Whereas in S. Luke, as the Gospel of the Humanity, the temptations culminate in that to pride.

² Ps. cxxxvii.

³ Dan. v. 13; vi. 13.

So we may be reminded that the early Church was far less endangered by the persecution, than by the friendship of the empire. And now the Church suffers far less from the attacks of her open enemies, than from the Erastianism and worldly spirit within her own borders. Such an interpretation, moreover, contains a warning against the danger of a merely external religion: we are warned against the temptation to seek a false unity by the surrender of principle; we are admonished that the friendship of the world is enmity with God; we are taught that Antichrist is to be looked for not without, but within, the Church.

In all this there is no doubt much which as yet is obscure, but surely the mystical significance thus suggested is full of teaching. These three great powers of the ancient world afford a very striking type of our three great enemies, the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. For the last we read of no restoration, only of final judgment.¹ But the Christian looks forward to a coming time when the natural impulses and the intellectual powers will be in harmony with the rule of Christ, and when the world, too, the intellectual and social world, will be full of the knowledge of the glory of God.

‘In that day there shall be a high way out of Egypt to Assyria, and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt, and the Egyptian into Assyria; and the Egyptians shall serve with the Assyrians. In that day shall Israel be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, even a blessing in the midst of the land: whom the Lord of Hosts shall bless, saying, Blessed be Egypt My people, and Assyria the work of My hands, and Israel Mine inheritance.’²

Now, the above interpretation will be rationally justified if the relation of Israel to these nations corresponds in principle to the relation of the individual soul (or the Church, as the case may be) to its surrounding influences.

If the original temptation of the Israelites with regard to Egypt was due to a tendency to fall back into a slavery which with all its degradation offered at least flesh-pots, and exemption from moral effort, then it affords an exact parallel to the temptation in our own spiritual lives to yield to the flesh with its slavery of the will, but with its obvious pleasures also and its abandonment of the moral struggle. If the subsequent attractiveness of the Egyptian alliance was due to the apparent hopelessness of the national cause, without the help of material force, then it corresponds to our temptation to rely upon some natural power in the conflict with our spiritual foes.

¹ Isa. xxi.; Rev. xviii. 2.

² Isa. xix. 23-25.

If, with regard to Assyria, the temptation was to quail before its imposing force and intellectual skill and high civilization, and so to lose trust in the sufficiency of the Divine protection, it is exactly the same temptation which assails us now when our Faith is threatened by philosophers and men of science, and our Church attacked on grounds of political expediency.

If a chief characteristic of the Chaldeans was their pride,¹ and if the temptation of the Israelites with regard to them was that of falling into their ways and accepting their friendship and forgetting their own high calling, then it exactly corresponds to our own temptation from all forms of self-assertion and from all forms of worldly religion. The mystical interpretation in each case is justified, because the things compared involve a common principle, an identical law.

Other rational principles of Mystical Interpretation may perhaps be discoverable besides those which we have here tried to indicate. But it is submitted that these will at least warrant us in searching beneath the letter of Holy Scripture for a deeper spiritual significance. And the difference in value between the books which have furnished the occasion for these remarks seems to us to depend upon the fact, that in the one case Mystical Interpretation is guided by a reasonable principle, consciously avowed, or at least instinctively apprehended, while in the other case it is to a great extent unregulated and inconsequent.

Mr. Jukes treats the narrative with which he deals as involving definite spiritual principles, which may be traced out on various planes of human life and history. For proof of the applicability of his interpretations, he is usually, indeed, content to rely upon their intrinsic value and instructiveness. Those who have eyes to see, will recognize their truth, and for others 'arguments are of little service.'² Yet those who read his books with care and sympathy can hardly fail to recognize, not only that they are pervaded by a spirit of the utmost reverence, and informed by the wisdom of deep spiritual experience, but also that they are ruled by the presence of a guiding and ordering principle. In the introduction to the

¹ Cf. Daniel iv. 30, 'The king spake and said, Is not this great Babylon that I have built for the house of the kingdom by the might of my power and for the honour of my majesty?' Cf. Daniel v. 20. Habakkuk, i. 6-11.

² *Types of Genesis*, p. xix and *passim*; cf. *Mystery of the Kingdom*, p. 26. 'The subject is one which needs eyes to see, rather than proofs and reasons.'

Mystery of the Kingdom, Mr. Jukes enters upon a discussion of the 'Existence and Principle of a Mystic Sense.' We have not referred to this discussion above, because our own conclusions have been reached independently, and because the subject has been approached by us from a somewhat different point of view. But the leading principle laid down by Mr. Jukes is substantially identical with that which we have chiefly relied upon. 'Why is it,' asks Mr. Jukes, 'that the words which primarily apply to Israel of old, equally apply to Christ, the Church, and the believer?' And he replies:—

'I would not speak presumptuously, but if I mistake not, the reason is this : that whether it be Israel of old, or one of Israel, or Christ, or the Church, or the believer, each, if faithful to his calling, is, or has been, a vessel for the manifestation of the Word, whose path is, and ever must be, one. Israel of old was the chosen vessel of the Word of God,¹ so was the Israelite of a humble and contrite heart,² so is the saint,³ so is the Church,⁴ so above all is Christ.'⁵

We have spoken here of the *law* of God's working in the moral and spiritual as in the material world. But indeed the laws of nature no less than the laws of grace are nothing else than the manifestation of the Divine Logos, of the eternal Wisdom of God reaching from one end to another, mightily and sweetly ordering all things.

What we are now concerned to maintain is that the recognition that there is a rational basis for Mystical Interpretation will not only remove the fundamental ground of opposition between the schools of literalists and allegorists, but will impose a duty upon each. The critical investigator ought not to ignore, or at least to reject, the typical application of the passages whose primary meaning he endeavours to elucidate. And, on the other hand, the mystical interpreter ought to be on his guard against extravagance. He ought to take care to clear up the exact historical significance of the passage he is dealing with before he does anything else. He ought to recognize that the Bible is the record of a revelation from God, and that he has consequently no right to treat it simply as a field for the play of ingenious fancies, or the tracing of merely external resemblances. He is bound to ascertain as well as he can, what a given passage was meant to convey to those to whom it was first addressed, and, if he can detect in it, as so explained, spiritual principles which have a wider application, then he may wisely go on to show its

¹ Exod. xxix. 45.² Isa. lvii. 15.³ 1 Cor. vi. 19.⁴ 2 Cor. vi. 16.⁵ S. John i. 14.

'mystical' meaning. Doubtless in estimating the work of others, we must not be too hasty in rejecting an interpretation because we do not at once see the ground for it. But if we are to avoid fancifulness and absurdity, we must be very jealous in insisting upon the literal sense, and we must at least *seek* for the rational principles which can alone finally justify any other.

No one who has studied the Old Testament with any care can fail to recognize that one of our most pressing needs just now is that able and earnest men should devote their attention to the criticism of the text of the Old Testament, and the candid and impartial elucidation of the historical implications of its narratives. But if the views expressed in the foregoing pages be sound, there is much work to be done in another direction. We look forward to the development of an exegesis which will do full justice to the philological and historical interpretation of the text, as the basis of all other interpretations, but which will also work out the 'mystical' significance of the Old Testament Scriptures in harmony, as far as possible, with the great saints and theologians of former days, and which will moreover put forward this mystical interpretation, not as resting upon any subjective fancy or sentimental resemblance, but as founded upon clear rational principles, which can in each case be exhibited in such a way as to be acceptable to all clear-headed and pure-hearted Christian men.

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ART. III.—THE ATOMIC THEORY.

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10. *The Atomic Theory of Lucretius contrasted with Modern Doctrines of Atoms and Evolution.* By JOHN MASSON. (London, 1884.)

ATTEMPTS have been made, both in ancient and modern times, to explain the origin of the material universe. The ultimate nature of matter was a subject of speculation with the Greek philosophers. Their views were borrowed and more fully developed by later Roman thinkers, whose fetches from the deep *arcana* of nature were often marvellous. Their speculative guesses have in many cases been proved by the researches of modern science to have a foundation in truth. In one case, an ancient theory has come to be recognized by most scientific men as embodying the principle which has led to many important discoveries in recent times. Of those which have come down from antiquity, two only are deserving of notice, one being the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, and the other the protest against it, known as the atomic theory. The *ὁμοιομέρεια* (or likeness of parts to the whole) of Anaxagoras and the Peripatetics, was the assertion of the principle that a particle of matter can be subdivided indefinitely, at least in imagination, after the actual operation has become impossible owing to the weakness of the senses, and that earth, if so subdivided as long as it was visible, would always be earth; and so of every other substance.

The authors of *The Unseen Universe* point out that, if this theory be correct, matter must be practically continuous but intensely heterogeneous, and that if the heterogeneity were sufficiently marked, the laws of gravitation would be capable of accounting for at least the greater number of effects at present attributed to molecular forces. In the latter case the law of gravity would still have to be accounted for. Others denied that the continual subdivision was possible, and hence arose the atomic theory. They said that matter, after being subdivided a certain number of times, although the parts might become so small as to be beyond the grasp of the senses, would ultimately be impenetrable, no longer divisible, hard in solid singleness, and *ἄτομοι*, or that which cannot be cut. The two theories were therefore in direct opposition to each other.

It was the opinion of the late Professor Clerk Maxwell that they took their origin from the speculations of the philosophers about number and continuous magnitude. The first exact notions of quantity were founded on considerations of number which is discontinuous, because it is only possible to pass from one to another *per saltum*, while geometrical magnitudes are continuous. The attempt to apply numerical methods to the latter led them to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of space and time. A similar process of reasoning was easily applied to matter. If it is extended and fills space, the same mental operation which recognizes the divisibility of space, is capable of application to the matter which occupies it. From this point of view the atomic theory might be regarded as the old numerical way of conceiving magnitude, while the opposite doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter might appear the most scientific. The atomists maintained the distinction between matter and space; atoms, according to them, not filling the universe, because there is void between them. Their opponents held that there was no vacuum, because all space was filled with matter. In recent times, those who hold the atomic theory believe in the continuity of matter and a plenum, so that in this respect they are at variance with its ancient supporters.

Professor Veitch is of opinion that there is no necessary incompatibility between the atomic theory and the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter. As, on the former theory, it must at a certain point necessarily retain length and breadth, to say that it is still indivisible, is contradictory. Replying to the difficulty, he argued that matter, up to a certain point, might be qualitatively but not quantitatively indivisible. In

the former case, no possible analysis, real or in conception, could get out of it anything but one homogeneous unity, in the sense of its quality or definite nature. If this reasoning be sound, there is no real incompatibility between the doctrine of the ultimate divisibility of matter, and the theory of the atomists. To suppose that the final elements of a body are absolutely impenetrable, and that they are at the same time capable of being infinitely divided in thought, does not seem to him to be necessarily antagonistic to the atomic theory, if the conception of qualitative indivisibility be retained. The ideal divisibility of anything occupying space is always possible, but this is not repugnant to the notion of the impossible division of the integrity of its quality. To the same purport Maxwell said that he did not assert that there was an absolute limit to the divisibility of matter. What he asserted was, that after a body had been divided into a certain finite number of constituent parts, called molecules, any further division of them would deprive them of the properties which gave rise to the phenomena observed in the substance.

The germ of the atomic theory was first stated by Leucippus, a contemporary of Anaxagoras, about B.C. 400. It was taught fifty years afterwards by Democritus, whom Bacon regards as the most scientific of the ancient philosophers, and nearly a century later was more fully developed by Epicurus. The theory was ridiculed and rejected by Aristotle, and nearly all the Greek philosophers, but it seems to have proved attractive to the Roman intellect. The writings of those who held it prior to the age of Lucretius, who died B.C. 55, are lost, so that the only remaining source from whence authentic information can be obtained about it is his poem *De rerum natura*. Bacon, in his treatise *De principiis et originibus*, said that Democritus was a greater man than Plato or Aristotle, although their philosophy was noised and celebrated in the schools, amid the din and pomp of professors. It was not they, according to him, but the barbarians Genseric and Attila who destroyed the atomic philosophy, because at the time when all human learning had suffered shipwreck, the planks of the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy, being lighter and of a more inflated substance, were preserved and transmitted to posterity, while the more solid parts sank and almost passed into oblivion. The atomic theory remained in abeyance till Gassendi rescued it from oblivion, and showed that it afforded the true basis for the scientific study of nature. Subsequently, in the hands of Dalton, who found out the chemical law of multiple proportions, it led to other important discoveries in

the domain of molecular physics, and is now adopted by nearly all scientific men. Professor Huxley has said that if there is one thing clear about the progress of modern science, it is the tendency to reduce all scientific problems, except those that are purely mathematical, to problems in molecular physics: that is to say, to attractions, repulsions, motions and co-ordination of the ultimate particles of matter. The atomic theory is therefore leading to discoveries in science, of which Lucretius, with all his deep insight into nature, could not have formed any conception. Criticizing these speculations, the authors of *The Unseen Universe* say that they represent the most plausible guesses yet propounded as to the ultimate nature of matter.

The ancient atomists anticipated, however darkly, several modern discoveries, which are now fully recognized as facts by scientific men. The guesses of Lucretius were the forerunner of verities which have been extracted from nature by following the Baconian method of obeying her with the view of learning her secrets. Generally speaking, the principles laid down by Lucretius are either true or foreshadow truths which have been brought to light by more recent research. The atomists had a clear conception of the operation of laws in nature, which the late Professor Clifford used to support the Epicurean negation of a Providence, and Professor Tyndall to show the uselessness of prayer, except for personal and individual benefits. To the atomists, the permanence and regularity of natural phenomena became the foundation of speculative inquiry, while in the hands of some scientists it is also used to subordinate religion to their particular theories. Lucretius said that light and liquid were composed of atoms; which has since been ascertained to be true. His 'hooked' (*hamata*) atom was a dim foreshadowing of gravity and cohesion, while his conciliation (*concilium*), invented to bring the atoms into contact, has some connexion with chemical affinity. There are passages in the *De rerum natura* which point to the transformation, conservation, and dissipation of energy as now understood. The Epicurean notion of the atoms falling eternally through space suggested to Kant the nebular hypothesis. The atomists believed that the atoms were always in motion, even in dense bodies, but they did not attempt to calculate the speed, which, under different conditions, has been ascertained by the late Professor Maxwell and others. They had also some idea, however obscure, of specific gravity, of spontaneous generation, evolution, natural selection, and survival of the fittest. Mingled with much that was absurd

and erroneous, with false analogies, and assertions about the atoms which were metaphysical and ridiculous, these and other speculations leave no doubt about the acuteness of the Greek intellect, even when groping its way amid the darkness of the age.

While many of the speculations of the atomists were well founded, there were difficulties in their theory which they either attempted ineffectually to explain, or left entirely unnoticed. In modern times it has proved fertile in discovery in the hands of scientific men, but in several instances it has had the unfortunate effect of landing them in materialism, or even of ousting God from the control of His universe. The ancient atomists assumed that the atoms were in motion from all eternity, flying about in confusion under the influence of blind chance. At first they were supposed to be moving downward in parallel lines, but when the 'declination' took place, and one atom turned aside and struck another in the illimitable void, this originated collisions and conglomerations, which after numerous trials ended in the construction of the world. Motion was communicated by their falling downward by their own weight, Lucretius in this unconsciously assuming the world as the basis, by which to measure direction and velocity. The atoms moved of their own accord, and ultimately the world was generated.

Modern materialistic atomists are forced by their own principles to assume for their atoms eternal motion as Lucretius did. Boscovitch said that matter was made up of atoms, but in a particular sense. Each was an indivisible point, having position in space, and capable of motion. It was a geometrical centre, endowed with potential force, by which was meant that any two atoms could attract or repel each other, in proportion to the distance by which they were separated. This notion was to some extent accepted by Faraday. The idea of substance was abandoned, while the external relations by which alone the atom was capable of making known its presence, were retained. Picton, in *The Mystery of Matter*, putting aside the ordinary conception of atoms as indivisible particles occupying space, and taking up this theory, regards matter as 'accumulated centres of force.' He supposes them capable of interpenetrating one another, and of thus producing a new mode of force—in other words, a new substance. He admits that force is a function of matter as much as motion is, but holds that matter in its ultimate essence is spiritual. He views it as the elementary phenomenal definition, such as consciousness is able to apprehend, of a universal

spiritual power. His theory, therefore, lands him in the untenable position of pure spiritualism. For the impenetrable hardness of the Lucretian atom has been recently substituted its absolute mobility, so that it cannot be conceivably fixed or divided ; which also assumes eternal motion. This is the vortex ring theory of Sir William Thomson, which he supposes to be the true form of the atom. Matter is thus in its ultimate form supposed to consist of the rotating portions of a perfect fluid which continuously fills space. Clifford pronounced it to be as much a fiction as the attracting and repelling points of Boscovitch. The authors of *The Unseen Universe* speak of two forms of energy changing into each other, of which the one is due to actual motion, the other to position, the former being called kinetic, and the other potential energy. Maxwell said that the latter was nonsense in materialism, unless taken to mean configuration and motion. The potentiality when applied to atoms, as understood by them, means a capacity of movement, so that when one comes near enough to another, there is a tendency of each to meet. There is no explanation as to whether this was an original primary self-determining influence, or whether it arose from the mutual attraction or repulsion of a crowd of other atoms. Before the question of the original character of the atoms can be determined, these difficulties must be explained, because actual motion is not a necessary part of the conception of indivisible atoms endowed with force and existing in space. If they are to be of any use at all in producing combination, they must be supposed to be furnished with some sort of potential energy, whether of gravitation, chemical affinity, or of any other higher kind of attraction. If they are supposed to have this original quality, they either passed into motion of their own accord, or received the impulse from an external power. If the former, there is no reason why they should not have been in motion from all eternity, as Lucretius supposed, and if the source of it be in themselves, there was no necessity to wait for time and outward circumstances to develop it. In this case the energy, whether visible or molecular, could never have been potential at all, and must always have been kinetic, which assumes eternal movement, and the eternity of matter. If, on the other hand, the outgoing of potential energy depends on conditions external to itself, as is involved in the very conception of it, the necessity arises for deciding whether this consists in the mutual attraction of particles endowed with it, and for explaining the outward circumstances which brought them into proximity sufficiently near to allow

mutual attraction to come into action. There must be a power which set them in the universe, where their possible energies might come into play, which is of necessity outside the conception of potential energy. Professor Veitch uses the illustration of different pieces of wood in a forest, in each of which there is potential energy, because when rubbed together heat and fire will be produced, but there must be a hand to produce the friction. Transformation of potential into actual energy is the law of the universe, but the conditions irrespective of the manner of development constitute for pure atomists an insuperable difficulty. These are either to be found in contingent circumstances, which leaves the work of creation to chance, as Lucretius left it, or they are to be looked for in some form of Intelligent Power.

After innumerable trials, the atoms, according to Lucretius, who assigned to them some degree of volition, succeeded in forming the world, which thus came into existence by blind chance, teleology being entirely excluded from his system. The gulf between the inorganic and the organic with its vegetable and animal life was not bridged over, nor indeed was any attempt made to do so. The same difficulty confronts the scientific atomists of the present day, who have left no effort untried to meet it. Those of them who believe in a First Cause, as well as those who deny it, are on their own principles equally called upon to solve it. Gassendi, whether from policy or otherwise, acknowledged God as the Creator, but, according to Professor Tyndall, immediately dropped the idea, applying the known laws of mechanics to the atoms, from whence he deduced all vital phenomena. In his view a definite number of molecules were first produced, which were the seeds of all things. Next followed the series of combinations and decompositions which are at present going on and will continue hereafter. The principle of every change resides in matter. In artificial productions the moving principle is different from the materials worked upon, but in nature the agent works within, this being the most active and mobile part of the material itself. Tyndall affirmed that this was substantially the idea propounded by Maxwell in his Discourse on molecules before the British Association at Bradford in 1873, but it is difficult to extract such a notion from it. After discussing the question scientifically, the latter proceeded in the concluding paragraphs to state his views about the origin of matter. He expressed his belief in a First Cause, whose existence he inferred from His works, from the characters of the atoms, and the exact collocation of matter

which they exhibit, which the imagination can readily conceive might have been altogether different. There is no distinct statement in the Address that God afterwards left the molecules by their own inherent forces to evolve human life, the processes of nature, and the organisms of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. What he said was:—‘That matter as such should have certain fundamental properties; that it should exist in space and be capable of motion; that its motion should be persistent, and so on, are truths which may, for anything we know, be of the kind which metaphysicians call necessary. We may use our knowledge of such truths for purposes of deduction, but we have no data for speculating as to their origin.’ This is very far from saying that matter possesses within itself a potency of development, sufficient to produce all the phenomena of nature. Subsequently, in the same Address, he said that natural causes were at work, which tended to modify, if they would not at length destroy, all the arrangements of the earth and the whole solar system. Tyndall thought, if he understood them correctly, that both Gassendi and Maxwell regarded the atoms as prepared materials, which, formed by the skill of the Highest, produce by their subsequent interaction all the phenomena of the material world, which amounts to saying that God created and set the world in motion, leaving it afterwards to develop the powers implanted in it at the outset. But they differed fundamentally, because, while the first assumed the existence of a First Cause, the latter inferred it from the atoms which he called ‘manufactured articles,’ borrowing the expression from Sir John Herschel, but using it in a different sense. In such articles there are three kinds of usefulness, viz. cheapness, serviceableness, and quantitative accuracy. Maxwell thought that by this expression he meant to assert that as a number of exactly similar things could not be each of them eternal and self-existent, they must therefore have been made, and that he used the phrase to suggest that they had been made in great numbers. The sense in which Maxwell used it himself was different from this. What he thought of was, not so much that uniformity of result which is due to uniformity in the process of formation, as a uniformity intended and accomplished by the same wisdom and power, of which accuracy, symmetry, and continuity of plan are as important attributes, as the contrivance of the special utility of each individual thing. He also said that all molecules throughout the universe execute their vibrations in precisely the same time, and bear impressed upon them the stamp of a metric system, as distinctly as does the metre of

the archives of Paris, or the double royal cubit of the temple of Karnac. No theory of evolution can be found to account for the exact similarity of them, because it necessarily implies continuous change, while each atom is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction. None of the processes of nature have produced any difference in their properties, so that it is impossible to ascribe either the existence of the molecules, or the identity of their qualities, to any of the causes commonly called natural. On the other hand, the exact equality of each to all others of the same kind, gives it the essential quality of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. To this reasoning Clifford took exception in a lecture on 'The First and Last Catastrophe,' delivered in the ensuing year. He said that from the evidence that molecules were of exactly the same weight and degree of vibration, all that could be inferred was that, whatever differences there might be, they were too small to be ascertained by the present modes of measurement. The evidence that molecules of a given substance are alike is only approximate. Even supposing that they are exactly alike, it could not be inferred for certain that they had not been evolved, because it is quite possible to conceive, amid the obscurity which hangs over the evolution of organized beings, that there may be other processes which result in a definite number of forms, just as the former has produced a still greater variety. In the present ignorance about the shape of molecules, Clifford said that all that was possible was to show that such experiments as could be made did not afford any evidence that it was absolutely impossible for molecules of matter to have been evolved out of ether by natural processes.

Professor Tyndall, who admits a First Cause, seems, like Gassendi, at once to throw Him overboard, because he uses arguments commonly employed by materialists—seeks to vindicate the theory of evolution irrespective of God, like Epicurus, detaching the Creator from His universe, and in this going beyond Darwin, whose theory does not necessarily dispense with a creator, or lead to the conclusion that the development of the varieties of organic life could ever have arisen out of the reckless play of chance.

Most modern atomists believe that nature contains within herself the powers which ultimately develop themselves in the organisms of vegetable and animal life. Lucretius could only construct the world by the action of chance. They assign to the molecules formative energy, which manifests itself

in the symmetry and order of outward objects. Tyndall has stated the views of the scientists on this matter. While the ancient atomists derived their idea of gravity from falling bodies, they had no conception of molecular polar force. Previous to the discovery of the attraction of gravitation, the attraction of iron by a magnet, and of light bodies by amber, was known. The polarity of magnetism and electricity appealed to the senses, and thus became the foundation of the conception that atoms and molecules are endowed with definite attraction and repellent poles, by the play of which crystals are produced. Molecular force thus becomes structural. After this it was easy to extend its operation into organic nature, and to recognize in it the agency by which plants and animals are built up. Out of experience, therefore, arise conceptions which are entirely beyond its limits. Speaking of the ice crystals and of the growth of an oak, each in perfect symmetry, he supposes that the result is produced by a formative power working within, which in the former was locked up in the drop of water from the very first, and in the latter in the earth, acorn, and sunlight, which by their interaction produced the tree. All this he supposed to result from the inherent 'potency' of matter.

The difficulties stated by Veitch in the way of accepting such a theory of the structure of nature, seem to be insuperable. Are the atoms with their supposed or real powers of mutual attraction and combination sufficient of themselves to account for the synthesis of bodies which has actually taken place in experience? Professor Balfour Stewart has shown that cohesive and chemical combinations depend for their possibility on the relative nearness of their elements. A molecule of sand consists of silicon and oxygen, neither of which is supposed to be capable of further subdivision, because they are regarded as elementary bodies or atoms. Two molecules of sand when near enough together have a strong attraction for each other, and it is this which renders it so difficult to break up a particle of rock crystal. It is only exercised when they are near enough to form a homogeneous structure, and entirely ceases when the distance between them is somewhat increased. From this it appears that molecular cohesion is a force which acts very powerfully through a certain small space, but vanishes altogether when the distance becomes perceptible. The force is strongest in solids, while in liquids it is much diminished, and in gases it ceases to act, because the molecules are so far away from each other as to have little or no mutual attraction. Hence it

follows that there can be no synthesis of elements unless they co-exist within certain limits of space. Is this necessity of co-existence for the formation of matter to be regarded as a new element in the atomic theory? or—which is the only alternative—is it to be regarded as a collocation imposed upon the atoms by an external power?

If force passes into motion and produces synthesis of molecules, as in crystals, and if chemical forces can effect such a combination of atoms as will form new compounds unlike the original elements, another important step still remains to be taken before a complex structure, such as a plant or a tree, can be produced. Every definite form depends only ultimately on the mere force or motion of its molecules. The variety and distinctiveness of organic forms depend, not only on the direction of the motion, but also on direction limited and completed in a unity. Before a plant can assume the symmetry of perfect beauty, each molecule must follow a definite path, must fall into fitness with its neighbour, and rest, as compared with the others, in a final limitation, otherwise there can be no individuality of leaf, or flower, or plant, or tree. This is not implied in the fact that the molecules are mutually attractive, or primary forces capable of passing into motion in any direction whatever. The effect is clearly produced by force working in subordination to an end, the possible varying in space tending steadily to a definite purpose; and if it be incapable in itself of accomplishing it, there must be some power animated by intelligence dominating and regulating the process. After the reality and properties of atoms have been admitted, there remains the difficulty of constructing the world, because scientists cannot explain their modes of motion, or account for their mutually adjusted movements in a given place and time.

Tyndall speaks of the marvellous structural power latent in every drop of water, which only requires the withdrawal of opposing forces to bring it into action, and of the tendency of the ultimate particles of matter to run into the symmetric forms noticed everywhere throughout the world, the very molecules appearing inspired with a desire for union and growth. Instead of seeking for a cause for this phenomenon, he inquires how far this wondrous display of atomic force extends—whether it gives movement to the sap of trees, to the beating of the heart in man, and to the circulation of the blood. The tendency to define matter as the mysterious thing by which each is accomplished, is an illustration of the unwillingness of many scientific men to admit a power acting

in it from without. Tyndall supposes an Omnipresent Formative Power residing in matter; which points, however dimly, to the omnipresence of the Divine Energy, but it is essentially materialistic. The marvellous adaptations and the proofs of design are nothing in his system but the offspring of nature bringing forth, after her own method, all things of herself. Her method is evolution, and no Demiourgos acting at intervals in human fashion is needed. But the notion of a Divine Mechanist who sometimes from without interferes with the laws of nature, and at all other times leaves them to work with inherent energy, is as repugnant to religious thinkers as it is to scientific men.

Referring to the anthropomorphic notion of a Demiourgos, he says that two courses, and two only, are possible. Either the doors must be opened freely to the conception of creative acts, or the common notions of matter must be radically changed. There are either distinct successive acts of creation, interpositions at different stages of this otherwise progressive development, or else a development throughout of the organic from the inorganic, according to the laws of crystalline structure, or chemical combination. Either the Creator interferes, when the necessities of the world require, or it has within itself the potency which carries forward all things without such interference. But the alternative is unfair. By the term 'freely' he would force upon those who differ from him the most vulgar and unscientific of the existing conceptions of creation, while the creation of a limited number of primordial forms would, in his view, involve anthropomorphism as much as the creation of a multitude. Veitch further answers, that the alternative would set up an illegitimate dualism. It is unreasonable to place the unseen or Divine power, supposing it to exist, in a position external to the developing world, and then to imagine that it must act only by interference, interposition, and addition at particular points, thereby forming an erroneous notion of the Deity. This dualism separates the Creator from His universe except at particular times, and interferes with the true notion of God. In evolution, in structural crystallization, in chemical combination, there is a strictly reasonable, though invisible, element which works and renders the object what it is. This power cannot be supposed to have only acted at the beginning to create and set the world in motion, and then to have withdrawn only again to interfere at definite or indefinite intervals. It must be regarded as consecutive and contemporaneous, coexistent with all created things. If it be admitted at all, it is necessarily

always and everywhere, and this obviates the necessity for supposing 'distinct creative acts,' as if nature required the introduction of new elements or forms. Neither is it incompatible with a theory of development viewed as a conception of the progress of inorganic elements. In successive millenniums these would yield increasingly complex forms, inorganic and organic, vegetable and animal, the progress being from the lowest organisms up to man, as standing highest in the scale of creation. This would present the visible and external side of the universe, antecedent and consequent being joined together throughout indefinite duration, thereby affording scope for scientific inquiry and a basis for scientific law. On the other hand, there might coexist with natural evolution, and co-operating with it, an invisible power of reason or will, never deviating from an original plan or breaking in upon it by distinct acts of creation and interposition, but manifesting itself throughout in a harmonious and contemporaneous development of definite idea in structure and combination of life in the germ, of sensation in the animal, and self-consciousness and personality in man. This view of Professor Veitch is at least as reasonable as that of the scientists who make matter coeval with God, and possessed of an energy little short of omnipotent.

The atomistic materialists find themselves confronted with the difficulty of evolving life out of dead matter. They freely admit that it has never been known to have been produced, except from antecedent life. Tyndall acknowledges that he cannot point to any satisfactory experimental proof that such has been the case. Professor Huxley said that the lifeless elements of the protoplasm, carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen, are the same for all organisms, vegetable and animal, but admitted that life has not yet been produced by the synthesis of these elements, although he inclines to the opinion that somehow in the indefinite past it did so arise. Clifford had a similar notion. As the earth was once in a liquid state from physical heat, there could have been nothing but dead matter upon it, which consequently must have been turned somehow into living matter, whether by spontaneous generation or otherwise. Roscoe, speaking of the red blood corpuscles, said that chemists had not been able—and that the evidence at present went to show that there was not much hope of their being able—to construct such granules artificially. So far as science had progressed, the question was in such a position that they had not been able to obtain any organism without the intervention of some sort of previously existing

germ. Bastian's experiments were thought to show that spontaneous generation or *archebiosis*, in the sense of life being produced from dead organic matter, does take place, but no one has shown that it takes place in the sense of *heterogenesis*, or the production of life from the inorganic. The conclusions of Bastian have since been shown to be untenable, by Professor Tyndall, by a series of experiments which he described in the *Nineteenth Century* for January 1878. Sir William Grove, in his presidential address before the British Association at Nottingham in 1866, said that the result of careful experiments by two French philosophers was that no living organisms could be formed from matter. If heterogeny or the development of them without generation from parents of similar structure could obtain at all, searching investigations showed that it must be confined to the more simple organic forms of life, and that all which are progressive and more highly developed are generated by reproduction. That dead matter cannot produce a living organism is therefore the universal experience of the most eminent physiologists. In fact the law of *biogenesis* is justly regarded by Huxley and others as the great principle underlying all the phenomena of organized existence.

From whence, then, is life derived by the scientific atomists? Divorced from matter, where is it to be found? asks Professor Tyndall. Whatever faith may say, knowledge shows them to be indissolubly joined. Tracing the line of life backwards, it approaches more and more to what is called the purely physical condition, when organisms of the simplest type are reached, like the *protogenes* of Haeckel, in which there is a form distinguishable from a fragment of albumen only by its finely granular character. Can we pause here? he asks. If a magnet be broken, two poles are found in each of its fragments, and if the process of breaking be continued, however small they become, the original polarity continues. When further subdivision is impossible, the intellectual vision can be extended to the polar molecules. Is there not a necessity for doing something similar in the case of life? Is there not a temptation to agree to some extent with Lucretius when he affirms that nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself, without the meddling of the gods? or with Bruno when he declared that matter was not that mere empty capacity which philosophers imagined her to be, but the universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her womb? Believing in the continuity of nature, he could not stop where microscopes ceased to be of use. In this case the vision of

the mind authoritatively supplemented the vision of the eye. By an intellectual necessity he crossed the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discovered in matter the promise and potency of all terrestrial life. Scientific men draw the line from the highest organisms through the lower down to the lowest, and the prolongation of it by the intellect beyond the range of the senses leads them to the conclusion which Bruno so boldly enunciated. The whole process of evolution is the manifestation of a power absolutely inscrutable to the intellect of man. It is by the operation of an insoluble mystery that life on earth is evolved, species differentiated, and mind unfolded from the prepotent elements in the immeasurable past. The phenomena of physical nature have their roots in a cosmical life, an infinitesimal span of which is offered to the investigation of man.

In his apology for the Belfast Address before the British Association, he said that, with Kant, Laplace, and Sir William Herschel, and the best scientists of the day, he believed in the nebular theory. According to it, the sun and planets were once diffused through space as an impalpable haze, from which the solar system arose by condensation. The mist was condensed by heat, and the heavenly bodies became orbicular by molecular force. For æons, the number of which the human imagination cannot grasp, the earth was unfit to support beings endowed with life. It is now covered with living beings, and the question arises how they were introduced? Was life implicated in the nebula, as part of a vaster and wholly unfathomable life? or was it the work of a Being acting outside the nebula, who fashioned and vitalized it, but whose origin and ways are past finding out? As far as the eye of science, says Tyndall, has hitherto ranged through nature, an intrusion of purely creative power into any series of phenomena has never been observed. The assumption of such a power is opposed to the very spirit of science. In another place, while holding to the importance of science as an instrument of intellectual culture, and a ministrant to the material wants of man, he affirms that it has neither solved, nor is it likely to solve, the problem of the origin of the universe. The question still remains unanswered, and science makes no attempt to answer it, because there is no quality in the human intellect which can be applied to its solution. As life prevails on the earth, it is therefore useless to attempt to account for its origin on any principle known to science.

While the scientist can explain to some extent the methods of nature, he leaves out of account the Power which works

with and through them. Tyndall simply asserts that the force immanent in matter is matter, which is nothing but an affirmation incapable of proof. It is irrelevant to show that it is attached to material media and organisms, which his opponents do not deny, because the intellect discerns besides, the movements of matter, with their disposing and formative power, and the attracting and repellent energies which, dealing with molecules, crystals, and magnets, are essentially distinct from them. Science deals only with the sequences of phenomena, and not with dynamic ideas. It may describe the formation of crystals and icicles in all their perfection, with the view of shutting out an efficient and intelligent Cause, but this is nothing more than the enumeration of the laws which It has impressed upon them, and a description of its external action. Science can deal with atoms in the abstract, ascertaining with comparative ease their weight, qualities, and shape, as things to be considered in certain mutual relations, but it cannot answer the question as to how they became combined. The difficulties of the atomic theory of the world do not lie so much in the properties of the molecules as in their modes of motion, and in the way in which life is said to have been evolved from dead inorganic matter. The energies of which science speaks, are only the external successions of phenomena, while to tell what it is which works within is equally beyond its province and ability.

The same difficulty arises at every step. Darwin imagined the world at the beginning to be full of dead matter, in the midst of which there was one primordial living form, capable of self-development so as to produce the varieties of nature. Tyndall seems to regard matter as having within it the principle of life, and able to evolve from itself living organisms of every sort; thereby throwing the difficulty one step further back, because the source must be explained from whence it derived this power. If the successions of phenomena prove that it is animated, there must be some originating cause; for it is unreasonable and contrary to all experience to suppose that life and motion can come out of dead inorganic matter. He admits the existence of God, but he hesitates to say that matter received its powers from Him; and if it did not, the only possible conclusion is that it is eternal, which leads either to a dualism detaching the Deity from His universe, or making God and matter identical. The same result is inevitable, if the assumption of science be true, that the intrusion of creative power at any stage, even previous to the appearance of the sup-

posed nebular mist, is contrary to experience and intellectual necessity.

Dealing with his positions about an intellectual necessity and the inscrutableness of the process of evolution, Veitch endeavoured to show that they were inconsistent, and could not be maintained by anyone who had sufficiently realized the meaning of each. If there be an intellectual necessity which leads back beyond the lowest organism to the source of its life, the whole process should be perfectly clear. If the intellect can prolong continuity backwards into this region, the mystery of life is solved. It is because it cannot, that there is a mystery. To hold along with this necessity that the whole process of evolution is the manifestation of a power absolutely inscrutable to the intellect of man, is therefore an inconsistency.

The prolongation of the line by the intellect beyond the range of the senses, which leads to the conclusion of the potency of matter to evolve from itself life and mind, is apparently called by Professor Tyndall 'the continuity of nature.' This doctrine, which is prevalent among scientific men, was expounded by Sir William Grove in his presidential address at Nottingham, in which he supposed that it was a natural law dominating the universe upwards, and in infinity downwards, as shown by the microscope, and that it was the true expression of almighty power. While professing himself unable to explain why matter is endowed with a tendency to gradual structural formation, he did not look for special interventions of creative power in effecting changes which are difficult to understand, because, being beyond the limits of time, the concomitants of them were lost. The authors of *The Unseen Universe* accept it as the basis of their speculations. Without giving any direct definition of it, or showing the grounds on which they supposed it to rest, they furnished illustrations of its operations from astronomy, with the view of accounting for the origin of life, energy, and matter. Ultimately, they arrived at the conclusion that the law of continuity, which implies that there is no possibility of being carried from the conditioned to the unconditioned, involves the conservation of energy and the principle of *biogenesis*, in virtue of which, the appearance of a living being in the universe denotes the existence of an antecedent possessing life, or of an agent whose function it is to develop it. As understood by them, it implies continuous transformation of physical antecedent into consequent, without break or direct creative interference from God, and an unbroken series of conditioned

and conditioning in the visible universe, going back to the first atom and germ of life, followed by a gradual evolution and development in time, warranting the position that the first appearance of them is to be referred, not to an act of creation, but to a physical condition previously existing in an invisible universe, or a supersensible sphere of being. An act of creation in time would be a break of continuity. It must be supposed to have taken place behind and beyond the invisible sphere, out of which arose the primordium of existing things, which of necessity involves such a break, so that either this took place, or the atoms, and consequently matter, must be regarded as eternal.

Without defining what he meant by continuity, Tyndall said that it led him by an intellectual necessity to believe in the potency of matter to originate life. To this it may be replied that continuity of nature, not being a matter of experience, only shifts the difficulty backwards into the unknown and unknowable. If the theory were established in a satisfactory manner, it would probably show that the present visible universe is united to preceding and possibly indefinite lines of past systems, while, so far from explaining, it would only remove it farther back. It would then require to be explained, as in the case of the visible world, from whence the order, the laws, and life of the elements composing them had been derived, and how they became possessed of the power to originate life. The difficulty is caused by the nature of the material of our system. Life cannot now be got from it by any known process, or from anything except pre-existent life. It is therefore useless to prolong the existence of matter or energy backwards through millions of years, as if an intellectual difficulty, arising out of the quality of them, could be thereby solved. It is only put back into the illimitable past, but not removed or explained. Neither will the illustration of the nebular hypothesis help him, because it is only an unproved theory, and will not account for the way in which life may be supposed to have become mingled with the solar mist. In fact, it rather contradicts it, because if for thousands of years, during the process of cooling, the earth was too hot for living organisms to exist upon it, when inorganic matter became fit for habitation, life, on the showing of the scientists themselves, must have been derived from some other source.

Tyndall affirmed that evolution was the manifestation of an inscrutable power, and the operation of an insoluble mystery, by which life on earth was evolved. This assumes

that there is a power which operates on this principle, and that it is inscrutable. It is true that the method of its operation cannot be explained, because it is impossible in thought to ascertain the point from which it works, and from thence to conceive the evolution of organisms. But the line of its operation, supposing it to exist, suggests the idea of definite ends, and an intelligent agent, while on the atomic theory the evidences of design are only the offspring of nature bringing forth all things after her own method. It appears, however, that there is some sort of connexion between the power working in the phenomena of the world, and the laws and processes of the intelligence through which alone the very conception of them is possible. If there be an analogue of it in the universe, the principle of things cannot be pronounced an insoluble mystery, and absolutely inscrutable. It is not a greater mystery than the working of thought, yet this is not regarded as either incognizable or unreal.

In opposition to Tyndall's theory of the potency of matter, Dr. Carpenter has attempted to show that through what he calls the force sense there is obtained a direct cognition of force, as immediate and direct as the cognition of motion, and that it is one of the universal ideas, which belong to every human mind. Employing an illustration to make his notion clear, he compared the position of man as a student of nature to that of a person studying the machinery of a cotton factory, without knowing anything about the power which moved it. Fixing his attention upon a single machine, the student might suppose that it moved by its own inherent power, doing certain work in a particular direction. Occasionally one or other machine might stop and then go on again, when the person in charge of the works disconnected its axis from a leather band running round a longitudinal shaft at the end of the building, apparently essential to the working of the machinery, the observer not being able as yet to understand why it was so. Laying hold of the band, he at once became conscious, through his force sense, that it was an instrument conveying power, and that so far from any one machine being possessed of inherent energy, the source of it lay in the shaft. Seeing that all the machines derived their motion from it, he might ask himself whether it had the power in itself, or whether it derived the motion from some ulterior source. While occupying himself with these questions, both machinery and shaft suddenly stop, but after a little time go on again, without the interference of any visible agency; from which he might feel himself justified in supposing

that in the latter there was some inherent potency of motion. Not wishing to leave anything uninvestigated, he goes round to the other side of the wall, and there finds that one end of the shaft comes through it, and is set in motion by a steam engine. Its force is derived from coal, and that of the latter from solar radiation; and, if there be further inquiry into the source of the sun's energy, a wall is at length reached to the other side of which there is at present no access. But, asks Carpenter, is there no other side? Does not the illustration show how unsatisfactory is the doctrine of the inherent potency of matter, as the ultimate explanation of the existing kosmos? If the man is thought to be foolish who supposes the main shaft of a cotton mill to turn of itself, because he sees it apparently to end in a wall which conceals from him the engine which moves it, are not the scientists chargeable with equal folly when they attribute self-motion to the ultimate molecules of matter, because the power which moves them is concealed from view? They confound law and force, and then attribute the latter to the phenomena of matter, because they are unable to go behind the wall and find out the source from whence it comes.

The atomic theory also breaks down in the effort to account for the origin of sensation. Lucretius and modern scientists are equally unable to meet this central difficulty of materialism. The former sought to refine the atoms to such an extent as almost to amount to what might be called spirit, but still the solution of it was not found. It is impossible to conceive how sensation could come from the most minute soul-atoms of any shape, and moving in any direction. Even supposing them to be individually sentient, no one can explain how isolated sensations of atoms, separated by a void, could be combined into one personal consciousness. The answer attempted by Lucretius was, that it exists only in the organism considered as a whole, made up of soul and flesh together, and not severally in its parts. His fundamental principle was, however, that the sentient is developed out of the non-sentient, his meaning being limited to the position that it is not possible for sensation to proceed from anything under any circumstance, but that much depends on the fineness, shape, motion and arrangement of matter, whether it shall produce a capacity of feeling. But this notion of an organic animal body is the introduction of a new metaphysical principle alongside atoms and void. The sensation of the whole cannot be a mere consequence of any possible sensation of the individual atoms, because out of the otherwise impossible

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summation of the dead molecules, no sensation in the whole can arise.

In his paper on *Virchow and Evolution*, Tyndall fully admitted the difficulty and the impossibility of explaining it. Asking, What is the causal connexion between the objective and the subjective, between molecular motions and states of consciousness? he answers: 'I do not see the connexion, nor am I acquainted with anybody who does. It is no explanation to say that the objective and the subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Why should it have two sides? This is the very core of the difficulty. There are molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think and feel when it runs into frost ferns on the window pane? If not, why should the molecular motion of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion, consciousness? We can form a coherent picture of the purely physical processes—the stirring of the brain, the thrilling of the nerves, the discharging of the muscles, and all the subsequent motions of the organism. We are here dealing with the mental problems which are mentally presentable.' But we can form no picture of the process whereby consciousness emerges either as a necessary link, or as an accidental by-product of this series of actions.' Elsewhere in the same paper he says: 'We may affirm that the brain of man, the organ of reason, without which he can neither think nor feel, is an assemblage of molecules acting and reacting according to law. Here, however, the methods pursued in chemical science come to an end, and if asked to deduce from the interaction of the brain molecules the least of the phenomena of sensation or of thought, I acknowledge my helplessness. The association of the matter of both with the matter of the brain may be as certain as the association of light with the rising of the sun. But whereas, in the latter case, we have unbroken mechanical connexion between the sun and the organs, in the former, logical continuity disappears. Between molecular mechanics and consciousness is interposed a fissure, over which the ladder of physical reasoning is incapable to carry us.' Referring to this passage, one of Tyndall's critics said, that scientists like him recognize this chasm, which their ladder is too short to cross, under an illusion common to those who limit their studies to physical nature. They place themselves, in idea, on the wrong side of the gap. They think they can approach the problems of mind from the side of matter, and try in vain to lay the plank across.

The Epicurean doctrine of free will involved Lucretius in

the necessity of attributing it to the atoms also. He could not explain this principle in human beings, who were the highest produce of atomic evolution, unless it were present from the first in the molecules of which they were formed. If men have free will, then matter from whence they came must have it also, since nothing can come from nothing. Speaking of the mind-atoms, he distinguished between external and internal necessity. The minute mind-atoms, by their natural gravity, would offer a certain amount of resistance to blows from without—by which he meant the necessity which reigns everywhere in nature. But although external weight was of less importance, still it was fatal within the mind, and would hopelessly imprison it. Therefore, if it were to be free, the atoms composing it must possess free will, because nothing else could deliver it from necessity. Declination exists everywhere in the atoms composing all forms of matter. It operates in its formation, and at the same time gives to the soul the power to exercise free will. If man can move at will, the atom must be able to move with equal freedom, and if it move at free will, it may swerve from the perpendicular line of necessity, whereby the falling atoms are brought into contact. This was the Epicurean reasoning which both explained free will and accounted for the origin of the world. Lucretius strengthened his argument by appealing to personal consciousness of effort, thereby anticipating the modern objection to necessity, that we are free because we feel ourselves to be so. The vividness and directness of the feeling are such that no arguments from necessity can do away with the consciousness of freedom. But the absurdity of attributing acts of volition to dead atoms remains. As they move of their own accord as if they were alive, the only possible conclusion is that the theory involved pantheism, perhaps in its lowest form, although Lucretius insisted in one place that matter was utterly dead; and in another, in order to support his doctrine of free will, virtually conceived it as living.

A theory substantially the same, but more subtle, borrowed from Wundt, was propounded by the late Professor Clifford in his doctrine of mind-stuff, which is parallel with that of atomic declination. It had, however, been anticipated by Gassendi, two centuries before. The idea of the latter was that whatever existed in the fire existed also in the wood, although in a latent state, and that whatever substance there is in the soul, which moves in the body of an animal, first existed in the food, or whatever other matter produced it. He

recognized in plants a weak form of hunger and appetite, as shown in the assimilation of food ; taste and touch, as seen in their preferring the nutriment of one soil to another ; and pleasure, as shown in their joyful outburst in the spring, after their wintry sleep. In plants he found traces of habit, and in inanimate matter, such as the magnet, something like consciousness, which by a kind of desire attracts iron. He thought that there must be in the latter a soul, or something analogous to it, and that this, both in it and in plants, was a foreshadowing of consciousness, which he traced from the lowest organisms, through shell-fish and worms, up to the highest. Nature is not accustomed to pass from one extreme to another, except through intermediate stages. The fruits of trees become sweet from bitter, fragrant from scentless, yellow from green, by a gradation so imperceptible that at the beginning nothing is discerned of the quality which is to be developed, and in the end generally nothing of what was at the beginning, so that it is possible to conceive that unconscious matter may become conscious by an exactly similar gradation, not, however, within human power to trace. All living things, even the meanest, which are spontaneously generated, arise from seminal molecules which have existed either from the beginning of the world, or from a later date, because it cannot be absolutely said that conscious things come from unconscious, but rather from particles which, although they do not actually possess consciousness, yet are, or contain, the elements of consciousness. Gassendi distinguished between non-conscious atoms and molecules possessing some faint traces of the rudiments of sensation, but he did not attempt to explain the difficulty insuperable to the earlier and later atomists, of which he does not seem to have formed an adequate conception.

Clifford's theory of mind-stuff is contained in his essays on *Body and Mind*, and on *The Nature of Things in Themselves*. He admitted that the subject was obscure, that it was difficult to make out what others who held it meant by it, and, baffled by the subtlety of his own speculations, that he was not sure of his own meaning. Masson has attempted to give a summary of it, admitting at the same time that the process of reasoning by which Clifford endeavoured to maintain his view, was exceedingly difficult to understand.

According to the latter, along with every fact of consciousness there is some disturbance of nerve matter. When a man is conscious of anything there is something outside him, which is matter in motion corresponding to something

inside, having the same substance and property. Both are made of the same stuff. The object outside, and the optic ganglion are both matter, which consists of molecules moving about in ether. Whenever the optic ganglion of the brain is disturbed, because certain pieces of grey matter have arranged themselves there in the form of a square, the consciousness of a square is produced in the mind. There are therefore two classes of facts which always run parallel, the one being physical, and the other mental. But there are also lower and less complex feelings than those which go to make up consciousness. 'If we accept the doctrine of evolution at all,' says Clifford, 'the only thing that we can come to is, that even in the very lowest organisms, even in the Amœba which swims about in our own blood, there is something or other inconceivably simple to us, which is of the same nature with our own consciousness, although not of the same complexity—that is to say (for we cannot stop at organic matter, knowing as we do that it must have arisen by continual physical processes out of inorganic matter) we are obliged to assume, in order to save continuity in our belief, that along with every motion of matter, whether organic or inorganic, there is some fact which corresponds to the mental fact in ourselves. The mental fact in ourselves is an exceedingly complex thing, so also our brain is an exceedingly complex thing. We may assume that the quasi-mental fact which corresponds and goes along with every motion of every particle of matter, is of such inconceivable simplicity, as compared with our own mental fact, with our consciousness, as the motion of a molecule of matter is of inconceivable simplicity when compared with the motion in our brain.'¹ The fundamental deliverance of consciousness is the affirmation of its own complexity. When a stream of feelings is so compact together, that at each instant it consists of new feelings, of fainter repetitions of previous ones, and of links connecting them together, it is called a consciousness. Every feeling is a most complex structure, built up from a great many elementary ones, just as the action of the brain is made up of a great many elementary actions in different parts of it grouped together in the same ways. Each of the former corresponds to a special comparatively simple change of nerve matter. According to Clifford, a feeling can exist by itself, without forming part of a consciousness. If the line be followed backward from the organic to the inorganic, and if the complexity of the organism is proportional to that of the con-

¹ *Lectures and Essays*, vol. ii. p. 61.

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sciousness, where is the line to be drawn? He said that it is impossible to indicate a point where any sudden break takes place, and that it is contrary to all the natural training of the mind to suppose a break of continuity so great. But there is a certain indefinite point at which it is permitted to infer facts out of the consciousness corresponding to them. 'There is only one way out of the difficulty, and to that we are driven. Consciousness is a complex of ejective¹ facts—of elementary feelings, or rather of those remoter elements which cannot even be felt, but of which the simplest feeling is built up. Such elementary ejective facts go along with the action of every organism, however simple; but it is only when the material organism has reached a certain complexity of nervous structure (not now to be specified), that the complex of ejective facts reaches that mode of complication which is called Consciousness. But as the line of ascent is unbroken, and must end at the last in inorganic matter, we have no choice but to admit that every motion of matter is simultaneous with some ejective fact or event, which might be part of a consciousness. From this it follows that a feeling can exist by itself without forming part of a consciousness. It does not depend for its existence on the consciousness of which it may form a part.'² The element of which even the simplex feeling is a complex, Clifford called *Mind-stuff*. 'A moving molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to form the film on the under side of a jelly-fish, the elements of mind-stuff which go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of Sentience.'³

Subsequently Clifford sought to show that the reality which underlies all matter is the same stuff which when compounded together produces mind. The universe consists entirely of mind-stuff, being nothing but the reality of that which is perceived as matter, a mental picture in which it is the thing represented. There is no matter without something like mind behind it, so that it is mind-stuff in the interior side.

All this is very obscure, and does not by any means explain the origin of consciousness. Every mental feeling is made up of facts so exceedingly simple, that they can be perceived only in groups. If a single elementary feeling does not con-

¹ By the word 'ejects,' Clifford wished to distinguish feelings or things *thrown out* of the conscience, from 'objects,' things presented in the consciousness.

² *Lectures and Essays*, vol. ii. p. 84.

³ *Ibid.* p. 85.

stitute consciousness, how can a complexity of such feelings produce it? If the molecules possess each some degree of feeling, does this account for the conviction of personality? The materialist cannot explain the origin of consciousness and free will from dead atoms without a break in the continuity of development, and the entrance of a new energy. The only way of evading the difficulty is by supposing that they are not actually dead, and that they contain in a faint and weak form the faculties of consciousness, which are ultimately evolved in their highest form in man. In the same way Clifford constructed the mind out of atoms of mind-stuff, which he supposed to contain something analogous to mind, and to exist by themselves as elementary feelings. Lucretius could only explain free will by attributing it to the atoms. The reasoning of Clifford, starting from a similar standpoint, was substantially the same, so that the theories of atomic declination and mind-stuff are parallel, and must stand or fall together.

As far as space has permitted, we have considered some of the more recent developments of the atomic theory. Its proper sphere is the domain of physics, where it has already led to important discoveries in science, and may hereafter lead to others of still greater importance. Professor Tyndall, in his lecture on *Matter and Force*, delivered to the working men of Dundee, said that it ought to be known and avowed that the physical philosopher as such must be a pure materialist. His inquiries deal with matter and force, and with them alone. When scientific men overpass the limit which separates the atomic theory from metaphysics, they involve themselves in difficulties which they are unable to explain. Hitherto the conflict between them and Christian divines has hardly been waged on equal terms, because the one cannot and ought not to see anything in their own department but what their science teaches them; while the others, holding perhaps too tenaciously to traditional interpretations of Scripture, are sometimes tempted to regard their opponents as materialists or even atheists. When science has furnished indisputable evidence of its discoveries, and established its theories on an irrefragable basis, reconciliation with revelation need not be despaired of.



ART. IV.—NONCONFORMIST OBJECTIONS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT.

1. *Essays on the Church.* By a LAYMAN. (London, 1859.)
2. *Conversations on Church Establishments: The Liberationist Prize Essay.* By JOHN GUTHRIE. (London, 1867.)
3. *The Church and State Question as settled by the Ministry of our Lord and the Apostles.* By ROBERT VAUGHAN. (London, 1867.)
4. *Standard Essays on State Churches.* (London, 1867.)
5. *Denominational Statistics of England and Wales.* By E. G. RAVENSTEIN. (London, 1870.)
6. *Ecclesia: Church Problems considered in a series of Essays.* Edited by H. R. REYNOLDS. (London, 1870.)
7. *Essays on Church and State.* By A. P. STANLEY, Dean of Westminster. (London, 1870.)
8. *Three Essays on the Maintenance of the Church of England as an Established Church: The Peek Prize Essays.* (London, 1874.)
9. *Disestablishment.* By GEORGE HARWOOD. (London, 1876.)
10. *Articles in the 'Contemporary Review.'*
11. *Letters on Disestablishment in the 'Times' in October and November, 1885.*

BEFORE dealing with some of the arguments for Disestablishment now commonly used by Liberationists, it is necessary to determine the meaning of terms, because amid the din of controversy, the same word is frequently employed to denote different ideas, as the necessities of disputants seem to require. Political Nonconformists employ terms with a meaning to suit their own purposes, which Churchmen will by no means allow to be a true description of Church and State, as now used to describe the position of the religion established in England. With the idea of the spiritual church as One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Invisible, the present controversy has no concern, because Anglican Churchmen, while believing themselves collectively to be a visible branch of it, are not called upon to argue in favour of its future external establishment in all the kingdoms of the earth, as predicted in prophecy, which incidentally furnishes a powerful argument against the assertion of some Nonconformists, that when Church and State are amalgamated, the former is degraded and obstructed by the

connexion. Neither is it concerned with the Church in the sense of a number of exclusive persons assembling in a Zion or a Little Bethel, and calling themselves a true church of Christ, absolutely independent of the civil power, although established in the sense of legal protection for their worship, and the property held under trust-deeds for particular purposes; or with any number of such churches collectively united in organizations like the Congregational and Baptist Unions. Mr. Eustace Conder in his essay on *Church and State in Ecclesia*, said that Christianity might exist without being embodied in a church, and without any organized society of Christians, which, whether scriptural or not, is a view never yet acted upon in any age, or by any religionists. The Church, in this controversy, must be taken to mean a body of Christians held together as one Communion by a system of polity and doctrine, altogether different from the collection of independent atoms which meet in a Nonconformist conference or annual meeting. It is the Church in the sense of an external organization, now commonly called the Establishment, of which the members in their religious character, enjoying certain rights and privileges and the use of certain property for ecclesiastical purposes, are protected by law. The system is older than the State in its present form, and constitutes an organic part of it.

Controversialists are not consistent in the meaning which they attach to the term State. At one time it is used in the sense of the Crown, or the Government of the day; but this is a view clearly inapplicable at the present time, because the Sovereign, being bound by law to be in communion with the Church of England, is therefore only a unit of it, and, although exercising certain powers in her administrative capacity, through her Ministers, cannot in any real sense be called the State. Neither can the Government for the time being be so regarded; because they only wield the powers of the State in their representative capacity, as a committee of the majority in Parliament. By neither the Sovereign, nor the Government of the day, was the Church placed in her present privileged position, so that some other meaning must be found for the term in this connexion. The State is a complex idea, comprising the whole civil polity of the nation, as distinguished from the ecclesiastical and spiritual. It is the nation organized for political, administrative, social, and economic purposes. It includes every individual without exception, because all are under its control, and amenable to its laws. Viewed in this light, the union of Church and State

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is an unfortunate and misleading expression, which first came into use about the middle of the seventeenth century, because it implies that the ecclesiastical polity and civil constitution of the nation were at one time distinct, and that at some time a union took place, of which history, however, makes no mention. If the same person can be a citizen and a churchman at the same time, enjoying religious and civil privileges, in this idea lies the germ of the relationship now existing between Church and State, which began when Ethelbert was converted to Christianity by S. Augustine, and has prevailed throughout the whole history of the nation. Liberationist attacks upon what is popularly called the union, are therefore assaults upon what does not and never has existed.

The cry now raised for Disestablishment emanates from Nonconformists. The term can only be understood by ascertaining what is meant by the Establishment; but upon the meaning of it there is little agreement either among the friends of the Church, or their opponents. The investigation involves an examination of the theories of Church and State which have been invented at different times to explain or account for the connexion as it now exists. Against these theories the attacks of Liberationists are frequently directed, who erroneously suppose that by demolishing them they are thereby overthrowing the principle of state churches in general, and that of the Church of England in particular. One of the best known of these theories is that of Warburton, who, basing his idea upon the so-called 'social compact,' which had been invented to account for the origin of society, supposed that there was an alliance of Church and State for the advantage of each, with partial toleration for Dissenters. This was only a speculation to which he did not adhere rigidly throughout his work, because in some places he used it interchangeably with the *union of Church and State*, which suggests an entirely different idea. It is unhistorical, and has been long since abandoned by nearly all theorists. The theory of Paley was similar, except that he proposed absolute toleration for Dissenters, which is now the law. He said that a religious establishment comprised the clergy, a legal provision for their maintenance, and the limitation of it to the teachers of a particular sect of Christianity. This implies that the State, by which he seems to have meant the Government, is external to the Church, and that a legal provision was made at some time for the clergy by it, which is again unhistorical. In more recent times the late Dean Stanley, having before his mind the manifold aspects under which the existing Estab-

blishment may be viewed, said that its principle was included in two essential features—the first being the recognition and support by the State of some religious expression of the community, and the second that it should be controlled by the State. This attempt to describe the principle of an establishment is unsatisfactory, because it would involve the State in the obligation of deciding between the claims of rival sects, for which it is incompetent, and because it is unhistorical and inapplicable to the present Church of England, which was never chosen by the ruling power in preference to any other sect. The former part of the definition is one of the theories against which Liberationist writers have directed their most vehement objections, urging that the State cannot decide between the claims of sects competing for establishment. They fall to the ground when confronted with historical facts. A subsequent writer in the first of the Peek prize essays defined an Established Church to be a Church in possession of endowments and property, secured to her by law. According to him the Irish Church, which was allowed by Parliament to retain some part of her property, is still established, although crippled in her resources. This theory is worked out elaborately, and supported by numerous arguments; but when brought to the test of fact and reality, it collapses like a house of cards. If it were sound, the Nonconformist churches in England which possess property under trust-deeds are established, because the terms can be enforced by law, which was the opinion of Josiah Conder. Many of the difficulties which now attend the cry for Disestablishment, would on this theory disappear, because the confiscation of the property of the Church would settle the question without further trouble. If there were no endowments there could be no State Church, and the Church which retained them would be established even though it were disconnected from the State. It would also be necessary on this theory to determine what proportion of the ancient endowments, after Disestablishment, would entitle a Church, liberated from the control of the State, to be regarded as established; which cannot be determined. The fallacy of the definition lies in regarding property as the essence of an establishment, whereas it is only an accident, because if the endowments of the present State Church were confiscated, and she were allowed to retain her other privileges to the exclusion of Dissenters, she would be still established.

Harwood defined a State Church to be a Church under the control of the State, of which it is only a department entrusted with the duty of offering ministrations of religion to all, without

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forcing them upon any. A National Church, according to him, means a Church teaching the religion which a nation actually holds, not that which it ought to hold. Whatever be the faith which it accepts, whether Mohammedanism, Christianity, or any other, that is the form of belief which ought to be supported by the State. Parliament, which controls other national affairs, is complete master of the Church, and can, if the nation wishes, make any changes it pleases in its doctrine and arrangements.

This is naked Erastianism, borrowed from Hobbes. In the definition the State is taken to mean the Government, but immediately after the author uses it in the sense of the nation, because he says that the State *means* the nation as a political organization, and the Church the nation as a religious organization, putting both on a footing of equality, whereas in the definition one is regarded as subordinate to the other. There is a further difficulty, that in the existing relations between Church and State, the former is not really controlled by the latter either in her worship or internal organization. It is the law which was enacted by Churchmen in Parliament for the regulation of their religious concerns and security of their own religious liberties, carried into effect by the bishops and other appointed officials, which governs the Church. This is also a Liberationist fallacy which, while assuming that the Church and the State in the sense of the Government are distinct organizations composed of different persons, makes it the ground of a series of objections which fall of themselves when the truth is correctly stated. It includes such objections as that the Church is in bondage to the State, that her work is defiled and impeded by it, that the clergy are paid by the State, and others of a similar kind, all of which are based on this error.

The theory prevalent among most Churchmen immediately before and since the Reformation, has been that Church and State are identical. The nation and the Church are one, and for that reason the Sovereign is supreme in both. Every individual is supposed to be a member of the Church into which he was baptized. It is pre-supposed, and in some cases affirmed, in the Acts of Parliament affecting the Church from the time of Henry VIII., and is always assumed in those statutes which have granted privileges and exemptions to Nonconformists. It was held by Cranmer, by Whitgift against Cartwright, by Overall in his *Convocation Book*, and more fully elaborated, and placed on a sound basis, by Hooker. Subsequently it was re-asserted and vindicated by Jeremy

Taylor, and in later times by Arnold of Rugby, and Dean Stanley. It commended itself so strongly to Hobbes that he propounded it in his *Leviathan*, but vitiated by certain doctrines about the power of the Sovereign in the Church, which no Churchman would now accept. Hallam said that his theory was not far removed from the doctrine of Hooker, and still less from the practice of Henry VIII. Even Shaftesbury, in his *Characteristics*, has propounded it, so that he also is against the modern Nonconformists. Their only real objection to it is that when the fact is regarded, the theory becomes unreal, because there are in the nation thousands and possibly millions of Nonconformists. Still there can be no doubt that while the Establishment did not develop itself in the progress of years from any theory, those who governed the Church in Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-Norman, Plantagenet, and Tudor times, regarded every Englishman as a member of it, and entitled to its ministrations. Nonconformity really began at the Reformation, because the Lollards and the followers of Wycliff in the fourteenth century, while agitating for the reforms of ecclesiastical abuses, did not separate themselves from the Church. The late Dean Stanley ironically described Dissenters as non-conforming members of the Established Church. Although now in a state of unjustifiable schism, they are at liberty to return whenever they can see their error; and no one, as the law stands at present, has any power to close the churches against them, because the theory now holds good as much as it did in the reign of Henry, when it was embodied in the preamble to the statute '*For the restraint of appeals*' to Rome.

Objections against the Establishment have been classified into religious, political, and social; but the division must be regarded as made only for the sake of convenience, and not as an accurate classification, because religion, politics, and sociology are so intermingled in the present condition of human life, that in the case alike of the individual and the community, they cannot be dissociated from each other; or, if dissociated, not without serious injury to each. Politics without religion become degraded. Religion without politics loses its vigour; and social life, when dis severed from both, sinks into meanness and demoralization. The erroneous idea that politics and religion should be separated is the foundation of many objections to the Establishment, and is practically admitted to be incorrect by the Nonconformists themselves, when they make Zions and Zoars centres of political activity for compassing the overthrow of the national Church. A

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more reasonable division of the objections classifies them into those which are directed against the principle of the Establishment, and into those which are directed against its accidents. If the former cannot be answered, the position of its defenders is untenable; but even if the whole of the latter were admitted to be valid, they would collectively constitute only an argument for the reform of abuses, and not for the overthrow of the Established Church.

In the conduct of the argument against the objections of Liberationists, it must never be forgotten that the Establishment, as they represent it for controversial purposes, and the amalgamation of Church and State, as it now actually exists, are very different things. Objections against the latter only are deserving of notice, because those directed against the former fall of themselves, as soon as the real origin, history, and present position of the Establishment are pointed out. Many of them are based on ambiguous terms, or on terms used in an erroneous sense, and then the finger of Liberationist scorn is triumphantly pointed at the Established Church of England, as based on a wrong foundation, and little better than a collection of abuses, of which it is confidently affirmed that the days are numbered. Such difficulties in like manner disappear when a definition of the true meaning emasculates the objection.

The absence of any attempt to disprove the principles of the Establishment from the Old Testament, is a remarkable fact in this controversy. Hooker based his theory of the identity of Church and State upon the principle of the Jewish model, in which each was so amalgamated with the other that separation between them was impossible. The argument is that an amalgamation of Church and State which was appointed and developed under the direct superintendence of God himself, must be right in principle, and when applied in a Christian nation cannot be wrong, and deserving of the opprobrious epithets, such as spiritual adultery and the like, which Liberationists are so fond of applying to it. This simple fact is the crux of the controversy with which they have never been able to grapple. The late John Angell James, instead of meeting it, said passionately:—

‘As to the argument which is founded on the constitution of the Jewish theocracy, we consider it to be so irrelevant and inapplicable, that the very attempt to bring it forward in support of a Christian institute, betrays at once the weakness of the cause. We view the theocracy as altogether a Divine institute, which was set aside by the

coming of Christ, was never designed to be imitated, and is altogether incapable of imitation.'

The same statement had been made before him by Wardlaw, almost in similar terms. 'The Jewish,' he said, 'was a temporary system instituted for special ends, and those being once accomplished, it was never meant to be, and never indeed can be, repeated.' Both Liberationists, while feeling the force of the argument, evade it, and seek to turn attention in another direction, as if this were any reply. It does not involve, as a necessary consequence, setting up again the whole Jewish system of ritual, inspired legislation, and the polity built upon it, as Eustace Conder, in *Ecclesia*, and others, following Wardlaw and James, absurdly suppose.

The arguments derived from Scripture against the principle of Establishment are few and irrelevant, and in recent controversies less stress has been laid upon them than formerly. The late Mr. Miall, in his essay on *Religious Establishments incompatible with the Rights of Citizenship*, originally published thirty-eight years ago, said that his main objection to every kind of *alliance between Church and State* sprang out of his views of man in his religious capacity, and that his strongest arguments were derived directly from the Bible. Throughout the essay, however, he did not appeal to a single passage of Scripture. It may be said in general, that the New Testament teaches nothing definite, one way or the other, about State churches, from which James drew the conclusion that the silence of Christ and His Apostles about legislative interference on behalf of religion, was a proof of no little strength against them. Liberationists are, therefore, driven to rely upon a few isolated passages, separated from the context, which, when correctly explained, do not seem to make much in their favour. Cartwright and the old Puritans maintained that Scripture contained directions about everything pertaining to the constitution and government of the Church, as quoted by Dr. Stoughton in *Ecclesia*, who pronounced it to be an unguarded and untenable position. They indeed adopted the sound principle of the sufficiency of Scripture; but when asked, sufficient for what? they answered for 'all things,' meaning that it covered the whole question of Church polity. James boldly asserted the same principle. He said that the Holy Scriptures were the sole authority, and sufficient rule in matters of religion, whether relating to doctrine, duty, or Church government. Cartwright, not objecting to the principle of Church and State, could not, therefore, have

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supposed that it was discountenanced in the New Testament, so that if the passages now used to overthrow it can be shown to have no reference to the question, the Liberationist objections based upon them will be neutralized.

There are in the New Testament only two texts from which even the semblance of an argument against the amalgamation of Church and State can be derived. The first is the answer of Christ to the tempting question of the Pharisees and the Herodians: 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' Wardlaw maintained that these words distinguish between things civil and sacred, and between the rights of God and civil magistrates. The payment recommended, according to him, was not a religious act. Under the theocracy, there was no proper distinction between God as the Head of the Church, and as the Head of the State. But when the precept is used as applying to Christians, a distinction must be drawn between the duties owing to Him and to the magistrate. The latter must be limited to his official functions, and when he comes upon religious ground, he steps beyond his province. All that is properly religious lies between God and the conscience, and no human authority is entitled to interfere. National establishments break down the barrier (?), and Cæsar oversteps the limits of his commission, encroaching upon the rights of conscience, and interfering with the liberties of his subjects. Such are the inferences which Wardlaw draws from this passage.

He seems to have been conscious that there was a weakness in his reasoning, because both in the passage now quoted, and immediately afterwards, he admitted that there might be a difficulty in tracing the precise line of demarcation, and this furnishes the reply to his argument. The fallacy of it consists in supposing that the answer of Jesus places obedience to the civil magistrate, and the allegiance due to God, in direct contradistinction, whereas the latter includes the former, which depends upon it for its proper sanction. The late Dean Stanley rightly said in answer:—

'The distinction between the things of Cæsar and the things of God, so far from having any foundation in the text from which the words are taken, is directly contradictory to them. The things which were due to Cæsar were to be paid to Cæsar, not because they were God's, but because they and Cæsar were both of God. The things which were to be paid to God were in that case the things of Cæsar, because, being paid to Cæsar, to whom they were rightly due, they were therefore paid to God.'

In His answer, Jesus could not have intended to lay down the principle which would prevent the amalgamation of Church and State, because, if so, He would have been passing a censure upon the Jewish economy, of which God Himself had been the author. The civil power had then passed to the Romans, who, although heathens, actually stood to the national religion in the relation of protectors, under whose authority the temple services and ordinances were carried on. He does not censure them, nor disapprove of the position they then occupied toward the Jewish Church, and, if not, it is impossible to believe that He intended to condemn Church establishments, when in after times the rulers should be Christian. The passage has really nothing whatever to do with the question now at issue. Any plain man not in search of texts to support a preconceived theory at all hazards, would say that it taught only that State and Church ought not to be rival claimants for obedience. While the Pharisees were fully alive to the necessity for rendering obedience to God by keeping the precepts of the law as they understood them, their views were not equally clear as to the obligation of obeying the ruling power, and it was to set them right about the claims of each that these memorable words were uttered.

The Divine utterance before the tribunal of Pilate has also been used as a foundation on which to rest what is thought to be a conclusive argument against the union of Church and State. 'My kingdom is not of this world (*ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*). If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews. But now is my kingdom not from hence (*ἐντεῦθεν*). Upon this, Wardlaw and others reasoned, in general, that the entirely spiritual nature of Christ's kingdom, affirmed in the passage, separates it from all the kingdoms of the earth, and that the latter, being secular, are by their very nature *opposed* to the former, which is heavenly. All State patronage is, therefore, they say, inconsistent with the character of the Christian Church, and can have no other tendency than to cramp its energies and frustrate its design. Vaughan, another Liberationist writer, said that Pilate understood Jesus to affirm that His kingdom, being devoid of force, must necessarily be harmless to other kingdoms, and that the Saviour must have seen that He was so understood, and must have allowed the impression to remain unaltered. From this he inferred that not only is the kingdom of Christ spiritual, which is not denied, but also that it cannot employ force, and therefore that this passage precludes the interference of civil governments.

To meet the argument derived from the Theocracy in favour of the amalgamation of Church and State, Wardlaw said, that 'now' in the passage is an adverb of time, and indicated 'a transition from a comparatively secular and worldly state of Christ's kingdom to a state essentially different. It expressed a contrast between the kingdom of Christ as it existed in the Old Testament, and as it was to be in the future.' His ignorance of Greek betrayed him into an interpretation which the words of the original will not bear. They might be rendered, 'If My kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews. But they do not fight (*νῦν δέ*), therefore my kingdom is not from hence.' Wardlaw thought that if such a meaning had been intended, the terms *νῦν οὖν* would have been used, but this is impossible, because the latter particles must have a temporal signification. This is the only sense they will bear in the three other places where they are found in the New Testament (Acts x. 13, xv. 10, and xvi. 36). The words (*νῦν δέ*) express contrast, as in S. John ix. 41, and xv. 22, and in many other places, making it clear that the meaning is, that the forbearance of Christ's followers, when He was betrayed by Judas, must be understood as showing that His kingdom did not derive its origin from this world. If Wardlaw's interpretation were admitted, it would imply that the Jewish Theocracy had an earthly origin, and that when Jesus, before the tribunal of Pilate, replied to the accusation of sedition, He claimed to be King of two dispensations, presenting a view of His meaning which has never been advanced by any interpreter.

The argument that the words of Jesus establish a perpetual separation between His kingdom and the governments of the earth, cannot be sustained from the actual teaching of the passage. So far from divorcing the Church from the State, it seems to point to a different consequence. After the four kingdoms of Daniel was to come a fifth of heavenly origin, which was for that reason to be all-comprehensive, exercising authority throughout the earth, and impossible to be destroyed. It does not occupy by the side of States a sphere separate from them, and not embraced by them, but it seeks to bring, and will ultimately bring, them all into subjection to itself. Jesus does not say, 'My kingdom has nothing to do with yours,' but He intimates that, not being of earthly origin, it cannot be contended for by human powers. He disavowed such pretensions to all temporal authority as would have absolved the Jews from allegiance to the Romans, and from

obligation to pay tribute, but He said nothing which would lead to the conclusion that the amalgamation of the Church and Christian States was unlawful or inexpedient.

These are the only two passages in the New Testament of any importance upon which Liberationists rely for support in their efforts to bring about a separation between Church and State, but Eustace Conder in *Ecclesia* has thrown them both overboard as useless. After affirming that the statements about the Kingdom of Christ in Scripture are varied, so that different conclusions may be derived from them as each person's inclination may prompt, he proceeds to observe:—

'It is but one example of these seeming paradoxes, that while we find our Saviour expressly saying that His kingdom is not of this world, other passages (as in one of the chief prophecies of Christ—Ps. xxii., 28) as expressly declare that He shall reign over the Gentiles, that the kingdom is the Lord's, that He is the Governor among the nations, and that the time approaches, when it shall be proclaimed with thunder, songs of praise, that the kingdoms of this world are become our Lord's and His Christ's.'

That is, that the Church has been established in all the kingdoms of the earth.

The minds of some respectable Dissenters have become so warped by continually crying out for Disestablishment, that they are probably not fully aware of the absurdity and irrelevancy of many of the objections to the existing Establishment, which they have gravely propounded in their published writings. Illustrations may be found in many places of the article on *The Relation of the Church to the State*, by Mr. Eustace Conder, in *Ecclesia*. Assuming that the present connexion of Church and State is an alliance, admittedly of great antiquity, he said that it was beginning to be counted among things that were old, and were ready to vanish away. The Liberationist cry, that the alliance is doomed, afforded, according to him, not a positive proof, but a powerful presumption that the principle was false. In another place in the same article he supposes two cases, one being that of a nation in which there was an Established Church, but where the bulk of the people were irreligious, and the other that of a nation in which there was no Establishment of religion, but where the main body of all classes were religious, and then proceeds to amplify and descant upon each case, laying special stress upon the latter, as Liberationists commonly do. Neither case has ever had any correspondence with fact in any country, not even in America, the religious paradise to which agitators for

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the separation of Church and State continually point as a proof of what religion can accomplish without State aid, but where only one in seven of the population makes any profession of religion whatever. He admits that imaginary cases could not prove anything, but a few sentences after he unwarrantably draws from the former case the inference that 'the working of the Establishment principle, in our rough inconsistent English fashion, has been such as to warrant the conclusion that the more completely it is worked, the more complete is its failure in regard to the real christianization of the national life.' Arguing from the imagination, ignoring patent facts, and begging the question, may deceive some thoughtless and prejudiced Dissenters, but no honest and conscientious person can be taken in by it.

According to the same writer, State patronage and the control of Christianity contain the inevitable and fatal flaw of necessarily involving either persecution or immorality. That the Church now persecutes anyone, or any sect, because they differ from her, or for any other reason, is contrary to plain facts patent to the whole world. The truth is rather that for many years the Church has been persecuted by political Dissenters, by the agitation which they have set on foot in the country for Disestablishment, and for robbing her of her privileges, because they are offensive to them. Attempting to make out his charge of injustice, he assumes as an historical fact what has never happened in England. According to him the State, when claiming to be supreme judge of religious truth, must make a selection of the church or churches to be established, and in so doing must discountenance and injure other churches, in proportion to the favour shown to the selected communion, which would be unjust; or it must patronize all doctrines and rites, as equally true and equally important, which would be immoral. The whole of this is obviously beside the question, because the Church was never selected to the exclusion of other sects, all of whom have sprung from her notably since the Reformation, the only case brought forward to support the charge of persecution, being the exclusion of Dissenters from the Universities, which, at best only a sentimental grievance, no longer exists. The patronage and support of all forms of religion alike, as if one were as good or as worthless as another, would, according to him, strike at the very root of morality. Neither has this any bearing upon the Church as now established, because, except the payment of army and jail chaplains, and chaplains in the navy, the State gives no assistance for the maintenance of the

opinions of any sect, whether true or false. Such absurd theories are little better than attempts to bewilder the minds of prejudiced people, and turn away their attention from the real question at issue. They are of no real value in this controversy.

Another objection formerly urged against the Establishment, but little noticed by more recent Liberationists, is that it interferes with the rights of conscience. Mr. Miall urged it in his Disestablishment speech in the House of Commons on May 9, 1871, but assigned no tangible reason for his assertion, which is plainly contradicted by the Toleration Act. The author of the Liberationist Prize Essay, entitled *Conversation on Church Establishments*, affirms that the State interferes with the rights of conscience when it selects and endows a particular faith, thereby constituting itself the judge of a religion for the nation, reiterating the fallacy which has been already exposed. By intruding itself between God and the conscience, he says that it virtually claimed infallibility, and infringed upon the most sacred rights of man. He supports his position by a quotation from Hobbes of Malmesbury; but it may be set aside without further notice, because few churchmen would accept this philosopher as an orthodox exponent of their principles. In the following statement, which includes a quotation put forward under the name of a distinguished prelate, the writer comes nearer the mark:—

‘I fear bishops and clergy have taught this very doctrine, which you say is atheistical; for example, Archbishop Parker, in the following passage of his *Ecclesiastical Polity*: “The magistrate is empowered to govern the consciences of his subjects. Private persons have no right to judge: they are not masters of their actions, nor ought they to be governed by their own judgments, but they ought to be directed by the public conscience of their governors. If the magistrate imposes anything sinful, he, and not the people who submit to the imposition, is accountable to God for it.” True, it is an archbishop who speaks, and similar sentiments may be found in the Homilies of the Church of England; but not the less for this, it is atheism to the core, making religion a bit of State parchment, and conscience an impertinence, dethroning God and demoralising man.’

This wild nonsense would not be deserving of notice, were it not that it belongs to a class of misquotations and misrepresentations which reflect nothing but discredit upon the Liberationist writers who employ them, and upon the cause they advocate. The essayist produces no passage from the Homilies to support his assertion, so that it must be taken for what it is worth. With the quotation from Parker no reference is

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given, but this dishonest omission cannot be allowed to screen the Liberationist writer from punishment. He took it without verification or acknowledgment, *verbatim*, from Angus, who inserted the extract as a note to page 183 of his *Voluntary System*. Archbishop Parker, the prelate who lived in the reign of Elizabeth, never wrote any work on *Ecclesiastical Polity*. The quotation which the ignorant writer pretends to make is really from an anonymous treatise, entitled *A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie, &c.*, published in A.D. 1670, but known to have been written by Samuel Parker, who afterwards became Bishop of Oxford, to which Owen wrote a reply, imputing to the author sentiments which he repudiated in a subsequent work. Parker's views are not fairly represented in the passage purporting to have been taken from his writings, and even if they were, they are entitled to no more weight than ought to be attached to the opinions of any other individual author. As produced by the essayist, it appears to be a continuous extract, but in the original work the first sentence is separated from those that follow by an interval of 298 pages, and both are so garbled as to pervert the meaning, and misrepresent the design of the author.

'The Magistrate is empowered to govern the consciences of his subjects.' This assertion is only a part of two propositions which Parker stated in the following terms, and afterwards proceeded to illustrate at great length :—

'It is the design,' he said, 'of this work to settle matters on their true and proper foundation; first, by proving it to be absolutely necessary to the peace and government of the world that the supreme magistrate of every commonwealth should be vested with a power to govern and conduct the consciences of his subjects in matters of religion; secondly, by showing this to be so certain and undoubted a truth that it must be acknowledged by its fiercest adversaries, and that those who would deprive the supreme civil power of its authority in reference to the conduct and worship of God are forced to allow it in other more material parts of religion, though they are both liable to the same inconveniences and objections. And this will oblige me to state the true extent of the Magistrate's power over conscience in reference to divine worship, by showing it to be the very same with its power over conscience in matters of morality and all other affairs of religion.'

Having discussed the former proposition, he arrived at the conclusion

'that the duties of morality are the most weighty and material concerns of religion, and that it was as certain that the civil magistrate had power to bind laws concerning them upon the conscience of his subjects, so that every man's conscience is, and ought to be, subject

to the commands of lawful superiors in the most important matters of religion.'

Dr. Arnold felt the force of this argument, and urged it against those who asserted that the State had no concern except with the temporal concerns of the people, as if religion were entirely beyond its province. He said that this doctrine, to be consistent, should maintain that the State has no concern with anything moral, except so far as it affects the bodies and property of the people; but its advocates shrink generally from answering this conclusion, and thereby cut away the ground from under their feet, and can only justify the exclusion of religion from the care of the State on the supposition that it is not moral, but merely ritual and mystic or theoretical. Eustace Conder, in *Ecclesia*, says that the sole object of civil government is to restrain the wickedness and misery of man within the narrowest possible bounds, and to maintain justice, the support of religion being no part of its duty, however useful it may be as an independent auxiliary in promoting the welfare of the people.

Parker maintained the liberty of conscience, with which no civil ruler can or ought to interfere:—

'All human authority and jurisdiction extends no further than men's outward actions; these are the proper objects of all laws; whereas liberty of conscience is internal and invisible, and confined to the minds and judgments of men; and while conscience acts within its proper sphere, the civil power is so far from doing it violence that it never can.'

Precisely the same doctrine is laid down by Vaughan. He said that the civil power could not enter the domain of mind, that it could not rule it, that no external law could supersede the inner law of conscience, and that opinion could not be reached by any of the coarse implements of the civil magistrate.

At the beginning of the other part of the quotation the essayist omits a sentence which introduced an important modification of the meaning. Parker's words are:—

'In cases and disputes of a public concern, private men,' he said, 'are not properly *sui juris*; they have no power over their own actions. They are not to be directed by their own judgments or determined by their own wills, but by the commands and determinations of the public conscience. And if there be any sin in the command, he that imposed it shall answer for it, not I whose duty it is to obey. The commands of an authority will warrant my obedience; my obedience will hallow, or at least excuse, my action, and so secure me from sin if not from error, because I follow the best guide and

most probable direction I am capable of; and though I may mistake, my integrity will preserve my innocence.'

Having stated that governors are the best judges of what concerns the public good, he adds:—

'If we take away the condescension of our private consciences to public authority we immediately dissolve all government, for in case of dissension, unless we submit our persuasions to their commands, their commands must submit to our persuasions.'

These quotations are sufficient to convict the Liberationist writer of dishonesty in perverting Parker's meaning, with the view of casting upon the Church the odium of sentiments which she never promulgated.

Various objections against the Establishment have been urged by a distinguished Dissenter in recent publications. Some are those of old opponents rehabilitated to suit the present controversy, and some are little better than mere assertions, as that 'the parochial organization through the inefficiency of the clergy has signally failed,' the truth rather being the other way, as is well known to churchmen. Others are weak and unsatisfactory. This gentleman objects to the Establishment because, in his opinion, it had alienated half the religious people of the nation. In the article in the *Contemporary Review*, in which this statement appeared, he had admitted, a few pages before, that in scarcely any instance had Nonconformists at first been theoretically anti-churchmen. Owen, Baxter, Whitfield, and Wesley were not. The fathers were practical seceders, and the children became theoretic opponents of the Establishment, and voluntaries by conviction. If the earlier Nonconformists seceded on other grounds than the State Church principle, it is evident that they were not alienated by the Establishment as such. The ranks of Dissent are not at this day swelled by discontented or half-hearted churchmen, who are seldom known to abandon the faith of their fathers. The Wesleyans are the largest body of Dissenters, but there are no secessions to them, and any increase of their numbers must be accounted for by the growth of the population.

'Half the religious people of the nation' is an assertion based upon the number of attendances at Church and Nonconformist chapels on March 30, 1851, as shown by the census returns of that year. Since then, there has been no religious census, owing to the opposition of the Dissenters in Parliament, in 1861, 1871, and 1881; which suggests that if a proper census of the denominations were taken, the result

might not be so favourable to them as they wish other people to believe. The whole subject is involved in great obscurity, but there is some reason to believe that the assertion that half the religious population—which would involve also a very large proportion of those who make no profession of religion at all—is alienated from the Church of England, is without real foundation. In a paper read before the Statistical Society in 1865, Mr. Horace Mann estimated the total number of Nonconformists, exclusive of Roman Catholics, at about five millions, but for various reasons a considerable deduction must be made from this aggregate. Mr. C. G. Rennie, in a paper communicated to the Church Institution, in 1870, estimated the Dissenters, without counting the Roman Catholics, as numbering about four millions and a quarter. His figures were based upon the calculations of Mr. Ravenstein, taken from the returns of the Registrar-General for 1867, who estimated the number at a little more than three millions and a half, and if to this total be added the increase in the intervening three years, the number will be about four millions. In a speech delivered in S. George's Hall, Liverpool, by the Right Hon. J. G. Hubbard, in 1872, he said that he had investigated all the sources of information open to him, and had arrived at the conclusion that the proportion of Dissenters of all kinds to the aggregate population was 24 per cent., while Mr. Ravenstein's calculations reduced it to 22 per cent. Another calculation based upon the statistics provided in the *Congregational Yearbook* and the *Baptist Handbook*, which are annual publications, makes the aggregate number of the two denominations to be somewhat less than two millions. Wesleyans, Roman Catholics, and Jews not being opposed to the Establishment, the significant fact, therefore, comes to the surface that the violent outcry now being raised in the country against the Established Church, has been got up by about one-fifteenth of the nation, supposing that all Congregationalists and Baptists are in favour of the separation.

The same Liberationist objects to the Establishment, that it does not conduce to the highest truth and holiness, which is virtually the same as the difficulty urged by Wardlaw and others, that the State Church corrupts and degrades religion. The proofs assigned for this strange assertion are the manner of the appointment of bishops, the system of patronage with its abuses, the independence of the clergy of congregational control, and the party struggles in the law courts. Are any or all of these, he asks, conducive to the spirituality of the Church? According to him, during the Hanoverian period,

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by driving out the Wesleyans, the Church lost the best of her people, and among the clergy piety, in the spiritual sense of the term, became the exception rather than the rule. At the present time, according to him, notwithstanding the personal excellence of saintly men, the Established Church in England has signally failed in the nurture and development of the spiritual life, which is the highest characteristic of a church.

The Liberationist confounds the accidents with the inner life of the Church, and, because in his opinion the former are objectionable, the latter is decaying or extinct. If a pious clergyman be elevated by the Crown to the episcopate, the manner of his appointment will not destroy his spirituality, or convert him back to be a worldly-minded man. This part of the objection is an insult to every bishop on the bench. The system of patronage has no such necessary tendency, while the independence of the clergy enables them to have the courage of their convictions, without fear of dismissal by their congregations. The Liberationist admits that during the Hanoverian period, Dissenters did not escape the chilling influence, and if not, the dearth of religious life must be attributed to them as well as to churchmen. But it is unreasonable to lay upon the present Establishment the blame of a state of things supposed to exist a century ago, and urge that therefore it ought now to be abolished. He looks with Nonconformist jealousy only on the outside of the system, and knows nothing about the vitality within. If the Church has signally failed in the nurture and development of the spiritual life, how does it happen, to use his own words, that 'The Establishment is now dying of spiritual life.' If true religion is to be discerned by its effects, abundant evidence of its existence can be produced. The long catalogue of illustrious Churchmen who have by their writings, and by their saintly lives, illustrated religion, both in the unreformed and reformed periods of Church history, is conveniently ignored by this Liberationist. The numerous publications which every year issue from the press, and the unexampled activity of Churchmen in works of charity and benevolence, Church-extension, and self-denying labours for the Evangelization of the masses at home, and of the heathen abroad, contribute to prove that some sort of spiritual vitality is at the present day working powerfully within the Establishment.

In the opinion of the same Liberationist, it is a scandal that the Church should be legislated for by a Parliament composed, as it is, of various religionists. The Church, he asserts, is a spiritual body—confusing the Church invisible

with the Church as externally organized—and it is absurd to suppose that Roman Catholics, Socinians, and Jews can legislate for her advantage. Both secular and religious subjects are dealt with by the Legislature, and the latter, according to him, must therefore necessarily be mismanaged. Mr. Peter Bayne also thought that it was inexpedient for Parliament to interfere with the Church, but he located the damage in a different quarter. He said, in an article in the *Contemporary Review*, 'I for one hold that secular things are very seriously contaminated by such contact as this with things sacred.' What sect of religionists has the honour of numbering this gentleman among its adherents? It is a strange theology which has taught him that religion has a contaminating effect upon anything with which it is brought into contact. The late Baldwin Brown entertained a different opinion, and expressed it in the following terms:—

'It seems to me that we very much underrate the intelligence and earnestness with which, in the present day, the representative assembly of a Christian nation would address itself to religious discussions, while we quite undervalue the profound anxiety to handle religious questions wisely, which political persons and bodies have manifested throughout all the ages of the Christian culture of the world.'

He then affirms, with Cartwright in the *Admonition to Parliament*, and the Puritans, that the Government has the amplest right to promote the religious well-being of the people by legislative measures, and hence it is evident that they did not regard the action of Parliament as contaminating to religion.

The supposed bondage of the Church to the State is also urged by Liberationists as an objection against the Establishment. The nature of the slavery has been stated to be that, having surrendered her liberty to the State, she is powerless to give expression to any new convictions of truth, or to alter any usage which the circumstances of the times may render it expedient to change: From this slavery the Nonconformists profess their anxiety to liberate her. The freedom of the Church, said one of them, whose opinions have been already discussed, is one thing; the freedom of the individual member of the Church is another. The former is the only freedom that can reasonably be claimed—freedom for every Church to formulate its own doctrine, to regulate its own worship, and to administer its own discipline, and this not at the outset only, but throughout the course of its history, as fresh light and a higher knowledge shall guide it. This is the liberty

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which established churches surrender. In doctrine and worship, they virtually refuse all fresh teachings of the living and indwelling Spirit of God. They make a treaty with the civil power, whereby they surrender all legislative control over their own doctrine and worship. So far from being freedom, it is the entire surrender of freedom; the State practically rules the Church.

This description of a state of things supposed by the Liberationist to exist in the Establishment, takes for granted that there is an alliance between Church and State, but it is little better than a misrepresentation, and requires to be modified by some important considerations. Doctrines and ritual are both sanctioned by law; but when the Church accepted the last Act of Uniformity, there was no stipulation with the State, express or implied, that no alteration should ever be made. What does the Liberationist mean by 'fresh teachings of the living and indwelling Spirit of God'? Does he mean a new revelation, or novel views of the meaning of Scripture? If the former, is it not a virtual acknowledgment of the vagaries of excited enthusiasts, who choose to affirm that they have received new light? If the latter, it cannot be denied that more has been done within the Church, notwithstanding her supposed bondage, for the exposition of Scripture, than by all the sects put together. The Liberationist assumes that because certain doctrinal truths are formulated in the Articles and Liturgy, all free inquiry into the meaning of Revelation is virtually suppressed. The literature of the age is a sufficient proof that this is not the case. The new light of a Congregational Church may be thick darkness, and while the church members are groping in it, fundamental truths may be lost, and the Christian faith may be exposed to shipwreck. It has been admitted that Dissenting ministers, under the influence of new light, have continued preaching doctrines which no ingenuity could reconcile with those specified in the trust-deeds of their chapels. The Formularies are fixed by law, and cannot be changed, except with the consent both of the Church and of Parliament, and if any clergyman propounds opinions at variance with them, the law provides means for setting him right. This is what is called 'the entire surrender of freedom.' In the State, law is the condition of liberty; but according to this, in the Church it is nothing but slavery. By means of the Formularies there is protection for the liberties of individuals against the tyranny of ecclesiastical rulers. A court of law alone can determine whether they have been contravened or not, and it is this which secures the religious freedom

of Churchmen. What the Liberationist calls the bondage of the Church to the State involves the liberties of individuals, protects religion from being made the shuttlecock of the fancies of persons who may pretend to have received new light, and, as history proves, affords ample scope for the development of theological opinion.

On the theory of the identity of Church and State the objection is still less capable of being sustained. Every Nonconformist church, ignoring ecclesiastical history, and rejecting the doctrine and practice of the Anglican Church, claims for itself the power of settling its own affairs, fixing the teaching to which alone it will listen from the pulpit, changing it whenever the seatholders receive new light, and of appointing and dismissing their preacher, over whom they are despotic. Because other Christians choose to act on more rational principles in the settlement of the affairs of religion, is this any good reason for asserting that they are in bondage to the State, and that their system obstructs the development of truth? Churchmen, instead of leaving the management of the affairs of every parish to ignorant or unqualified persons, with the power of alteration at any time, regulated in Parliament the main points of their Church polity two centuries ago, and they have not thought it necessary since then to introduce any fundamental modification; but the power exists, and is frequently exercised, in dealing with questions of minor importance. They do exactly the same thing by their representatives as is done by the seatholders of a Zion, except that measures for the regulation of Church affairs are carried by the wisest and most experienced laymen. Members of a Congregational church can give any orders they please to their minister, and make any regulations they may deem expedient. Lay churchmen in Parliament exercise the same powers, but with strict regard to the rights and liberties of both clergy and people; and, according to legal and constitutional precedent, if 'new light' should illuminate the minds of a majority of them, nothing could prevent the changes in doctrine and ritual which it might seem to require, just as the majority of seatholders could determine in favour of Transubstantiation, and send their preacher away, if he refused to accept and proclaim the tenet they had espoused.

It is also objected that the State Church, in its conditions and influences, is inimical to practical efficiency. She has failed in her mission because she is established, and therefore, according to the Liberationists, she ought to be disestablished to enable her to do her work more effectually.

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'Philosophy and experience,' says one of them, 'teach that the influence of establishments is such as to neutralize the elements of spiritual power in a church, rather than to intensify them. The self-reliance, freedom, flexibility, and conscious and undivided responsibility of independent congregationalism bring out inherent qualities of adaptation, and devout development, in a higher degree than is possible in a church that is externally and artificially sustained, and in which doctrine, ritual, and rubric are stereotyped by Act of Parliament.'

For proof of this he referred to the Church history of the period following the Restoration, and to the supposed energy of Nonconformists in recent times.

The difficulty of the Liberationist is rather apparent than real. He states what *in his opinion ought to be* the state of things in an Established Church, and then urges this as an objection against the amalgamation of Church and State in England. A partial and one-sided view is taken, while the advantages are overlooked, as well as the manner in which they are secured. If it were inquired whether a greater amount of good could be done by acting within certain rules, or according as the temper of each religionist might prompt, there would be little difficulty in supplying an answer. The efficiency of a regiment depends on its discipline, while if every company were allowed to fight in its own way, and on its own account, it would soon become a mob. In the State Church the law fixes the doctrine and ritual, but not as some Nonconformists imagine, so as to supersede liberty of thought, and destroy all personal responsibility and liberty of action. The public services must be carried on according to the prescribed forms, and parishes must be worked within limits which impose little or no restriction. In all other respects there is free scope to develop 'the elements of spiritual power' and 'to intensify them.' None but a Liberationist, seeking Disestablishment, would imagine that the system is inefficient for the highest ends, or that the works of charity, benevolence, and philanthropy, so extensively carried on by the spontaneous liberality of Churchmen, had no existence.

'Philosophy and experience' show that every kind of work can be done better according to rule and under responsible management than if left to the impulsive movements of isolated congregations—which the principle of the Congregational Union and other Nonconformist organizations practically admits—or to over-zealous or half-hearted individuals. The fixedness of doctrine and rubric does not interfere with Christian effort, or destroy the personal responsibility of

religious people. In fact it has nothing to do with either, and instead of checking the liberality of Churchmen, it has a contrary tendency, because it secures their confidence in the application of their contributions for the support of the system to which they are attached. If the Church is 'externally and artificially sustained,' it ought to be remembered that there is ample scope for voluntary efforts in building churches for which the funds are voluntarily raised by public liberality, and in carrying out missionary and other operations. Even on the lowest ground, there is as much zeal and devotion among Churchmen as among voluntary, dissenting congregations, and it is nothing but a misrepresentation to say that the Establishment has a deadening and paralysing effect upon them. It has the great advantage of combining order with an ample field for the exercise of Christian effort.

The inferior social position of Nonconformists has been urged as a reason for disestablishment. The State Church, it is said, provokes rivalry and enmity between Churchmen and Nonconformists, and causes the former to look upon the latter as socially degraded. The grievance, if such it can be called, was stated by Mr. Miall, in his Disestablishment Speech, in the following terms:—

'The spirit of exclusiveness born of the Establishment system and fed by the encouragement given to it by the sanction of the law, permeates more or less the whole framework of society in this country. A dualistic and divided agency characterises by far the largest proportion of moral, charitable, and philanthropic enterprises among us. Almost every village of any size has two distinct sets of apparatus for doing good—the one worked by Churchmen, the other by Dissenters. Every section of society is thus split into incoherent parts. Many are the useful schemes which have to be abandoned, owing to the absence of good feeling between the favoured and degraded sects.'

Supposing the state of things described in this passage to be true, would the Disestablishment of the Church remove the sentimental grievances of Dissenters? Disestablishment in Ireland has aggravated and intensified the exclusiveness of Churchmen, and instead of producing a closer approximation between them and those who were formerly called Dissenters, the old chasm has been widened. The members of a disestablished church do not lose their social superiority, because in Scotland the old Episcopal Church, to which most of the aristocracy and the upper classes belong, instead of lessening, contributes to foster a state of things similar to that about which Liberationists so loudly complain in England. If the

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violent wrench caused by the separation of Church and State south of the Tweed could be effected, the social inferiority of the Nonconformist sects would still continue. Whatever bitterness toward them now exists in the minds of Churchmen, caused by the agitation and misrepresentations of Liberationists, would be intensified in the future, if their efforts for the overthrow of the Establishment should prove successful. The Disestablished Church would still retain her connexion with the Crown—unless the Act of Parliament requiring the Sovereign to be in communion with her were repealed—her traditions, her culture, her literature, the vast majority of the population in all ranks, from the Queen to the peasant, and her Episcopate; and if to these be added the resentment which churchmen would naturally feel at being robbed of their endowments and privileges, there can be no doubt that Disestablishment, instead of breaking down any of the existing barriers between Churchmen and Dissenters, would only render them more formidable and impassable. It would be easier to punish one class for its social superiority than to remove from the minds of those who belong to it the sense of their superior position. The confiscation of Church revenues, and the appropriation of them to the reduction of taxes, or to promote free education, might satisfy Liberationists, and vex those who are above them in the social scale, but it would not contribute to bring about the fraternization of the classes which are now said to be estranged from each other.

ART. V.—ISAAC CASAUBON AS A CHURCHMAN.

1. *Ephemerides Isaaci Casauboni*. Ed. J. RUSSELL. (Oxford, 1851.)
2. *Isaac Casaubon*. By MARK PATTISON. (London, 1875.)
3. *Quarterly Review*, Sept. 1853, 'The Diary of Isaac Casaubon.' (London, 1853.)
4. *I. Casaubon. ad Cardinalem Perronium Epistola*. Ed. F. MEYRICK; præfatus est C. WORDSWORTH. (London, 1875.)

WHATEVER may be the defects of our Anglican system—and in these days when nostrums for Church reform are perpetually being recommended from within, no one can say that

her children are blind to them—this, at any rate, can be said for it, that it has succeeded, far more than any other religious system in the world, in attracting men of the highest culture and refinement. Such men, who have in vain sought a home elsewhere, have found one within the Anglican pale; and no better instance could be found than Isaac Casaubon. The mental process through which Casaubon passed, has been by no means an uncommon one; but there is of course a special interest in tracing it out in the case of one who was, beyond all question, the greatest scholar in Europe, or indeed in the world, at the time when he found his home in the bosom of the English Church; for by that time the only man who could rival him, Joseph Scaliger, had passed away.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it had not yet been discovered that 'the higher culture' was in any way inconsistent with the most implicit Christian faith, and the deepest Christian piety. There is nothing, therefore, surprising in the fact that the first scholar of the age should have been from first to last a most devout believer, and a most pure and blameless liver. He had breathed from his very infancy the atmosphere of devotion. His father, Arnold Casaubon, who was his only teacher in his early years, was a very model of that earnest and self-denying, but narrow and austere, type of piety which prevailed among the Huguenots. From his father's instruction he passed on to the seminary of Geneva founded by Calvin himself, for the express purpose of propagating the reformed doctrines, and now directed by an equally exclusive theologian, the famous Beza. First as pupil, and then as 'professor,' Casaubon passed eighteen years at Geneva, and during the whole of that time there is no trace of his being dissatisfied with his religious position. He was a Calvinist of the true Genevan type. Nor does this mean only that he was content to pursue his classical studies without troubling himself much about theological questions. Such a course would have been impossible amidst his surroundings; for Geneva was saturated with theology, and dominated by theologians; and if it had been possible, it would have been quite out of accordance with the bent of Casaubon's own mind. We think of him as the great classical scholar; but the fact is that from the very first, and all through his life, he took a far deeper interest in theology, and was always yearning to 'give himself to better studies' than the classics. This inclination was encouraged by his father, to whose wishes Casaubon always showed the greatest respect. When he presented to his father his first literary performance, the *Observa-*

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tions on *Diogenes Laertius*, telling him at the same time the various schemes he had in view, the father replied that 'he would rather have a single observation on the sacred volume than all the fine things he was concocting.' Such a remark, coming from such a source, and harmonizing as it did with his own feelings, would doubtless sink deep into Casaubon's pious soul. Then again, all secular knowledge was disparaged at Geneva, and Casaubon, who was the humblest of men, would quite agree with the opinion that his labours in the field of classical literature were of very inferior importance.

Nothing at this period would tend to shake his hereditary belief. For the only two forms of Christianity with which he had been brought into contact were the Calvinistic and the Roman. And there could be no question between the two. All that he knew about Romanism was, that it was cruelly addicted to persecutions, from which his own family had suffered severely. The contest between Romanism and Calvinism was in his view at that time the contest between truth and error, between God and Satan. 'Whatever,' he writes in 1690, in reference to the savage attempts of the Duke of Savoy against the Genevan heretics—'whatever has been achieved against the enemy, has been done by God's own hand, which we have seen, I may say, with our eyes;' and a little later: 'I have divided my time between the recension of the text of Aristotle, and looking on at the wonders the Lord hath wrought for us.' Soon, however, his faith, not in the religion professed, but in the professors of the religion, was rudely shaken by the very sharp dealing he met with from the Genevan authorities in reference to the payment of his wife's marriage portion, which, on some quibble which it is needless to explain, 'had lapsed,' it was said, 'to the Exchequer.' Casaubon is betrayed into most unwonted severity of language. The Genevese are 'swindlers,' 'brigands,' 'Pharisees,' 'hypocrites, with their mock piety.'

His removal to Montpellier in 1596 was evidently regarded by him as a change for the better in spiritual as well as in other matters. 'This Church,' he writes, 'is indeed flourishing in piety and good works, if any is in France;' but in doctrine it differed in no point from that of Geneva, and there is as yet no trace of Casaubon being dissatisfied with his position as a Calvinist of the reformed Church. If he had been dissatisfied, we should certainly have heard of it; for soon after his arrival at Montpellier, on his thirty-eighth birthday, February 18, 1597, he began that wonderful Diary which might well be termed *Ephemerides*; for in it he pours forth day by day, till

within a fortnight of his death, all the secrets of his soul. It is, on the face of it, no conventional record, but a genuine expression of his feelings; and it shows, among other things, how literally he strove to carry out the injunction to 'cast all his care upon God.' His little worries, which the interruption of his studies by his friends, and his want of business habits entailed upon him, are all confided to his Heavenly Father.

'To-day,' he writes, 'I got six hours for study. When shall I get my whole day? Whenever, O my Father, it shall be Thy Will!'

'This morning not to my books till seven o'clock, or after; alas me! and after that the whole morning lost; nay the whole day! O God of my salvation, aid my studies, without which life is to me not life.'

'Deliver me, my Heavenly Father, from these miseries which the absence of my wife, and the management of my household, create for me. Not being used to keep our accounts, I am perfectly aghast when I see the expenditure of this family.'

The Diary gives us a beautiful picture of a pious and simple life. Every day his first act in his study was always on his knees; then followed half-an-hour's devotional reading. Sunday is always given up to theological reading, and attendance at church. He heard at least three sermons every week—two on Sunday, and one on Wednesday. There is sometimes a little complaint about the preachers: one is 'very aged, and become, without his own fault, lethargic'; another 'a mere youth, quite unequal to the post of first pastor in such a large congregation'; but such complaints are rare, and only refer to individuals, not to doctrine.

In 1598 he became acquainted with a family named De Vic. Both the husband and wife were cultured people, and fond of patronizing learned men, and the humble-minded Casaubon was not above being patronized. The De Vics were staunch Romanists, and perhaps from the very commencement they intended to make Casaubon a proselyte. At any rate they induced him to accompany them to Paris, and with the assistance of the learned De Thou (Thuanus) got him established as a sort of dependent at Court. The King of France was Henri IV., a man without learning or morals, but fond of patronizing learned men, and of talking on religious subjects. He received Casaubon with open arms, professed himself ready to provide for him, and always treated him with the utmost kindness. But *surgit amari aliquid*. 'The Huguenot lad of Navarre' had become a Romanist himself; and if he had become so more from policy than from conviction, there was all the more reason why he should expect his dependents to follow his example. If he could not afford to keep a con-

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science, certainly *they* could not. Casaubon should have a professorship in the university; but no heretic could hold such a post; he must therefore abjure his errors and be admitted into the true Church, as his royal master had done before him. Such 'conversions' were going on every day. The process was very simple. The inquirer was ready to learn; the learned doctors were ready to teach him; a decent interval elapsed; the new convert was convinced, became a good Catholic, and was duly qualified to pick up any of those little crumbs of material comfort which were of course reserved only for the faithful. It was soon known that Casaubon was not to be won over on such easy terms as these. His conversion, if it took place at all, must be a real conversion, not a sham one; for Casaubon was the very soul of honour—almost morbidly conscientious, earnestly anxious after all kinds of truth, but, above all, after religious truth. No stone, however, must be left unturned to bring about the happy change. The game was well worth the candle. There were then in the world two great scholars whose reputation towered far above all compeers: one was Joseph Scaliger, the other was Isaac Casaubon. It would be a great feather in the cap of Rome if either of them could be won over. But to attempt to convert Scaliger was quite hopeless. No one was hardy enough to beard that formidable old lion in his den at Leyden. But Casaubon's was a more hopeful case. There was hope both from his strength and his weakness. From his strength: for how could a really learned man sympathise with his co-religionists when they expressed a sublime contempt for all secular learning, and scorned Christian antiquity with all the scorn of profound ignorance? From his weakness: for Casaubon was the most guileless, childlike, unworldly of men; just the sort of man, in fact, to walk into a trap with his eyes open. Such a trap *was* set for him, and he *did* walk into it.

Philippe de Mornay, the friend and counsellor of the king in his Huguenot days, wrote a book against the doctrines of Rome, which a far more learned man, Bishop (afterwards Cardinal) du Perron pronounced to be full of false citations. The king determined that a conference should be held at Fontainebleau to decide the question. Commissioners were appointed on both sides; and the two Protestant commissioners were to be Casaubon's friend, Cannaye de Fresne, and Casaubon himself. This plan of holding a conference was a common and ingenious plan for covering the retreat of those who were seeking a pretext for coming over from the persecuted and unpopular, to the persecuting and popular side.

It is to be feared that De Fresne was among that number. Poor Casaubon, therefore, in spite of the warnings of his friends, placed himself in a thoroughly false position when he consented to attend officially this sham conference. He regarded the matter simply from the scholar's point of view; and, his sole desire being to discover the truth in this particular case, he felt bound to decide against De Mornay. But that was not at all what was expected of him by his co-religionists. He was a Protestant commissioner, and his duty was to support the Protestant side, through thick and thin. If the Protestant Hamlet declared that the cloud was like a whale, it was the Protestant Polonius' duty to reply, 'Very like a whale.' So, after the conference, both Huguenots and Romanists thought his conversion was only a question of time; and while the former looked more and more coldly upon him, the latter redoubled their efforts to win him over to their side.

It has been said that he wavered, and in the face of the admission of his son Meric, it would be bold to deny that he did. The friends and foes of Romanism seemed to combine to make him waver: perhaps the foes even more than the friends. He was sorely tried by a new kind of preaching at the Protestant church. The lethargic old man, and the raw youth at Montpellier were bad enough, but the *learned* preacher at Charenton was worse. Du Moulin, the preacher in question, was really a man of abilities and attainments, but he was not competent to deal with learned questions in a way that could satisfy 'a fatally accurate' man (to use Mr. Pattison's pointed expression) like Casaubon. The shy, retiring hearer began to hint doubts as to the perfect accuracy of the brilliant preacher's statements, and the complete cogency of his arguments. Now, if there is one man in the world who less than another can brook contradiction, it is perhaps the popular preacher, in a congregation which makes preaching everything. Far more showy people than Casaubon hung upon Du Moulin's words, and accepted his erudition as a thing not to be questioned. Who was this poor hanger-on of the Court, without a spark of brilliancy about him, to dare to doubt? Clearly a Romanist in disguise. The Huguenots followed the lead of their pastor, and regarded Casaubon as a very doubtful Protestant; the Romanists were persistent in their efforts to make him cease to be a Protestant at all. The king set his favourite confessor, Father Coton, a Jesuit, upon him. His friends who had gone over from Protestantism were, of course, most anxious to induce

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him to follow their example, especially his brother-commissioner, Cannaye de Fresne, who contrived, we are told, 'theological breakfast-parties, at which he entrapped Casaubon into the company of Jesuit priests.'¹

But the most persevering and the most effective was Du Perron, the learned Bishop of Evreux. Du Perron had orders to pursue him like his shadow; waylay him in his walks, intrude upon his meals, and sit at his elbow in the library' [that is, the King's library, the sub-librarianship of which, under De Thou, was the only office Casaubon ever held in Paris]. The single topic of conversation was the errors of the Protestant, and the infallibility of the Roman, religion. There is no doubt that Du Perron's efforts were not without effect; he at least succeeded in making him thoroughly dissatisfied with Calvinism. Though infinitely inferior to Casaubon in point of general learning, he was more than a match for him in this particular field; he was at home on his ground, while Casaubon was a comparative stranger. He was much more adroit, more ready, more showy. He could also dangle the bait of the professorship before the needy scholar's eyes. And he could feel with just confidence that, as against Du Moulin and the Huguenots, he must have the advantage with a well-read man who valued Christian antiquity like Casaubon. The whole case is summed up in the pathetic entry—which is like a prolonged wail—in Casaubon's diary for the commencement of 1610:—

'May the year which this day commences be a happy one to us all! To myself and all mine—wife, children, sister. Grant this, O Everlasting God, I pray Thee of Thy mercy, and for the merits of Thy only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ. Now, if ever, yea, more than ever, have I need of Thy aid and protection. Now, indeed, have I to fight without ceasing a spiritual fight. Not a day, not an hour, scarce a moment, have I respite from their attempts on me. The antagonists, too, are such as it is not easy either to neglect or to shake off. We wrestle with men of the first consideration, either for learning or rank. I am perpetually forced to argue with an adversary who is, without dispute, of all on that side, the first in learning, second to none in ability [Du Perron]. Again, I have to support the most pressing instances from him who is above all in the kingdom in rank, and to whom, under God, I owe for so long maintenance,

¹ *Quarterly Review*, Sept. 1853: 'Diary of Casaubon.' There is now no need to conceal the fact that this article was written by Mr. Mark Pattison, and that it first gave him the idea, which more than twenty years later he so admirably carried out, of writing the life of Casaubon. The present writer well remembers a walk with Mr. Pattison over Port Meadow, in which he unfolded his views to the young undergraduate by his side, who had then very hazy notions about Casaubon!

favour, and the leisure and ease I now enjoy [the King]. The matter has now come to that pass that if I persist in opposing his wishes in this particular, I must forfeit his favour and benefits.¹

Then follows a long and touching account of his straits, pecuniary and other, and he concludes :—

‘God Immortal ! My mind shudders lest, thus beset, I should offend Thy Divine Majesty, by doing that which I abhor and detest. *Πρίν μοι χάρις εἴπῃς χθόνι.*’

How was it all to end ? The Gordian knot was cut by the assassin's dagger which put an end to Henri IV.'s life in the spring of 1610. Casaubon had now no longer any tie in Paris ; it was simply his connexion with the king which had kept him there so long. Paris was no spiritual home for him. Where could he find one ? He had at one time been brought into some communication with the Arminian Protestants of Holland ; but these, though free from the exclusive narrowness of the Huguenot Calvinists, were too cold, too rationalistic, above all, too much out of accord with primitive antiquity, to satisfy Casaubon. He had projected a visit to Venice, with the object of examining for himself the condition of the Greek Church. The visit never came off ; but if it had, he would not have found a Church so much to his mind as that in which he at last met with a haven of rest. His true home was our own mother Church of England. There he found the best modern representative of Christian antiquity, without the incrustation of mediæval superstitions ; the learning of Holland, without its rationalism ; the piety of the Huguenots, without their narrowness and contempt for learning and antiquity. In fact, he was, as Mr. Pattison truly remarks, ‘an Anglican ready made, as the mere effect of his reading the Fathers to meet Du Perron's incessant attacks.’¹ His theological position is well described by himself in a letter to Tilenus, professor of theology at Sedan, in 1602.

‘Let me remind you of the situation in which I have been placed. For years past I have scarce had a day free from contests with persons professing a different religion. With what freedom, with what zeal I have spoken on these occasions, God knows. I never invited these conflicts ; they were always forced upon me. I was not a theologian, but being compelled to give reasons for my opinions, I was driven to suspend all other studies, and to give myself up to this one. I compared the writings of our friends and their opponents with the doctrines of the ancient Church. Among the rest I read Bellarmine. On scripture, tradition, the authority of the old commentators, on

¹ Pattison's *Casaubon*, p. 300.

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the power of the Pope, on images, on indulgences, I could by certain reasons demonstrate all Bellarmine's positions to be false; but when I came to the chapter on the sacraments (though there can be also there some things which can be refuted) it is no less clear to me that the whole of antiquity, with one consent, is on the side of our opponents, and that our writers who have attempted to show that the Fathers have held our views have egregiously wasted their time. The careful study of the ancients had raised certain scruples in my mind. About these I would give a kingdom to be able to consult you, for all I desire is to learn. That I am staggered by the consent of the whole ancient and orthodox Church, I cannot conceal.¹

In the eight years which elapsed between the writing of these words and his settlement in England, these feelings were much intensified. One can therefore well understand his surprise and delight at finding in England 'a whole national Church encamped on the ground on which he had believed himself to be an isolated adventurer.'² For an account of the circumstances which led to, and the results which followed, his settlement in England, the reader must be referred to the pages of Pattison. It may suffice to note here that the two Englishmen with whom he was brought into the closest intimacy were the very two who were best qualified to satisfy his religious cravings. One was Lancelot Andrewes, then Bishop of Ely, the other John Overall, then Dean of S. Paul's. The enthusiastic way in which he speaks of Bishop Andrewes shows that he had found in him a man after his own heart.

'He is a man,' he writes to De Thou, 'whom if you knew, you would take to exceedingly. We spend whole days in talk of letters, sacred especially, and no words can express what true piety, what uprightness of judgment, I find in him.'

To Heinsius:—

'I am by way of seeing the Bishop daily. He is one of a few whose society enables me to support being separated from De Thou. I am attracted to the man by his profound learning, and charmed by a graciousness of manner not common in one so highly placed.'

He was equally fortunate in his other intimate friend. John Overall is a man to whose character and learning posterity has scarcely done full justice. The man whom the great Bishop Cosin, to the very end of life, always spoke and thought of as his 'lord and master,'³ was a very remarkable

¹ Pattison, pp. 253-4.

² *Ibid.* p. 303.

³ See Canon Ornsby's admirable Introduction to the *Correspondence of Bishop Cosin*, published by the Surtees Society.

man, and Casaubon evidently regarded him as such. To these was afterwards added Thomas Morton, afterwards Bishop of Durham. It would be difficult to find in any age a triumvirate which would more ably and characteristically represent the English Church. There is one other person whose relations to Casaubon must not be passed over. That one is the King himself. James I. had so unhappy a knack of making everything he said and did ridiculous, that it is difficult to do justice to him. But he was unquestionably a man of great learning, and quite capable of appreciating the merits of Casaubon for himself, instead of taking them on trust as Henri IV. had done. His kindness and consideration for the gentle and retiring scholar were unbounded. Perhaps his attentions were rather embarrassing to one who, scholar-like, loved solitude, but Casaubon knew that he always meant well, and so, rarely complains. James has been blamed for diverting Casaubon from his classical studies to theological disputation, for which he was not so well fitted. But it must be remembered that from the first, Casaubon had always been yearning to devote himself to theological instead of classical studies; so early as 1596 he had determined to set the example of studying Church history;¹ in fact, the review of Baronius' *Annales* was only the renewal of an old project. And though in themselves the *Exercitationes*, which he undertook at the instance of the king, may not have possessed much permanent value, yet they accomplished one very important result, in completely destroying a sham colossus, which, in the interests of the Anglican Church and of all opponents of Romanism, it was very desirable to have destroyed. The *Annales* of Baronius appeared at the time when Rome was beginning to recover from the shock of the Reformation, and when her power was certainly beginning to revive; they were thought to be an indestructible monument of stupendous, almost supernatural, learning. Casaubon was the only man who was strong enough to pull the huge building down; he did so, and Samson-like perished in the ruins; for it is said, and probably with truth, that his labours on Baronius hastened his death.

Casaubon met with some disappointments in England, but with one thing he was never disappointed—his connexion with the English Church. He still continued to attend the French Reformed church, and was on intimate terms with its ministers, who visited him on his death-bed. But his heart was with us. His youngest son, James, was baptized, and

¹ Pattison, p. 356.

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his elder, Meric, was confirmed according to the rites of the Church of England. John, the eldest of all, had, long before, become a worthless convert to Rome. Meric, his father's favourite, became an Anglican clergyman of a marked Church type; and, by a graceful act, was appointed to the prebend, at Canterbury, which his father, though a layman, had held.¹

English Churchmen may feel a pardonable pride in the thought that Isaac Casaubon, whose reputation in the field of literature in which he moved was almost unique, and who was as good and devout as he was learned, found his true home and his best satisfaction in the English Church. He was a special favourite with one whose character, combining the utmost guilelessness, simplicity and purity with profound learning and a life-long taste for classical as well as theological studies, much resembled that of Casaubon—the late honoured Bishop of Lincoln. It was at his instance that the *Epistola ad Perronium* was published separately, in the interest of the re-union of Christendom, by one who has devoted his best years to the bringing about of that much-to-be-desired event.²

Casaubon's remains were laid among the great dead in Westminster Abbey; his funeral sermon was preached by one of his greatest friends, Bishop Overall; his epitaph composed by another, Bishop Morton. To the very last he was teased by the irrepressible Romanists.

'The French Ambassador sent a nobleman to him to put the question directly, "In what religion he professed to die?" "Then you think, my lord," was the answer, "that I have been all along a dissembler in a matter of the greatest moment," expressing at the same time his horror of such deceit.'³

Casaubon was as clear from intellectual as from moral deceit. He understood perfectly well the true position of that branch of the Church Catholic in the faith of which he died; and we cannot more fitly conclude this article than by quoting one or two proofs of this from his own writings, which are not cited by Mr. Pattison. Here, for instance, is a specimen which is a commonplace in the mouth of one who has been bred an Anglican, but is remarkable as coming from one who had been brought up as Casaubon had been:—

'The Anglican Church is prepared to give an account of her faith, and to prove by facts themselves that the authors of the Refor-

¹ To Meric Casaubon we are indebted for the preservation of the invaluable *Ephemerides* of his father.

² *I. Casaubon. ad Cardinalem Perronium Epistola*: ed. F. Meyrick; præfatus est C. Wordsworth.

³ Pattison, p. 472.

mation established here did not propose to erect any new Church (as the ignorant and malevolent calumniously assert), but to restore one which had fallen to the best possible form; and they judged that form the best which was handed down to the rising Church by the Apostles, and adopted in the ages nearest to them.¹

'If I am not deceived, the purest part of the whole Reformation is in England, where, together with the study of truth, there flourishes the study of antiquity.'²

Casaubon was equally pleased with the ritual as with the doctrine of the Church of England. It has been seen that the celebration of the Holy Eucharist was one of the chief points on which he felt out of sympathy with the Huguenots. By its celebration here he was particularly impressed. 'I have seen,' he writes after the first celebration he had witnessed at S. Paul's, 'the Communion of the Holy Eucharist, certainly far different from what it is with us in France. Wherefore I embrace thee the more, O English Church, as being nearer to the ancient Church.' The Psalms of David were his special delight; a Hebrew Psalter was the one book he carried with him into England, leaving the rest to follow him. We can fancy, therefore, the pleasure he would feel on finding that the Psalms formed a part of Matins and Evensong every day. Other instances might be quoted, but enough has been said to show the bonds of sympathy between the great scholar and the Church of his adoption.

ART. VI.—THE INFLUENCE OF THE PULPIT.

1. *Footprints of the Son of Man as traced by S. Mark.* By H. M. LUCKOCK, D.D., Canon of Ely. (London, 1885.)
2. *The Art of Preaching, &c.* By the Rev. HENRY BURGESS, LL.D. (London, 1885.)
3. *Sermons Choisis de Bossuet.* (Paris, 1868.)
4. *Œuvres de Massillon.* (Lyon, 1810.)
5. *Œuvres de Bourdaloue.* (Paris, 1862.)

FIFTY years ago—a period to which writers upon ecclesiastical subjects are often wont to refer, as marking a most important crisis in the religious history of this country—fifty years ago it was the fashion to depreciate sermons, to

¹ *Epistola ad Cardinalem Perronium*, p. 494.

² *Epistola ad Salmasium*, p. 489.

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deny the influence, and to discourage the rhetorical arts, of the Pulpit. Indeed, somewhat before that date, Dr. Chalmers, then entering upon his career, and whose influence as a preacher became almost unbounded, had felt it necessary to offer a somewhat elaborate apology for the cultivation of oratory in connexion with religious subjects, which it had become customary to treat in a manner wholly conventional and with most wearisome monotony. The Doctor himself was a most splendid instance of the power which may be exerted by a preacher, whose great intellectual gifts were sustained by a character of the most child-like simplicity, and by a piety as deep as it was genuine. As with other really great speakers, his very defects became sources of strength. His broad Scotch accent, his somewhat uncouth but most natural manner, all added force to his pleadings, as they impressed the hearer with the utter genuineness and unaffected piety of the preacher, and brought him face to face with a man of deep convictions, and of a burning enthusiasm. It was the verdict of one of the most eminent writers and thinkers of that day,¹ that Dr. Chalmers's sole voice had revived the fast decaying religion of Scotch society, and 'made it fashionable' among the educated classes, with whom it had sunk into the most cold and barren neglect. But south of the Tweed, the Doctor's style admitted of but little successful imitation. Melvill, indeed, who charmed alike the University of Cambridge in Great S. Mary's, and the merchants of the City at the Golden Lecture, whilst a vast congregation, drawn from the middle classes, had crowded his church at Camberwell, has been charged with the attempt at such imitation; but there was nothing in those elaborate periods, and rhetorical artifices, which could stir the heart of a nation, or re-awaken its slumbering faith. In England, at least, the popular preachers of that time were felt to be rather floating with the stream, the somewhat sluggish stream, of the religious feeling of the day, than breasting the adverse current, and fighting with the waves of ungodliness and unbelief.

Then came the Oxford movement; but, with one marked exception, its rise was very little dependent upon the influence of the Pulpit. There was at first a natural reaction from the somewhat inflated style of the rival school, whilst the remarkable simplicity and even severity of style, which was natural to the distinguished Vicar of S. Mary's, degenerated in not a few of his scholars into a degree of baldness, amounting almost to affectation. It was not given to everyone to imitate

¹ Dr. Prichard, author of *Natural History of Man*.

with success the severe and exquisite purity of language which clothed the thoughts of John Henry Newman; and, in fact, his celebrated sermons, though they bear the title of 'parochial,' are perhaps more strictly academical in their character, than any series which has been delivered in S. Mary's, since it became the University Church. They were academical, as addressed week by week, and term by term, to a select body of students, who hung upon the great preacher's lips, as the 'Sons of the Prophets' might have hung upon the words of Elijah, or the students of the middle ages on those of some great 'Master of the Sentences;' but 'parochial' sermons they were not, nor were they in any true sense models for such. Hence, as we have said, in the literary world, the Pulpit was stated to have lost its influence with mankind. Many causes were alleged for this result. The multiplication of books, the absorption of intellectual interests by an ever-increasing variety of subjects, the new impulse given to thought in the direction of science and of art, had withdrawn the attention of society from the preacher. In a word, it was announced in the columns of the leading journal, and that in tones of compassionate superiority, that the clergy had ceased to be the teachers of mankind.

If this were so, it could arise only from one of two causes. Either the clergy were no longer competent to guide in the great subject entrusted to them; or, that subject had itself lost its influence with mankind, and the decline of the Pulpit was but one indication of the decay of Faith.

It is curious to observe how many circumstances have contributed to change this estimate. In the first place, the range of theological speculation has been enlarged in almost exact proportion to that of science or of history. The domain of religion has been found to touch upon that of every other branch of knowledge. Questions physical and metaphysical alike affect her intimately; at the same time, Biblical criticism and liturgical developments have combined to stir deeply the inner life of the Church, whilst the great doctrines which are grouped around the Sacraments have contributed still more powerfully to move her. Assuredly, there is no longer any scarcity of topics upon which to speak, nor any lack of minds quickened with the spirit of inquiry. The real difficulty is to find teachers in sufficient numbers, qualified to deal with subjects of such great and varied interest.

In addition to all which, the Church has now for some years past, recognized the great obligation resting upon her to address herself with earnestness and effect to the middle and

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better educated among the lower classes, with whom, under certain conditions, sermons are always popular. The strain thrown upon her in this direction is enormous. The spread of education, with the flood of periodical and somewhat superficial literature which follows in its train, is doing very much to stimulate, and very little to satisfy, the intelligence of these classes. There is no problem at this moment pressing more urgently for a solution, than how to meet the ever-growing want thus created. And it is of the utmost importance to observe that it can be adequately met *only by oral teaching*. The classes to whom we refer are not great readers, but when met with tact and with intelligence, they are admirable listeners, and often acute, though, it may be, not very deep or well-instructed, thinkers. They are extremely open to the influence of a sympathetic voice, and are not only willing, but really anxious, to receive instruction upon great and weighty principles, if proffered in terms which they can understand, and enlivened by apposite and abundant illustration.

Until of late the religious wants of these classes had been met, so far as they had been met at all, chiefly by preachers of the Nonconformist school; a school, the leaders of which were often men of great power, and of varied attainments, and skilled in the rhetorical department of their function, to an extent but very exceptionally found among the clergy of the Church of England. But a quarter of a century ago, the influence and character of the Nonconformist Pulpit was very remarkably affected by the scientific theories, and more especially by the Biblical criticism of the day. The traditionary reverence for Holy Scripture had been rudely shaken, whilst the preacher had neither creed nor liturgy to support him, and (such is the cruel irony of fate) his own efforts had done much to break the spell of authority. His theological system, which had been cast for the most part on Calvinistic lines, had been cruelly disturbed, and there had been no time, and few materials, for readjustment. Hence there was beginning to be felt, amongst those who had hitherto depended almost exclusively upon his ministrations, the need for something more distinct than clever speculation, something more definite, and, if the word may be admitted in such connexion, something more dogmatic. Thus, not in a single class alone, but throughout society, there arose in the hearts of men and women cravings which mere science could not satisfy, and which could as little be met by merely human theories, however brilliant or original. It was as in the days of S. Augustine, when he exclaimed that the philosophers had robbed him of

his God, and left him in exchange the four elements. Then did men turn once more to the Pulpit, and chiefly to the Pulpit of the Church of England, for guidance and instruction. Nor did they turn wholly in vain. Divines like Dr. Liddon and Bishop Magee of Peterborough gathered vast congregations in the naves of our great cathedrals. The Church of Ireland lent the brilliant eloquence of the Bishop of Derry, and the pungent, caustic irony of Dean Reichel; whilst not a few other men of sound learning and good judgment, combined with natural powers of eloquence, are doing excellent service, each in their several spheres. Those who have stood among the dense congregations of S. Paul's or Westminster Abbey, or have gazed upon the crowds that flock to hear Canons Knox-Little, or Body, or Hole, would be tempted to think that the verdict of half a century ago had been reversed, and that the influence of sermons had revived in no inconsiderable force.

Yet it must be confessed that the Church of England is at present but indifferently prepared for the great and increasing demand that is made upon her. Her clergy, as a class, have been very little given to oratorical display. In common with the vast majority of their countrymen, they have been but little trained in the practice of public speaking, and the quiet pastoral relations which have so happily existed between them and their people, have called for little beyond homely counsels and simple exegesis. But times are rapidly changing. Though it were undoubtedly untrue to say that the attitude of society is directly hostile to religion, yet it is certainly captious, critical, and, where not suspicious, at the least unsettled.

While much contemporary literature is bitter in tone, sceptical in opinion, and questionable in morals, there is an active body of secularists in every large town, and atheistical publications, and secularist lectures circulate largely in our more populous villages; and though it is quite true that the ultimate appeal in matters of religion, rests rather with the conscience and affections than with the intellect, still, intellectual difficulties must be fairly met, and intellectual objections must be fairly answered, and thus a heavy and exhausting burden is thrown upon the clergy. In addition to which, the Church has her yet more pressing office to discharge of propounding the faith, as well as of defending it; and also of maintaining, as she alone can maintain, a true and righteous standard of morals in society. In each of these three departments of her work—the defence of the faith, the exposition of the faith, and the maintenance of the moral purity and

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rectitude of society—it is clear that she must largely have recourse to the influence of the Pulpit, and it is of the utmost importance she should do this with equal energy and wisdom. The late Bishop of Ely, in the few words of his preface to Dr. Luckock's discourses on S. Mark, evidently betrayed his great anxiety on this account. It is obvious that he dreaded the growth of a feeble sentimentalism, or of an unreal mysticism, in the place of that robust and practical theology, which can alone command the assent, and direct the lives of our countrymen. It is true, that in his recommendations of Dr. Luckock's Lectures to the free use of the younger clergy, the Bishop confined himself to the expository work of the Pulpit, and to one department of that work—viz., exegesis. And here, without doubt, if he will avail himself of such guidance as that of Dr. Luckock, and of others like him, the young and inexperienced preacher will find himself upon the safest ground, and furnished with topics which will never fail to interest the religious portion of his congregation. He is supported by the authority, and instructed by the example, of perhaps the greatest of all preachers of this class, S. Chrysostom; and gradually, as he becomes more and more acquainted with the real workings of human nature, and the miserable facts of social life, he may be led from simple exegesis into those fields of searching moral and spiritual rebuke, which startled the audiences of Antioch and Constantinople. But whilst confining himself to this single suggestion as regards the tyro in homiletics, we are convinced that Bishop Woodford—himself no undistinguished or inexperienced proficient in the sacred art—was by no means unconscious of the pressing needs of the Church in the other directions to which we have referred; and we think that we may perhaps do something to promote the great objects which his Lordship had so seriously at heart, if we extend our observations at somewhat greater length, upon each of the three provinces into which we have distributed the work and influence of sermons.

First, then, as to the Church's primary and essential work—that of the exposition of the faith to those within her circle, or to those serious inquirers from outside, who present themselves in her assemblies.

It were superfluous to speak of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as forming the basis of such instruction; but perhaps it may not be so superfluous to suggest so simple and so antiquated a formulary as the Church Catechism, as providing a scheme of larger and fuller instruction. And yet we have known very wise and sound Churchmen, who have found here

an admirable text-book for doctrinal instruction ; a text-book concealed, and for the most part entirely out of view, but the terse and pregnant definitions of which, if somewhat beyond the comprehension of the children for whose learning they are ostensibly composed, are yet admirably fitted to suggest the lines upon which dogmatic instruction may be given. And though in the present day the Socratic method may be quite inadmissible in the Pulpit, yet the suggestion of the question, and the supply of the answer, after the question has been adroitly raised in the mind of the listener, is a method of wonderful power with 'children of a larger growth.' But the Catechism, in common with other theology to which we shall very briefly refer, has this advantage, that it is indigenous, of home growth, the product of English minds—at least the second portion to which our remarks more particularly refer—and therefore wonderfully in accord with genuine English sentiment, and downright sense. Of course it is suggested here merely as a scheme, a skeleton of dogmatic teaching. For its expansion, the shelves of our forefathers groaned with theology, strong in fibre, and firm in texture, in that it was home-spun. Who ever turned to Barrow, or to Pearson, or to Jackson, or to Hammond, or to Beveridge, and failed to find a mine from which to quarry the solid and true stones, of which a doctrinal sermon might be built ; and if more poetic colouring, the touch of more delicate sentiment, of softer beauty, or of a more tender spirit of devotion, be sought for, what can exceed the wealth of Andrews, of Jeremy Taylor, or of another old divine, now, alas ! but little remembered, Joseph Mede, whose speech, like his name, was redolent of honey ! We confess that we have felt somewhat jealous of the neglect of the stores of our great divines, and have seen reason seriously to dread lest, in the cultivation of exotics, we sacrifice somewhat of the vigour of our native growth.

The mention of Beveridge suggests a question of infinite interest, the manner and the degree in which the Pulpit is to be made the vehicle of instruction in what are known as Church principles—*i.e.* the constitution and privileges of the Church itself. The extent to which this instruction had been neglected, and the difficulty attending its revival, is remarkably shown in a letter which we are enabled to submit to our readers, the prescience of which invests it with an almost prophetic character. It was written certainly not later than the year 1833. The writer,¹ who died in 1834, was a well-known

¹ The Rev. Thomas Sykes, vicar of Guilsborough, and brother-in-law of Joshua Watson.

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clergyman of the old High Church school, and a man of very considerable influence in his neighbourhood. If it be borne in mind, that at that date the first of the *Tracts for the Times* had not yet been issued, the wisdom and foresight of the writer will be admitted to be very remarkable :—

‘I seem to think that I can tell you something which you who are young may probably live to see, but which I who shall soon be called away off the stage, shall not. Wherever I go, all about the country, I see amongst the clergy a number of very amiable and estimable men, many of them much in earnest, and wishing to do good ; but I have observed one universal want in their teaching, the uniform suppression of one great truth. There is no account given anywhere, so far as I can see, of the One Holy Catholic Church. I think that the causes of this suppression have been mainly two. The Church has been kept out of sight, in consequence of the civil establishment of the branch of it which is in this country, and partly out of false charity to Dissent. Now this great truth is an article of the Creed, and if so, to teach the rest of the Creed to its exclusion, must be to destroy “the analogy or proportion of the faith.” This cannot be done without the most serious consequences. The doctrine is of the last importance, and the principles it involves of immense power ; and some day not far distant, it will judicially have its reprisals—and whereas the other articles of the Creed seem now to have thrown it into the shade, it will seem, when it is brought forward, to swallow up the rest. We now hear not a breath about the Church ; by-and-by those who live to see it, will hear of nothing else, and just in proportion perhaps to its present suppression, will be its future development. Our confusion nowadays is chiefly owing to the want of it, and there will be yet more confusion attending its revival. The effects of it I even dread to contemplate, especially if it come suddenly ; and woe betide those, whoever they are, who shall in the course of Providence have to bring it forward ! It ought especially of all others to be matter of catechetical teaching and training. The doctrine of the Church Catholic, and the privileges of Church membership, cannot be explained from pulpits, and those who will have to explain it will hardly know where they are to turn themselves. They will be endlessly misunderstood and misrepresented. There will be one great cry of Popery, from one end of the country to another. It will be thrust upon minds unprepared, and upon an uncatechized Church. Some will take it up, and admire it as a beautiful picture ; others will be frightened and run away and reject it, and all will want guidance, which one hardly knows where they will find. How the doctrine may first be brought forward we know not, *but the powers of the world may any day turn their backs upon us, and this will probably lead to the effects which I have described.*’

The italics are our own. We will not pause to point out in detail, how the course of events since 1833 has justified the anticipations, not of this sentence only, but of the whole of

this most remarkable letter. The concluding words suggest a very striking parallel between the present crisis, and that which attended the first Reform Bill. The civil supports of the Church threaten gradually to give way; all the more necessary does it become to put forward her spiritual claims. There can be but little doubt that this necessity will be abundantly recognized. Happily, much has been done in this direction since the date of the letter. Among the more intelligent classes, and within her own communion, 'the doctrine of the Church Catholic and the privileges of her members,' are far better understood than even twenty years ago. But among the great masses of the people it is not so. Persistent efforts are made to represent the Church as one among innumerable sects, and these efforts are largely successful. It is therefore impossible but that the great counter truth of the Divine constitution of the Church, and the authority of her Orders, should be prominently and energetically put forward. We feel it quite needless to stimulate the zeal of those upon whom this duty will inevitably be thrown; we would rather urge upon them the delicacy, as well as the difficulty, of the work which is before them, and the strength which comes of moderation. Dr. Liddon's most admirable sermon on Episcopacy, preached at the consecration of the Bishops of Lincoln and of Exeter, is an excellent example of that strength in moderation, for which we have been pleading. It has received much attention, and will produce permanent effect, and this because it clearly and forcibly states the claims of Episcopacy, and the enormous power of its Divine Institution within the Church, without rashly advancing to conclusions, which after all shock the sentiments, and contradict the experience of mankind, and produce not conviction, but reaction. However, the subject is too large to deal with thus incidentally.

Not the Church alone, but the Christianity of the country, is evidently approaching an acute crisis in its history. If there be much to cause anxiety, there is also much to suggest hope. The line between faith and unbelief will, it is true, be more distinctly drawn, and the forces of infidelity will consequently appear stronger and more consolidated than heretofore; but faith, too, will gain at once in decision and intensity, and Churchmen will become more prepared for exertion, and more inured to sacrifice. But it is essential that the battle be fought with prudence, as well as zeal, and whilst the spiritual claims of the Church and of her priesthood must be put forward in no timid or hesitating tone, it is of the utmost importance that the terms should be wisely chosen, that they

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should be such as, whilst distinctly maintaining the Divine constitution of the Church, and the spiritual authority of her ministry, should yet unite Churchmen as much, and shall divide them as little, as possible, and, moreover, should be cast in such a form as shall be intelligible to the average English understanding. It must be borne in mind that the Church stands now, in such a sense as for a generation she has never stood before, in the presence of an enemy, organized and determined. Her tactics must be at once defensive and offensive; but for success it is essential that she close in her ranks, that she occupy firm and indisputable ground, and content herself with maintaining the cardinal verities of her Creed, of which 'The Holy Catholic Church' is certainly one of the first and greatest. This topic can no longer be excluded from our Pulpits. None can tell how much depends upon the wisdom and skill with which it is advanced. Surely we may look for wise and timely direction from the heads of the Church in this important matter. We cannot but think that a most serious responsibility rests upon them here, and with them for the present, with the greatest anxiety, we leave it.

The second department in which the Pulpit would seem called to play a very important part in the immediate future, is that of the defence of the faith against the attacks so vigorously made upon it from without. Until quite recently it was felt, and probably with justice, that to deal with such attacks in sermons, was calculated rather to suggest difficulties than to solve them. The case is now very different. Scepticism is in the most marked degree aggressive; there is no village of any considerable size, and no body of workmen of average intelligence, in which the popular objections to Revelation do not circulate with great freedom. To ignore this fact is but to enact the foolish part of the ostrich, whilst no doubt the subject requires the most prudent and careful handling. It is but a few months since the incumbent of a new church, in a large manufacturing town, invoked the aid of such of his neighbours as had more leisure at their disposal, to prepare a course of argumentative sermons on Creation, Miracles, Prophecy, Inspiration, and similar subjects, which were constantly meeting him in the daily work of his parish; and we understand that the course which was given in response to his appeal, was received by a congregation, mainly consisting of superior working men and members of the middle class, with much interest and marked satisfaction. It is, of course, a matter of no small difficulty to combine the scientific accuracy necessary to the treatment of such subjects, with a popular style and

clearness of statement ; but the case to which we refer seemed conclusively to prove that the spirit of inquiry was most active, and that these men were most anxious to hear the case for Revelation temperately and fairly stated. We are convinced that scepticism is a condition of mind by no means acceptable to those of our countrymen with whom 'life is real and life is earnest,' however it may gratify the leisure of an idle, pleasure-seeking, and dilettante class. For subjects such as those above specified, it would seem that a course by different preachers, each upon his own special ground, is the best adapted ; and certainly the more leisurely and more scholarly among the country clergy can scarcely render more acceptable service to their brethren of the towns, than in contributing to such a series. Only let it be carefully borne in mind that there are at the least two requisites for the successful discharge of such an office—knowledge of the subject, and knowledge of mankind. The most learned scholar, and the most diligent student, may entirely fail to interest the class of hearers to whom we refer, until he has learnt to present his subject from their point of view, and to meet the questions actually present in their mind. The preacher of real influence must, above all things, *know mankind*. And that he may know them, he must converse with them, in the workshop, on the railway, or in the field. Few things will so greatly interest and surprise an intelligent mind, as to discover the most curious and unexpected turns of thought which occur among classes, whose education and association are so different from his own. It is, perhaps, a matter of some tact and skill to draw out a stranger into a free expression of his views, especially if you be recognized as a parson ; but we are convinced, and that from experience, that most valuable hints for homiletics can be gained in a third-class carriage, on a Northern line of rail.

Speaking generally, the attacks upon revealed religion, as addressed to the lower and less educated classes, are based almost exclusively upon the exaggerations of Calvinism, or upon the alleged 'faults of the Bible.' The supposed scientific inaccuracies of Genesis, the incredibility of miracles, and more particularly those of the Old Testament, the cruelty of the Canaanitish wars, and the moral failings of Old Testament characters who are supposed to be the subjects of Divine approval, these and similar objections recur again and again ; in addition to which, the supposed results of criticism are very unscrupulously used as invalidating this or that passage, and throwing doubt upon the authenticity of the whole.

One chief difficulty in dealing with the very imperfectly educated classes, amongst whom these objections are at present so sedulously circulated, lies in this, that they are but ill prepared for those more thoughtful views of the nature and structure of Holy Scripture, which have replaced among scholars and divines the mechanical and literal view of inspiration. Nor are they better qualified to apprehend the *progressive* character of Revelation, alike in its moral and spiritual features. Indeed, one of the most singular characteristics of the half-educated mind, is its inability to measure distance in time, just as the untrained eye is unable to measure distance in space. One, or five, or twenty centuries are much the same to the mind which, from its ignorance of intermediate events, is quite unable to realize the distance between Noah and Abraham or Abraham and S. Paul. Nor is their perception of proportion more accurate than that of time. There are those to whose faith some apparent inaccuracy in the book of Numbers, is no less embarrassing than would be the exclusion of the Four Gospels from the Canon. It is obvious that in dealing with such minds, very great patience as well as caution must be used. Nor is it possible to answer every objection in detail, and it must be admitted that there are some questions, which the extreme antiquity of the records, and also the extreme brevity of many of them, leave in hopeless obscurity; as, for example, one which the writer of the present article has found constantly recurring, and that in all seriousness: 'Who was Cain's wife?' One can only answer, 'We really do not know, we were not there, and we are not told.' The history of a thousand years is compressed into a few verses, and this is not one of the questions to which the record enables us to reply. But we are inclined to think that the influence of the Pulpit will be most wisely used, on the one hand, in gradually educating the people in the great principles which underlie the solution of almost all such questions, in leading them to understand something of the construction of the Bible, and the relation to each other of its several parts, and the further relation in which the whole has from the very beginning stood to the covenanted Church of God.

On the other hand, Holy Scripture is its own best witness; and the preacher who elucidates the greatness of that Revelation which it conveys, the lofty spirituality of its teaching, the pure standard of its morality, and the degree to which, though confessedly progressive both as regards spiritual truths and moral standards, it was nevertheless incomparably supe-

rior, in both, to the highest level to which the Gentile world could reach—will have done much in anticipation to blunt the point of the sceptical arrows.

Mankind, in their possession of Holy Scripture, are much in the position of those who have received a jewel of inestimable price and beauty, which has been handed down to them in a casket, itself extremely precious, and extremely beautiful, but also of very great antiquity. By reason of its great age, much of its workmanship is strange and unintelligible to modern workmen, and some parts may possibly have been broken off, or defaced by time. Surely it were unreasonable if, on account of some real, or, as is more probable, some supposed faults in the casket, men were to neglect the priceless jewel altogether! One man may say, 'I do not understand this old-fashioned workmanship;' another, 'I do not think this piece fits in just as it should;' a third, 'I cannot make out the hinges or the fastening;' whereas, if they would but look at the jewel which the antique casket contained, its beauty and its value would soon convince them of the real character of that in which it had been conveyed down to them safe and sound through many ages, to enrich their life and fill their hearts with joy. It would not then be any valid objection with them that the casket (to carry on our illustration) was composed of various metals, from the purest gold to comparatively inferior amalgams, that the workmanship betrayed great variety of taste and skill, showing how great a number and variety of workmen had been employed on it, that here and there perhaps a fragment had been lost or misplaced, and here and there it was impossible to learn with accuracy the date of the work, or the name of the workman. All these points would become of very little weight, when it was perceived that there was, on the whole, a perfect congruity of design, a wonderful harmony in so great variety, and that the purpose of the whole was evidently to convey to successive generations a treasure of inestimable value, and that in the manner best adapted to the moral and spiritual enlightenment of each succeeding age. We are, therefore, of opinion that while specific difficulties are by no means to be evaded as they arise, still, the influence of the Pulpit as regards such objections as those to which we have referred, will be the most powerful when indirect; the strongest in its correction of scepticism, when it is most successful in setting forth truth.

There is, however, a third department in which the influence of the Pulpit is of the first importance, and in which there rests a peculiar obligation upon a National Church to exercise

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it judiciously and well. It is the maintenance of the moral tone of social life. Whatever may be thought of the wisdom of some utterances of the Evangelical Pulpit, however narrow their judgment may have been upon certain points, and however mistaken their indiscriminate censure of amusements, yet it must be confessed, and greatly to their honour, that the nation owes to our Evangelical forefathers a deep debt of gratitude for their courageous protest against the vices of the Regency, and for the immense influence which they exerted in raising the moral tone of society. If ever there was a case in which a nation acted nobly, and made great sacrifices at the bidding of conscience, and in which the sense of duty triumphed with but little aid from political or selfish interests, it was in the British repudiation of the Slave Trade. Few nobler lives are written in the pages of our history than those of Clarkson, and Buxton, and Wilberforce, and Granville Sharpe. And though it may be said that these were none of them preachers, yet were they strongly supported by men who exercised great power in their day, not so much by means of brilliant intellectual gifts, as by force of moral character.

A marked and very instructive feature of that movement was that it was chiefly from below. The middle classes became religious, when the Court and fashion were such as the memoirs of the period but too flagrantly reveal. It is true that the religious movement of that day did not open the churches for daily service. When all the circumstances are considered, it was perhaps hardly to be expected; but it is scarcely remembered as it should be, how it introduced family prayers into many a household, and planted that form of quiet unobtrusive piety which moves one's love and admiration, when one comes across it in the familiar letters of those days. With all their faults, and we do not deny them; with all their narrowness, and this we acknowledge to the full; with all their want of scholarship, and their lamentable ignorance of the Church's Corporate life and office, yet was there in those preachers—men often of but humble attainments but of strong good sense—a conviction of God's immediate Presence, and a habit of direct appeal to conscience, which made them as the salt of a most corrupt society, and enabled them to leaven the nation with righteousness. With a thousand faults, and with omissions which as Churchmen we cannot but deplore, yet as addressed to men and women, heads of households of the middle and commercial classes, the sermons of Cecil, and of the *then* John Scott of Hull, a name still so honourably represented there, were models of plain speaking of practical

truths. It may be that there are some among our readers who have still stored up, docketed and labelled, as the correspondence of those days used to be, letters that passed between mothers and their children, wives and their husbands, sixty and seventy years ago. Books were then but few, and literary habits slender, but those secret and most touching records of domestic life show what was then the influence of the weekly sermon—that personal preaching of a present God, and ever-watchful Providence, and ever-loving Saviour. In face of the danger of the growth amongst us of a feeble sentimentalism, or an unreal mysticism, we cannot refrain from recalling the attention of our younger clergy to those practical discourses upon moral duties, which used eminently to distinguish English divines, and were not less conspicuous among the sermons of the very greatest French preachers. Let it be remembered that moral virtues, when based upon the true motive, and sustained by the only sufficient strength, become Christian graces, the fruit and glory of the Christian life. If Bishop Butler thought it not unworthy of his great powers to preach his celebrated sermon upon the Government of the Tongue, if Jeremy Taylor could expend the stores of his varied learning and his inexhaustible imagination upon the subjects of Christian simplicity, and Christian prudence, if Bossuet and Bourdaloue could each preach before the Court of Le Grand Monarque, upon the sins of ambition, the Christian preacher need surely not be afraid lest he stoop beneath the spiritual dignity of his office, in analysing the motives of human conduct, and holding up a mirror to mankind. Irrespective of the direct value of his counsels, the Christian preacher acquires a special authority with his hearer when he shows a familiarity with the workings of his heart, and can expose to him the intricacies of his motives, and the true character of his particular temptation, as yet unsuspected by himself. It is in this respect that a training in moral philosophy forms so important a part of the preacher's education. It is indeed an essential qualification for the rhetorician in every department; but how eminently is this the case where the subject-matter is not political, as in the senate, or forensic, as at the bar, but duty itself in its most personal relations, the regulation of the whole conduct of life! For a rough and ready estimate of character, with a bitter and caustic exposure of its follies and its deceits, commend us to the witty Dr. South. Lacking in reverence, and lamentably deficient in spirituality, and in those respects no model for a Christian preacher, yet few have clothed more acute remarks, in more

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trenchant language. Indeed, in the use of forcible yet simple English he has perhaps no equal, unless it be the present Bishop of Peterborough, who, in the selection of the most telling word, and that one of the commonest and most familiar in the language, which yet no one else would ever have selected, greatly resembles the witty Canon of Westminster and Christ Church. We subjoin one or two extracts from this once celebrated writer, and these not the most striking that could be selected, but as examples of his singular power in the use of plain, forcible English. It is some five-and-thirty years since Tait, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, drew the attention of his scholars at Oxford to the writings of South, as a model of vigorous expression, and the lapse of a generation may excuse the renewal of the suggestion.

'They knew that there was a righteous and searching law directly forbidding such practices, and they knew that it carried with it the Divine stamp—that it was the law of God. . . . And this surely, one would think, was knowledge enough to have opened both a man's eyes and his heart too—his eyes to see and his heart to consider the intolerable mischief that the commission of the sin set before him must infallibly plunge him into. . . . For we must know that God has set a flaming sword, not only before Paradise, but before hell itself also, to keep men out of this, as well as out of the other. And conscience is the angel into whose hand this sword is put. But if now the sinner shall not only wrestle with this angel, but throw him too, and win so complete a victory over his conscience that all these considerations shall be able to strike no terror into his mind, lay no restraint upon his lusts, no control upon his appetites, he is certainly too strong for the means of grace, and his heart lies open like a broad and high road for all the sin and villainy in the world freely to pass through.'—*On the Guilt of Taking Pleasure in Other Men's Sins.*

'And, by the way, let the boldest, the hardiest, the securest sinner know that God is able without ever touching him either in his estate, his health, his reputation, or any other outward enjoyment dear to him, but merely by letting a few drops of His wrath fall upon his guilty conscience, so to scald and gall him with the lively sense of sin, that he shall live a continual terror to himself, carry about him a hell in his own breast, which shall echo to him such peals of vengeance every hour, that all the wine and music, all the honours and greatness of the world, shall not be able to minister the least ease to his heart-sick and desponding soul.'—*On the Messiah's Sufferings for the Sins of the People.*

It is generally reported that an eminent living preacher in a great measure formed his style upon that of the great preachers of the Court of Louis XIV. Of these, three names stand out with peculiar lustre—Bossuet, Massillon, and Bourdaloue. There is a certain quality common to all three, which

indeed is eminently characteristic of the French genius, and which particularly recommends them to the attention of the English student. Differing greatly in genius as in style, they all agree in the extraordinary clearness of their arrangement. Every sermon is capable of the most accurate analysis, and from the analysis every sermon can be completely reconstructed. Nor is the diction less clear than the arrangement. It is impossible to miss the purport of a single passage, or to fail to discern its bearing upon the whole. In the greatest artists, such careful arrangement does not interfere with the flow of the periods, or the occasional fire of the orator; whilst it adds immeasurably to the clearness and perspicuity of the style. This intense love of order which so peculiarly marks the French mind, and is by no means confined to their literature, is by no means equally characteristic of the average English sermon, which it is hence sometimes difficult to follow, and still more difficult to remember.

Of the three whom we have mentioned, Bossuet claims precedence as well in order of time as in the prominent position which he held amongst his contemporaries. He was the most eminent, and, alas! perhaps the most bitter controversialist of his day. The Eagle of Meaux had the sharp talons, as well as the piercing eye and soaring pinions, of the king of birds. Neither in controversy nor in his sermons did his learning ever fail him; and, important as was the part which he was called upon to play in public, Bossuet never ceased to be a most industrious student. But the Court of Louis XIV. was no very salutary atmosphere for the Christian Bishop, nor did the religious rôle which the Most Christian King chose to assume towards the end of his reign, render the position less difficult. The Court divine found himself upon a stage on which the personal views of the sovereign could scarcely fail to influence the statements of the preacher, nor could his piety easily escape the contagion of his ambition. Certainly, at the present distance of time, and with our changed sentiments, one starts with surprise and with disgust at the terms of adulation in which the Monarch was addressed in the House of God; nor are Massillon or even Bourdaloue free from what appears to us a breach both of taste and of propriety in this respect. Still, in Bossuet we have the work of a great, learned, and ambitious mind, instinct with that love of order to which we have referred, and one singularly susceptible of beauty. In his grand periods we are reminded, *mutatis mutandis*—and many things have to be changed—of the pomp and majesty of Horsley; but the Bishop of St. Asaph never softened into

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the sweetness or the smile of Bossuet, when he was touched with a sentiment of tenderness or beauty. Bossuet then would seem to us a model of powerful and dignified eloquence, across the majestic features of which there passes that peculiar smile of sweetness which so eminently belongs to France. This of course it is not given to every one to imitate; but there is one practice which marks him in common, though in a less eminent degree, with the two others whom we have classed with him, and which we think may supply a very useful suggestion to many a young preacher. Noting some terse and pregnant passage of S. Augustine—the one of all the Fathers whom he most studied—he allowed the thought to germinate in his own mind, to grow there into many ramifications, and at last to expand into a sermon. But though the germ was from S. Augustine, that great master of the human heart, the sermon was Bossuet's, losing nothing of originality, and strongly marked by his individuality.

Those who are familiar with the style of S. Augustine know how he was accustomed to compress some great thought into an epigram, so few and so pointed were the words. On one occasion he had spoken of the wicked as '*spe desperati*,' (by hope bereft of hope). The expression had evidently sunk into the mind of Bossuet. He had dwelt long, and pondered deeply upon it, till at last in his sermon upon Penitence, he draws out its full meaning with terrible force, describing at length how the sinful man, presuming upon the hope of Divine mercy, deprives himself finally of that hope ('*spe desperatus*').

It was an old saying current among our forefathers, '*Sermo sine Augustino, sine sale*' ('The sermon without Augustine is without savour'). However this may be, the converse at least is true, and the preacher who could unfold one of that Father's deep thoughts into a plain, practical sermon, never lost touch of the English mind. Take such a saying as that most celebrated one, '*Deus patiens quia æternus*,' or that marvellous reflexion upon the greatness and littleness of life, '*Tempus æternitatis imitatio*,' or another sentence of inexhaustible wisdom, '*Ama, et fac quod vis*,' or his statement that in the Incarnation, the Divine Word manifested a Presence which He always had in the world from its creation. Great as was the intellectual power of S. Augustine, and marvellous as was the intellectual experience through which he had passed, the greatness of his powers would never have secured for him that undying influence which belongs to him, but that the depth of his sympathies was as great as that of his knowledge, and that he was as tender as he was wise.

But to return. The student may wisely study Bossuet as a master of rhetoric and of learning ; he will, however, as we think, feel that he was one whose independence was compromised by his position, and whose spirituality was sadly warped by his ambition.

Not so with the two great rivals of his fame. Bourdaloue and Massillon were men of less brilliancy, perhaps of less power, than Bossuet, but as preachers who appealed rather to the consciences than to the admiration of their hearers, and who were both well versed in the intricacies of the human heart, they would seem to be more serviceable models for the young divine.

Resembling each other very much in some respects, they are the more strikingly contrasted in others : Bourdaloue the stronger, Massillon the more graceful ; Bourdaloue the greater master of moral analysis and of logical statement, Massillon gifted with the more ready flow of poetry, and the more delicate sense of beauty. And their character corresponded to their style. Bourdaloue was one of those who, grave and severe in their view of human life, and unsparing in their censure, yet surprise us by the depth of their tenderness and compassion. No sin escapes his sarcasm, and no subterfuge his exposure. No motive is so complex but he lays it bare in his merciless analysis ; yet one feels that his heart yearns towards every penitent, and that there is none to whom he is so severe as to himself. It is a curious problem how the court of Louis XIV. and the monarch himself could bear to listen so patiently, and for so many years, to so uncompromising a moralist ; unless, indeed, the solution be found in the readiness with which each listener transfers the application to his neighbour from himself. A singular anecdote is related of Bourdaloue, which may show how the great preacher soothed the sadness which at times oppressed him. On the occasion of one of his great sermons, which was to be delivered in the afternoon, he absented himself from the preceding portion of the service, and when, as the time approached, the sacristan went in search of him he could not be found. Presently, however, he was discovered in a room of the priest's house playing on his violin, and thus recovering the calmness of nerve and temperament, which the anxiety of his preparation had disturbed. A more characteristic anecdote is that of his death-bed, for which he had made most devout and careful preparation. 'It behoves me now,' he said, 'to prepare myself for that hour for which it has been so often my duty to prepare others.' And then he added at the close : 'What-

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ever pains of purgatory it may please God to allot to me, those I accept in most complete submission, knowing that He is both merciful and just.'

Massillon was cast in a different mould. Kindly, genial, and of gentle mood, the world wore to him a brighter aspect than to Bourdaloue. Yet he, too, was well trained in moral science, and was most uncompromising upon moral questions. It must have been a work of no ordinary courage to rebuke in such terms as he used, the avarice and grasping ambition of the dignified French clergy. Nor did Bourdaloue himself more earnestly protest against the subtle encroachments of a worldly spirit. In this respect Massillon's episcopal addresses are a model of fearless statement, as of affectionate counsel. His sermons generally were of a tone more gentle, and a rhythm more equable, than those of Bourdaloue, and probably would be more attractive to ordinary minds. Yet it was of Massillon, not of Bourdaloue, that the king used the oft-quoted words: 'My other chaplains send me away contented with their performances; this one leaves me ever discontented with myself.' The sequel of the anecdote is less creditable to the king, for Massillon was never admitted to preach a second course of sermons at Court, until after the death of Louis XV.

Both preachers continued their sermons to what we should consider a most inordinate length; and Massillon, as more diffuse, was the longer of the two. Their sermons, therefore, will serve as quarries, from which may be obtained rich materials for modern discourses. It were boldness indeed to dare to appropriate the whole. Massillon, as the younger, was, to a certain extent, influenced both by the style and the genius of Bourdaloue; but they were alike remarkable for the directness and simplicity of style which they substituted for the artificial and meretricious elegance of the earlier French school.

We have dwelt at some length upon these two great examples as being masters in the treatment of Christian morals, a department of homiletics which must always contribute, in so large a measure, to the strength and interest of the Christian Pulpit. In that Pulpit doctrine must ever hold the foremost place, and even the subtleties of doctrine must occasionally be found; yet of these subtleties the mind ultimately wearies, whilst the moral teaching of the Gospel is at once the necessary outgrowth of its doctrine, and the evidence most readily appreciated by mankind.

ART. VII.—GEORGE CASSANDER.

1. *Georgii Cassandri Opera.* (Parisiis, 1616.)
2. *Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam.* (Parisiis, 1642.)

FAIR-MINDED men of all sections of the Church will be disposed to look favourably on one who is ready to approach points of difference in a conciliatory spirit, and to dwell upon matters of agreement, rather than those of divergence. Of men of such a character and disposition there have been few in the Church of Rome. The two great formulas which appear to govern controversialists of that Church, are: 'Never concede anything;' and, 'Never allow yourself to be in the wrong.' With those who are governed by such laws, controversy is of course useless; and, as a matter of fact, the controversy with Rome has long practically ceased. The Anglican case has long ago been fully stated, and thoroughly established. The Roman affects not to see anything in it, and will probably continue to do so. We are convinced that more words and plainer demonstration (were it possible) would not alter his attitude, and we turn aside to some more profitable field for the exercise of energy. At the same time, we cannot but wonder at the amazing spectacle of this bondage of the intellectual and moral sense to external authority; this self-complacent rejection of history; this calm attitude of immobility; and we welcome with especial readiness any members of this self-absorbed body who show traces of a more candid spirit. Of these, one of the most remarkable was George Cassander. Cassander has somewhat of a unique position in the history of religion. He was not, like Erasmus, mixed up in all the literary controversies of his day; in no way did his position bind him to the conciliatory treatment of Reformed doctrines. He came to the consideration of these matters as a true theologian, and considered them in a true theological spirit. With him, it was no question of proselytizing. The possibility of quitting his status in the Church probably never occurred to Cassander; on the other hand, he had no thought of bringing the Reformed back again. His great work was to institute a calm theological examination as to how far the doctrines accepted by the Church of his day had a substantial agreement with those formulated in the Augsburg Confession, and the result was in every way remarkable. It is observed by Mr. Hallam that Grotius, starting from the Reformed side,

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exhibited a more complete acceptance of Roman doctrine than Cassander maintained, though the latter never quitted the position of a respected member of the Roman Church. That he stood out in a very peculiar position towards the great mass of that Church is indisputable. The Puritans of the Stuart times were fond of calling the High Churchmen 'a Cassandrian kind of Papists.' Were there a few such Cassandrian Papists in places of authority in Rome now, we should have better hope of the future unity of Christendom. Meantime, on the principle which we laid down at starting, the life and works of this good man well deserve our attention.

Of all the German Reformers who fought the great battles of the sixteenth century, Philip Melanchthon, by universal consent, occupies the highest place. The fierce and impetuous Luther, the iconoclast of the movement, looked upon him as a saint, while the better part of the defenders of the old opinions could not bring themselves to be bitter against him. Why was this? Because of the eminent candour and fairness of his mind, and his intense desire for peace; because, with a view to peace, he was ready to tolerate many things in the Church of Rome which others considered insupportable; because there was no schismatical spirit in him: and this gave a charm and beauty to his character which attracted all. What Melanchthon was on the Protestant side, that George Cassander was on the side of the Romanists. But while the name of Melanchthon is familiar to all, Cassander is but little known. There is no Life of him, and probably but few are acquainted with his clearly and ably written works. He seems to be quite passed over in Church history. His name does not even occur in Mosheim. But in the scanty roll of the liberal theologians of the Romish Church, among the names of Grosseteste and Gerson, Erasmus and De Thou, Sarpi, Courayer, and Du Pin, he well deserves a conspicuous place. Now that the Romish doctrines have been imbedded in the hard concrete of the Decrees of Trent, such work as Cassander attempted may seem utterly superfluous. But, in his day, when Trent had only just spoken, and many of the best men of the Church stood aghast at the utterances of the new creed, it was not so. There was still hope of a more candid treatment of the doctrines in dispute; still hope that the teaching of the primitive and best times of the Church might count for something; still hope that Christian men might not be set one against another in bitter animosity. Upon this hope Cassander lived and wrote, and, though his efforts were abortive at the moment, his labour was not in vain. For he has left us a noble example of

candour and fairness, such as may even yet bear fruit in the reconciliation of the hostile branches of the Church.

The future pacific theologian was born in the year 1515, in the isle of Cadsand, near Bruges. Following the fashion so prevalent in his day, he appears to have adopted as his surname a Latinized, or, rather, Græcized derivative from the place of his birth, and was universally known as George Cassander. He was educated at the University of Louvain, where, as he tells us (Ep. iv.), he took his degree of Master of Arts in 1532, being then only seventeen years old. He applied himself to study and to teaching. At Ghent, Bruges, and other places, he gave lectures on philosophy and poetry; but, like all others in that period of upheaval, he was soon attracted specially to theology. He now went to reside at Cologne, and commenced earnestly the consideration of the points in dispute between the Romanists and the Protestants. The result of his studies was to lead him to the conclusion, that there was much more basis of agreement between them than was commonly thought. He believed that he had discovered a *via media*—a position in fact almost identical with that taken by the Church of England, and advocated by her most famous divines. This *via media* he set forth in a short Latin treatise entitled *De officio pii viri in hoc ecclesiæ dissidio*, published anonymously either in 1561 or 1562. Of this we must give some account.

The writer first speaks of the great disquietude then prevailing, in which he confesses himself to share. His earnest desire and prayer was for peace among Christians, and in the attempt which he feels called upon to make for obtaining this, he desires to be judged candidly and fairly. For himself, he says, he had always been strict in his observance of Church rites and duties; but he was strongly averse to superstition. This had inclined him at first to sympathize with the Reformers, but he had soon come to see their excesses, and that they were for doing away with everything which had been abused. He thinks he has found a safer way—that of Scripture, interpreted by the ancient Church.

‘This,’ he says, ‘is what is called by some “Catholic tradition” and “unwritten verity.” Although in these matters, which are questions of faith, there is nothing which is not in some manner contained in Holy Scripture, yet, inasmuch as tradition is nothing else but the explanation and interpretation of Scripture itself, it may be held of kindred authority; so that it has been well said that “Scripture is tradition, implicit and sealed up, and that tradition is Scripture, unfolded and unsealed.” Well, then, did Vincent of Lerins, who lived

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about the time of Augustine, when already many and various heresies had vexed the Church, desire him who would be fortified and safe against all heresies, to propose to himself these two things as guides—viz. canonical authority and Catholic tradition. Not that canonical authority does not of itself suffice, but inasmuch as the words of Scripture are drawn aside to various opinions by impious and unlearned men, therefore, we must go to Catholic tradition for some certain opinion, and this Catholic tradition is to be determined by three marks—viz. antiquity, universality, and consent.¹

There are many matters, he argues, which we ought to receive as set forth in Scripture and handed down by the tradition of the Churches, but there are other questions which do not repose on plain testimonies of Scripture, nor on such ancient and large consent of the Church. Yet, in these latter times, specially in this Western Church, they have been received and settled; and inasmuch as they are manifestly not opposed to the divine writings, we ought not to act contumaciously in striving to confute them, nor, for that purpose, disturb the peace of the Churches. 'And if any opinion, now altogether received and adopted, should be shown to be less probable than it was thought to be, yet, even so, I do not think we ought to contend against it at all times, and with great bitterness, but rather to inquire and discuss it with learned and moderate men. And in those things which only rest upon the probable opinions of men, however learned, and in which there is variety of opinion, each ought to have the free power of following what he pleases.'² He would not deny that modern inventions opposed to the Scriptures and the tradition of the ancient Church, and introduced through ignorance, or even corrupt motives, in those evil days, were to be avoided as of evil influence; but he would not hold that every private man was bound to contend in these matters with all persons indifferently, when he is certain to give offence, and when there is no prospect of his doing good. We ought to use Christian prudence; not saying rashly, and everywhere, what is in one's mind, but when the glory of God or the good of our neighbours requires it, speaking boldly what one thinks. Having thus impressed upon those on the side of the Reformers the necessity of caution and moderation, he turns to those on the side of the Church. As to ceremonies, he says, and rites of the Church, he would have those ordained by Scripture, and those universally practised by the Church, to be retained; but with regard to others, he would have them judged according to their merits and uses—not

¹ *G. Cassandri Opera*, pp. 782-3. Paris 1616.

² *Ibid.* p. 783.

holding that everything that has been abused must be given up, but not stiffly contending for indifferent matters.

'I cannot deny,' he says, 'that in these latter times, through ignorance, avarice, and ambition, certain cults and rites have crept into the Church which are radically faulty, and the observation of which hinders the integrity of the faith. I think that all will admit that inasmuch as these ought to be abolished by those who have power in the Church, they may be avoided by all those in a private capacity who perceive the fault of them.'¹

He then goes on to speak of his own position as a member of the Church, not inclined in any way to abandon his allegiance to her.

'For this Western Church of Rome, in which I was born and baptized, seeing that it retains the profession of Christianity and Apostolic doctrine on the chief articles of the faith and the sacraments (although in the celebration and administration of the Eucharist some faults may be charged), and in many ceremonies and rites presents still the image of the ancient Church, and is governed from the Apostles' times by a perpetual succession of presbyters and bishops (although they have much degenerated from pristine uprightness)—this Church, I say, inasmuch as I hold it to be the temple of God, and no mean member of the Catholic Church, I must needs embrace and venerate. But I do not deny that this same Church is in no small degree diverse from that its ancient glory and splendour, and has been disfigured by many diseases and faults, and has sometimes been miserably oppressed by the tyranny of its governors. I believe that in this Church the word of God and His sacraments are preserved, and that there is in it, as I hope, a great multitude of the elect, who in truth constitute the Church and Bride of Christ, although there be many, and those among its chief governors, who do not belong to the Church of Christ, and so are the enemies of Christ and His doctrine, and, as it were, strangers exercising a tyranny in it.'²

Having thus plainly admitted the existence of grievous abuses in the Roman Church, but yet not holding its condition to be so entirely corrupt as to call upon him to relinquish membership therein; Cassander goes on with great candour and fairness to indicate what might fairly and allowably be done by those who go somewhat farther than himself in estimating the vital mischiefs which had crept into the Church. In doing this he exactly indicates the position taken up by the Church of England towards that of Rome at the Reformation, and gives his tacit approval to the Anglican standpoint.

¹ *G. Cassandri Opera*, p. 785.

² *Ibid.* p. 786.

'I cannot condemn those,' he writes, 'who, holding fast to the foundations of Apostolical doctrine, and out of zeal for true religion, perceiving from the teachings of learned and pious men that some things needed correction, have, under the guidance of the highest authority, and with the general consent of the Church to which they belong, made certain corrections in the matter of doctrine, and who hold that certain ceremonies ought to be removed, even if they be of great antiquity, should the doing so be useful to the people, who demand this and almost make it necessary; if only this be done with as little scandal and disturbance as possible, and the unity of spirit and the bond of peace with the rest of the Church be preserved.'¹

But while Cassander thus extends his approval to an orderly and deliberate reformation, made by a national Church, he condemns those who on account of the corruptions found in the Church, altogether revolt from it, and even try to overthrow it. The Church, he says, is still the true Church, though it has contracted many defilements; as a stream which has been polluted in its course is still the same stream which issued pure and sparkling from the mountain spring. Those who revolt in enmity must needs be condemned, but not those who have been rejected by the Church because they have conscientiously made certain changes in the method of teaching, and the form of the ministry. 'It is not separation which constitutes schism, but the cause of separation.' With admirable candour he continues:—

'Whatever I find in any part of the Church, whether it be called by the ancient name of Catholic, or the new name of Evangelical, to be pure and sound, and agreeable to the evangelical and Apostolical tradition, that I venerate and embrace as belonging to the Church of Christ; and the Church which holds this, inasmuch as it is founded on the true Apostolical doctrine contained in the short Creed, and does not by impious schism separate itself from the communion of other Churches, I judge to be a true Church and a member of the Catholic Church of Christ. And this I say, not only with regard to the Westerns, but also with regard to the Eastern Churches of the Greeks, and those which follow their rite.'²

Cassander then finds it necessary to put in a caution against a false notion which might possibly arise as to his views. He shows that he is no Latitudinarian: that he does not consider doctrinal statements and differences of small importance, or that he is prepared to recommend an amalgam of creeds.

'I would not,' he says, 'be so set upon avoiding parties as, condemning both sides, to endeavour to set up between them a new and

¹ *G. Cassandri Opera*, p. 787.

² *Ibid.* p. 791.

neutral sect (as they call it), but I would condemn party spirit so far as it stands in the way of the formation of a fair and candid judgment of the points in dispute. Both parties, indeed, are agreed in fundamentals, viz. that Christ is the sole foundation, and that religion consists in the love of God and our brethren. For all, therefore, there is the opportunity of leading a Christian life, nor need we despair of a more complete agreement if all will rightly apprehend these things.¹

Such utterances as these from one who wrote from the stand-point of an orthodox member of the Church, of necessity attracted much attention. The more eager Reformers, who were for keeping no terms with the Romish Church—regarding her as utterly defiled and anti-christian—immediately took the alarm. This was something more dangerous, in their views, than even Melancthon's concessions. For a member of the 'Synagogue of Satan' to be showing Christian charity, and a readiness to adopt candid interpretations, and to seek for unity, was in the highest degree perilous to that line of policy which they favoured. Accordingly, Calvin at once fell upon this treatise with the utmost ferocity. He thought that he recognized it as the handiwork of Baldwin, a lawyer, with whom he had previously had some passages of arms, and, according to his wont, he hurled personal abuse, invective and insinuation against the author. It is a 'virulent book with a plausible title.' The writer has 'fox-like cunning'; 'An iron front and a breast of steel.' His 'impudence is egregious.' He is an 'impostor,' a 'pestiferous taint'; and so on.² Baldwin may well have been somewhat astonished, and not a little provoked, by finding himself abused so roundly for a book of which, as far as appears, he knew nothing; and he answered Calvin's attack in no particularly gentle fashion. The rejoinder of Calvin is curious and amusing. Disgusted with having made so egregious a mistake, he yet is not inclined to relinquish the fray.

'You deny you wrote the book,' he says, 'and you tell me about a certain Cassander. I will let the reader into the secret. This is a joint composition of these two worthies. Cassander is an obscure individual whose name would never have been heard of, had not Baldwin obliged me to bring it forward. The poor man has lived a solitary life, and so has got to be in love with his own fancies, and to be altogether stupefied by his morose disposition. He was scented out by Baldwin, who found that he had been employed for twenty years in hammering out this middle religion, which mixes up light and darkness, and under specious pretexts upholds all the abuses of the Church. The marks of Baldwin's style are evident, and the

¹ *G. Cassandri Opera*, p. 791.

² *Ibid.* pp. 800-2.

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lies, with which he is familiar, adorn the tract. Baldwin is the real author, Cassander a mere nobody who has been made use of.¹

The absurd pertinacity and disingenuousness of Calvin furnished a good opportunity to Cassander to indite a telling reply. This he did in the form of a dialogue between Modestus and Placidius, in which he defends, at considerable length, the opinions enunciated in the *Officium pii viri*. He utterly denies that Baldwin suggested, assisted, or was in any way concerned in his work. He did not know of its preparation, and even after its publication, he did not know who the author of it was. The dialogue preserves the calm tone of the original treatise, and Cassander is not led away by the evil example of Calvin to rail at his opponent. Meantime the controversy, from its singular character, excited considerable attention, and led to somewhat important results. It was a time when the most bitter disputes and ferocious cavillings were raging amongst the reformed Germans, all of them springing more or less from the concessions and conciliatory writings of Philip Melanchthon, in defence and explanation of the Confession of Augsburg. Flacius and Strigelius, Osiander and Stancarus, were busily employed in devoting one another to infamy in this world, and utter destruction in the next, for differences about the power of the will, the nature of justification, the character of the Atonement, and so forth. The Council of Trent had just concluded its sessions by anathematizing all who would not accept its new creed. In the Christian world, all was confusion, wrath, and strife. The new Emperor Ferdinand, sincerely desirous of peace, and not so bigoted a son of the Church as his predecessor, came to hear of the writings and reputation of the candid theologian of Cologne. He thought he saw a ray of light, and he proceeded at once to endeavour to utilize it. On May 22, 1664, he wrote from Vienna to George Cassander, as follows:—

'Learned, faithful, beloved,—Inasmuch as your remarkable erudition, singular piety, and most ardent desire to benefit the Catholic Church have been much praised and commended to us, we entertain a confident hope that your presence and aid would be of no small use to us in a certain important business, to the glory of God, and the safety and benefit of our dominions and of all Germany, which we now have in hand. We therefore entreat you that, as soon as the present letters shall be delivered to you, having arranged your private affairs, you would consent to come to us, in order that for two or three months we may be able to make use of your prudence, counsel, and industry. We desire you to accept as provision for the way a

¹ *G. Cassandri Opera*, p. 808.

sum of 300 florins, which our commissary at Spire will pay you, and that you would, if possible, bring with you some theological books suited for these times. In doing this, you will be doing a thing worthy of your virtue, and one especially pleasing to us, and which we shall know how to recognize.¹

Cassander received the Imperial missive at Duisburg, in Cleves, on June 20, by the hands of the Archbishop of Cologne, and no doubt he would have gladly obeyed so flattering a summons, had he been able to do so. But the miserable state of his health utterly incapacitated him.

'Would,' he writes, 'that I were able in some degree to respond to your Majesty's opinion of me, and to obey your will and command. I desire indeed above all things to help and to quiet the Church, but I am without the powers of mind needed for this work. Whatever little talent I may possess is taken away and enfeebled by continued weakness, and constant attacks of disease, attended with the utmost suffering, and entirely destroying any power or zeal for study. I have indeed employed any time that was free from disease and pain during some years, in investigating the controversies and the sources of the disagreements of this age, and the methods of composing them, or at any rate of preventing still greater distraction and division. And in doing so, I have arrived at the conclusion that there is no other method of helping the Church of to-day, except the searching into the opinion and judgment of the ancient Church, so as to bring the Church now back to the description and form of the Church of that time, and especially to that Church which flourished from the age of Constantine, as being that in which all the controversies concerning the chief matters of our religion were most diligently handled and explained, in those most weighty Councils; and the government of the Church, restored to liberty, was settled with the best and most salutary rules. None can venture to refuse the Church of that time the title of Church, and both sides, even that one which is wont to appeal to the Scriptures alone, have appealed to its judgment and arbitration, and as it were offered a compromise on the ground of its sentiments. I am willing to do what I can towards this end, but my body is too weak to bear so long a journey, seeing that the least thing exposes me to the most terrible attacks of gout, which three or four times in the year confines me for long periods to my bed.'²

To this letter the Emperor replied, lamenting Cassander's weak condition of body, which deprived him of the benefit of his personal advice, and requesting him to set down in writing his views on the Confession of Augsburg, and Melancthon's defence of it, and expressing the hope which he entertained of some agreement between the opposing parties being arrived at,

¹ *Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam*, p. 2. Paris, 1642.

² *Ibid.* p. 3.

'if those manifest abuses which in these latter most evil times have crept into the Catholic Church should be purged away, and some concessions should be made of things having only human sanction, and some subtle questions not necessary for salvation be put aside, and an endeavour be made to ascertain clearly the things which belong to faith and morals, and the right understanding and use of the sacraments and ceremonies of the Church.'¹

He desires Cassander, therefore, to examine the Confession of Augsburg with this view, noting first the matters in it, with which the Catholic Church might agree, and giving reasons where it cannot yield. Then he would have him note the opinions advocated by those who hold the Augsburg Confession, which, being opposed to the teaching of the Church, are not condemned by that Confession, but rather tacitly approved. Lastly, he would desire that he should set down all the opinions and doctrines held by various reformers, but not sanctioned by the Confession of Augsburg. He would have from him a summary of doctrine to which priests and preachers might refer as a criterion of what might lawfully be accepted and taught. And this work, so necessary for the Church, he would have him commence without any delay. To this letter we owe the famous treatise known as *The Consultation of Cassander*. In this work, to which we have a parallel in Du Pin's *Commonitory on the English Articles*, the writer does not altogether follow the method indicated by the Emperor, but taking each article of the Augsburg Confession in order, he criticizes it, showing how far it agrees, and how far it disagrees with the theological teaching accepted by the Church. What will perhaps most strike a reader of this treatise, is the length to which the writer is prepared to stretch the Roman doctrine, in the desire to find common ground with the Reformers, and the way in which, in doing so, he ignores the Council of Trent. For instance, on the much disputed doctrine of justification, the Council of Trent had laid down that the 'instrumental cause' of justification was baptism; that faith had no more special work therein than as 'the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root'; that to say that none could be justified without believing he was justified, was impious and heretical (Sess. VI. Can. vii. viii. ix.). Cassander, on the contrary, lays it down as the teaching of the Catholic Church, that justification is the remission of sins to the penitent, and quotes with approbation:—

'We acknowledge it to be true, that for the justification of a man there is altogether required, that a man should certainly believe, not

¹ *Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam*, p. 6.

only in general, that on account of Christ sins are remitted, but that they are remitted to the individual man himself, on account of Christ, through faith.¹

He even accepts the word assurance (*fiducia*) as the proper description of justifying faith (a word which had been specially condemned by the Council of Trent), and defends the expression, 'we are justified by faith alone,' on the ground that Christian faith cannot really be *alone*, as it implies contrition and the purpose of righteous living. He also defends the doctrine of the imputation of righteousness, as not opposed to the Catholic theology.² Cassander's remarks on the seventh article of the Augsburg Confession, which defines 'the Church,' are interesting, inasmuch as the Augsburg phraseology is adopted in our Articles XIX. and XXXIV. He finds nothing to reprehend in the definition of the Church as 'congregatio sanctorum,' explaining 'sanctorum' as meaning 'baptized,' and admits the 'notes' of the Church subjoined, 'in quâ Evangelium recte docetur, et recte administrantur Sacramenta.' But he says this is not sufficient. There must be a further note of 'unity,' and this unity implies obedience to the governors and rulers of the Church.³ He then proceeds to inquire who these are, and argues that though the present state of the Church be wofully corrupt, yet that it still is the Church; and though the Popes, the sovereign rulers of it, have committed all sorts of crimes and oppressions, yet they are still rulers by right, and may demand obedience. In endeavouring to prove the right of the papal supremacy, it must be confessed that Cassander is not above the usual papal falsifications of history; but when he has established it (as he thinks) he makes a very mild use of it. Of those who reject it with moderation and charity he says:—

'Although they might seem to be separated from the fellowship of the Church, and to be involved in a certain error through ignorance, yet I would not consider that they ought to be judged as alien from that inward Church fellowship, which in mind and in will they desired to cherish.'⁴

The power of the Supreme Pontiff he desires to be brought back to the limits prescribed by the ancient Church, and to be used according to the precepts of the Gospel and the tradition of the elders only to the edification of the Church.

¹ *Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam*, pp. 29, 35, 37.

² Concil. Trident. Can. XI., 'Si quis dixerit homines justificari vel solâ imputatione justitiæ Christi, vel solâ peccatorum remissione . . . anathema sit.'

³ *Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam*, p. 57.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 63.

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When insisting upon the note of external union with the Roman Church, Cassander seems to have forgotten his own *dictum* in the *Officium pii viri*, viz. '*Separatio non facit schisma, sed causa separationis*.' If the dominant Church insists on unlawful terms of union, it is she that is the schism-maker.

On the Augsburg Articles touching Baptism and the Eucharist, Cassander does not see any irreconcilable difference between their teaching and that of the Roman Church. The Augsburg Confession has wisely shrunk from defining the mode of the Presence¹ in the Eucharist, and the commentator, having given what he believed to be the teaching of antiquity on the subject, adds in the same wise spirit:—

'Would that it could be brought to pass that men would be contented with such an explanation, and abstain from unnecessary questions, which have no concern with faith or piety, and acquiesce in the teaching of the ancient Church; which is the only way to get rid of these quarrels as to the Sacrament of Unity.'²

In treating of the seven sacraments of the Roman Church, Cassander displays the utmost candour. He freely admits that there are only two sacraments in the higher sense of the word, and that the number *seven* is altogether an arbitrary one, first suggested by Peter Lombard, and adopted with reference to the sacred number seven. There are other sacred rites, he says, which might stand on the same footing; and some of those called sacraments have had their sacramental character denied: as Confirmation, which many have held to be merely a strengthening of grace, not the giving a distinct grace; and Matrimony, which Peter Lombard and Durandus denied to be a sacrament.³ This language is somewhat remarkable if we compare it with that of the first canon of the seventh session of the Council of Trent:—

'If anyone shall say that the sacraments of the new law were not all of them instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord, or that they are either more or fewer than seven, viz. Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, and Matrimony; or that any one of these is not truly and properly a sacrament, let him be anathema.'⁴

The modern Council is thus seen anathematizing, not only the Protestants, and halting Romanists like Cassander, but

¹ 'De Cœnâ Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint, et distribuuntur vescentibus in Cœnâ Domini, et improbant secus docentes.'—Art. X.

² *Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam*, p. 80.

³ *Ibid.* p. 103.

⁴ *Canones et Decreta Conc. Trident.* p. 42. Lipsiæ, 1842.

even such pillars of the faith as Peter Lombard and Durandus. Cassander is no less liberal on the matter of Orders than on that of the sacraments. In the Augsburg Confession (as in the English Articles) nothing is defined as to what the 'right calling' to Orders consists in; but Philip Melancthon, in his Defence of the Confession, had declared his willingness to treat Order as a sacrament; while Cassander, on his side, is quite ready to admit that there are only two sacred Orders, viz. priest and deacon;¹ and that the minor orders have fallen into disuse, and might even be abolished, if only proper provision were made for young persons to be fitted for the sacred orders. Neither would he insist on the necessity of unction in giving Orders. Very shortly before this was written the Council of Trent, in its twenty-third session (July 15, 1563) had ordained the necessity of preserving the five minor orders, and by its second canon had anathematized those who rejected them. By the fifth canon of this session it had also anathematized those who rejected the use of unction in giving Order.

As to what is said of rites and ceremonies in the Augsburg Confession, Cassander indicates that there might be sufficient ground for agreement between it and the Catholics, if these things were regarded not of necessary religious obligation, but only of pious use. He acknowledges that 'in the institution of celibacy, in the celebration of Masses, as well as in the cult of saints, some things had crept in which needed correction.' With regard to the question of free will, there is (according to Cassander) no ground of difference between the Confession and the Church divines, both parties acquiescing in the usual theological paradox, which admits that man has free will, but denies that he can use it to any good purpose. With regard to the cultus of saints, Cassander acknowledges that very great abuses and superstitions had affected it, so as to make many good and learned men judge that the whole practice had better be abolished. With this, however, he does not agree, but proceeds to defend the cultus of saints with some ingenuity, by fanciful arguments from the Old Testament, noting at the same time with just reprobation the horrible blasphemies which this cult has introduced, especially as respects the power and dignity of the Blessed Virgin. With regard to the administration of the Eucharist in both kinds, Cassander freely admits that the denial of the cup to the laity is altogether unjustifiable on the grounds of Scripture

¹ This is according to the Roman theology, which holds the *Episcopatus* to be *gradus Presbyterii*, not an *ordo*: a doctrine evidently invented to add dignity to the Pope.

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and primitive antiquity, and does not attempt to defend it. Only he would have 'him that drinketh, not despise him that drinketh not,' on the ground of Christian charity. He concludes his discussion of this point as follows :—

'Although it be preferable, if necessity should arise, to use one part of the sacrament rather than be deprived of the whole ; yet I think scarce anyone who shall have considered this matter carefully would be found who, if the ancient custom of the Church were restored, and the Blood of the Lord joined again in the dispensing of the mysteries to the Body of the Lord, would not rather use the full and entire sacrament than a part of it.'¹

Cassander is of opinion that the processional carrying of the Holy Sacrament is an abuse. He strongly condemns the enforcement of clerical celibacy, as the cause of the greatest mischief and immorality,² and would allow even married priests to exercise their ministry. Cassander has considerable fault to find with the way in which the Protestants celebrated Mass, but he is quite prepared to condemn the abuse of private Masses, to explain the sacrifice as 'the mystical representation and commemoration of the Sacrifice once perfected,' and to reject the notion of 'iteration.' He admits that the monastic state has altogether degenerated, 'so that nowhere is there a more licentious and profane life than in some monasteries.' After touching upon the authority of the Church, which, he says, has not been sufficiently exercised in times past for the correction of abuses, but which he most earnestly desires to see exerted for that object, he concludes his treatise by restating the difficulties under which it was written, and declaring that he has endeavoured on all the points to ascertain and set forth the judgment of the primitive Church ; that he desires in no way to dogmatize, but is willing to be instructed by men more learned than himself. He knows, he says, that some things which he has written will be displeasing to extreme men on either side, but he records his conviction that the state of the Church, which has suffered grievous mischief, must be reformed in some such way as he has indicated, or else that its own children will bring about its most assured destruction. In the concluding paragraph occurs the only allusion to the Council of Trent (if indeed it be an allusion) which is found in the treatise. Assuredly, no one would discover from the *Consultatio* that the whole of the points on

¹ *Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam*, p. 165.

² He says of the clergy of his day, 'Vix centesimum invenies qui ab omni commercio feminarum abstineat.'

which it touches had just been settled by the authoritative decisions of a Council, calling itself Œcumenical, of that Church of which Cassander professes himself a loyal son. He thanks God that the Emperor had undertaken to heal the wounds of the Church by lawful and fitting remedies, 'discarding those violent and aggressive measures hitherto used with but little wisdom, and with an unfortunate issue; and which have not only irritated the wounds of the Church, but have made them almost incurable.'

George Cassander has hitherto been set before the reader in the character which is most distinctive of him, viz. as a peace-loving and a peace-seeking theologian, but it would not be right to conclude a notice of him without adverting to his other theological works, besides those relating to the matters in dispute between the Protestants and the Roman Church. These are extremely valuable. In a collection called *Liturgica*, he brought together epitomes of all the most ancient liturgical forms, together with very valuable comments and explanations, selected from ancient writers. There can scarcely be a more useful work than this for illustrating the history of the Eucharist. He also made a very large collection of ancient Latin Hymns and Prayers, and edited for the first time writings of S. Vigilius, Honorius, Prosper, and Hilary. A very valuable collection of ancient testimonies on Infant Baptism, with copious commentaries and disquisitions, is due to him. But perhaps the most valuable work written by Cassander, as it was a strong and unanswerable protest against one of the crying errors of his time, was his treatise, *De Sacra Communionem sub utrâque Specie*. He here shows clearly, that it was the unbroken custom in the Church for one thousand years after Christ, to communicate all the faithful with both the bread and the cup; that the custom of 'intinction,' which grew up in some Churches, was a plain testimony of this; and that no argument has ever been alleged against the practice, except (as is alleged) the fear of sacrilege through spilling the cup. If this were a valid reason, he says, we should be charging the whole of the ancient Church with a carelessness about sacrilege. He concludes, after an exhaustive examination of all objections, that there is nothing to hinder the restoration of the cup to the laity, and that it ought most certainly to be done. This he does without in any way questioning the *totus Christus* doctrine of the Roman Church, but making a very clever and telling use of that canon of the Church which lays it down as sacrilege for the priest to consecrate one species only. If the two species

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must of necessity be consecrated, the two species must evidently have a value for the user; and why, then, are they to be denied, when so many good and virtuous people eagerly desire them?

There is a large collection of the letters of Cassander to his learned friends, discussing in much the same spirit, but sometimes with a greater freedom, the topics on which we have already given extracts from his writings. We find from one of them that the collection of hymns which he edited had been put in the Index Expurgatorius, on account of a note which he had appended to a hymn on S. Catherine, giving conclusive reasons to show that such a person never existed.¹ In another letter, he uses rather a striking simile to describe the state of things between the Church and the Reformers. The Church, he says, is a fair tree, which from neglect and defect of pruning, has grown lop-sided and crooked. The Reformers are husbandmen desiring to set it right, but they drag at it with such violence that they tear its roots altogether out of the ground, and while one pulls one way and one another, the tree is fairly rent in pieces.² Among his letters is one to Cox, Bishop of Ely, who had written to him and enclosed what Cassander very justly calls a *munusculum*, viz. two crowns,³ and, at the same time had asked for Cassander's opinion as to the use of the cross in churches, a matter which was troubling the English bishops at the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth. Cassander writes very temperately and wisely, giving good reasons for the retention and use of the cross. In fact it is impossible to read this good man's writings without being struck by the clearness and common sense which they exhibit. Had the Church been willing to listen to the voice of such men instead of stereotyping all the mediæval accretions by the preposterous definitions of the Council of Trent, there might have been a reformation without schism or division, a peaceful triumph of truth, a defeat of the machinations of the powers of darkness, a happy and united Christendom.

¹ Epp. xiv., xv.

² Ep. v.

³ Bishop Cox was somewhat of a money-lover (if all accounts of him be true), and did not deal very fairly by the revenues of his see.

ART. VIII.—MATERIALISM IN MODERN ART.

1. *Ten Lectures on Art.* By EDWARD J. POYNTER. (London, 1879.)
2. *Essays on Art.* By J. COMYNS CARR. (London, 1879.)
3. *The Art of England.* Lectures given in Oxford by JOHN RUSKIN. (Orpington, 1883.)
4. *Landscape in Art.* By PHILIP GILBERT HAMERTON. (London, 1885.)

ART is one of the most perfect of moral barometers, sensitive to all changes in the surrounding intellectual medium, as the mercury to those of the weather. The interpreter of nature to his fellow-men, the artist depends on the disposition of his audience, no less than on his own, for the manner in which he shall fulfil his mission, and the readiness of his sympathetic response to their tone of mood or feeling is the direct measure of his power to move them.

For what is the special and distinguishing characteristic by which he is singled out from the rank and file of humanity, as an exponent of its dumb aspirations?

It is this: he is pre-eminently and superlatively a man with a message. A mysterious prompting, the purport of which he scarce comprehends, struggles for utterance within him, and burdens his soul with its importunate craving for expression. In melody or in marble, in flash of prism-hued colour, or in burning eloquence of speech, his inward thoughts *must* find outward shape that all men may see and understand. Good or evil, inspired of angels or of fiends, this yearning is a power that will not be denied, and the artist who is earnest and faithful under the compulsion of its imperative behest, must count among the living forces of his generation.

But the artist's message must be delivered in language intelligible to mankind at large, and it is in seeking for this medium of communication that he is forced to adapt himself to those around him. Thus, the paintings of Perugino, himself, if we may trust contemporary records, a man devoid of all faith, breathe a sentiment of emotional piety, because he painted for a public of believers; while the art of Michael Angelo, fervent Christian though he was as an individual, is uncoloured by any Christian feeling, since it was addressed to an age that had abandoned the attitude of fervent belief.

The artist does not choose what manner of message he

ART.

(Lon-
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by JOHN

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shall transmit, but is rather chosen as its instrument, and may be, nay probably oftenest is, unconscious of its purport. It works within him as a dominant impulse, mastering, but not excluding, a host of other impulses, as the melodious motive of a great symphony governs and subordinates all its minor harmonies. At times, indeed, we seem to lose its strain, drowned in the general dissonance of sound, or overborne by some opposing current of tune; but it is never really overpowered, and triumphs in the main, amid all the majestic modulations of the orchestra. So it is through the artist's works as a whole that we must track the workings of his mind, to catch in the recurrence of the leading chords of thought the keynote to which its moods are set. The dominant idea that emerges thus from the works of Dickens is the recognition of profound pathos under the most grotesque aspects of humanity, a truth never so forcibly enunciated before. Scott's mission was to develop character, as it is distinguished in nature, by delicate touches and insensible gradations, instead of by strong lines and violent contrast, so as to present us with groups, not of types, but of individuals. Among painters, Turner's instinct urged him to interpret the infinite subtleties of aerial distance, and thus give his landscapes those spacious horizons that seem to emulate the vastness of nature herself. Raphael, with a purity of taste unmatched in art, aimed at showing the ideal of feminine loveliness in its most exalted type; Titian, at an exuberant splendour of physical beauty, set off by every accessory of ornament and detail; Andrea del Sarto, at a consummate majesty of sober harmony, attained within a comparatively limited range of light and colour, by exquisitely calculated economy in their use. Of the great poets and dramatists, Shakespeare's genius was mainly inspired by the influence of man on man, so that he frequently makes secondary characters the instruments for evoking the great passions that sway his principal personages. Macbeth's ambition is thus roused by the prophecy of the Witches, and Othello's jealousy by the insinuations of his tempter. Dante's more obvious theme is the relation of man to a future state; that of the Greek dramatists, his subjection to an inexorable and superhuman destiny; Homer's, his position in reference to nature and the natural forces, as personified by the Olympian deities.

The further we go back in the history of culture, the more simple we find the ideas thus set forth in art, and the less their exposition is overlaid by details of extraneous subtleties of thought. The action is more vivid and energetic, the

central theme stands out more clearly, the range of thought is narrower, and the creative power less diffused. The Homeric world is not complicated, like the Shakespearian, with psychological enigmas, and the mind is not distracted from contemplating the bodily prowess of Hector or Achilles, by following them through moral conflicts, like those of Hamlet and Macbeth. The severe lines of the Parthenon contrast in similar fashion with the elaborate structure of a Gothic cathedral, and the singleness of devotional type presented by Fra Angelico's adoring angels, with the multiform aspects under which humanity is portrayed in Tintoretto's Paradise.

But art, whether inspired by the plain, direct purpose of the earlier time, or by the perplexed, conflicting aspirations of the later, invariably aims at the form of expression most in harmony with the feelings of its own generation. The passionate desire of the creative mind is not alone for comprehension, but for sympathy, not merely to develop the ideal it has conceived, but to compel others to regard it from the same point of view, and with emotions similar to its own. It puts forth an argument, while it embodies a vision, and would fain engage the reason as well as the sentiment of the world on its side. How this is best to be done, it is part of the instinct of genius to divine, through that exquisite sensibility to all surrounding influences, which makes it the most perfect gauge of the moral conditions among which it works.

Thus the artist, in delivering his message to humanity, will unconsciously appeal to its tastes, its passions, and even its prejudices, in the desire to win a hearing for that which he has to say; and in his craving for sympathy will ever seek to touch the widest range of feeling, and reach the largest section of society within his sphere. Following this instinct, Dante chose to write the *Divine Comedy* in the despised vulgar tongue, that it might be read by women as well as men, by the unlearned as well as scholars; and true art in like fashion, will ever refuse to address itself to a circle or a clique, turning from the narrow judgment of the select few, to seek the wider suffrage of even the ignorant many.

We shall, then, never find in the artist the reformer of his age, since the craving for sympathy, which is an essential element of the creative impulse, rather prescribes for him the part of its courtier. Its prevailing tendencies are concentrated and intensified in his stronger nature, so that he becomes the very personification and epitome of its spirit, and is prompted in his work by the external influences which he unconsciously reflects, as much as by his personal and deliberately held con-

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victions. These we must consequently exclude from our minds in studying the creations of his genius, or else our view of them will be perplexed by the seeming contradictions we shall find in them, and we shall supply from our own imaginations something that does not really exist in them. The most striking example of this discrepancy between individual character and artistic tendency is found in the mighty genius, who, himself an earnest believer, finally banished all true religious expression from art. Michael Angelo, with that instinct, half sympathetic, half prophetic, which is the dower of the highest order of imagination, seized the idea for which society was ripe, and cast it in the most powerful mould in which it has ever been given to the artist to realize his inner dream. This idea was the abandonment of all expression in art of man's incorporeal essence, in favour of literal portraiture of his mere material structure. The definitive recognition of this view of human nature marks the hopeless decline of the Renaissance, which had previously balanced the perfection of physical form it aimed at, by dignity of intellectual or religious expression.

Now, it is a singular study how Michael Angelo, not only himself a man of the sincerest piety, but restricted in his work by the requirements of his patrons to purely devotional subjects, was in his treatment of them so completely the mouth-piece of his age, that they do not contain or suggest a single spiritual idea. Indeed, if we might in one phrase sum up our impression of his whole artistic character, we would describe him as the first and last great animal-painter of humanity. The pagan Greeks never so entirely lost sight of an indwelling spirit in the earthly clay, as this great genius of Christian art, who brought to bear on it, in its decline, perhaps the most energetic and original mind that ever guided a human hand in its workmanship. It was this extraordinary force, so to speak, of intellectual momentum, that totally upset the balance of public taste in his own day, and in ours has still power to warp the judgment of those who pass his works in review. It is not easy, indeed, to retain the calm attitude of criticism in the presence of that stupendous series of frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, which, from their unity of general design, and adaptation throughout to the building of which they form a part, must be ranked as the most splendid achievement of architectural decoration in colour which the world has ever seen.

It is only natural that the imagination should be so impressed by the power revealed in these majestic groups, as to

supply from its own resources qualities that do not really exist in them, and invest them with the spiritual significance which the subjects they treat of, and the place they occupy, seem naturally to suggest. Yet it is scarcely too much to say, that if we exclude these considerations from our minds, and confine our attention exclusively to the composition itself, we shall not find through the entire range of its component figures one that expresses a single moral sentiment, or inspires a single religious idea. It is the apotheosis of human nature, and of human nature in its lowest aspect, as the foremost and most perfect type of the animal kingdom. Every figure is replete with energetic vitality, but it is the life of instinct, not reason, that animates those mighty limbs, and plays in those powerful muscles. The prophets are majestic, but their majesty is that of physical grandeur, like that of a couchant lion,

—'che guarda e posa.'

The Sibyls are portentous, but with a savage strength as little suggestive of angelic inspiration as that lodged in the supple body of the leopardess, or the fleet limbs of the wild roe. In looking at Michael Angelo's works in marble, there is the same curious sense of some element of humanity being absent, and in the sacristy of San Lorenzo, where are the great monumental groups of Day and Night, and Morning and Evening, we seem to be in the presence, not so much of sculptured men and women, as of a series of fossil types of a lost race, having the outward form without the immortal essence of humanity. The same monumental temple supplies another illustration of the master's contempt for that individual expression of character which more especially distinguishes man from the lower animals; for the defeated Titan, who sits brooding on his fall, above the desecrated sarcophagus¹ of Lorenzo Duke of Urbino, owes his weird power over our imagination to the 'shadowed face,' where it is free to fill the void left by the artist with some mysterious creation of its own, more effective than any defined form he ever gave to human features. 'Il Pensiero' is for this reason the most impressive single figure, sculptured or painted by Michael Angelo's hand.

¹ The sarcophagus was opened in 1875, and the remains were proved to be those of Lorenzo Duke of Urbino, by the presence of a second skeleton, the body of his son, Alexander, having been thrust in here after his murder. 'Il Pensiero' is consequently identified as Lorenzo Duke of Urbino, thus confirming the tradition of Florence on this disputed point, and refuting the theory put forward by Grimm in his *Life of Michael Angelo*, and adopted by Ruskin.

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It was, however, after the great Tuscan had himself passed away that the full working of his influence was clearly manifested; and, in the productions of his followers, when his consummate genius no longer disguised debasement of aim and purpose, the world for the first time fully recognized the embodiment of mere animal force as the supreme ideal of art. The sources of Hellenic inspiration had indeed been pagan, but not materialistic; for the Greek had a lively faith in those unseen forces with which his quick fancy and ardent sensibility peopled the visible world around him. Not only, too, did he believe in the survival of the soul in some vague future state, but he alone, of all untutored men who have sought to embody their imaginary divinities, aimed at symbolising superhuman power by perfection of human symmetry, instead of by hugeness or monstrosity. Thus the natural ideal was exalted by being sought as the type of the supernatural, and it was not until all its nobler meanings were strangled by the rank growths of popular superstition, that pagan art declined into materialism, as did Christian art when once it had ceased to be governed by the true Christian spirit.

Ere that change was fully accomplished, the sceptre of intellectual supremacy had passed away from it, and a rival influence had arisen to dispute successfully its claim to the first place in the domain of thought. The coincidence, so often dwelt on between the hour of Michael Angelo's death and that of Galileo's birth, suggests the metaphorical metempsychosis which then took place, when the spirit of progress shifted its dwelling from art, which the one had founded on anatomy, to science, which the other based upon experiment. Thus the era of mystical abstraction was closed for ever by these two great leaders in their respective fields of thought; and man's physical nature on the one hand, and his mental faculties of investigation and research on the other, became the standard and guide of his achievements in search of beauty or truth. But while the spiritual ideal was equally eliminated from the teaching of science and art, the results of its absence were widely different in the epochs ruled by these two forms of mental energy, and the vigorous animal materialism of the later Renaissance is in no degree akin to the dry intellectual materialism of these latter days of ours. The visible universe has superseded man's own nature as his chief object of study, and the result is a singular tendency to transfer to the inanimate forces of matter all those interests and emotions which had hitherto centred in humanity alone. The mind has had its centre of gravity shifted by the

astounding series of discoveries initiated by Galileo, and the imagination remains, as it were, stunned and paralyzed in the presence of realities that distance all its conceptions. It reels before the contemplation of two abysses disclosed by the artificial aids to sight then introduced, and is equally incapable of fathoming the illimitable of vastness, and the illimitable of minuteness, system beyond system in the world of celestial space, system within system in the world of organic life. Every added means of discovery, so far from bringing us nearer to the ultimate boundaries of creation, seems to remove them farther and farther from our ken, and open up new horizons, ever vanishing in a perspective that baffles our finite gaze. Nature keeps her secrets to the end, while she deludes us with her seeming answers; behind the riddle we have solved, she confronts us with another still more inscrutable; beyond the veil we have pierced, she ever interposes a fresh barrier of mystery between us and her inmost sanctuary. Science is met in every direction by a *ne plus ultra*, and, if honest, has to confess herself foiled at last. But the humble acknowledgment of ignorance would not serve her in an age greedy of ephemeral novelty, craving stimulants for its jaded imagination, and consequently ready to prefer charlatanism to truth. Her votaries, then, are driven to abandon the slow pursuit of knowledge for the specious flights of speculation,¹ to seek novelty in paradox, and veil ignorance in vagueness; the result being the foggy abstractions of a new mysticism, with Pantheism substituted for spirituality.

Modern science boasts of materialism as its religion; but art professes no creed, and propounds no opinions. It reflects, indeed, the tendencies of those speculations on the constitution of the universe which have taken the lead in contemporary thought, and to which it has had to yield its own former primacy; but evidences of moral tone in art can only be gathered from a view of it so wide as to take in its general bearings, and gather in a single glance the meaning of many isolated facts. Now in such a sweeping survey of all contemporary art, the one universal characteristic that first strikes us is its deficiency in high imaginative power, and in that supreme and inscrutable charm of interest which this faculty

¹ A singular plea was adduced in a letter to the *Times* not very long ago for raising the salaries of professors of science, on the ground that they are driven to broach paradoxical theories in order to make their lectures attractive, and by the increased attendance at them render a sufficient addition to their incomes. We leave our readers to judge whether some of the strange doctrines recently propounded may be thus accounted for.

alone confers. Wherever the modern spirit has spread, this languor of the imagination has attended it, shown now in fantastic extravagance, now in tame reproduction of dry fact, in delirium or in paralysis, equally symptomatic of decaying vitality. We shall return later to pass in review the evidences of this fatal decline of poetic strength; but we prefer first to examine its relation to the spread of materialist views in society, whether among artists themselves or among those to whom they appeal for sympathy.

We will begin by asking ourselves to what end this singular faculty of imagination was bestowed on us, and what main purpose of our being is served by it. Of all human endowments, it is the only one of which we find no germ or hint, however rudimentary, in the brute creation, and it thus stands out as the distinctive prerogative of man. In him it is innate, and the child trembling in a darkened room, and the savage shuddering among the solitudes of nature, are alike thrilled by its suggestions of an unseen universe. From a material point of view it is an utterly useless faculty, as it tends neither to the preservation of the species or of the individual, and it cannot, therefore, have been evolved by any of those elaborate 'survivals,' or 'selections,' to which it is the fashion to refer so many other mysteries of our being. It plays no part in the ordinary life of the senses, it guides not the lip to its food, nor the hand to its prey, and stands aloof from the service of mere corporeal necessities, as though belonging to an order of being in which their grosser promptings have no part.

What, then, is the function of this mysterious faculty, so superfluous to man's physical existence, and so strangely implanted in his breast amid powers that minister solely to his lower wants? By what title of superiority does it rule supreme over his nature, controlling and marshalling at its will the more positive and real impressions of his senses, in the strength of a higher revelation than any they disclose, and opening up to him whole worlds of aspirations and desires that they can never satisfy?

The secret of its power and use is this, that it alone enables man to apprehend spiritual truth, to which mere reason, if entirely divorced from it, would leave his mind blind and blank as that of the beasts that perish. It alone gives the soul a loophole of outlook from its prison of clay, a vision of a world other than that of the senses, of a life other than that of the flesh. It alone is the soul's warrant at once of her existence and of her immortality, the source of her capa-

city for infinite happiness and infinite pain, the proof of her birthright of eternity, the foretaste of her inheritance of freedom.

Art is the outward expression, the uttered language of this intangible faculty, and in its earliest forms is invariably prompted by those dim spiritual intuitions, which the imagination implants in the most untutored minds. All primitive poetry treats of supernatural subjects, and all primitive religion associates some form of artistic expression—music and dancing, sculpture or drama—with its rites of worship. In no age of the world has a poem of the highest order been produced which does not deal extensively with supernatural agencies, and sculpture and painting both attained their meridian of splendour as modes of expression of two forms of belief, widely different, indeed, as truth and falsehood, but having their foundation in the same universal instinct of humanity.¹

Now in the present day, when the strongest current of thought is violently anti-religious, and all its minor eddies follow more or less closely the direction of its central stream, art is compelled to choose between the abandonment of her highest aspirations and of that public sympathy which is a necessary condition of her existence. Imagination, under penalty of that ridicule which inflicts on her the most deadly of wounds, is condemned to remain chained to the ground, with her gaze fixed on the earth beneath her, instead of soaring to heights whence she could survey the boundless horizons of infinity. What is the result in her special field of production, as shown by the class of mental food most eagerly sought by the largest numbers of the population? The novel of the circulating library, the poetry of the music-halls, the art of the caricature. This is the fruit of all the æsthetic teaching of critics, and artificial refinements of civilization; and as the true art of a nation is always founded on the broadest basis of its society, so it is here that we find its genuine expression among us.

But this sphere of taste is at least below criticism, so we will look a little higher in the social scale, and see how the prevailing materialism affects the artistic work supplied to the class that especially prides itself on culture. The first feature that strikes us in this more select public is that no one of its

¹ It is a remarkable fact that all great painters, even those whose sympathies might have seemed most alien to such subjects, have achieved their masterpieces in religious pictures. Thus, Titian's genius culminated in his 'Assumption,' that of Rubens in the 'Descent from the Cross,' that of Van Dyck in the 'Crucifixion.'

component units dares to have an opinion of his own. Free-thinking in matters of religion is allowable forsooth! and even admirable; but it must be counterbalanced by the most unquestioning acceptance of dogma in matters of taste. The fiat has gone forth that certain styles of furniture and decoration are artistic, certain shades of colour and fashions of dress harmonious or æsthetic, and lo! all the mansions of the elect assume the monotony of a row of almshouses, and all the female votaries of the school are clad in uniform as strictly as a charity school. A poet or painter, novelist or composer, is adopted with equal unanimity, and belauded in a set of cant phrases, caught from some recognized leader of taste. Now this extraordinary readiness to forego all private judgment implies either an utter distrust of its guidance, or a total want of individual preference. To like things because somebody else likes them, argues either that one is devoid of all spontaneous liking, or is ashamed of it, and a stranger might almost come to the harsh conclusion that these devotees of high culture, if deprived of the artificial standards of fashion, might prove to be on no whit a higher level of appreciation than the audience that roars encore to a comic song, or thunders applause to a Surrey melodrama. Such is the temper of the highly-cultivated public, to which is addressed a large portion of the art we are considering, and the general characteristics of which we will try to investigate.

It is commonly said on all hands that modern art is realistic, but the word is often used with a vague sense of the meaning attached to it. It is indeed capable of a double interpretation, for there are in art two forms of realism, a noble and an ignoble. The higher and nobler realism is produced by that imaginative power in the artist of so selecting the few truths he is permitted by the limits of his art to lay before us, as to suggest the innumerable other truths he is compelled to omit. He thus calls our imagination to his assistance, and from the partial picture he has presented to us enables us to realize the entire picture he had in his mind. This is the realism of Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare, of Titian and Tintoretto, of Turner and Claude. It is the essence of all true art, and without some measure or degree of it there could be no art at all.

But ignoble or literal realism is its very antithesis, since its principle is to supersede the imagination as far as possible, and present, without its assistance, a heterogeneous mass of details supposed to be life-like, because reproduced or actually set down from life itself. Now this supposition proceeds on a totally false assumption, since the life of nature dies in art,

and its dry bones remain totally inanimate until a new vitality is breathed into them, first by the artist's imagination, and secondly by that of the spectator sympathetically aroused. Artistic truth is not natural truth, but a very limited selection from it; for art is at best but a series of expedients and compromises with nature, and would be quickly discovered as but a shabby trickster if she could not persuade our minds to lend themselves to her illusions, and to be the accomplices of her legerdemain. We will try to exemplify our meaning by a homely illustration, and contrast a house-agent's description of a dwelling with a poet's or painter's. The former gives us an inventory of all the house contains from basement to attic, and contains a hundred facts for every one stated by the latter. It is a useful document if we want to judge of the house as an investment, or decide on it for a residence; but it does not enable us to see it as the artist does with a few strokes of pen and pencil. The poet, whether he paint with words or colours, sets it before us in its relations to all the great truths of life and nature, will let us know how it meets the sunlight, or defies the storm, how it shelters its inmates in cold and heat, in joy and sorrow; the valuator informs us of the length of its frontage, the number of its doors and windows, the thickness of its walls, but calls up no picture in the mind of its aspect as a whole.

A great deal of descriptive writing at the present day is composed on this mechanical or cataloguing principle—that is, it consists of an enumeration of qualities, objects, or sensations, without any regard to their poetic perspective or relative power of exciting the imagination. A high sense of this imaginative value of certain points of character, scenery, or drama, is the special prerogative of genius, and its absence is the absence of all organic or vital principle in art. Its subtle essence is as incapable of analysis as that which animates the living creature, and resembles it, too, in being only recognizable in its effects. We know when it is wanting, by the artist's failure to arouse our interest, and by our own cold indifference to his work, be it novel, picture, or play, and this negative test is the only one by which ignoble realism, which might be more justly styled 'literalism,' can be detected. Though so prevalent in contemporary productions, it is no invention of modern taste, but has existed in all false art since the world began. It is, however, only within recent times that it has been adopted as a principle, and boasted of as a perfection.

These and similar results we cite in proof of our main argument, that in an age dominated by materialism as its leading mode of thought, the imagination, withheld from its

proper field of supernatural aspiration, and driven to exercise itself on the commonplace actualities around it, must necessarily lose the power of regarding them from a poetic or dramatic point of view. It is frequently remarked that in our ordinary novels we have abundance of talent, but no genius, much of the superficial cleverness that amuses the mind, but none of the commanding interest that enchains it. The crimes of the police-courts, the scandals of the 'Society' papers, are re-enacted in their pages by characters without a gleam of noble sentiment, or a spark of genuine passion, to raise them above the dead level of mediocrity. Imaginative poverty oscillates between the opposite extremes of the extravagant and the commonplace, giving us on the one hand the avowedly sensational school of the 'shilling dreadful,' with its cheap horrors and mechanical elaboration of improbabilities, and on the other the glorification of triviality in narratives of everyday life depending for their sole interest on various phases of love-making, in which the billing and cooing is sometimes described with nauseating fullness of detail. Of the first class we may take such books as *Called Back* as a specimen, while the works of Miss Rhoda Broughton stand at the head of the second category.

One great artist, indeed, we have had, to raise our standard of fiction; but it is precisely because 'George Eliot' had imaginative genius of a very high order that we accuse not her, but the age in which she lived, of having perverted that great gift from the nobler uses for which it was adapted. For it was her artistic mission to teach a great moral truth, showing how the drama of good and evil played out in every heart has its issue predetermined by the accumulated force of previous tendencies, making it the inevitable moral sum of the entire life. In following out this evolution of evil, we are consequently made to see how weakness develops into wickedness, and self-love into crime, how selfishness breeds cruelty, and softness treachery. We are shown how Tito Melema's heart was not too narrow to be the scene of struggle between the eternal forces of a better and a worse nature; nor the soul of the purblind weaver, too utterly darkened by miserly greed, for a ray of light to penetrate it, through the appeal of the helpless loveliness of childhood to its one surviving spark of human tenderness. But when 'George Eliot' began to write, Christian belief still governed the minds of her public, and the conflict of opinion in England was not, as now, between religion and philosophy, but between Church and Dissent. Nay, we may perhaps trace to her evident familiarity with Nonconformist

preaching, so probing and personal in its character, her passion for tracing out those strivings and wrestlings of the inner man, which she may have heard frequently dwelt on from the Methodist pulpit. It is, at any rate, probable that discussions upon these and similar themes were the strongest intellectual influence to which her early years were exposed, and that it was long before these first impressions were effaced from her mind under the guidance of a new school of metaphysics.

Her genius, thus warped from its original bent, reflected the great revolution in public opinion wrought during the progress of her career; and what has been the result as shown in her later works? A marked decline in their power to interest is an unmistakable symptom of the loss of imaginative force in their author, while a tendency to substitute for the development of incident and character the working out of abstract problems of society shows that human nature, with its personal drama, has been thrust aside from the first place in her mind. This change is in strict conformity to the teaching of the modern school; for if the individual soul be but a spark evolved out of matter to be swallowed up in annihilation, its history is of small account compared to that of the general interests of humanity. Thus the great moral issues of life, which had so powerful a hold on the author's imagination, are obscured in her recent works by vaguer and wider questions, and the personal interest, required by drama, is proportionally diminished. The tragedy of Lydgate's story (in *Middlemarch*) is no longer, like Tito's, the degradation of a soul, but the frustration of a career, and the aim of the hero's life in *Daniel Deronda* is not moral victory, but national triumph. Meantime the imagination of the author, in renouncing its true field, has lost its firm grasp on human nature, and pays the penalty of its subservience to public opinion in failure of artistic efficiency. The later 'George Eliot' remained as analytical as ever, but her analysis was devoted to paltry motives, instead of supreme emotions; she left the deeps for the shallows, and the loaded plummet-line which had dredged the abysses of the ocean of life, became a cumbrous superfluity among the mudbanks along its shores. Instead of the grand types of character first created by her, in her last works she dealt with personages as commonplace as those of the most ordinary magazine story, and described them by superficial attributes devoid of any artistic significance. The reader will remember that we defined imaginative realism as being the power of seizing on the leading truths of nature in such a way as to suggest the minor ones, and literal realism as the indiscrimi-

nate record of facts taken at haphazard from actual life, without any intervention of the imagination in selecting or arranging them. This is the realism to which 'George Eliot' descended in her later works, and we shall take as an instance of it a character in *Middlemarch* much praised for its 'naturalness.' Natural it certainly is, so much so that we might be introduced to half-a-dozen Mr. Brookeses in a day, and forget them in five minutes after. The author's expedient for giving him individuality, by ticketing him with a perpetually recurring phrase like 'You know!', is as far removed from true art as would be the device of a painter seeking to convey a likeness by catching some trick of the face, instead of labouring to reproduce a characteristic expression, and to reveal, as Emerson so finely puts it, 'the aspiring original within.' The shallow word-portrait conveys as little idea of the true nature of the inner man, as would such a painting of his external aspect.

If we contrast this superficial literalism with the imaginative realism of the great masters of art, we shall see how paltry and inadequate a substitute it is. Lady Margaret Bellenden in *Old Mortality* resembles Mr. Brookes in her perpetual recurrence to a favourite phrase, but the old lady's fond references to His Gracious Majesty's ever-memorable breakfast at Tillietudlem suggest a whole train of ideas, and portray the character, not alone of the speaker, but of the entire class and epoch of which she was a type. The most seemingly trivial details in a work of high genius are always thus pregnant with intense creative significance.

We find then, to sum up, in the modern English school of fiction a marked and continuous decline of imaginative power, evidenced by the disappearance from its pages of all exalted or vigorous types of character, and the substitution of inferior interests for the loftier one of the purely human drama. Social questions, scientific or philosophical disquisitions, descriptions of scenery or upholstery, occupy the foreground, and thrust the figures of the actors into the middle distance; one chapter reads like an extract from the catalogue of a dealer in bric-à-brac, another like a page out of a topographical dictionary; the vicissitudes of wealth and commerce, the entanglements of money or property, have generally a more powerful influence on the plot than the characters of the personages; in short, material surroundings tend more and more to swamp life itself in the novelist's pages.

Such are a few of the effects on imaginative literature in this country of the modern school of thought, and if we turn to France, we shall find the results of its teaching in a still

more advanced stage of development. There the seed planted by Voltaire and Rousseau first struck root, and there it has ripened first and fastest to a harvest. The nature of the crop is patent to the eye, for the tares have thriven and multiplied, until the good grain is choked out of sight. A great name comes first to our pen, for the colossal figure of Victor Hugo still dominates an arena in which he had no rivals, and has left no followers. We do not mean to disparage his genius, but to try and consider how far its bent was directed by the tendencies and tastes of the public it addressed. That bent inclined it to tragic exaltation, bordering on mysticism, with its accompanying desire of evoking awe and wonder, horror and surprise, in the minds of the audience. These emotions are most naturally found in supernatural subjects, invariably selected by imaginations of the highest order, provided sympathy with them can be found in the society around them. The France for which M. Hugo wrote was not, however, likely to furnish it, and his visionary fancy was driven to draw the elements of its creations from the material world alone. Seeking then for supernatural effects in purely natural forces, he invested them with a sort of monstrous vitality, and tried to infuse a soul into matter, endowing its manifestations with fantastic personality. The struggles of the hero in *Les Travailleurs de la Mer* resemble a series of conflicts with evil genii, the gun broken loose from its fastenings in *Quatre-Vingt-Treize* seems animated with a spirit of malignity, like a demon unchained from the abyss. Where he is content to be natural, as in the chapter describing the children at play, or that called 'Gauvain Pensif'—both in the above-named work—he is thoroughly sublime; but where he aims at sublimity he is simply extravagant, accumulating physical sufferings until we are on the verge of nausea, and mental horrors until we feel the bewilderment of delirium. His false morality—a sentiment rather than a principle—sets all his dramas in an unnatural light, and as his characters pass from the lowest depths of vice to the sublimest heights of virtue, without a struggle or a relapse, and are penitents without religion and converts without faith, we feel them to be alternately fiends and angels, but decline to believe in them as men. In contrast with the author's impossible dreams of actual life, we would place an exquisite little volume, in which his powers of realizing the supernatural had full scope. We speak of the legend of *Le beau Pécopin et la belle Bauldour*, a tale of mediæval diablerie, to which the weird force of his imagination has given a picturesque vividness almost unique in modern literature.

Extravagance is one form of imaginative decline in art, but its exaggerations, even when most grotesque, are inspired by a nobility of aim utterly lost in the sordid literalism which seems to be their alternative. Victor Hugo at least always aspired to soar; but the great leader of the opposite school of French fiction was deliberately content to grovel. Balzac selected by preference the most degraded aspects of human nature, and produced powerful but repulsive pictures of life. From his harsh realism has sprung, by logical sequence of development, the still more unsightly crudities of the present school which its professors euphuize as 'naturalism,' but which we would rather designate as simple bestiality. Among a host of obscurer names, that of M. Zola stands out prominent as its chief representative; and how thoroughly its productions are fitted to the depraved taste of the age is shown by the fact that of one of his latest works forty thousand copies had been disposed of, previous to publication. The utter negation of all spiritual meaning in life, the cynical choice of its most revolting phases—the triumph, in a word, of debased materialism—can hardly be carried farther than in the works of this school, whose existence is a disgrace to modern civilization.

Of the contemporary stage there is little to be said, save that its decadence reflects the same tendencies as are discoverable in fiction. The dramatist, like the novelist, seeks to disguise failure in portraiture of character, by elaboration of material accessories, which he indeed has the advantage over his compeer of being able to present in bodily substance, instead of summoning up to the mind by pages of description. In the bringing out of a play much stress is laid upon scenery and decorations, as, for instance, in the recent production of *Faust* at the Lyceum, for which it was loudly trumpeted abroad that a special peal of bells had been cast at an expense of 400*l.*! Meantime the pieces represented are, for the most part, so empty and vapid that it may be doubted if any amount of genius would suffice to give them interest; and we look on at a set of puppets going through the most ordinary scenes of every-day life, presented with a bald literalism that culminates in the introduction of 'real' water, or a 'real' cab, omnibus, or mechanical auxiliary of some description, to help out the author's poverty of invention in character, in dialogue or situation.

It might have been thought that the art which speaks to the eye alone would be more independent of moral and intellectual influences, in its treatment of visible form, than that

which addresses itself directly to the mind, and clothes itself in the less tangible garb of words. Yet it is not so in fact; for the prevailing mode of thought, at any given epoch, is even more clearly reflected in its painting than in its literature. Of modern sculpture it seems unnecessary to speak at all, for its existence is as artificial at the present day as that of a dead language, into which we no longer translate our thoughts or feelings. Sculpture and poetry are the two primitive arts, the unconventional language of the imagination in a stage of society when thought, working on anything outside the material wants of life, has to forge an utterance for itself. Figurative speech, then, suggests itself to the mind of the poet, as the block of stone lends itself to the hand of the artist, as the only available vehicle of expression. In the more sophisticated stages of national existence, both arts lose their supreme position among more varied and artificial outlets for thought.

In modern sculpture¹ we will only particularize two works whose popularity serves to illustrate the decline in public taste. The first is 'The Reading Girl,' which, without grace of treatment, dignity of subject, or beauty of form, achieved a triumph, from its homely fidelity to every-day life. But a far lower depth of degraded realism was reached in a subsequent work, which, though only to be tolerated by the vilest taste, has attained the celebrity of a masterpiece, the nauseous group known as 'You Dirty Boy,' and so often reproduced as to render description superfluous. Its crowning success, in being purchased by a firm of manufacturers as an advertisement, suggests what may be perhaps the ultimate goal of modern art, to be associated with commerce in blazoning its achievements to the ends of the earth.

But painting is at least a living art amongst us, much patronized by the rich, and flourishing exceedingly, if the number of works produced, the prices paid for them, and the public attention they excite, can be taken as affording any test of prosperity. That the art itself is nevertheless in a state of decadence seems admitted by its professors and critics on all hands. Mr. Poynter, in his *Lecture on Decorative Art*, speaks as follows:—

'The mannerism of English artists is more often that of complete ignorance, and ignorance has a manner of its own, made to conceal ignorance. This mannerism is known by the name of cleverness.

¹ In striking exception to the general decadence stands out Sir Frederick Leighton's 'Athlete strangling a Python,' a solitary modern example of antique ideality of treatment. The same remark applies to 'The Sluggard,' a noble work by the same distinguished artist, which will be on view next month at the Royal Academy.

That dexterous manipulation, those brilliant performances with transparent shadows and sparkling lights, with which the walls of our exhibition rooms are yearly covered, are only displays of ignorance. They serve to conceal from a public, amazed at the dexterity of the performance, the fact that the painter knows nothing of his art. If the pictures are not in this wise, they are what is called realistic, the realism consisting in the most elaborate painting of trivial details, while the great and important truths of nature are unknown and uncared for; so that the value of the work is reckoned according to the patience of the artist in realising trifles, and the success of the picture is in proportion to the time the artist has taken in painting it' (*Lectures on Art*, pp. 45-6.)

That is to say, its realism is what we have classified as unimaginative literalism, and consists in elaborating the little truths and neglecting the great ones, as is the manner of all mechanical and unworthy art. This is the verdict of a distinguished painter on the art he practises; we will now hear the judgment of one of its professed critics, Mr. Comyns Carr, from whose *Essays on Art* we take the following passage:—

'To literature it has always been permitted to attempt the highest triumphs, and the writer has not been thought mad who has chosen in the research of beauty to leave the world of common things, and to desert the portraiture of manners. But in English art it is not so. The standard here has always been lower, and the artist has seldom ventured at all, and has always ventured at his peril, to trust like the poet to the strength of his invention. It would take too long to enter upon a consideration of all the causes that have led to this result. But the fact remains that, since the Reformation, art in England has held only a subordinate place in the history of the imagination, and has never from the first attempted to mirror to men's eyes the great world of passion and beauty that the ruin of the old order of things set free. All the force of the English renaissance seems to have found its way into English literature. Imaginative art was left to perish with the system that had given it birth and encouraged its earliest efforts. In the new birth it had no part.' (P. 43.)

What this new birth was we learn from another passage in the same work, where the author thus defines the tendencies of modern art:—

'All modern painting of the first importance has been in essence realistic; it has been based on veracity of portraiture rather than upon intensity of passion. It has exchanged severity of line for luxury of colour, losing something in dignity of invention, gaining much in splendour and charm of execution. In the presence of a great work of the Florentine school, the beauty of the idea makes us half forget the workmanship, but in the masterpieces of modern painting, the power and subtlety of the workmanship make us forget the idea. Rubens was the first great master whose painting frankly

expressed this change. Through him we know at last that the old order of things is dead, and that a new order has arisen. His respect and reverence for the great idealists of Italy was all the more disinterested because he could not inherit their glory. It was a respect due to the dead, and having magnificently discharged the debt, he passed on with perfect sincerity to create a new world of his own.' (*Ibid.* p. 144.)

We will not stop to join issue with the author on the superior splendour of modern colouring, as our theme is not the executive side of art; but, in developing our views as to its moral aspects, we dispute his assertion that Rubens was the first great master imbued with the realistic in contradistinction to the idealistic spirit in painting. We would rather point to Michael Angelo as the master who made and marked this revolution, and stands as the connecting link between mediæval and modern art.

The Titan brood of the Sistine Chapel seem at once more and less than man; but the great Flemish colourist endowed the race of splendid animals he created, with all the fire of human passions. Michael Angelo typified force, or the energy of matter, in muscle; Rubens went a step lower for his ideal, and embodied its inertia, or baser element, in the masses of adipose tissue with which he has overlaid it. Yet the one system was the inevitable development of the other; and not to Rubens, but to Buonarroti, do we trace the origin of modern realism.

The languid negative materialism of these days is, however, far removed indeed from both these vigorous assertions of physical vitality. And that the decline in modern art is not to be accounted for by any causes confined to its own sphere, but by some universal influence pervading society at large, is shown by the identity of its shortcomings with those already noticed in contemporary literature. For in art, too, it is the grasp of human character, the expression of human individuality, that seem gradually slipping away from us, and fading from our canvases as they are vanishing from our printed pages. And, as in the novels, so in the pictures, the artist instinctively seeks to supply the lost element by the obtrusion of other interests, and to distract the minds of his audience from his failure in essential power, by the display of a multitude of minor aptitudes, and happy knacks.

The most characteristic school of modern art is that of genre-painting, the peculiar invention of our time, with Meissonier at its head in France, and scores of disciples all over Europe. Its speciality is microscopic finish, and minute

elaboration of detail on a small scale of size : so that when we are introduced to the interior of a lady's boudoir, painted on a few square inches of canvas, we may be able to see the pattern of the old blue china on her shelves, or of the Persian rug on her floor—may examine the creases of her white satin dress, and the folds of her opera cloak lying on a chair. This is all legitimate, provided that the interest of the central figure justify all this dexterous rendering of its accessories, and the lady's beauty seem the culminating point, or her elegance the harmonizing influence of her luxurious surroundings. We should be made to forget the gorgeousness of the shrine in doing homage to the goddess of the temple. If this be not so, the heterogeneous assemblage of all these properties, without the assertion of a single purpose to give them dramatic unity, is of no more artistic value than the 'chiffons' of a milliner's show-room, or the furniture of an old curiosity shop. Now, in a picture of the modern genre school, humanity is but an appendage to upholstery ; the lady's face is the one quarter of an inch of canvas that has obviously proved uninteresting to the artist, and her figure is only of importance in so far as it serves as a peg for her gown. Abolish her altogether and the composition loses nothing in interest ; for gilding and marqueterie, inlaid cabinets and carved oak chairs, dragon vases and peacock fans, remain as great a trophy as before of the artist's sleight-of-hand, and taste in bric-à-brac. This tale of his delight in the paraphernalia of luxury is the only tale the picture tells, and it would tell it equally well without the waxwork nonentity, whom he has draped and bedizened in such gorgeous apparel.

The old Venetians were not a whit behind us moderns in their appreciation of surface and texture, or in dexterity in rendering their most subtle distinctions by play of light and colour ; but the human gem still remained with them more precious than its setting, the motive and cause of all its appurtenances of splendour, not an accident in their midst. No man loved better than Titian the sheeny shimmer of satin or purple pansy-bloom of velvet, the prismatic flash of gems, or cloudy damasking of dim brocade ; but we forget in Cardinal Ippolito's princely bearing and perfidious beauty, the amaranthine glow of his tunic ; Catherine Cornaro's eyes outshine her diadem, and the pallor of her cheek is fairer than the lustre of her bodice.

In genre-painting the human element seems to have been deliberately slurred over, as of secondary interest, through the artist's preference for still life ; but in portraiture this cannot

have been the case ; and yet here we are struck by the same absence of character or individual expression. External truth is there ; the painter's hand and eye have faithfully transferred to his canvas the outlines and colouring of his model, yet we feel in examining the result of his labours that something is wanting, and that while the outward semblance of the man is retained, the indefinable intangible essence which constitutes his human personality has escaped all attempt to fix it. Mechanical fidelity or dexterity can never reproduce this inner self ; for mind can only be grasped by mind, and mere material accuracy is powerless to hold or to master it. Modern portrait-painting resembles photography in supplying what seems a satisfactory likeness of a familiar face, but gives no idea of an unknown one ; our imagination in the one case supplementing the blank left by the picture, while in the other, having no such aid to fall back upon, we receive no impression at all.

The great masters, on the contrary, give us a more vivid impression of the originals of their portraits than we could have formed for ourselves, if we had actually known them, from the imaginative power of genius in concentrating all the essential traits of character into a single view. We thus seem to be more familiar with the aspect of Leo X., of Julius II., and of Lorenzo the Magnificent, than with that of ninety-nine out of a hundred of our acquaintances, and it is this power of realizing character at a glance, that is so completely absent in our modern art.¹

A singular proof of the indifference to expression which pervades it, is the tendency of nearly all contemporary figure-painters to diminish the size of the human head out of all proportion to that of the limbs and body. A total want of dignity and character is the result ; and we receive an impression of inane feebleness and vacuity from the picture, even before we have had time to analyze its cause. It is either done from a mistaken idea of grace, founded on a total misconception of the laws of symmetry, or is the painter's refuge from the dilemma he is placed in, by his deficiency in power of conceiving or portraying character ; and is in either case an illustration of the prevailing source of artistic failure.

If we find the same sign of decadence in the gradual elimination or overshadowing of pure human interest, common to both literature and art in this country, we can trace an equal identity of tendency between these two fields of intel-

¹ Here too one notable exception forces itself on our attention, viz. Sir Frederick Burton's magnificent portrait of George Eliot.

lectual productiveness in France. The following passage in reference to French painting by Mr. Poynter might be applied word for word to French novels:—

‘Although I have adopted here a system of instruction pretty closely following the French, I do not by any means consider or intend to convey the impression that the result at which French artists arrive is to be held up for imitation. Much as I admire their technical facility, I do not consider that they make that use of it which it should be the aim of a true artist to keep before him. French art has indeed of late years enormously degenerated. Thanks to the continued and persistent efforts of the “realistic” school, it is descending lower and lower to a mere brutal materialism, any subject which may afford a means of displaying technical facility being eagerly seized upon, and, as every artist vies with his fellows in the production of the most sensational results, it is difficult to say at what depths of the horrible and morbidly sensational it may finally arrive.¹

‘The French school, as I have said, has rapidly degenerated. Ingres, and one or two of his pupils who formed themselves on his style, are dead, and during the last ten years of the Empire the works of the French artists ran into every kind of extravagance. Their conception of ideal beauty is not that it is to be found by looking for it in nature, but rather by adding something to nature of their own devising; this something is chiefly a theatrical and sickly sentimentality, which is peculiarly their own, but which is absolutely devoid of any real or inherent beauty. When, on the other hand, they paint nature unidealized, it is almost always on the disgusting or the horrible that they seize for imitation with a cynical pleasure which is no less characteristic than their false and bombastic sentiment.’ (*Ibid.* pp. 117, 119.)

But the most noteworthy feature in the history of contemporary painting is the large and increasing attention it devotes to landscape, the minute and extensive study of which may be considered the artistic speciality of our own day. It is the field to which English painters have principally devoted themselves, although it might seem at first sight that they must labour under considerable difficulties in their study of nature, from the imperfect transparency of their atmosphere, as compared with that of more southern countries. This peculiarity of their climate, however, may be found, on second thoughts, to facilitate their task, although it must certainly tend to enfeeble their artistic perceptions. It requires only a moment’s reflection to convince us that, as the human eye—not that of the painter alone, though of him it is true in a more

¹ This is a true prediction of what has since happened. The French portion of the picture gallery in the Exhibition of 1878 was remarkable for nothing so much as the display of sensational horrors, treated in the most realistic style and on an immense scale.

especial sense—is receiving a constant education in the appreciation of form and colour, the lessons of nature in this direction will be more impressive to his mind, in proportion as such form and colour are more strikingly distinguished and more clearly defined. The conditions of light in northern countries are such as to lower the whole scale of chiaroscuro, and merge all the more delicate gradations of form in nearer objects; while in the distance, colour and form, with the exception of a shadowy outline, are swamped alike in the pervading medium of atmospheric haze. A mountain at about ten miles off, in an English landscape, appears as a mere silhouette, a flat mass of bluish grey defined against the horizon. At an equal distance in a southern country, it is seen as a solid object with all its sculptured relief of form marked in exquisite modulations of amethyst and purple, with every farmhouse and sheepcote on its slopes a glittering point of sunlight, distinct yet minute as a seed-pearl, with its zones of tufted chestnut forest, or silvery olive groves, its broken steeps, its pasture levels, showing in true local colour, softened but not obliterated by distance, and with its crown of bare neutral-tinted crag flushing and paling against the sky, as varyingly sensitive to change of light, as the cheek of a girl to change of emotion. Thus the number of lessons taught by the southern mountain is practically endless, while the northern mountain is blank of all suggestions save as to mere outline. But, exactly in proportion as it is more barren of detail, it is more easy of portrayal, and a single sweep of the brush, with a little modification of colour here and there, will approximately reproduce it on canvas. It is the same with all other objects, so that the representation of the nebulous distance of an English landscape is much easier than that of the clear distance of an Italian scene, where intervening space must be conveyed to the eye by gradation of hue, instead of obliteration of detail. In this way atmospheric opacity assists the landscape-painter by reducing the embarrassing superfluity of visible truths he has to select from, and thus limiting his bewildering freedom of choice. This may perhaps explain the superior excellence of the Dutch and English schools in painting scenery, and the failure of Italy, so pre-eminent in other fields, to produce a great master in this branch of art.

Be this as it may, it is at any rate certain that landscape is the prevailing and popular form of pictorial expression in this land of pale shadows; and that it should be so, is a fresh illustration of the gradual withdrawal of modern art from the representation of purely human interests. And in its treat-

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ment of this, its chosen subject, there is a growing tendency to accept minute and literal rendering of nature as a substitute for imaginative selection from her truths. The *Times* critic, who may be held as the mouthpiece of public opinion, wrote some time back, in reviewing the Dudley winter exhibition of drawings :—

‘The proportion of landscapes to figures shows how strongly the naturalistic current of the time sets to the former field of study. To devise stories, groups, dramatic actions and expressions, asks the exceptional gifts of imagination and invention. To reproduce something we can see at home or abroad as it stands fixed for us in its substantial features is an achievement possible to such trained skill, close observation, artistic appreciation of effect, and patient labour as under existing conditions is by no means uncommon. Never, we should suppose, was so much good, honest, *unimaginative* work being done from nature. Never was there a larger public to appreciate and pay for it.’

This, though it reads like irony, is evidently meant seriously, and may therefore be taken as fair evidence of the low standard by which landscape art is tried. Imagination and invention are not required of it, and dull, plodding accuracy is to take their place. But the result of this ‘good, honest, unimaginative work’ is a want of definiteness and meaning in portraiture of scenery, exactly corresponding to the absence of character and individuality observable in portraiture of persons, and arising from the same cause, deficiency in imaginative power. If we look round the walls of our exhibitions, we shall be convinced that nature cannot be portrayed impressively, any more than man, without grasping some deeper truth than that which lies on the surface, and that the representation of figures and landscapes alike require the element of drama, to give them interest or charm.

Now, dramatic action is conveyed in landscape by change of light, as it is in figures by change of place or attitude ; but how shall the artist supply either on his canvas, since painting, in the words of Sir Joshua Reynolds, ‘has but one sentence to utter, but one moment to exhibit.’ Plainly, by so choosing that moment that it shall concentrate the results of as much previous movement as possible, by so ordering that sentence, that it shall suggest in its pregnant emphasis all of the story that it cannot tell. The selection of art must adroitly supply for the rapid succession of nature, not all whose transitory effects are suited to be perpetuated, any more than all the various postures of real life. This parallelism of light and motion in their powers of affecting us may be traced in some

of Mr. Ruskin's brilliant descriptions of scenery, the most glorious passages of prose-poetry in the language ; for he has instinctively translated the effect of light and colour on his mind, into images descriptive of energetic action. Thus in his chapter on Truth of Colour we find the following :—

'What can even the quiet inhabitant of the English lowlands, whose scene for the manifestation of the fire of heaven is limited to the tops of hayricks, and the rooks' nests in the old elm-trees, know of the mighty passages of splendour which are tossed from Alp to Alp over the azure of a thousand miles of champaign.'¹

And again :—

'the breathing, animated, exulting light, which feels, and receives, and rejoices, and acts—which chooses one thing, and rejects another—which seeks, and finds, and loses again—leaping from rock to rock, from leaf to leaf, from wave to wave—glowing, or flashing, or scintillating according to what it strikes ; or, in its holier moods, absorbing and enfolding all things in the deep fulness of its repose, and then again losing itself in bewilderment, and doubt, and dimness, or perishing and passing away entangled in drifting mist, or melted into melancholy air, but still—kindling or declining, sparkling or serene—it is the living light, which breathes in its deepest, most entranced rest, which sleeps, but never dies.'²

This is the true poetry of landscape, which animates it with life and meaning, instead of leaving it a dead, inert aggregation of matter, with nature's harmonies falsified by being stayed in their progression, with her most fleeting and transient effects sought out to be perpetuated, with her minute details preferred, and her great truths ignored. Now, this choice of the superficial, and neglect of the profound, is a prevailing characteristic of modern landscape-painting, as it is of modern literature ; and we find the ephemeral flash of a sunbeam from a wintry sky, or the drift of a wreath of mist along a hill-side, dwelt upon, and the permanent character of the scene, its general relations of light and shade, or delicate gradations of colour, sacrificed to obtain these transitory effects. The dim purples of the moorland are drowned in universal brown, or the blue gleam of the mountain lake quenched in all-pervading greyness, that some fleeting change of weather may be chronicled on canvas, or the artist's skill in rendering it made manifest. Indeed, the preference for loaded skies and sunless atmosphere seems to be gradually gaining ground, and the artistic taste in this respect reminds one of the British

¹ *Modern Painters*, vol. i. p. 159.

² *Ibid.* p. 175 (On Truth of Chiaroscuro).

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tar's exclamation of joy at being welcomed by a familiar downpour in the Channel on his return from a voyage to the Mediterranean—'I say, Jack, this is weather as is weather; none of your everlasting blue skies!' winding up with a nautical expletive against the monotony of the southern heavens.

Predilections like those of this patriotic mariner seem to have inspired a whole class of pictures, whose chill and misty aspect immediately suggests a desire for umbrellas and waterproof cloaks. For while every other living creature rejoices in the sunshine and light of heaven, the British artist seems to dread it, as might a resuscitated fossil saurian, reared in the steamy vapours that enfolded the prehistoric globe. And the clouds in which modern art loves to shroud itself are not the radiant upper strata that lie folded, like angels' wings, across the zenith, themselves the vehicles of light and colour, nor even the thunder-cloud, girt about with the power of heaven, lurid with its fire, sheath of its lightnings, but the dun rain-clouds, reeking and swollen, gorged and sluggish with the moisture they have drunk, blotting outline, extinguishing light, drowning colour, confounding distance, under a dank, dripping curtain of nebulous grey.

Now under such a sky as this, if it were introduced into a picture, artistic sense of fitness would suggest that a landscape should be spread in which some warm glow of earth might redeem the brooding dulness of heaven, that the slaty porphyry tones of heathery hill and moor, or amber warmth of fields ripe to harvest, might stand out in opposition to the upper grey, or the silvery tenderness of a tranquil sea breaking on yellow sands, harmonize with its tone. Instead of any such selection of tints, we just as often find the landscape painted from foreground to horizon in rank and violent greens that clash with the smoke hue of the upper half of the canvas, in a tuneless discord of colour. For the vesture of earth is only beautiful when it reflects the glory of heaven, and its gladness seems a mockery, its verdure a vanity, if the light from above have no part in it.

This absence of the higher colour sense is one of the most unmistakable symptoms of that decline in sympathetic imagination, evidence of which we have gleaned in so many fields of contemporary art. We have sought a reason for it in the restriction of that great faculty, from its highest sphere of exercise in supernatural ideas, and its direction to the purely physical aspects of nature, under the guidance of the negative spirit of cosmical materialism, animating modern thought. We have glanced cursorily at some of the phases

of this tendency, from its first powerful manifestation in the grand typical materialism of Michael Angelo, the most superb embodiment of physical energy, to the more rampant animalism of Rubens, with its baser ideal of physical enjoyment, and have tried to point out how these great unconscious translations of the forces of nature have given place in our own day to a cold analysis of her superficial aspects, amid which man appears but as the insignificant accident, to which science, the arbiter of modern thought, would reduce him. And if the Renaissance may be described as the apotheosis of human nature, then first idealized apart from its supernatural aspect, the aim of modern speculation tends to the apotheosis of the visible universe, dissociated for the first time in history from all idea of a creative principle. In both epochs the decline or degradation of the imagination, of which we see so many symptoms in contemporary art, is a necessary consequence of the absence of any lofty ideal for human contemplation, which remains, as it were, fettered to the dust of earth. *Ars vera, res severa.*

For man's sense of beauty springs primarily from his recognition of his own higher nature, and of his relation to the universe as the intelligent interpreter of its deeper meanings. In proportion to his power of grasping and expressing these meanings is his appreciation of visible beauty and of artistic significance. And if mankind at large should ever come to see in the universe but a huge ungoverned machine, going through cycles of growth and development in obedience to mechanical agencies alone, the grace and glory of nature would be blotted out by the negation of a mind directing her operations, the human imagination would perish of inanition amid the darkness and void of intellectual chaos, and all art, as well as all social order and morality, would disappear for ever amid the dissolving wreck of culture and civilization.

ART. IX.—ELLEN WATSON.

A Record of Ellen Watson. Arranged and edited by ANNA BUCKLAND. (London, 1884.)

THERE are very few departments of human thought which have not been explored by Dante, few of its phases which have not been defined and then illustrated by some forcible figure,

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which places them for ever before the mind like a picture in its frame, a jewel in its setting.

Such is the figure, original, hardy almost to rudeness, which, in the following passage of the *Paradiso*, describes the restless dissatisfaction of the mind before it is convinced of Divine truth, and the sense of security which follows upon that conviction:—

‘Io veggio ben, che giammai non si sazia
Nostro intelletto, se il ver non lo illustra,
Di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia.

‘Posasi in esso, come fiera in lustra,
Tosto che giunto l’ha; e giugner puollo;
Se non, ciascun disio sarebbe frustra.’¹

(*La Divina Commedia*, *Parad. iv. 124 sqq.*)

Undimmed by time, the bold conception of that master mind remains still in all its vigour, ready, so to speak, for application, should occasion call it forth, and now after a lapse of five centuries it sets its seal upon the interesting biography of Ellen Watson, which we have placed at the head of this article. Strange as the parallel may appear, the passage just quoted does not suggest the only point of comparison between the stern Florentine of the middle age, in the ripe seniority of his intellect, and the young and gentle girl who but yesterday, as it were, gave back in their first perfection to Him who gave them, His best and noblest gifts.

Science is the basis of the *Divina Commedia*, and all the sciences then known are invoked by Dante to help in the construction of his imaginary world. This solid foundation supports the superstructure of imagination, and gives it a consistency, a power, and a unity which lifts it into a region above other works of imagination, and places it in a kind of border-land betwixt fiction and reality, which it has occupied unchallenged ever since. In Ellen Watson we perceive the same love of the exactitude of science which, as she developed her extraordinary mental powers, led her to find in the solution of scientific problems a satisfaction so pure and unmixed, that for a time she deluded herself with the thought that it alone might constitute an all-sufficient happiness. But, still keeping

¹ ‘Well I discern that by that truth alone
Enlightened, beyond which no truth may roam,
Our mind can satisfy her thirst to know:
Therein she resteth, e’en as in his lair
The wild beast, soon as she hath reached that bound,
And she hath power to reach it; else desire
Were given to no end.’—*Cary’s Translation.*

to our parallel, 'Doubt,' as Dante goes on to say, 'springs like a shoot around the stock of truth;' and why? to push the scientific student on from summit to summit ('di collo in collo') till at last it is resolved in the great Truth of all, else 'desire were given to no end.'

'Nasce per quello, a guisa di rampollo,
Appiè del vero il dubbio : ed è natura,
Ch' al sommo pinga noi di collo in collo.'

(*Ibid.* iv. 130.)

Dante found it in middle life ('Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita'). By the allegory of the *Divina Commedia* he traces the process by which he attains to it in his own mind. Virgil, the impersonification of Moral Science, is his guide through the imaginary circuit of the *Inferno* and the *Paradiso*, but the knowledge of things divine can only shine upon him through the eyes of Beatrice who is the embodiment of Theology. Moral Science satisfied Ellen Watson for a time; but as, although unknown to herself, the brief sands of her mortal life were running out, while there was yet time, the immortal side of her nature awoke, and developed a craving which could only be satisfied by that Truth 'beyond which no truth may roam.'

All too easy is the task of a biographer which has to deal with only twenty-four years of a life like that of Ellen Watson. She was born in London on February 26, 1856. Her father was at that time a tutor in University College, the same college where afterwards his child pursued her studies with such distinguished success. But there was nothing in the childhood of Ellen Watson which at the time appeared to give promise of very exceptional talent. Though looking back upon it now that the short swift race is run, her parents testify to the readiness and quickness of her understanding, her gentle unselfish nature, and her fine sense of right and wrong, which nothing could warp or alter. She was the eldest of a large family, and she never lost sight of her duties as an elder sister, or allowed her own studies to interfere with her usefulness in her own home. It was part of the simplicity of her nature—or perhaps it is better described as the modesty of true genius—that she never for an instant allowed herself to suppose that her talents were to be cultivated at the expense of others. On the other hand, they were by no means to be allowed to lie idle, and so we read of 'her retiring to rest at the same time as the younger children, and then rising at four in the morning, so as to get some hours'

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work before the little ones were ready to begin their day with her.¹

Again, when studying for the Cambridge Local Senior examination, her plan had been to prepare herself at home for passing it; but her father interfered, knowing that she would endanger her chance by setting aside her own studies to be both the teacher and playfellow of her little brothers and sisters, and sent her to study at the North London Collegiate School. There, in December 1872, she passed the Cambridge examination in the First Honours' Class, and gained as the result of this position an Exhibition at Bedford College. Notwithstanding the double distinction, we find that, far from continuing her studies in London, she returned to her home, taking her place again as teacher and elder sister, as a matter of course.

What a lesson lies here for those who are only too ready to sacrifice all their home duties, to secure the unchecked development of mere average capacities by the advantages and freedom of a college life. This path, with all its manifold attractions, was a second time open to Ellen Watson when she came out second of the two women who passed in the Honours' Division of the 'Examination for Women' at the University of London in July 1874, and so gained the Gilchrist Scholarship for Girton College. How great must have been the temptation to one of her talents, with her love of learning. She might have continued her studies under the help and direction of college tutors, her powers of work would have had full and fair scope without interruption, with stated hours of recreation; in the companionship of her fellow-students she would have found the intellectual sympathy for which she had a most natural craving—all this she set aside, as not to be weighed in the balance with the greater importance of the claims of her family and of home. Her presence there was necessary. Her father, Dr. Watson, had removed from Reading, and kept a small school at Oakley House, Caversham; her mother's time was filled by the constant demands of the school household. Ellen at once perceived that, in these circumstances, it was her duty to relieve her mother of the charge of the younger children of the family, and, 'with that fidelity to the nearest duties, which was one of the strongest features of her character, she decided to remain at home and undertake this charge.' (P. 22.)

She was then sixteen, and, with one brief interval, she spent the next six years of her life in the cottage which Dr.

¹ *Record of Ellen Watson*, p. 22.

Watson had built for the residence of his children, in the grounds which surrounded the school-house. She never allowed her studies to interfere with her self-appointed task, and yet she managed to continue them, deep and close as such studies are which include the higher mathematics, the differential and integral calculus, the calculus of variations, and quaternions. In physics she read mechanics and optics, Tyndall's *Lectures on Light*, and some works on chemistry. During this time she enjoyed fairly good health; it was not till the winter of 1875 that the first symptoms of serious ill-health made themselves manifest in a delicacy of lungs, resulting from a severe cold caught during that winter. For five years she kept the fatal disease at bay. It was generally supposed that she must have succumbed earlier, had it not been for the vigour of her intellectual pursuits, which gave her so powerful an interest in life. The courage with which she faced a life of work, only to be matured with her own mature years, while struggling all the time with disease and weakness, forms one of the most striking features of her character.

After the first symptom of weakness of the lungs, she went to spend some weeks at Bournemouth, where she formed a friendship with an American lady, Mrs. Congreve, which, while it exercised a great influence upon her own character, left such an impression upon the mind of her friend, as can only be gathered from her own words—

‘I am delighted to hear that the papers left by our dear friend Ellen Watson are to be published with a short sketch of her life. She had more gifts and virtues than any woman I ever met, and her career, brief as it was, possessed that moral beauty which comes from the linking of rare ability, high aspiration, and unflinching integrity with settled purpose and faithful endeavour. Those who knew her the most completely must despair of giving to the world an adequate portraiture of a mind so vigorous, so trained and broad, and a nature so glowing with aspiration, as Ellen Watson’s; but it is possible to touch upon her graces and achievements in such a way as to quicken others, and impel them to strive for the prize which she won by persistent effort and patient self-renunciation.

‘When I first met her at Bournemouth in 1875, we were led into the discussion of many subjects which had an interest for both, but especially those connected with the religious life. From that time she spoke unreservedly to me of her inner life, rarely touching even upon the outer.’¹

Most of the passages afterwards quoted, which refer to the religious convictions of Ellen Watson, are from her letters

¹ *Record of Ellen Watson*, pp. 24, 25.

addressed to this lady. This friendship was one of several strong friendships formed by Ellen Watson with persons differing widely from one another in character and opinions. Yet she felt, and made each of her friends feel, how individually precious, how necessary each friendship was to her. It seemed as if the different faculties of her powerful mind required to gather depth and strength from various sources; where one failed, another would supply the responsive chord, and while her heart overflowed with sympathy and love for all, she only disclosed to each that side of her nature which would awaken a sympathetic response.

The sojourn at Bournemouth seemed for the time to have restored her health. On her return home she pursued her mathematical and scientific studies with renewed zest, till she reached a point when it was absolutely impossible for her to make further progress without advice.

This brings us to the next stage in her brief career. She applied for guidance to Professor Carey-Foster of University College:—

‘Though as a stranger I have no claim on your kindness,’ she writes, ‘yet, knowing no other road to much desired knowledge, I venture to ask it from you. What I need is advice as to the course of reading I should follow in order to acquire, as far as is possible for a solitary student, a thorough knowledge of the various branches of physics,’ &c.¹

This letter is dated February 4, 1876. From her second and third letters of February 9 and 17 we gather that she not only received a prompt reply from the Professor, offering her advice and encouragement, but also was offered the use of the Physical Laboratory at University College, for practical experimental work. In the autumn of this same year she was able to avail herself of this valuable permission; and now she was to reap the fruit of her self-sacrifice. Success crowned her solitary, unassisted studies, and she found when she began her work at the Laboratory, that she was up to the standard of the highest mathematical class, sufficiently advanced to profit by the lectures of the late Professor W. K. Clifford, who was at that time conducting the highest senior class in pure mathematics. She ascribes to these ‘inspiring lectures’ her greatest intellectual triumph, when, at the close of the session, in June 1877, she achieved the position of first mathematical student in University College. On his side, Professor Clifford formed so high an opinion of her mathematical ability that he believed

¹ *Ibid.* p. 31.

her to be possessed of the rare faculty of doing original work in that science, even to the extent of originating some new discovery in mathematics. He watched with the keenest interest the development of her mind, and was anxious in every way to promote her career. For him she felt the deepest reverence and esteem, always speaking of him as 'The Master.' It will not therefore be difficult to imagine that, when she carried away her Honours, together with the Meyer de Rothschild Exhibition of 50*l.*, far more valuable to her than either were the Professor's words of commendation:—

'Miss Watson's proficiency would have been very rare in a man, but he was totally unprepared to find it in a woman. A few more students like Miss Watson would certainly raise University College to a status surpassing that of institutions twenty times as rich, and which had been two hundred years longer in existence.'¹

Here was the culminating point of her intellectual career, as judged by a mere human standard, and at that very point it was given to her to see another 'summit' yet to which she must attain, else 'desire were given to no end.'

Hitherto, the nature of her studies had been exactly adapted to a mind whose ruling passion was the love of positive truth. She had found in the strictly logical conclusions of mathematics, in the severe experimental tests of science, a certainty which so satisfied that craving that she took this for truth, and wished for nothing further. It was a truth—material proof by certain well-attested phenomena of a material world—which satisfied her till brought face to face with immortality. The beloved life of her 'Master,' so full of all that was precious in itself, so fruitful to others of its own abundance, was being undermined by fatal disease. Suddenly it dawned upon the pupil that, 'as a post that hasted by,' that life was fleeing before her, that a few short months would be the allotted span, and then those brilliant intellectual powers would be clouded in death, the far-reaching calculations be brought abruptly to an end, the thoughts which seemed to soar into a world of space, turn again to the earth and *perish*:—

'I have a grief,' she writes, 'which may not be compared with yours, but which is more than any I have known for years. For more than a year I have known Professor Clifford, and have been taught by him. From the beginning his genius and goodness roused a devotion in me which has been growing ever since. And now he is dying from pulmonary consumption. He is young for such a great mathematician. He has begun a great work in many directions, but I fear

¹ *Record of Ellen Watson*, p. 56.

there is no hope of its being completed. He has just resigned his professorship, and is about to start with his young wife on an almost hopeless voyage. This morning I said good-bye to them—I fear for the last time. It is difficult not to despair, and ask what good there is in living when *this is all*. When death comes and all is over, every other sorrow seems nothing in comparison.’¹

But ‘*Is this all?*’ was the thought born of the great yearning tenderness, the unutterable longing. While yet the first struggle had but just begun in her mind, again the question is brought home to her in solemn warning. Another life, full of promise, like that of her ‘Master’ engaged in scientific research, personally known to her, young, eager, busy, is in an instant cut short, and again Ellen finds herself confronted with the problem which she appeals in vain to reason to solve. For months the struggle continued, and then one Sunday morning, when she was walking by the sea-shore, some faint glimmering of the true light dawned upon her mind. It is best to describe this in her own words, for they are aptly chosen:—

‘Such thoughts as I have of God I have gained only of late, and they would look very thin and bare if I tried to write them down. On Sunday morning my father and I walked a long way by the shore, and part of the time I was alone. Is there not something appalling in the lonely expanse of sea, and its deep sound, which seems to wrap one round and shut off everything else? Human affairs seem far off; our thoughts become vague, and all we think of unreal as in a dream. I wonder if you have felt this, and if the sense of loneliness and solemnity—of being apart from the world—has the effect on you too of making you question the aim and good of your life? To me, under this influence, anything short of the highest effort and the greatest results, or else the most enduring and strong affection, seems poor and unsatisfying; and since these fall to the lot of the very few I begin to despair; unless after all there may be a secret which would make life worth having, *and that is the close presence of a Divine Teacher and Friend, who listens to our silent prayers and fills us with all the strength and love we need.*’²

There was no hypocrisy in the character of Ellen Watson. She never feigned to be other than she was, or concealed the very gradual process of her mind towards the truth. ‘Only *sometimes* I hope and believe,’ she writes later (p. 81) to the same correspondent; she adds, ‘my creed is only “I believe in the love of God” and even this I apprehend but dimly’ (*ibid.*); and again, ‘The faith of which I told you is such a faint gleam that I am not sure whether you would think it

¹ *Ibid.* p. 58.

² *Ibid.* p. 75.

deserved the name. . . . Now that you have taught me to pray, it has seemed to become a part of life itself.' (P. 87.)

Meanwhile her physical health was giving her family and friends the gravest cause for anxiety. Bournemouth, where she had again been ordered in the hope of arresting the progress of the disease in her lungs, had failed. It was essential that she should leave England before the winter began—the choice lay between the South of France and South Africa. She chose the latter, on the ground that in a rising colony there must be a field for good and useful work in the education and training of the children of the colonists. It was not likely that a mind such as hers would be content with individual success. She longed to apply its well-trained powers to some more definite, some more lasting result than the fading laurels procured by her triumphs in competitive examination.¹ Such a sphere as she desired was opened to her through the good offices of a friend, Mr. Cecil Buckland, of Uitenhage. By his means she was appointed on the staff of teachers in the Diocesan School, Graham's Town, under the direction of Canon and Mrs. Espin, who presided over the school. The school professed to provide what is called the higher instruction for the daughters of colonists, and upon Ellen Watson would devolve the task of teaching mathematics and natural science. Her new course of life being thus distinctly marked out, it was decided that she should leave England for South Africa in October 1879. Her elder brother, William, whose health was in a measure affected like her own, accompanied her.

'It is decided,' Ellen writes, 'for my brother Willie and myself to go to Cape Colony this autumn. He will settle there probably. How long I shall stay is quite uncertain. Two years is the longest time I think of at present. They are sending me in the hope of curing me permanently. If I hope at all about it, I think I should wish to get quite strong and full of life, or else not to live any longer. It is not that life is burdensome on account of my ill health; on the contrary, I am busy from morning till night, and have not as yet been checked in anything I care to do. But now I want to do much more; no longer, as in the old days, any purely intellectual work, but some great work for men in which, while I sacrifice everything else, I may be face to face with others who are toiling and suffering, and to whom I may give sympathy.'²

¹ In July 1879 Ellen Watson added one more to the brilliant successes already achieved. After only two months' special preparation she passed the first B.Sc. Examination, at London University, in the First Division.

² *Record of Ellen Watson*, p. 80.

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Her last months in England she spent at her beloved home at Caversham. To distract her mind from the impending separation from those she loved, and to whom she had consistently endeared herself by her life of pure unselfishness, she occupied herself in preparing a series of papers on the lives of great men, which she thought might be afterwards of use to her in her school lectures at Graham's Town. Thus sustained by the high sense of work for others, consoled by the prospect of regaining health and strength, with many a fond wish, many an earnest prayer and blessing to speed her on her way, she thought she had nerved herself to endure the anguish of parting; but alas! she had not realized how bitter that moment would be. For the sake of others she bore up heroically till she found herself alone on board the ship. 'I was strong until—until we had embarked, and then, O God! the suffering was terrible.'¹

Yes! in her agony she had learnt to call upon God. The severing of those earthly ties which had hitherto filled her heart, the fears for the safety of those she loved, which would arise in her own anxious heart, the sense of her own utter loneliness—by these sharp bitter lessons she was taught to pray. The unselfishness of her nature led her to pray first for others. 'You will be surprised, I know, to hear,' she writes to every one of her intimate friends, 'that I pray for you daily' (p. 93), and then at last she prayed for herself. From this time there is no longer any doubt as to her faith in God, which is declared with heartfelt conviction: 'I believe in God because I have *felt* the Divine Presence.' (P. 96.)

On November 2 she landed at Cape Town. Her reputation had preceded her, and already it was a question of choice as to her life and future work. It lay between the head-teachership of S. Cyprian's at Cape Town, and the appointment already offered her in the Diocesan School at Graham's Town, the best school in the Eastern Province. The climate decided her in favour of Graham's Town. Pending her decision she resided with Mr. and Mrs. Cecil Buckland at Uitenhage.

'Here we had the warmest welcome,' she writes, 'and are very happy. The Bucklands are all delightful, and it is the prettiest place I have ever lived at, in its own way. . . . Uitenhage lies in a valley, and there are hills all round—some of them mountains. . . . The days are spent in this way. Every one rises early, because Mr. Buckland has often to take the quarter to eight train to Port Elizabeth; but we breakfast at different times in batches, which is a charm-

¹ *Ibid.* p. 92.

ing plan, I think. Then the children all go to the Public High School here, except Anna (the eldest), Beatrice, and baby (the two youngest). Mrs. Buckland is busy in the house all the morning, and baby requires nursing, so I can help her in both these ways, which I like doing very much.¹

This bright little picture of Ellen's first Christmas (1879) at Uitenhage is given in all its details, because here she spent all her vacations, and it will be no surprise to the reader to learn that she became as great a favourite in the land of her adoption as she had been in her own home. Here as there, she consistently put aside all thought of herself, she never suffered her intellectual acquirements to stand in the way of her love of active household duties, while they gave a value to these lesser offices, and made her impatient of anything like imperfection in their fulfilment.

Meanwhile, her work in Graham's Town fills her with deep and increasing interest. Eighty scholars afforded a full and wide field for her energies. Not content with the regular work during school hours, she plans evening classes for those who have left school, so as to form a kind of literary society where there might be opportunities for discussions and for papers to be read on social topics 'so as to awaken their intelligence, and create higher interests.' Under such promising auspices the New Year (1880) opened for her, and saw her fairly embarked in the regular work she so thoroughly understood, and which was to her a source of inexhaustible interest. Towards the end of February a Confirmation was announced for the Holy Week, and Ellen gave proof of the sincerity of her newly-awakened conviction by sending in her name as a candidate. It was on her part a purely voluntary act, for having been baptized and educated among Nonconformists, she had never been brought up to consider it as either a duty or a privilege to be Confirmed. It was, moreover, a step that required some courage on her part. By her friends at home, on the one hand, it was almost certain to meet with disapproval; while her pupils at the school, on the other hand, would wonder why she had not been confirmed at an earlier age; but her motives were too strong to be turned aside by either of these considerations. She wished to give proof of her faith, by becoming a member of the outward and visible Church. The Church of England, by her services, her general teaching, her system of government, seemed to her to fulfil in every point the idea she had formed, since her arrival at

¹ *Record of Ellen Watson*, p. 111.

the Cape, of what that Church should be; and besides this there was yet a stronger reason: she knew that Confirmation gave her admission to Holy Communion. 'I know I lose a great deal,' she writes, 'by being shut out from the Sacraments of the Church. I am sure the Holy Communion would help me very much' (p. 125). Whatever doubts and perplexities still remained in her mind, she felt no longer any doubt or uncertainty as to the necessity of the spiritual relation between Christ and the soul: 'I am convinced,' she writes, 'that the one thing to be sought after most earnestly is a holy life, growing more and more in union with God, through utter submission and continual reliance' (p. 130). After her Confirmation she never failed to avail herself of the divinely appointed means for maintaining this union by diligent attendance at the celebrations in the Chapel of S. Andrew's College. Many fragments of letters and writings testify to the deepening and strengthening of her spiritual conviction at this period of her life, while she steadily and conscientiously fulfilled the duties of her self-chosen calling. Her work at the school was supposed to fill three hours in the day, but she was always ready to add to these labours by taking classes for Canon and Mrs. Espin if, by so doing, she could serve them and make some return for their great kindness to her.

It was during the second term (July 1880) of her work in the Diocesan School that the idea of literary occupation presented itself to her active mind, and she thought of employing her leisure hours in preparing papers, either for magazine articles or for a volume of essays.

For this class of writing her style was unpractised and wanting in finish. She was therefore advised to begin by writing down her thoughts on different subjects, just as they occurred to her, with a view of arranging them afterwards in essays. There was to be no 'afterwards' for her in this life, and therefore the fragments of her work which remain to us are not to be looked upon as specimens of literary skill, but merely as the reflection of thoughts of no common originality and power, crude as to their arrangement, but fruitful in suggestion, rich in the future promise of a combination in which her literary talent would rise to the level of her scientific acquisitions.

Among her fragmentary papers the most remarkable appear to be: (1) *Reflections on Socialism*, in which she to some extent anticipates, by four years, the opinions contained in the exhaustive treatise *Di un Socialismo Cristiano*,

by Padre Curci, the great Italian reformer of this century ; (2) *Cor Mundi*, in which all her knowledge of science is concentrated upon reconciling science with revealed truth, and which, had her knowledge of both subjects been on a par, would have been a most striking work. One short passage will give an impression of her mastery of the scientific side of the subject, and of her capacity for direct and simple statements of a difficult problem :—

‘The leading fact of this age is the unerring advance of physical science. Whatever truths we may be uncertain about, we are sure that no chance experiment can reveal an exception to the persistence of force and of matter. Now science teaches us the constant evolution of the higher from the lower, and that the later finer products overpower the earlier, and these grosser forms disappear and pass away. The same tendency is displayed in the history of man : brute force yielding slowly to the finer developments of mind. We find at last a people prepared for the highest form of religion. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to affirm that in one solitary instance evolution has worked in vain, labouring through a protracted process to produce at last a fruit hollow and useless, doomed now to early decay, we must admit that the verdict of science on religion should favour its persistence and further development. Let me guard here against a possible misconception : the part I have assigned to evolution is no more than the preparation of men to *receive* the higher truths of religion *from without*. I have appealed to science to confirm the view of the stability, endurance, and growth of religion, instead of that decay and death which some modern scientists predict for it.’¹

Besides these and other fragments, which were intended to form part of a volume of *Essays* to be dedicated to the memory of Professor Clifford, she did, by the request of the editor, send some contributions to the *South African Review*. Among these was an article called ‘A New Savonarola,’ which was a comment upon the essay on *Usury*, by Professor Ruskin,² whose ‘divine enthusiasm’ wins for him the title which stands at the head of her paper. The lecture on the great Savonarola himself, which she was preparing for the school at Graham’s Town, but was unhappily never completed, proves how well able she was to draw the comparison, for, so far as it goes, it is an admirable sketch of the great Italian reformer. ‘How Girls ought to be Educated’ is another of her contributions to the *South African Review*. This essay, which is a complete production, does not profess to touch the question of religion ; but upon the three lines of education, physical, intellectual, and moral, it is fruitful in wise, earnest, and practical suggestions, which deserve the careful attention of any

¹ *Record of Ellen Watson*, pp. 182-3.

² *Ibid.* pp. 193-201.

one who has to do with the training of youth. In developing her scheme Ellen Watson insists upon intellectual culture in place of the 'accomplishments,' which, imported in the first instance from the mother country, still remained the prevailing idea in the colonial system of education. She also points out with much skill, that the circumstances of colonial life place the question on a different footing altogether from that which it occupies in England.

'I shall, of course,' she writes, 'steer clear of any question of "*Rights*," and confine myself to advocating what is useful, or might be useful, to women in an ordinary way, that is, to women who marry. The state of this country is very different from England, of course. There is no large, by necessity self-supporting, class of women here, because their numbers do not preponderate. I have made rather a daring innovation in starting on the intellectual side, though, with the question—What are the duties belonging to women? because education ought to aim first of all at fitting them for these; and I think the care of their children is the most important duty.'¹

Thus to the last spending and being spent for others, did Ellen Watson's young, unselfish, energetic life, with all its store of brilliant talent, all its capacities for work, suddenly, without her being aware of it, come within sight of its goal. It was the winter of 1880, and this was to be the last year of her mortal existence. She was still at the Diocesan School of Grahamstown, but after Christmas she had the intention of removing to Bloemfontein, so as to assist in carrying on the educational work of the mission there, under Bishop Webb. She hoped also that the climate might be more favourable to the disease which still lay dormant within her, and gave occasional warning symptoms. There were two distinct branches of this mission—the one the education of the European colonists, the other the evangelization of the native Africans. To the former of these two branches Ellen now offered her services as teacher in the High School, her instructions to be conducted on the same principle of giving lectures, which she had pursued at Grahamstown. It was arranged that she should make the journey there after the Christmas vacation, which she was to spend with her first friends, the Bucklands, at Uitenhage. But neither of these schemes was destined to be fulfilled.

On November 29 she penned her last fragment of writing. It is a letter dated S. Andrew's Eve, and was written on her return from church, where the service had made a great im-

¹ *Ibid.* p. 121. See also pp. 201–21.

pression upon her. The most striking part of the letter is the following passage suggested by a hymn ('Through the night of doubt and sorrow,' &c.) which had been sung :—

'Do you remember giving me a *Nineteenth Century* with a review of *A Sister's Story* in it? I have had the book since, and there is something in it called "The Credo of Sorrow," which, if you have not seen, I am sure you would like to have. *It means a great deal to me, though I have no special sorrow*, and I wonder if it would under a real trouble. I think at those times it has been more of a comfort to know that the suffering was great, in order that it might lead to something great hereafter, than to try to lessen it with hope of a solace to come in the cessation of sorrow. But this is only a theory I have never put to any trial.'

'THE CREDO OF SORROW.'

'I believe that we have here no continuing city, and that we seek one to come.

'I believe that all things work together for good to them that love God.

'I believe that they who sow in tears shall reap in joy.

'I believe that blessed are the dead who die in the Lord.

'I believe that our tribulation worketh in us an exceeding weight of glory, if we look not at what is seen, but what is unseen; for the things we see are earthly, but the things we see not are heavenly.

'I believe that our corruptible body shall put on incorruption, that our mortal shall put on immortality, and that death shall be swallowed up in victory.

'I believe that God shall wipe away all tears from the eyes of the just; that there shall be no more death for them, neither sighing; and that there shall be no more pain when the first earth shall pass away.'¹

Strong in the youthful instinct to hold life fast against disease and death, she had no thought of immediate death when she traced the foregoing words, which were to remain on record as her last witness to the great truth which had seemed such a 'hard thing' for her to grasp. The next morning she went to the school as usual—there were now but two weeks to the end of the term—and it was not till the following day that she had any warning of the illness which was to prove fatal. She was at that time a boarder in the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mullins, with whom she was on terms of the most affectionate intimacy, and she breakfasted with the family. Afterwards she prepared for her daily walk before going to the Diocesan School; while dressing she was seized with a violent attack of hæmorrhage from the lungs. Mrs. Mullins's daughter came

¹ *Record of Ellen Watson*, p. 266.

immediately to her aid. The doctor was sent for. He apprehended no immediate danger, and thought she might recover her usual health. The next day she appeared better, but on the following day (December 3, 1880) another attack of the same kind prostrated her strength; she gradually sank. She was told her end was near. The sequel we give in the words of her biographer:—

‘She received this intelligence with perfect calmness, only looking up with a sweet smile on her face, and saying: “Oh, I am so sorry for mother, and all at home, not for myself”; and presently she added, “I hope it will be quick.” She then expressed a wish to have the Holy Communion celebrated. . . . Canon Espin read the Communion Service. She lay perfectly still, with an expression never to be forgotten on her face—it was the sunlight of the most radiant joy with the calm of perfect rest. She joined audibly in the responses throughout the service, but in the middle of the *Gloria in Excelsis*, her voice ceased; and with the words of faith and praise upon her lips, she passed away from earth.’¹

No one can close the record of so remarkable a life, so beautiful a death, unmoved. Pure, lovely, and of good report, it so fascinates the reader that it appears as if no single shadow could rest upon so fair a picture. But it is too unique of its kind, too valuable on that account as a most potent influence in the world, to escape the analysis of close and honest criticism.

To the last, Ellen Watson’s idea of religion was purely subjective. She writes of it, she speaks of it, only with reference to its effect upon herself—not to exalt her own individual experience, but because it enables her to draw deductions for others who may have either passed or have to pass through the same phase of belief by which she was so long troubled. This inadequate conception of religion challenges the attention most particularly in her case, because it is at variance with a character so entirely free from egotism or self-consciousness as was that of Ellen Watson. It is only to be accounted for by her total ignorance of the first principles of theology. Physical and natural science called forth all her great talents, to their study she gave with eminent success the vigour of her youthful intellect, the teaching and the training of years; but as to theology Ellen Watson, like many another example which might be cited, came into the world with that perfect knowledge supposed to be innate, forsooth! in every English mind, and to render all subsequent instruction or study unnecessary. Judging merely from the biography before us, she was left to find out for herself, while groping along the dark

¹ *Ibid.* p. 270.

path of mental suffering, those elementary truths which are placed within the grasp of every child of the Church 'so soon as they are able to learn.' She spent herself in the effort to prove by reason, with all the powers of her intellect, the lesson that should have been learnt in faith.

Accordingly, we are prepared to find that of the great verities of the Church's Creeds, Ellen Watson has not the feeblest grasp. Of the blessed Mystery of the Holy Incarnation she disposes in the following words :—' If a man's will can inform his body, and by its impulse work changes in surrounding things, so in like manner may the Divine will *inform one particular human body*' (p. 191). Faith of some kind she undoubtedly had, but it was not a faith in God *in Christ*. She had no idea of the Divine nature, of which, in Him, the Christian is made partaker. This appears, with painful vividness, in her comments on the 'Credo of Sorrow,' quoted above. She makes no mention of, no allusion to, the Man of Sorrows, Who has sanctified sorrow, Who by means of sorrow cements us, as it were, in closest union with Himself. Our dear Lord is always 'Christ,' a 'Teacher,' a 'Promiser,' not the Incarnate Word, not the Image of the Invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature. Had she lived, and had she met with wise and sympathetic teachers, capable of drawing out and directing her thoughts to good issues, she might, by God's grace, have been led, onward and upward, to a more perfect faith. Nay, shall we not believe and hope that in the Intermediate state, the conscious enjoyment of Christ's dear Presence may vouchsafe to her increased light and knowledge, and bring to higher development her spiritual growth?

To the same want of knowledge, or instruction, may be attributed the absence of either attrition or contrition for those best years of her life, when she lived 'without God in the world.' She seeks Him at last, and most happily for her finds Him while He may be found. She learns to love Him. Her whole soul, we read, 'seems to have been filled with an almost seraphic love of God, and an intense desire to know Him and to live always as in His presence' (p. 95). But she is untroubled by any pang of self-reproach, by any thought of the neglect of His worship, thitherto—the worship which includes praise, as well as prayer. She even goes so far as to venture on such a remark as this : 'There is nothing to regret, I think, in having known what unbelief is : I have *lost nothing* and gained much.' (P. 98.)

It is ignorance which makes her construct the plan of a perfect life, in which holiness must stand *first*, and then

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achievement, unmindful that repentance must precede either. It is ignorance which leads her into a presumption foreign to the modesty of her nature, and makes her assume towards religion an attitude of criticism, unbecoming to an elementary student of its vast and deep truths.

With greater knowledge there would have arisen a worthier conception of Worship, and we should not have looked in vain for some such condition of mind as that which prompted S. Paul's often repeated conviction that he was the 'least of the apostles;' or the still more awestruck words of Job, when, overcome by the contemplation of the majesty of God, he exclaimed, in deepest self-abasement, 'Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes.'

It is not from any wish to detract from all that is beautiful and, at the last, holy in the life we have been considering, that we call attention to this lapse—but because it ought not to pass unnoticed in an age when it is the custom to praise and exalt, as an unexpected marvel, any great intellect which may at any period of its existence condescend to believe in Almighty God.

For the rest—

'No further seek *her* merits to disclose,
Or draw *her* frailties from their dread abode,
(There they alike in trembling hope repose,)
The bosom of *her* Father and *her* God.'

ART. X.—CHURCH REFORM.

The Guardian: Articles and Correspondence on Church Reform. Nos. 2090-2103. (London, 1885-6.)

THE widely alleged and very generally accepted idea of the urgent necessity of Church Reform is one which it would, at the present time, be scarcely becoming in a Review, meant to be of real use and value to English Churchmen, to ignore. And the history, political and ecclesiastical, of the last few agitated months, if it show any one thing more plainly than another, indicates the necessity of spreading information and communicating clear ideas on a subject on which everyone, concerned or unconcerned, is well furnished with opinions, of one sort or another, too generally strong and sweeping in an

exactly inverse ratio to the special knowledge of those who form them.

It is, above all, necessary that a question such as this, once raised, whether wisely or unwisely, should not be shirked or pushed aside. Great though the strength of our Church has lately been shown to be, noble though its work, and growing though its acceptance with the masses, the time has notwithstanding never been in its history (any more than in the history of any institution, however holy, whose administration has been entrusted to fallible men) when its most ardent supporters could imagine its excellence to have reached its zenith, or to have marked any point in its progress when it could justly claim to be left finally free from cavil, censure, or correction.

In these days of bold assertion and free (and easy) inquiry we are at least as strongly bound as in the days of S. Paul to prove all things, in order that we may hold fast that which is good; and just because the pelican, which, if needful, gives its very blood for sustenance to its offspring, is a truer type of Church duty than the ostrich, which, when hard pressed, hides its head only in the sand, we should, at any cost of trouble or popularity, be ready to give a frank and careful examination to this important subject.

The line we feel disposed to take, however, in these pages is this: to urge our readers, instead of beginning to view the subject (as so many foolishly do) as an entirely new one, forced upon us for the first time by the angry threats of a noisy party whose desire for Church destruction came to signal failure in the late elections; or instead of treating it, on the other hand, in a spirit of panic terror, or selfish compromise, to open their eyes a little upon the history of what, so far from being a new subject, is as old as the Church itself; and, considering the amazing, almost incredible, advance of spontaneous Church reform in the last half-century, to assure themselves in the first place that the Church which is and has been reforming herself for so many years, far more sweepingly and effectually than the wildest of her enemies or the most pusillanimous of her sons can suggest her doing now, need not, at any violent summons of men who have neither share in her work, joy in her advance, or mandate for their interference, put herself out of her way to precipitate measures for which the best of her sons have long had the wisdom to strive as well as the patience to wait. And, though we shall dispute the very term of Church Reform they use, and indicate the motives and the objects of those who clamour for it, we

will examine frankly the proposals made, and give as we hope good reason to explain why we approve of some and why we condemn the rest.

We purpose, then, considering in the following pages—

- I. The cry for Church reform.
- II. The persons who raise it.
- III. The proposals they make.
- IV. The course for Churchmen to adopt regarding it.

I. *The Cry for Church Reform.*—If we proceed to examine this as the first part of our study, and if, as seems likely, we see enough on examination to make us altogether indisposed to accept, as essential to the prosperity or continued existence of our Church, many of the hasty nostrums which ignorant Churchmen or hostile non-Churchmen prescribe, we would protest, by anticipation, against the assumption that we are for a moment opposed to the introduction of many suggested measures which can be shown to tend to the bettering of present ecclesiastical conditions. We are as ready to advocate improvements shown to be practical, as we are bound to resist innovations which, however plausible they seem, offer neither sound principles for their justification nor good methods for their execution.

A cry is not a bad thing in itself. Whether, as is nearly always the case, it betoken war or weakness, it commands at least attention, if only by distracting thought from other things. And certainly the cry of Church reform has been loud enough of late to compel examination of its claims.

In the first place it may be pointed out that many clamourers for immediate and comprehensive reform of the Church of England, if they reason at all on the matter, are reasoning on a false analogy. It is easy enough to say that as the lapse of ages and the awakening of learning necessitated the Reformation in the sixteenth century, so, by the very doctrine of averages, lapse of time and spread of knowledge make a similar movement necessary to-day. But these logicians forget one most important difference between the cases, which entirely vitiates the analogy. The reforms of the sixteenth century were reforms of doctrine; and nothing is asked to-day beyond reform in practice, if indeed the word reform be not an absolute misnomer for even the widest and the wildest alterations suggested so far in certain Church matters by the hastiest and least instructed of our critics, whether within or without the pale of the Church of England.

For, if words have any meaning, as surely as repairing is a

different thing from constructing; as a roof may have new tiles and a window new panes without a remodelling of a whole building; the word Reform, as applied to the Church, is an extravagant hyperbole to describe any little measure of improvement which has yet been suggested to us. We may correct errors, we may redress injustice, we may remove causes of offence, we may introduce improvements, either in Church practice or Church policy; we may even correct abuses which are shown to be real; but each of these things, and all of them together, fall very far short of anything so necessarily destructive, however allegedly constructive, as reforming the Church itself; while the common loose analogy we protest against with the Reformation of the sixteenth century breaks down altogether in the sight of all who compare the state of the Church of England then with the state of the Church of England now.

However, though we should object to the need, however pressing, of any changes in matters ecclesiastical at the present juncture being dignified by so strong a name as Reform in its proper sense, we are not unwilling, for argument's sake, to consider in all frankness and sincerity the things men imagine worthy of being called by such a name.

It will not, however, be denied that though there be several things in Church matters capable of improvement, the immediate urgency of the introduction of such measures may be much exaggerated, and the Church reform cry may be loudly echoed by multitudes who are really ignorant of the direction in which the reform they clamour for is needed. As the labouring population, at all events in the south of England, shout now for measures to provide allotments for all cottagers, quite oblivious of the fact that such allotments have been long ago provided voluntarily for at least nine-tenths of their number, so multitudes are crying out for Church reform as pressing and indispensable who are absolutely unconscious of the existence of Church abuses or of things to be reformed.

A homely instance of the truth of this statement may be cited here. Just after the election had shown how unexpectedly strong a hold the Church of England still has upon the people, a man who, though a Radical shoemaker, is a regular churchgoer, told his rector, 'You know, sir, we don't want to disestablish the Church; that was all a Conservative alarm-cry. We only want to *reform* it.' 'And supposing,' said the clergyman, 'that you had power to do so to-morrow, and that you yourself were a commissioner for the purpose, what would be the reform you would think the most pressing and im-

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portant?' The reply is suggestive as well as amusing. He answered, after a pause, considerable enough to show he had not thought much on the subject before, 'Well, sir, I think the first thing should be the Marriage Service,' adding as his reason, 'It's hardly quite decent, sir, is it?'

II. *The persons who raise the cry for Church Reform.*—

From the cry itself we come next to consider the people who make it. We have already said that cries generally betoken either war or weakness, the shout of battle or the shriek of fear. And it seems to us that in a general way we may classify the clamourers for immediate Church reform as belonging either to the angry enemies or the timorous friends of the Church itself. As regards the first, we must remember that the cry is a substitution for another, which failed to rally force sufficient for the purpose desired. The old cry, which is allowed for the moment to die away upon the echoes, was the resultant of a mixed vibration, wherein the various notes 'Liberate the Church,' 'Discredit the Church,' 'Disestablish the Church,' 'Disendow the Church,' blended into the one common chord, 'Destroy the Church.' For the moment this chord has ceased to vibrate, and in its stead the note 'Reform the Church' seems more acceptable to the popular ear. But though the sound be softer, and the tune be sweeter, and the barrel changed, it is the same hand of hate that grinds the organ and makes the puppets dance. Marvellous indeed it is to mark, as regards the popular acceptance of this movement, so far as it emanates from the godless and unbelieving, how for once the proverb fails in its assumption that 'surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird.'

Let us classify, then, those enemies of our Church who cry for its reform, and see what claim they have to a hearing. First of all, the avowed infidel and unbeliever. Is he, in the name of common sense, to be heard in this matter of Church reform at all? He may be in his right in restricting the Church's influence, in refuting its authority, in stifling its existence; but he has no *locus standi* whatever in the matter of its reform. He objects to it, assails it, strives against it, because he dislikes, not its administration but its existence. Can it be conceived that he honestly wants to improve what he openly labours to destroy, and by making better what he declares to be all bad to weaken his own arguments for its demolition? This would indeed be sawing off the branch on which he sits, a piece of patent folly

of which it would be an insult to his vaunted common sense to consider him capable.

The avowed infidel, therefore, if he be consistent in his declared purpose of Church extinction, has, and can have, no true desire for the bettering of Church administration by any means whatever. 'Why, then,' it may be asked, 'does he trouble himself in the matter? Why not leave it alone, and let the Church, if all he urge against it be true, fall by its own inherent weakness, as he constantly avers it must? Why should he want to reform it?' The answer is perfectly obvious. 'He does not want to reform it.' What he wants to do is to get a footing among the motley workers at the so-called reform of the Church of England, not that he may clean her windows and admit more light, but that he may undermine her foundations and overthrow her structure.

From the infidels we turn next to the religionists, not members of our Church, who express so much desire for her reform, and we ask reasonable men to examine whether their stirring in this matter be for our sakes or for their own, keeping in mind the very important fact, to which we have before alluded, that the measures of Church reform advocated in no way aim either at alteration of Church doctrine or disendowment of Church property. We have a right to inquire of these persons why they are so urgently concerned in the alteration of any Church arrangements. If they say, 'We agree with the Church's doctrine, and are kept from union with her because of this or the other practice,' their course would be not only comprehensible, but admirable, and would command our full respect and our heartiest fraternal sympathy. But this, or anything like it, they do not say. Do they really, truly, anxiously desire to make the Church better, holier, more effective; in a word, more comprehensive even than it is to-day? Will they stand up before their congregations and say, 'We agitate Church reform to add, in God's name, to the Church of England's influence for good, even though in proportion as we succeed we must diminish the influence of our own particular sect'? How will their Nonconformist hearers receive their statement, if made? And if their own people find such an assertion, as they would, too strong for their unqualified acceptance, is it any want of charity on the part of Churchmen to reach the same conclusion, and to be certain that this professed desire to make our Church better, stronger, and more acceptable to the masses is not the ruling motive and not the single aim of this seemingly disinterested movement in their hands?

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Of course we do not for a moment dispute the assertion (for we believe the fact) that there are very many religious Dissenters who can and do sincerely sympathize with much of our Church's work, and rejoice to see it grow and prosper. These are the men whose counsel and whose aid might indeed be of service in the discussion and study of suggested improvements in our methods, or corrections of our errors ; but these are just the people who are not prominent at all in the present movement.

In a word, we may fairly say, without any want of charity whatever, that persons, not members of our Church, who press most eagerly the Church Reform question are simply unbelieving dissenters from our doctrine, or political non-conformists to our ritual.

If they will take their part, however illogically, in this controversy, and meddle, plainly without proper title, in a matter which does not really concern them, let us at least not close our eyes to the obvious fact that it is not love but strife which lies at the root of their activities, or believe for one single moment that the Church reform which we would compass is the same thing which, under that very harmless misnomer, covers the Church ruin which they desire to see.

And to those who find a lack of charity in such a judgment let us offer one signal proof of the truth of our position. Effort after effort has been made by Churchmen in Parliament after Parliament, to have measures of Church reform passed into law ; measures agreed upon by Church opinion, elaborated by Church leaders, longed for by the Church at large ; but the efforts have been frustrated, and those who made them discouraged by continual failure ; and that, be it remembered, caused by those very enemies to our Church who now call on us to accept their counsels on points which (as it has over and over again been cynically avowed by their Parliamentary representatives) it did not suit their purpose to let the Church reform herself, since her so doing would deprive them of the grievances they can now urge so persistently against her.

So far we have treated of Church reformers from beyond the Church pale ; but there are many within it. Few thinking Christian men, we trust, would be unwilling that proved errors should at any time be corrected ; and to that extent the loyal members of our Church are not only the heartiest reformers of the day, but in fact the only persons who have any true concern in the discussion or demonstrable interest in the decision of the question. We have little to do here with the party Churchmen, whether clerical or lay, who from mere political

motives will associate with any companions, join in any agitation, sign any memorial or any number of them, for their own purposes. As we warn faint-hearted Churchmen against allowing outsiders any undue weight in counselling or power in enforcing Church reform, we would, with still more emphasis, caution them against the influence of the so-called political Churchmen, lay or clerical, who are ready enough to dally with, if not to forward, proposals for disestablishment, and to hold, as they are not ashamed to do, unauthorized and discreditable parley with the foe.

In classifying persons who are now agitating so vigorously for Church reform, and in warning sober-minded Churchmen (just as desirous as any men living for all obtainable Church improvements) against complicating their study of the subject, and perhaps cramping their future freedom of action, by any alliance with men who in this matter are more than suspect of speaking words smoother than butter, while war is in their heart, the warning may derive more force from considering the time chosen for all this rather dictatorial advice. The fact that it comes firstly from opponents who, a few months ago, were loudly prophesying immediate disestablishment, and (till their leaders saw their error and made them hold their peace) making this a war cry for their political contest; and, secondly, from professed friends who have always counselled bargain, temporizing, and surrender, and always predicted ruin; and the further fact that both these parties have adopted this 'Reform' cry on the very morrow of the failure of their 'Disestablishment' one, should warn us that, though they change the title, they do not change the tendency of their efforts, and that the less true, honest labourers for the removal of abuses have to do with them the better for the Church we would uphold. For, if we find the same men who tried to ruin yesterday coming forward, with or without authority, to 'reform' to-day, we may be well assured that their sudden conversion is but a flimsy cover to mask a changed attack, and that their officious meddling in that work of reform which our Church for years gone by has been doing of herself springs from no good motive on their part, and shall meet with no weak response on ours.

'Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget.'

III. *The proposals made for Church Reform.*—Leaving, then, the persons who agitate for Church reform at the present time with a hint to our readers, which cannot be made

too emphatic, both of the importance of distinguishing their various motives for the agitation, and of the fact that they are already falling out among themselves,¹ we turn in the third place to consider the direction taken by the movers in this question, or, in other words, to inquire not only who they are who ask for Church reform, but what the particular reforms may be for which they ask; what old things they may wish to cast away, and what new things they may wish to introduce.

(1) The first of these is on every tongue: 'Abolish the sale of livings.' If there be one point in the whole question upon which all men seem to be agreed it is on the desirability of a measure for this purpose. Nothing can be more glaringly unfair than to blame the Church, as is so universally done by her opponents, for fostering a system of which she is the suffering victim and not the guilty author, and of which she has so long been eager to be free. Those who would destroy the Church because of the possibility of selling livings would scourge Lazarus for having sores. Any candid student of the subject must be perfectly clear on one part of the matter (which really absolves the Church as a Church from the blame so readily heaped upon it), that to abolish the sale of livings has long been a question, not of will, but of way, and that had the Church but had free hand to act, which she has never had, we should know nothing now of this great abuse. It is obvious that the blame for sale of livings lies not against the Church, but the State, as is indeed the case with many other so-called crying abuses for which the Church is generally made the scapegoat.

If this be not so, what should reasonable men expect to see? Surely that all the many professors of purity and liberality, who inveigh so heartily against this blemish of the Church, and who yet, whether Atheists, Dissenters, or nominal Churchmen, possess rights of Church patronage, *obtained in every case by purchase*, should abandon those rights instead of selling them, and in the act of sale committing the very wrong by which they consider the Church itself polluted. But we may wait long for Church reform on such a line as this from Church reformers such as these.

Recriminations, however, are not arguments, and the simplest answer that can be given to the alleged complicity

¹ See Report of Church Reform Conference of Clergymen, Nonconformist Ministers, and others, held on March 24 last, under the presidency of Mr. Albert Grey, M.P. We read:—'There was a marked division of opinion, which made itself evident when the question was put, the resolution being lost by two votes, and the amendment carried only by the casting vote of the Chairman!'

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of the Church in the sale of advowsons, or next presentations, is that men are all agreed upon the matter, but cannot yet agree upon the manner, of carrying out this item of reform. As yet no scheme has been brought forward able to command general assent; whenever it does, the delay will be brief before its full acceptance, but meanwhile objectors should prove the practicability of the reform, instead of blaming others for not accomplishing what they cannot themselves suggest any practical way of carrying out.

(2) To abolish the alleged impunity of 'criminous clerks' is another of the objects avowedly aimed at by the Church Reform agitation, and, like the abuse of patronage, the movement derives its chief justification from the general concurrence of all classes in the opinion that 'criminous clerks' should not be allowed to remain charged with cure of souls.

Although it may be urged, with some show of reason, that in no class of men on the face of the earth can there fail to be a certain percentage of 'black sheep,' and that that percentage is in the clerical profession numerically microscopic as compared with other associated classes, still it must be admitted that the moral wrong done by the existence of criminous clerks, and the still greater wrong done by the supposed exemption of such from due punishment, is magnified by their position as moral teachers and examples, and their punishment, or at least removal from their posts (in most cases synonymous terms), is plainly to be desired.

On this point, again, Churchmen feel quite as strongly as, and probably very much more strongly than, outsiders, and to blame the Church for leaving criminous clerks unpunished is again to attribute to its intention a wrong which it has no inherent power either to prevent or to correct. This we concede only so far as we concede the general assumption that there is at present no law for the punishment of such men. But, as a matter of fact, plenty of law exists (and, in the case of criminal clergy, much greater power than mere law could ever have) to free congregations from the baneful presence and tainted influence of criminous men. The alleged impunity of criminous clerks, however unwilling some of our readers may at first be to accept the statement, is really an infinitesimal grievance, and is likely to remain so until one of the first and safest principles of British jurisprudence has been eradicated from the minds of those who administer our laws.

The common error which in this matter magnifies whatever grievance exists, is that of regarding all incriminated clerks as criminous ones, or, in more familiar terms, that of

assuming all accused men to be guilty. There is no difficulty in punishing a clerk if criminal, but there is great difficulty in showing him to be criminal. If every person whom anyone else declared 'ought to be hanged' were executed, our population would suffer considerable decrease; and in civil matters we do not regard the absence of such wholesale hangings as a grievance or an error. Why should it be held such in ecclesiastical matters, wherein, at the very first step of investigation, nearly every incriminated man conscious of guilt is willing to submit himself to the heaviest punishment the law of the Church can now inflict upon him—the loss of his benefice—rather than endure the shame and brave the scandal of a public trial?

Of course it will be urged that men who, in matters of ritual or doctrine, run contrary to the views of their parishioners or the counsels of their bishop, are hard to punish, and that the long processes of law through which they may drag their causes wear out the purses of the prosecutors and the patience of the Church. But as to this, we answer that these cases, which are, for the most part, cases of conscience, are not what are generally kept in view by declaimers against 'criminal clerks,' whose cases are cases of conduct; and that, had the Church the power, as it would be well if she had, to put an end to the perversities of the crotchety and the crack-brained by simpler processes than at present, she would be glad to do so; but while refused that power she cannot be fairly blamed for evils caused by its want.

(1) A third point much insisted upon is the abolition of aged incumbents by obtaining power to enforce resignation of benefices by worn-out and incompetent men. On this topic we have had occasion to comment at considerable length in this *Review*¹ in an article on the new 'Clergy Pensions Institution,' to which we will refer our readers. It examines the arguments commonly offered for compelling resignations, as well as the objections to any hitherto proposed methods of enforcing such resignations. But this blemish, unlike a good many others which are inherent in the system, is really capable of correction in a rational way, and its removal will, we trust as a practically hopeful matter, be pressed by all true friends of our Church and her efficiency. A well-designed pension fund, which, leaving existing interests untouched, should include as a necessary contributor, at least every new nominee to a benefice, if not every new ordinee, would, in making resignations desirable instead of ruinous, tend in the

¹ Vol. xx., pp. 201 sqq.

course of a generation to remove the stigma from the Church of having her usefulness retarded and her work hindered by the dead weight of aged and worn-out men who burden her resources while unable to do her work.

(4) The next matter desired to abolish is the alleged 'autocracy of the clergy.' The power of the parson, whatever it may be, is one clearly defined by law; his exercise of it is subject to question, and he is responsible if in any point he exceed his power. But as these are not the days, and Englishmen are not the people, to submit either to arrogance or tyranny, we are inclined to believe the impugned autocracy to be more imaginary than real, or at least more often conceded than claimed. That some one should be chairman of the parish vestry is surely a matter of desirable order, and the ancient law or prescription which assigns that office to the parson surely has saved, and does save, a vast amount of preliminary time and possible wrangling as to presidency of a body which is in no way bound, and very seldom willing, to carry out the will of any one of its members because he happen to be sitting in the chair. But beyond this we know of very little opportunity for the parson to exercise his 'autocracy,' even supposing the doing so to be the ruling passion of his heart.

Only too often the line of conduct which ill-informed parishioners consider arbitrary and self-willed is that to which the law compels the minister, and is followed not from caprice or self-will, but from simple duty. We take the common instance of refusal to read the Burial Service over an unbaptized infant. How often in such case a paragraph headed 'Clerical Intolerance' goes the round of the papers, and is repeated and raged over perhaps by thousands of people, in the ignorant notion of its being a gratuitous deprivation to the dead infant of some mysterious benefit, and perhaps a piece of spite on the clergyman's part towards the parents, who had undervalued the baptismal office which it was his place to perform. And yet in this there is neither caprice nor choice, neither spite nor autocracy; the law is absolutely prohibitive, and the clergyman is bound to obey it, as much as he is bound to perform no marriage without banns or license; and the very parents who blame him so bitterly for obeying the law in case of a burial would prosecute him rancorously for breaking it in the case of a wedding, if he were the means of uniting their daughter in marriage to an objectionable suitor without giving the family the opportunities provided by the law of knowing and preventing the celebration.

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The 'autocracy of the clergy' is really a sentimental phrase, and a very unfair one if applied in any sense to the clergy generally. That some of them may be of dictatorial nature need not be denied, but in this they are seldom without abundant lay counterpoise; there is no reform conceivable by man that can alter individual character, while there is plenty of law to-day, for clergy as for other men, that can restrain individual misconduct. The authority which a clergyman can use, small as it is, may, we admit, be sometimes unwisely wielded; but it is better to have one man authorized to settle a small point of order than a dozen men encouraged to wrangle about it; and, supposing the exercise of *some* authority needed, it is better clearly defined and firmly held once for all than always having to be fought for. In short, in certain minor matters some one must be first, and the law assigns that place to the parson; in taking it he is no more an autocrat than a judge or a sheriff or a magistrate. It is only when he exceeds his office that he can be called autocratic, and such autocracy needs no formal abolition, since none are bound and few are willing to submit to it, even in the rare cases in which a self-willed parson attempts to arrogate it to himself.

This view is strengthened by the fact that in most of the instances offered of clerical autocracy the matter in dispute is really not one of government but of interpretation; and that, where the question has been argued out, it generally appears that the clergyman (naturally knowing his own business and duties, and the formularies which define them, better than outsiders) is in the right. The burial case we have referred to illustrates this position; and we can only greatly fear that any plan designed to free parishes from the tyranny of one autocrat, in the shape of a parson holding strictly limited authority, would hand it over to the tyranny of many autocrats ever struggling for pre-eminence, and ruling, while successful, with absolute control.

We have said enough, perhaps, on this point, and will leave it with the remark, worth bearing in mind, that it is not the small *authority* wisely entrusted by the law to the parson that is here assailed, but the *influence* of the parson, which is quite a different thing. The one, as being strictly defined and administrative, is no burden to any man, except perhaps the office-bearer himself; but the other is personal and boundless, a costly thing, only won by character, and to be measured by love and not by law. Let all those who envy and desire it strive for it even as the parson has to do, and win it even as

he wins, and they will find themselves, to their surprise, to have aided in accomplishing a far greater Church reform by their emulation than any they could ever have aimed at by their agitation.

In considering, at the length we have, the various matters Church reformers would abolish, we have left ourselves but little space to examine measures which they desire to introduce, without some reference to which, however, our brief treatment of this comprehensive subject would be altogether incomplete. The first of these matters is the 'Church Board,' or 'Parish Council,' or 'Real Vestry,' for these all seem to be nearly synonymous terms for the singularly indefinite assembly to which, under a proper method of reform, it is proposed to commit all matters of Church patronage, management, finance, and general control.

All these movements (we have abstained altogether from naming their advocates throughout this paper), however vehemently debated and however warmly supported in one quarter or another, have not yet passed the stage of theory. They are, every one of them, mere flirtations, more or less fierce, with the spirit of change; and must remain so till we are given, first, an intelligible definition of the powers they are meant to exercise; and are, secondly, shown a practical method by which they may be introduced. And the definition of the powers they are to exercise must wait for the settlement of another far more important question, namely, who the persons are who are to appoint the councils. The force of folly can no further go than to ask all reformers, as some reformers do, to give to Jews, Turks, and infidels the power of managing Church matters: and to say that because the State has chosen to adopt the Church's geographical distribution, all men who deny every Church principle must be sharers in Church management, possible modifiers of Church doctrines, and arbiters of Church destiny. That her fiercest enemies should advance this preposterous claim may give indeed a means to estimate their malignity; but that any of her own children should support the claim argues something more than ignorance or fear or weakness; it puts the so-called 'Church reformer' out of this discussion altogether, since in thus 'widening the comprehension of the Church of England' he simply abolishes the idea of the Church of Jesus Christ. And yet, under the name of Church Reform, we have had to listen to such extravagance as this, and are calmly told that membership of the Church of England means no longer faith in its spiritual doctrines, but residence within its terri-

torial limits. In a legal sense all dwellers in a parish are parishioners; in a religious sense they are not necessarily Churchmen, a point which can be easily established by asking a plain question of the enemies of our Church. Mr. Bright, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. Bradlaugh are all parishioners of whatever parish they dwell in; what would the answer of each of them be to the question, 'Are you a Churchman?'

The practical difficulty of 'parochial councils' or 'Church Boards' lies in the question of the power they are to exercise. As a merely consultative body to aid the clergyman they would have no power; as an administrative body to control him they would have too much; and he would be a clever man who could strike a happy mean between these two extremes. We are no nearer it to-day than twenty years ago, and yet need not despair, for the Church not only manages to exist but to progress in spite of their absence.

One more principal point of the proposals remains to be considered, and that is the redistribution of Church property.

Our observations on this part of the Church Reform programme may be briefly epitomised in the statement that the reformers generally confound the necessity of redistribution of Church property with that of its reduplication. It is part of the blindness caused even to the vast mass of Churchmen by the continual existence of Church endowments which prevents most of them from seeing the necessity of performing the money part of their Church duties. The bandage seems to drop from men's eyes the moment they become Dissenters; for then if they themselves do not perceive their duty it is very plainly shown them by their fellows, who do not value, and will not bid for, their patronage without their payment. Too many Churchmen have been brought up in the idea that because there is a geographical provision, at least, for the spiritual needs of the people, there is a sufficient provision for that people at all times, in all places, and of all numbers soever. But a moment's comparison should show the folly of men supposing that a provision, made by one generation a thousand years ago for a population of at most a single million, must prove sufficient for ever to supply the same relative want to a population of thirty millions. And this, notwithstanding the magnificent supplemental work already done and being done in the way of voluntary church provision, of which recent trustworthy and remarkable returns show that to the three millions annual value of old Church endowments the members of our Church add annually one and a half millions from their own resources.

Besides, the clamourers for the redistribution of Church property seem to be absolutely unaware that the very thing they want done has been in process of accomplishment ever since the establishment of the Ecclesiastical Commission, which exists for this very purpose, and of whose great and beneficent operations most agitators for redistribution of Church property are so grossly and totally ignorant as to make them generally believe it to be one out of many nefarious methods to plunder the British taxpayer for the enrichment of the Established Church.

We may remark in passing that it is not alone in an ecclesiastical matter such as this, but in almost every case of hasty and noisy agitation, that keen observers may note the cry for amendment of the law to be uttered in ignorance of the state of the law ; and that very often the greatest earnestness is used to correct supposed abuses which have been already corrected, as far as law can do it. The knowledge or tradition of the existence of an abuse is stronger than that of the steps taken, often quietly enough, for its correction ; and, as in the case of the Ecclesiastical Commission, the reform asked for to-day as a novelty by ignorant persons has been adopted many a year ago, and is in as rapid process of completion as the hastiest practical man can possibly desire.

So much, in general terms, for the proposal to readjust the distribution of Church property ; we may be allowed to examine a little more particularly the ultimate result of such redistribution if fully carried out. Roughly calculated, the whole amount of Church property received by the clergy as payment for work done would, if divided equally among all the beneficed men of every rank, give an average income of 240*l.* ; while, if the whole class of unbeneficed men were included as sharers, the average amount would only be about 170*l.*, not much above the average present stipend of a curate.

This may, as we will note in passing, be a matter fairly incomprehensible to some of the loudest advocates for this crude sort of ' redistribution ' until they be reminded that the main part of the sum expended now in the remuneration of curates, which the *Financial Almanac* and other equally trustworthy sources of Liberation statistics choose to include in their estimate of Church property, must be left out of calculation altogether, inasmuch as, being voluntarily paid by the incumbents now, not for providing pastoral service in substitution of their own, but workers in addition to it, it comes, not from Church endowments at all, but from the income, already

brought into average, of the beneficed clergy, and which can under no system of calculation be counted twice over on one side of the ledger.

It is obvious to remark under these circumstances that a readjustment of actual Church property (meaning, in the commonly obtaining sense of the term, present clerical income) would tend to extinguish, or at least vastly to diminish, the class of stipendiary curates, since an adjustment which left the beneficed men only 240*l.* each a year would leave admittedly little enough for each beneficed man's support, and nothing at all for the payment of curates. And when we remember that, except in case of personal incapacity, no compulsion can be applied to any incumbent to enforce his employing a curate, it is plain to see that anything like a systematic equalization of income applied to the beneficed clergy would of necessity, by largely reducing the resources of benefices whose incumbents now pay curates, throw most curates altogether out of employment and leave undone and unattempted the main part of that actual Church work which one section at least of so-called Church reformers would, we readily believe, desire to see increased.

We must look for a reason why so many persons should suppose a mere redistribution of Church income likely to meet the needs of the poorer clergy. It is the wrong conception generally entertained of the wealth of the clergy as a class. There is no other rank of life in which, not the net, but the gross income of every man is published to the world; and the lower and labouring classes, earners of smaller incomes themselves, learn to look upon their clergy as very rich, instead of being, with reference to other professional classes, extremely ill paid. The wealth of one large living is supposed to represent that of most livings, and no public means exist of comparing clerical with other professional incomes. A Paper on Clergy Pensions, by Canon Blackley, read at the Portsmouth Church Congress touches this matter so strikingly that we will quote from it in support of this contention:—

‘It is because the clerical profession is wrongly supposed to be a wealthy one, while, as a matter of fact, there is no profession of educated men nearly so badly remunerated as our own. A very common cry on this subject is, that the Church is very rich, while some only of the clergy are very poor. In other words, that a fairer division of Church property would remedy all the financial shortcomings of the profession. That the average gross income of the (beneficed) clergy from their benefices is under 250*l.* a year justifies the assumption in round numbers that the average net income of all

clergy does not exceed 170*l.*, and I call the attention of my hearers to the following comparisons with other callings in life. Take the legal profession. The barristers and solicitors in England number together only 17,000, while the clergy of the Church of England number 21,000. We will set the Chancellorship and the thirty-three Judgeships for this much smaller number against the thirty-one Bishoprics receiving a far lower general income, and will also set the County Court Judgeships, many though they be, and each worth 1,500*l.* a year net, against our thirty Deaneries, one of whose worthiest occupants is present at this Congress and receiving *nothing* a year, while liable for his predecessor's retiring pension.

'Eliminating, then, all the so-called great prizes of the two professions, I find from *Whitaker's Almanack* that, exclusive of numberless commissionerships, and other posts in Government offices only tenable by barristers, there are in the law offices, registries, and police-courts of London alone, 130 appointments over 1,000*l.* a year and averaging 2,340*l.*, while the Archbishop, and Bishops among them can dispose of less than fifty livings over 1,000*l.*, and averaging one-half the average value of the London law appointments. Again, I look through all these appointments to find any law officials whatever receiving so microscopic a net salary as 200*l.*, far above the average net income of all the clergy, and find only four individuals in that dismal category, of whom three are junior clerks, and the solemn and important duty of the fourth is as train-bearer, to hold up the tail of the Lord Chancellor's robe.

'Take the Army and Navy again ; without desiring to begrudge due honour to merit, we must note that successful Generals and Admirals, besides the promotions, titles, and other glories they receive, are often gifted with large sums of money, 20,000*l.*, 30,000*l.* or 100,000*l.* beyond their pay or stipulated pension, by their grateful country. But who has ever heard an instance of the grateful race of Englishmen presenting a meritorious clergyman, for a whole life spent in truest service of his country, with 20,000 halfpence, however liberally they bestow upon him the proverbial uncivil substitute for such copper coin?'

IV. *The course for Churchmen to adopt with regard to Church Reform.*—In the space assignable to an Article it is of course impossible to touch, however briefly, all the points of interest raised in the discussion of such a question as this ; but we have examined enough of the more prominent ones to be able, in conclusion, to offer a reasonable answer to the question, 'What attitude is to be taken by the Church herself and her faithful members towards this movement?'

We would say firstly, and as forcibly as we can, 'No *new* attitude whatever!' A mere momentary pressure is put upon us, either as a threat or a temptation, by men for the most part who have little care for the Church and little zeal in her

work, if even they be not of her bitterest and most implacable foes. We would ask them to turn their eyes from the small matters they now agitate to the great reform which in the last half-century the Church itself has brought about, and the miraculous growth, within that time, of true religion and undefiled. When we look back at this and say, in sheer amaze, 'What hath God wrought!' we shall have brighter faith in what He still shall work, and take the share we have been taking in His name, without troubling ourselves with the insidious counsels of enemies or the timid compromises of friends. We want many of these so-called reforms ourselves, for the Church's good, but we do not want them at the hands of political tricksters; if we want them that the Church may be better, we are indignant to be called on to introduce them that the Church may be safe. We want them soon, the sooner the better, but we want them sound, and have no idea of letting our course be confused by fear and precipitated by menace. Let us possess our souls in patience, and in this matter hold no fellowship with the designing or pitiful partisans who, in other matters than Church ones, are bringing our nation down to ruin. If this course of reform be pressed as a means of saving the Church, it is too late to enter upon it; if it pretend to be the final work of any statesman or of any party, their longest lease of life or power will be too short to complete it. The true sons of the Church will do best to hold aloof from all those discredited political charlatans who would fortify counsels of confusion with threats of destruction, but who have neither part nor lot in this important matter, because their heart is not right in the sight of God. Let Churchmen continue the Church reforms which He puts in their hearts, and the great work shall go on to its completion as it has gone throughout the last half-century; but let them leave political Church reform alone, for this can bring no blessing to them nor to our Church. What reform is needed the great Head of the Church is doing, and our only danger is in attempting it from wrong motives and in blind ways. And if any or many self-inspired prophets insist that the want of what they call reform will cause the destruction of the Church, we can simply answer that, working for what we call reform, we have our warrant for the Church's safety, and that He whose continual pity has till now fostered and protected, it is as able to cleanse it as He has been to defend.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Doctrine of the Church of England on the Holy Communion, restated as a Guide at the Present Time. By the Rev. FREDERICK MEYRICK, M.A., &c.; with a Preface by the Lord Bishop of Winchester. (London: Rivingtons, 1885.)

WE venture to think that this book hardly justifies its title of 'a guide.' Still less can it be said to be what the Bishop of Winchester in his preface so truly says we need, 'a clear exposition of primitive doctrine,' such as 'must be useful to puzzled consciences, and may assure those who are in doubt.' It seems to us to be painfully negative and hesitating in tone, to want in candour, and to fail in arrangement. It fails in arrangement by putting first the discussion of the Sacrifice. For the question of the sense in which the Eucharist is a Sacrifice depends on the nature of the Sacrament. The first question is of the reality and nature of the Presence of Christ in the Sacrament. Of this point, first of all, we must criticize Mr. Meyrick's treatment. His statement, for example, about the doctrine of the Primitive Church is very far from candid. He wishes to disparage a doctrine of a Presence in the Sacrament independent of reception or (as it is called, we think by a perfectly plain and legitimate use of the term) 'objective.'¹ In their *primâ facie* meaning our Lord's words, 'This is My Body,' appear to assert this doctrine, and it is therefore a question of very great importance whether the Early Church understood them in this sense. Dr. Mozley gives us a perfectly explicit answer on this point, and he is a writer whom no one can accuse of 'materialism' or unduly sacramentalist tendencies:—

'Certainly' (he says)² 'the ground taken by the Early Church with respect to the spiritual part of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper—the Body and Blood of our Lord—was *not* that that spiritual part was only an internal matter, a moral effect of the act of participation upon the mind. The Lord's Body and Blood was regarded as a reality external to the mind, even as the bread and wine was; it was considered as joined to the bread and wine, and co-existing with it in one sacrament. "The eating and drinking of it in the sacrament," Thorndike says, "pre-supposed the being of it in the sacrament." *The language of the Early Church on this subject is so well known, and so large a body of it meets us in the writings of the early ages, that we need not dwell long upon this characteristic of early teaching on the subject of the Eucharist.*

This doctrine Dr. Mozley calls that of the 'objectiveness of the inward part or thing signified in the sacrament.' It is stated, as everybody knows, with emphasis by the great master of Apostolic Tradition, S. Irenæus, '*The bread which is of the earth receiving the evocation (ἐκκλησιῶν) of God is no longer common bread, but Eucharist*

¹ Mr. Meyrick's objections to the term are the Arian objections to the term ὁμοούσιος, p. 190.

² *Lectures*, &c., p. 202.

*made up of two things—an earthly and a heavenly.*¹ It is further emphasized by the analogy which the Fathers of the period of the Councils trace between the Doctrine of the Dual Nature of Christ and the dual substantiality of the Eucharistic elements. It is uncandid of Mr. Meyrick then to shirk this fact, and gloss it over with vague language (pp. 194, 195), or it is illogical of him not to see that all subsequent doctrines about the Eucharist depend to a large extent on the primary one of what itself is. Because 'This is My Body,' therefore 'Take, eat;' and therefore '*Do this in remembrance of Me.*'

This doctrine is not Transubstantiation—with what Mr. Meyrick says on that head (chaps. xiii. xiv.) we have no quarrel—nor, if by Consubstantiation is meant a peculiar Lutheran tenet, associated with the Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's Humanity,² and in itself hard to understand, is it 'Consubstantiation.' It is a stale and used-up weapon of controversy to try and exclude Primitive teaching about the Eucharist by confronting it with the dilemma that it must be either Transubstantiation or Consistentiation.³ What we hold, Mr. Meyrick may call what he pleases. It is not what Luther invented, but what Irenæus handed down, whether Luther accepted it or no—the Doctrine of the real Spiritual Presence of Christ in the Eucharistic elements, in virtue of their consecration by the power of the Holy Ghost and the instrumentality of the minister. We quite recognize the counter-truth which the Fathers emphasize, and the English Church also (Article XXIX.), that the feeding on Christ is a spiritual act, of which faith is the only instrument. Christ when on earth was in Himself the Healer. The healing virtue was in Him objectively, and independently of men's faith. Yet only faith could appropriate it, use it, draw it out. Thus Christ, though he was in Himself unchanged to all persons at all times, says always, 'Thy faith hath made thee whole'—'according to thy faith be it done unto thee.' So, though the Eucharistic gift in itself is objective, and obeys objective tests, in its reception, it follows a subjective law. A spiritual gift cannot be received by a bodily mouth. A man may receive the Body of Christ within the 'circle of his teeth,' but he is spiritually no nearer It. If faith, the spirit's mouth, be shut, to that spirit Christ remains external, for all the physical nearness of the Sacramental gift. Thus we need a double sort of language to express a double aspect of truth, which is too spiritual for human language to express easily. ('We have no celestial language.') Such double-faced language there is in Scripture. 'This is,' is Christ's word. The wicked eat, S. Paul implies, but *discern not* what they eat. On the other hand, our Lord (in the whole of S. John vi.) identifies eating with spiritual fellowship and eternal life. Such double stream of language is in the Fathers; for example, in S. Augustine, in marked emphasis on both sides.

¹ *Contr. Hær.* iv. 18, § 5.

² See Rudolph Hospinian, *De Orig. et Progress. Concord. Bergen.* pp. 248-8.

³ P. 189. We must try and bear Mr. Meyrick's decision on the deficiency of our reasoning faculty.

We do not complain of Mr. Meyrick emphasizing the latter body of language; we do complain of his veiling the former.

Now we approach his treatment of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. The Sacrifice he would limit to the offering of alms and bread and wine as a thankoffering to God, and a commemoration in prayer of the Passion of Christ. He would make it have an end before the consecration, and be in no connexion with any Presence on the altar, of the Body and Blood of the once crucified and now glorified Redeemer—a Presence (as we hold) which lifts the Church on earth into union with the Heavenly Intercession of Christ, and in virtue of which we do on earth, in Jeremy Taylor's words, 'what He does in Heaven':—

'As Christ is a Priest in Heaven for ever, and yet does not sacrifice Himself afresh, nor yet without a sacrifice could He be a Priest; but by a daily Ministration and Intercession represents His sacrifice to God, and offers Himself as sacrificed: so He does upon earth by the Ministry of His servants; He is offered to God, that is, He is by prayers and the sacrament represented or offered up to God, as sacrificed; which in effect is a celebration of His death, and the applying of it to the present and future necessities of the Church, as we are capable, by a ministry like to His in heaven. It follows then that the celebration of this sacrifice be in its proportion an instrument of applying the proper sacrifice to all the purposes which it first designed. It is, ministerially and by application, an instrument propitiatory; it is eucharistical, it is an homage and an act of adoration; and it is impetratory, and obtains for us and for the whole Church all the benefits of the sacrifice which is now celebrated and applied.'¹

This view Mr. Meyrick regards as unwarranted and untenable, as we understand him. He adopts the minimizing position (*e.g.* pp. 38–40). The minimizing theory is open, we think, to very great objection. Firstly, that it does not correspond to our Lord's words of institution. That *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε*, &c., means 'offer this in My memorial' is evidenced, we think, by the repetition of the *τοῦτο* (*τοῦτο ὅ ἐστι—τοῦτο ποιεῖτε*), which makes it probable that the *this*² in both cases is the same thing; by the sacrificial context of the whole institution; by the evident belief of the Early Church, otherwise unaccountable, that Christ in instituting the Eucharist was 'instituting the Sacrifice of the New Covenant'; and not least by Justin Martyr (who had every reason to know what Gospel Greek meant) undoubtedly understanding *ποιεῖν* as 'to offer,' and *τοῦτο* as 'this bread' (*τοῦ ἁγίου ὄν . . . Χριστός παρέδωκε ποιεῖν*). If, then, Christ took bread and brake it and said, 'This is My Body, which is for you; this offer in My Memorial,' He certainly made the oblation to be in distinct connexion with that spiritual change in the Eucharistic element. It is a memorial oblation of that which by Divine power, and in a mystery, is the heavenly reality of Christ's Body and Blood.

¹ Jeremy Taylor, *Works* (Eden's Edition), vol. ii. p. 643; *Life of Christ*, § xv. Disc. xix.

² According to the text of Westcott and Hort, the '*this* do' cannot refer back to the injunction to eat and drink, for the words do not occur in that context. See 1 Cor. xi. 24.

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That it is a *Memorial Sacrifice* is due to the fact that it is the pleading of an accepted offering, not the offering of it for acceptance. It is a 'Sacrifice of *Praise*'¹ because it represents triumphant, joyful consciousness of acceptance once for all won, not the fearful winning of it. But it is not bare memorial or bare thanksgiving, not mere symbolic offering of the fruits of the earth, or verbal expressions of gratitude. It is fellowship in the Heavenly Act.

Again, we cannot believe that the Church would have attached so much importance to a mere material oblation of bread and wine. To call this 'The New Oblation of the New Covenant'—the fulfilment of the great prophecy of the 'pure offering' (Mal. i. 10, 11)—would be sheer Judaism, a falling back from the spirit to the symbol. The stress which the early theologians lay on the material and natural oblation is undoubtedly due to the fact that their argument is all with Gnostics, who wish to separate nature and grace—the God of Creation from the God of Redemption—and they use the Eucharistic oblation with its natural material, made to minister to the Redemptive purpose, as an irrefragable argument against such dualism. This explains the emphasis; it is the whole point of the argument. But S. Irenæus's language cannot be satisfied by such merely material oblation: 'the cup which is of that creation to which we belong, he confessed to be His Blood, and taught the New Oblation of the New Covenant, which the Church receiving from the Apostles offers to God in the whole world.'² Space forbids us to argue at greater length. But we must return for a moment to the point we insisted on at the beginning. The Doctrine of the Sacrifice depends on the Doctrine of the Presence. If the Early Christians believed that their material oblation became subsequently, by spiritual Consecration, the Heavenly Reality of Christ's Body and Blood, they could not possibly have failed to perceive that it was in virtue of this change that the oblation could be accepted as the effective memorial of the Passion of Christ. So far as *their act* was concerned, it ended with the material oblation. From that point they entered upon a higher privilege and became assistants at a Divine Act. To quote Irenæus once more:—

'The oblation of the Eucharist is not carnal but spiritual, and therein pure. For we offer to God the bread and cup of benediction, giving Him thanks that He has bidden the earth bring forth these fruits for our nourishment, and *then, having accomplished the oblation*, we evoke the Holy Ghost that He may make³ this Sacrifice, both the Bread the Body

¹ F. D. Maurice, *Kingdom of Christ*, 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 106.

² *Contr. Hæc.* iv. 17, § 5. We do not think the undoubted reading of the best MSS., by which the 'Word (*i.e.* Christ) is said to be offered to God in the Eucharist' (*Ibid.* iv. 18, § 4), need be wrong. Cf. v. 18, § 3. See also an article 'On the Doctrine of the Fathers on the Real Presence' in *C. Q. R.*, vol. ix. pp. 233-240.

³ ἀποφαίνω certainly, like ἀποδείκνυμι, means 'to make.' Mr. Meyrick admits this Pfaffian fragment (p. 37). It at least contains no more than is involved elsewhere in S. Irenæus.

We think it needs emphasizing that the true conception of the

of Christ and the Wine the Blood of Christ, that they who receive these symbols may obtain remission of sins, and everlasting life. They, therefore, who celebrate these offerings in the Memorial of the Lord hold not to Jewish rites, but spiritually ministering shall be called sons of Wisdom' (*Fragm. Secundum*).

We must now compress into a very small compass what further criticisms it is necessary to make.¹

Eucharistic Sacrifice does not make it consist in the material elevation of the consecrated species. S. Chrysostom's language about the Priest 'standing over the Sacrifice and praying' (*De Sac.* iii. 4) is significant.

¹ In compliance with the maxim *Fontes exquirite*, we have made it our business to confront Mr. Meyrick's Exposition of the Doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice with that of S. Irenæus and other Early Fathers. But if space allowed it would not be difficult to show that Mr. Meyrick is equally careless in dealing with the writings of several English Divines. He quotes them as maintaining the Holy Eucharist to be a 'Memorial' and a 'Commemorative Sacrifice'; but he either separates their words from the context, which gives the meaning they attach to these two Theological Terms, or suppresses the explanation they elsewhere give of them. And we are left under the false impression that they use the terms in the sense that Mr. Meyrick himself attaches to them. Thus, for example, he quotes Bishop Cosin on p. 22: 'We commemorate at the Eucharist the Sacrifice of Christ's Body and Blood, once truly offered for us.' But those who know Bishop Cosin's works are well aware that the bishop's views are entirely at variance with Mr. Meyrick's, as expressed on p. 17, and in chap. vi. Bishop Cosin, commenting on the words of the Prayer of Consecration, 'That His precious Blood,' writes, 'This word ["that"] refers to the sacrifice mentioned before, for we still continue and commemorate that sacrifice which Christ once made upon the Cross.' And then, adopting as his own the words of Maldonatus, he adds, 'If we compare the Eucharist with Christ's sacrifice made once upon the cross, as concerning the effect of it, we say that that was a sufficient sacrifice, but withal that *this is a true, real, and efficient sacrifice, and both of them propitiatory for the sins of the whole world.*' And again: 'This is no new sacrifice, but the same which is every day offered to God by Christ in Heaven, and continueth here still on earth by a mystical representation of it in the Eucharist' (*Works*, Anglo-Catholic Library, vol. v. pp. 106-108). Again, on p. 22, Mr. Meyrick quotes from Bishop Patrick a passage that he thinks makes for his theory; but he suppresses a passage from Bishop Patrick's *Christian Sacrifice* (pp. 14, 15), which tells against it: 'We do show forth the Lord's Death unto God, and commemorate before Him the great things He hath done for us. *We keep as it were in His memory, and plead before Him the sacrifice of His Son.*' Bishop Bull is quoted in sentences, disjoined from the context, and taken from widely separated paragraphs, on pp. 23, 50, 57, and 60; but no mention is made of Bishop Bull's own definition of Commemorative Sacrifice, *though it follows immediately on this passage quoted on p. 57*: 'The ancient Fathers held the Eucharist to be a Commemorative Sacrifice, and so do we.' The bishop continues: 'We offer by way of commemoration, *μνησμένοι προσφέρομεν, commemorantes, or commemorando offerimus*; according to our Saviour's words when He ordained this holy rite, *Do this in remembrance of Me. In the Eucharist, then, Christ is offered*, not hypostatistically, as the Trent Fathers have determined (for so He was but once offered), but commemoratively only; and *this commemoration is made to God the Father* . . . For every Sacrifice is directed to God, and the obla-

1. With reference to the questions connected with the 'Adoration' of the Sacrament (chaps. xv. and xvi.), we fully agree that the Eucharistic elements are capable of being so used, and are in the Roman Church so used, as to suggest that Christ in the Sacraments is brought down again to His life of humiliation, instead of our being exalted into the fellowship of His life of glory. *The Divine Prisoner of the Tabernacle* suggests, we think, dangerous theological notions. Again, the Adoration of Christ is made so prominent in modern Eucharistic manuals as to obscure the fact that the true approach in the Holy Eucharist is not to Christ, as distinct from the Father, but to the Father through Christ. This is the teaching of all Liturgies. Still, is it possible if Christ is present not to worship Him? 'Adoramus,' Bishop Andrewes says, 'non id, sed eum.'

2. With reference to 'non-communicating attendance' (chap. xvii.), surely Mr. Meyrick must admit that the question is not solved by mere reference to ancient practice. At least in her use of Confirmation the English Church has committed herself to the principle that there is a legitimate development (not in the doctrine, but) in the

tion therein made, whatsoever it be, hath Him for its object, and not man' (*Works*, vol. ii. p. 252). It is unnecessary to quote the remainder of the paragraph. Bishop Bull's words, '*Christ is offered commemoratively*,' and, '*this commemoration is made to God the Father*,' define the 'Commemorative Sacrifice' in a larger and truer sense than Mr. Meyrick admits, and express in brief what Bishop Fell sets forth more at length: 'The Melchisedechial or eternal Priesthood of Christ, joined with Kingship, was consummated in His Resurrection, and is now continued in His service in the Heavenly Sanctuary. In which Heavenly Sanctuary He perpetually offers His Blood and Passion to God; and, as Man, makes perpetual prayers and intercessions for us. As also *He hath instituted the same oblation of His holy Body and Blood, and commemoration of His Passion, to be made in the Holy Eucharist to God the Father by His Ministers here on earth for the same ends*' (*Annotations on Heb. v. 10*). It accords also with a definition given by Dean Field: 'In this sort Christ offereth Himself and His Body daily in heaven, and so intercedeth for us; . . . in that He setteth it before the eyes of God His Father, representing it unto Him, and so offering it to His view, to obtain grace and mercy for us. And in this sort we also offer Him daily on the altar, in that, commemorating His Death and lively representing His bitter Passion endured in His Body upon the Cross, we offer Him that was once crucified and sacrificed for us on the Cross, and all His sufferings to the view and gracious consideration of the Almighty' (*Of the Church*, Book iii., Appendix, vol. ii. p. 62). Dr. Grabe expresses in more strictly theological language the sense in which Bishop Cosin, Bishop Patrick, and Bishop Bull use the term 'Commemorative Sacrifice': 'The English Divines teach that in the Holy Eucharist the Body and Blood of Christ, under the species, that is, the signs, of bread and wine, are offered to God, and become a representative of the Sacrifice of Christ once made upon the Cross, whereby God may be rendered propitious' (*Adversaria*; Bodleian Library, quoted at length in No. 81 of *Tracts for the Times*, pp. 371-81). We have given these instances, and might give more, of the careless and misleading method of quotation which Mr. Meyrick has seen fit to adopt in support of his theory; and we desire to record our firm but indignant protest against it.

use of Sacraments, provided their original purpose is steadily kept in view. The question is, Does non-communicating attendance tend to be a *substitute* for Communion? We greatly doubt whether its abolition would in any way increase the number of Communions, whether in the Roman Church or our own. Does it help to teach ordinary Christians the idea of Worship and of Intercession in union with the Sacrifice? We cannot doubt it does. Still we need constant reminders that only by *Communion* can we really share the virtue of the Sacrifice.

3. Lastly, can Mr. Meyrick's theory of the meaning of *Fasting* Communion in the Early Church (chap. xix.) be maintained in view of S. Augustine's language about 'the Eucharist entering the Christian's mouth first of all food' ('prius quam cæteri cibi,' Epist. liv. 8)? Can it be maintained in view of the question whether a drop of water swallowed in bathing broke the fast (*See* Beveridge, *Synodicon*, Oxon. 1672, tom. ii. pt. i. p. 169)? We do not wish to be rigorists, or to be inconsiderate to the weak and the sick, but do not let us put a strain on historical probability.

We have omitted innumerable points in this book which suggest criticism. We have confined ourselves to showing that if the doctrine of the Church of England is, as we maintain, the doctrine of the Early Church, Mr. Meyrick interprets it, we do not say heretically (there is a great difference between inadequacy of doctrine and heresy), but in a minimizing spirit calculated to quench devotion and to leave the mind unsatisfied and an easy prey to unhealthy hankering after the Church of Rome.

The Great Question, and other Sermons. By WILLIAM ALEXANDER, D.D., Hon. D.C.L., Lord Bishop of Derry and Raphoe. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co., 1885.)

It is not often that a volume of sermons carries the reader along with a continuous flow of interest, so that it can hardly be laid down until it has been read through. This is the case, in our experience, with Dean Church's recently published sermons on 'The Discipline of the Christian Character'—reviewed in our January number—and also with this collection of fifteen discourses, which, had they appeared anonymously, might with confidence have been ascribed to the Bishop of Derry. In fact they could have been ascribed to no one else. He is well known to be the most truly poetic of all eminent living preachers—one might add, of living religious writers. It is a great mistake to think that florid writing is, as such, poetical. Bishop Alexander does not pile up gorgeous sentences; if he is oratorical he does not luxuriate in grandiloquence; his method of handling sacred subjects does not remind us of Falstaff's tavern-bill. But he is a born poet, with a natural tendency to vividness and beauty of expression; so that, allowing for occasional redundancy, what strikes one in his language is, not elaborated ornateness, but an aspiring movement and a spontaneous glow. The clear insight of the poetic imagination sees all the elements of an idea as a lucid whole, and

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combines them with epigrammatic force in sentences which are frequent in this volume, as: 'Nor again is the Resurrection the projection of creative enthusiasm. As the Church is too holy for a foundation of rottenness' (*i.e.* a fraudulent story) 'so is she too real for a foundation of mist. . . . Faith did not create the Resurrection; the Resurrection created faith.' 'The Epistle to the Romans is the logic, the parable of the prodigal is the idyll, of grace.' 'A shadowy Christ leads to a shadowy God.' 'Man hears within a spiritual prophecy, as truly as he hears without a natural history.' 'Free inquiry is one thing: free-and-easy inquiry is another.'

That there are sparkles—not few nor far between—of Irish humour, is matter of course. For instance: 'It might be well' (in reference to rhetorical amplifications of Bible history) 'if preachers tacitly considered themselves bound together in a society for the suppression of cruelty to Scripture.' 'The dismal metaphysician, whose name *agnostic* sounds better in Greek than in its Latinized equivalent *ignoramus*.' 'Among the many heads shaken at the Bible, some are empty.' (This, however, is a remark we have met with before.)

The volume takes its name from the title of the first sermon, on 'What think ye of Christ?' Hardly three of the sermons are explicitly apologetic; but the present conditions of the controversy with unbelief repeatedly present themselves to the preacher, and he shows a dramatic facility in putting the unbeliever's thought into words. 'Some may' say that 'what were once called the evidences of Christianity have been suddenly struck by bolts from the clouds, and their splinters are still white upon the ground. . . . Butler's argument no longer tells. . . . Redemption is undermined by the annihilation of the myth of the Fall, and the work of the second Adam evaporated by the proved non-existence of the first' (p. 18); or, 'Philosophy has killed religion at the very roots' (p. 54). 'It shows man that he has not fallen, but risen, through countless millenniums. . . . Heaven is a Utopia for dissatisfied and miserable individuals. For this, science substitutes a well-grounded expectation of incredible advance for the species until the days when all shall perish in an ice-stiffened world. The strain of thought must increase more and more until life shall slowly be subtracted, rather than violently wrested, from Christianity' (p. 254). In these and other passages the eloquent Bishop gives to the unbelief which he describes the benefit of his terse and pointed representation. He shows that he has not been unobservant of the recent developments of scepticism; he is not afraid of looking them in the face. Human experience, he thinks, verifies the Fall. He reproduces that argument from the combination of our Lord's 'self-assertion' with His moral pre-eminence which Dr. Liddon pressed so powerfully in his *Bampton Lectures*. He enumerates 'six great heads of evidence for the Christian religion: prophecy, miracles, the morality of the Gospel, the propagation of the Gospel, the character of Jesus, the existence of the Church' (p. 55). In the next page he insists that 'if the Resurrection were anything but a fact . . . in the long run the witness of the apostles

and disciples must have been a fraud,' so that what he elsewhere calls 'this coarse and clumsy theory' would after all supersede the more delicately negative hypothesis of illusion. But he is uniformly conscious of the extremities to which negation has been pushed; he knows that the modern rejection of Christ is very largely a rejection of God as a living and personal Being. He confronts those who maintain that Evolutionism has silenced Theism; he contends that 'if there was no mind in the universe before the principle of Evolution came into action, that principle must have sprung from nothing; thus the mindless universe becomes, as has been well said, a great bank without a banker,' &c.; that 'Evolution does not account for all . . . certainly not for the secret behind the embryo . . . for the infinite capacity of thought . . . for the subtle, many-chorded instrument of speech . . . for the conscience of the man' (p. 22). He relies for the future of Theism on the fact that 'the soul cannot live without God' (p. 133); that man's intellect must always lead him to another Mind . . . conscience must always present to man a law . . . and man has . . . an affection which has God for its object,' so that while he remains man 'religion is indestructible; and to speak of religion is practically to speak of Christianity' (p. 301). He exposes the hollowness of that idealism which dreams that it can retain an etherialized extract of Christianity while casting aside faith in the actual Christ (p. 181), and which claims for agnostics a moral right to communicate, so long as they can feel tenderness for the memory of a creed which they have outgrown (p. 166). It may perhaps have required some courage to emphasize the profound and saddening unreality of the Eucharistic passages in *John Inglesant*. And it was a still bolder step to challenge an irritable scepticism by affirming that 'occasionally, at least, an unbelieving soul means a diseased conscience'; that 'in many cases, at least, doubt is culpable' (pp. 58, 228). We remember how acrimoniously Bishop Wordsworth of Salisbury was assailed for a gravely measured statement to this effect in the first of his *Bampton Lectures*.

But we must say a few words about Bishop Alexander's practical enforcement of Christian principles. More than once he dwells on the melancholy of modern life as sometimes darkening into avowed pessimism, and as caused in part by stress and weariness, in part by morbid 'self-analysis,' but, above all, by the decline of faith. Christianity, as advocated by the Bishop, is a thing of gladness, of activity, of power. It makes 'life worth living'; it supplies motives which should tell even on such a matter as man's treatment of God's dumb creatures (p. 292); it finds that 'place' for true repentance which (as another eloquent prelate of Irish birth has contended in his sermon on 'The Ethics of Forgiveness') the laws of the natural world exclude (p. 85); but it demands that repentance shall be continuous, and that no rapturous emotions shall shut out from daily conduct the masterful thought of a judgment to come (p. 104). The plain-spoken warnings against evil thoughts in the sermon on 'The Revivals of Memory,' and the pleading against sensuality in the

sermon on Samson, are among the most useful passages in the book. We must pass over much; the framework of the sermon on 'The Tolerance and Intolerance of the Gospel' will, perhaps, be hardly appreciated by those who have not walked around the carefully preserved walls of Londonderry, and do not know how the critical days of the great siege are there kept as festivals practically of more account than the common holytides of Christendom; but readers may find in a few pages of this discourse a relief from the difficulty which is oftener felt than expressed in regard to the 'imprecatory psalms.' As a contrast to the scene of that sermon, with its stormy, if heroic, associations, we may take Wells Cathedral 'at the opening of the Ken Memorial,' on S. Peter's Day last year, when Bishop Alexander, evidently enjoying his duty to the utmost, pronounced a loving *éloge* on the saintliest and gentlest of the Nonjurors; or York Minster at the opening of its restored south transept, when he condensed into a single discourse not a little of the splendid enthusiasm with which, as a Bampton Lecturer, he had formerly pleaded for the Christian use of the Psalms. In both these sermons, and in another preached at a Church Congress, but not in these alone, we are perforce reminded of the theological influences which were potent over the accomplished author's youth. He passed through Oxford life in the later days of 'Tractarianism'—perhaps we should rather say, in the days which followed on Dr. Pusey's suspension; it 'comes natural' to him to refer to Dr. Pusey's practical teaching; in one passage, indeed, he couples 'Pusey and Arnold' together; twice he reproduces Newman's celebrated dictum about a 'luminous' consciousness, of two beings, 'God and our own soul' (pp. 186, 245); one whole page seems to be inspired by the thought of Newman's *Parochial Sermons*, and elsewhere (p. 277) he gives a remarkable anecdote in which the 'Vicar of S. Mary's' appears as a predictor of Church congresses. As a chosen preacher on signal occasions, he meets, full in front, the charge that Church principles involve 'exclusiveness' and 'formality'; he proclaims that 'the Church is the home of the Eternal Personal Spirit, the channel of His energy'; he twice affirms that the Eucharist has a sacrificial character (pp. 167, 273); he points out that 'the intenser grasp of the notion of the Christian priesthood,' at the outset of 'the Church movement,' 'brought in its train its correlative and corrective, the priesthood . . . of the baptized, whereby we learn that the consecration of the Eucharist is the Church's act, and that the priest is the Church's tongue' (a phrase, we remark in passing, which parts off the notion of a delegate empowered by the body from that of an organ provided for it) . . . 'for the special priesthood does not exclude the general, nor, again, does the general cashier the special' (p. 275). 'Revivalism' is censured as virtually forgetting the continuous presence of Christ and of His Spirit; 'Salvationism,' for 'ignoring the sacraments and denying the ministry' (pp. 258, 261). The somewhat eager inference from Rom. xvi. 1 which would put deaconesses in parallel with the deacons of the New Testament is gently corrected (p. 276); and the reticence of the Prayer Book, in the prayer for

the Church Militant and the Burial Office, in regard to a direct commendation of the faithful departed, is regretfully, if we mistake not, alluded to as a result of the dread of Roman error (p. 280). On the whole, the Church movement is regarded as having set in motion a 'new force in the spiritual world,' and touched humanity at every point of its vast circumference.

On one point, the interpretation of 'the carcase and the eagles' (pp. 266-72), we own that the Bishop, although he has made the older view as attractive as possible, has yet failed to make us give up the comment which we learned long ago from the revered and lamented Archbishop Trench, referring the text to God's judgments on a 'body of moral and spiritual death.' Bishop Alexander pleads that to refer it to the saints feeding upon Christ is more germane to the context, which speaks of 'the coming of the Son of Man'; and he draws on his own recollections of a Donegal eagle's majestic flight in order to enforce the dignity of the symbol of *oi áseroi*. But, to our mind, that same context, as dwelling on the return of the living Christ, forbids us to apply to Him, thus manifested, the image of a 'carcase'; and, as picturing to us a day of doom, suggests a judicial or penal purpose for the 'gathering.'

While we write, the tragedy of Irish history seems to be approaching a new crisis, which many, including so pronounced a Liberal as Mr. Goldwin Smith, regard with the gravest apprehension. At such a time the Bishop of Derry's hopes, uttered last Easter before the Prince of Wales and his family, for a *pacata Hibernia*, a reconciliation of Irish parties, a 'resurrection' of mutual 'love,' may appear the fondest of fancies. But they depend, he would answer, on the prayers of many hearts; and 'more things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of.' Ireland, alas! is in no mood for any such prayer.

Movements of Religious Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Century. By JOHN TULLOCH, D.D., LL.D., Senior Principal in the University of St. Andrews. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1885.)

THERE is a melancholy interest attaching to the present volume as its author's last work, its publication happening about the time of his regretted decease. It is one of the series of the S. Giles Lectures, which have been an important feature in the religious and literary life of Edinburgh, and to some extent have modified the prevailing harshness of Scottish Presbyterianism. The life and writings of Principal Tulloch were always an influence in this beneficent direction. Though the author describes his book as dealing with the nineteenth century, he still further limits and defines his purpose by giving as his dates 1820-1860. Some one once said that the nineteenth century did not begin till 1830, which seems to have been rather Dr. Tulloch's idea; and at the same time he does not adhere very scrupulously to the 1860 date, but allows his subject to overflow into succeeding decades. The book is interesting and instructive, the style lucid, the matter scholarlike and thoughtful. It has some

drawbacks, partly inseparable from the mode of treatment, and partly inherent in the author's somewhat vague way of looking at religious literature.

Indeed a great deal of the volume, instead of being entitled 'Religious Thought,' might be called 'Irreligious Thought' in England. This would especially apply to what he tells us of Carlyle, the two Mills, and Mr. G. H. Lewes. Principal Tulloch, at a time when much nonsense has been talked about the religious opinions of these writers, points out in a clear trenchant way the thoroughly unchristian character of their distinctive teaching. It is a drawback, however, that the author is always laying down very dogmatically literary judgments which many of his readers would desire to modify. He succeeds best when he discusses Scottish subjects; when he comes to English authors there are often shades of opinion and position which, as a Presbyterian, he is hardly capable of appreciating, and he falls into some errors of detail. His account of Edward Irving, M'Leod Campbell, and Erskine of Linlathen, of whom the last two have considerably influenced much modern English theology, are written *con amore*, and most people will sympathize with the condemnation of the Church 'that stoned its prophets' in casting out such admirable men. Where Principal Tulloch shows to great advantage is when he is dealing with a large mass of literature, when he can give a guide through the labyrinths and reduce profuse scattered writings to definite propositions. Very good examples of this are his chapters on Coleridge, Maurice, and John Stuart Mill, where his clear style and steady reasoning serve him well. He is too fond of the terms 'uncritical,' 'unhistorical,' which he sometimes applies unfairly, and even when fairly applied hardly carry the measure of condemnation which he associates with them. Principal Tulloch knew personally some of the writers whom he discusses, and that enables him to give some side-lights and illustrations. Thus he remembers Erskine of Linlathen characteristically saying to him of a common friend: 'He is a great reasoner, but I do not find any *light* in him at all. The thing itself he does not see, but he can give many powerful arguments for it. The Schoolmen were more of this stamp—endless writing and argument, but no light.' Some of his friends were not very erudite, for they had never heard of Dean Milman's *Latin Christianity* or his *History of the Jews*. There are some anecdotes about Carlyle, but they are hardly worth adding to what Mr. Froude has told us. In much of his book he is traversing ground that has been already fully occupied, especially in his discussions of Hurrell Froude, Newman, Pusey, and others, whom he understands wonderfully well from the standard of the Westminster Confession, and yet whom he does not understand. Many of his remarks respecting modern unbelief are extremely good. Moreover, he clears a way—makes the marshes plain, to use his own expression—between the confines of belief and unbelief. Thus he says, 'We fear it must be said that to Carlyle in some respect is due the modern habit, conspicuously exemplified in *Natural Religion* and Mr. Matthew Arnold's writings, of using the name of God without

any note of its Christian meaning—a habit in every respect pernicious, as both leading to moral confusion and ignoring the living growth of moral and religious ideas.' With a strong and tender regard for Carlyle, who was one of his personal friends, he clearly shows the negative character of his teaching. 'With all Carlyle's talk of God, of the Divine, he everywhere shrinks from any definition of God as distinctively moral. He refused to acknowledge a Personal Life beyond his own life—a Life pitiful as well as just, Love as well as Law. And so his idea of the Divine readily sank into the idea of Supreme Force. He scouted the materialist who denied Spirit, but he no less scouted the Christian who sought to realize the relation of the Supreme Spirit to himself as an individual.' Again, he shrewdly points out a common defect in the enemies of the faith as exemplified in Grote's devotion to James Mill.

'Masterly and critical as his intellect was in his own departments of study, he is a striking example of a common characteristic of the course of modern negative speculators. The basis of his speculation is professedly inquiry. It is supposed by those whom its current has swept away so abundantly in recent times to be the result of the irresistible progress of the human intellect. Yet no body of religious disciples have ever followed the voice of Authority with more unhesitating decision than a large proportion of the professed army of modern unbelief. They have surrendered themselves with most melancholy monotony to the voice of some master or other, without any genuine inquiry on their own part or even any knowledge sometimes of the real character of the conclusions from which they dissent. It is indeed a pitiful comment on the weakness of human nature that the anti-Christendom of modern times has reproduced in flagrant forms two of the worst vices of Mediæval Christendom, viz. intolerance and vulgar deference to authority.' (P. 248.)

His examination of the drift of the teaching of the younger Mill is thorough and effectual. He detects the irreligious drift of the *System of Logic*, which for so many years was the favourite text-book of the University of Oxford. Dr. Tulloch, if we remember aright, first came prominently into notice after his Burnett essay on *Theism*, by his essay on the Positive Philosophy, in the *Edinburgh Review*. He is a master of that whole line of controversy with which in this country the name of John Stuart Mill is identified. We are very sorry that our limits do not permit us to follow his examination of the famous chapter of 'the Law of Universal Causation' in the *Logic*. This portion of the book, which rises into eloquence, is well worth reading, and will have a permanent value.

There is some weakness—and, indeed, inaccuracy—in some of his English sketches. His account of Robertson of Brighton is an example of this. He speaks of 'the temptations of his young life at Paris,' where Robertson only made one short visit, not the long residence which Dr. Tulloch supposes. He has an elaborate criticism on Robertson's sermons at Winchester, which has absolutely no value at all as an independent judgment, for Robertson left no sermon whatever avowedly preached at Winchester. He is simply echoing Mr. Stopford Brooke. He also repeats Mr. Brooke's curious

mistake in saying, 'the undergraduates were thronging the church and beginning to hang upon his words, when the sudden change to Brighton came.' The change to Brighton and nearly all that brief ministry happened during the Long Vacation, when there were no undergraduates at Oxford. He says that Robertson left Winchester for a holiday—the fact being that he gave up the charge altogether. He mentions M. Malan's conversation with Robertson, and quotes him as saying, 'Vous avez une triste vie et un triste ministère.' Malan said, 'Vous aurez,' the point being that it was a prophecy of his future. He says that Robertson's theological learning was ample. Robertson was scholarly and accomplished, but his theological learning was thin; he scarcely possessed any acquaintance with patristic learning and Christian antiquity. It is curious to meet with so many errors within the compass of a few pages. It is still more provoking to find him characterizing one of Dr. Mozley's Essays as 'a bad specimen of a bad school, and of strange and even coarse arrogance!' When we consider the intellectual difference between Dr. Mozley and his critic, we feel inclined to transfer the arrogance to the side of the latter. He speaks of Dr. Mozley as the chief theologian of the Oxford school, but in fact Dr. Mozley exhibited a considerable divergence therefrom in his work on *Baptismal Regeneration*, with which Principal Tulloch seems to have had no acquaintance. We have freely stated our view of some defects in this volume; but it contains decided elements of value, and is a final memorial of a singularly accomplished, thoughtful, and amiable man.

Hebraica: a Quarterly Journal in the interests of Hebrew Study.
Volume I. : March 1884–April 1885. (Chicago : The American Publication Society of Hebrew.)

WE are anxious to draw attention to the publication of this journal, as it gives good hopes for the future of the study of Hebrew in America. It originally appeared in monthly numbers, but apparently it was very soon found impossible to keep it up in this form, and after the issue of three numbers it was formed into a quarterly—wisely, we think, as there is much more chance of its *living* in this more substantial shape. Dr. Harper, the managing editor, has been fortunate in securing the services of such well-known scholars as Drs. Paul Haupt and Hermann Strack as associate editors; nor are theirs the only names of eminent European writers to be found in these pages. The issue of a journal devoted entirely to the interests of Semitic study (for it is not confined to Hebrew), and yet of a somewhat popular character, is of course an experiment, and as such may fairly claim to be treated with some indulgence. But we have been much struck with the steady improvement in the quality of the quarterly numbers hitherto issued. At first there seemed a little too strong an inclination to rely on second-hand material, and that which was already easily accessible to students of Hebrew: e.g. with Dr. Taylor's admirable edition of *Pirge Aboth* already in the field, it was a distinct waste of space to reproduce a translation of this

treatise ; so, too, Baer and Delitzsch's editions of the Hebrew text of the books of the Old Testament are so well known that we should have thought it needless to reproduce a whole section from the Prolegomena to one of them. But as the journal receives wider support it naturally improves in quality, and we can assure any of our readers who are interested in the study of Hebrew, that they will not find it a waste of money to become subscribers. There are many valuable articles scattered throughout the volume now lying before us, some more abstruse, some fairly elementary, but giving just the information for which the beginner is often at a loss where to look ; and we are glad to see that some of our best Hebraists in this country are beginning to contribute critical notes—e.g. Dr. Driver and Dr. Cheyne. As far as *writers* are concerned, the prospects of the journal are safe enough. What is now wanted is a considerable increase in the number of *subscribers*. We conclude with the following editorial note at the close of the first number of volume ii., which will show our readers exactly how matters stand at present :—

‘When it seemed doubtful whether another volume of *Hebraica* would be published, many letters were received in which the strong hope was expressed that it might be continued. The managing editor, after much debate, concluded to undertake the second volume. And now, will not those who declared themselves interested in its success lend a hand in making it such? What is needed? About four hundred additional subscribers. Is there not something which all who have at heart the interests of Hebrew study can and *will* do to secure these subscribers? The journal will improve with each succeeding number, if its friends will but help and encourage it. *Now* is the time. The fact is, it is *now* or *never*. Shall it not be *now*?’

Société des Etudes Juives.—*Annuaire pour 1885*.—*Revue*, October–December. (Paris : Durlacher, 1885.)

Le Talmud de Jérusalem, traduit pour la première fois par Moïse Schwab. Tome VIII. (Paris : Maisonneuve et Ch. Leclerc, 1885.)

THE *Société des Etudes Juives* pursues with unabated activity the course of its useful publications. Let us notice in the first place the Year-book for 1885, which contains, besides the usual obituary memoirs, list of members, &c., a lecture by Maurice Vernes. The subject selected for this occasion is one with which few of our readers are probably acquainted, and which is certainly unknown to the general public. When we are invited to consider *apocalyptic literature* we are naturally led to think of the Revelation of S. John the Divine, and of non-canonical writings belonging to the early ages of the Christian Church ; M. Vernes deals with the apocalyptic treatises which the Jews produced about the same time, and which had the character of prophecies ; the book of Enoch for instance.

The *Revue des Etudes Juives*, in its last number (No. 22, October–December), gives us on various subjects of history, literature, and archaeology, essays of the most interesting nature ; thus our readers will notice a paper on S. Polycarp and on his relations with the Jews

of Smyrna. Again, an article by M. Levi adds much to our knowledge of the tales and legends which were current during the middle ages, and some of which can be traced to the Talmud. Arabs, Persians, Greeks and Romans often relate with more or less modifications the same story, and in a certain anecdote which Voltaire borrowed from Gueulette's *Soirées Bretonnes* one hundred and twenty years ago, we find no less than twelve Oriental versions or readings, including Persian poets such as Maçoudi, Tabari, and Meydani. Whilst Mr. Hild brings to a conclusion his article on the Jews in Rome during the imperial period, M. Moses Schwab publishes a list of documents illustrating their history in our own country. We are all aware that a sentence of banishment was pronounced against the Jews in 1290; now, from one of the *Rotuli* enumerated by M. Schwab, it appears clearly that they still were to be found in London as late as 1294, and perhaps later still. The usual bibliographical summary of the *Revue* is as copious as ever; Russia, Germany, Poland, as well as France, India, and Jerusalem, supplying materials for the critic.

We must not forget to mention M. Schwab's recent instalment of his French translation of the Talmud; it gives us the treatises *Kethoreboth*, *Nedarim*, and *Guittim*. Our author takes the opportunity of remarking in his preface on the total want of method which has presided over the composition of the text. Whatever may be the subject of the legal point under discussion, the juridical opinions of the rabbis who were present at the time are developed out of all proportion. In vain does the reader endeavour to find in these volumes details on points of history or archæology: he is lost in a perfect chaos of subtle distinctions, divisions and subdivisions; casuistry predominates everywhere; hardly any legends are related in this eighth volume; details on geography and science in general are of the scantiest kind. On the other hand, the glossary of Greek and Latin expressions is comparatively large. We may notice that the last treatise (*Guittim*) is not complete; the conclusion being reserved for the ninth volume of the series.

The Pulpit Commentary. II Corinthians. Exposition by the Ven. Archdeacon FARRAR, D.D. *Homiletics* by Rev. DAVID THOMAS, D.D., Editor of the *Homilist*. *Homilies* by Various Authors. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co., 1885.)

WE reviewed Dr. Farrar's 'Commentary on the First Epistle' in 1884. This Second Epistle presents a remarkable contrast to that which preceded it. Whereas that is formal and systematic in method, and deeply doctrinal in character, touching the heights and depths of the Christian Revelation, this latter is essentially personal, and the product (humanly speaking) of events. It is strange to reflect how many of the details of an autobiographical nature which come to us from S. Paul are to be found in this Epistle. He speaks in it of 'being pressed out of measure, above strength,' by his trouble in Asia (i. 8); he had 'no rest in his spirit' at Troas (ii. 13); 'without were fightings, within were fears' (vii. 5). Yet he is 'not a whit behind the very chiefest apostles' (xi. 5); he is 'in journeyings often, in perils of

waters, in perils of robbers' (xi. 26); he has been 'caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter' (xii. 4), and many other recollections, without which the conception we have of S. Paul would be far fainter and more incomplete than it is. It was to be expected that the exposition should reflect in some degree the quality of the text. Hence the character of the comment is largely concrete and psychological, and we gladly acknowledge that there is often much that is striking and interesting, and even edifying, in the parallels which Dr. Farrar's extensive reading suggests to him. The comment on iv. 7, 'in earthen vessels,' is really both useful and beautiful. We notice a misprint of *skēnos* for *σκεῦος*. On vi. 5, again, we have the following suggestive observation, which may serve as a specimen of the general character of the notes:—

'Nothing, therefore, is more clear than that the Acts only furnishes us with a fragmentary and incomplete record, in which, as we gather from the Epistles, either the agonies of S. Paul's lifelong martyrdom are for some reason intentionally minimized, or else (which is, perhaps, more probable) S. Paul was, as his rule and habit, so reticent about his own sufferings in the cause of Christ that S. Luke was only vaguely, if at all, aware of many scenes of trial through which he had passed.'

Or again, on vi. 5, 'watchings,' he observes, 'spells of sleeplessness' were a necessary incident of such a life; and an eminently nervous nature like that of S. Paul is rarely capable of the habitual relief of sound sleep. Hence he again refers to this in chap. xi. 27. His 'sleeplessness' was sometimes the necessary result of labours 'night and day' (Acts xx. 31; 1 Thess. ii. 9).

We never read a work of Dr. Farrar's, as far as we remember, that had not many flings at 'religious parties,' which he so much hates, or 'party spirit' which seems to be to him a *bête noire* always deserving the worst he can find, or make opportunity to say of it. We find such, accordingly, in the note on x. 12 and elsewhere; though it is not very obvious how it follows directly from the text. But Dr. Farrar is rather given to push his analysis to the verge of subtlety, and read out of an expression more than is really in it. We notice this especially towards the end of the Epistle, as in the note on 'the very chiefest apostles' (xi. 5), and still more strikingly in that on xi. 9. Dr. Farrar suggests as a substitute for the simple, exquisite, and suggestive rendering of A. V., 'I was chargeable to no man,' the entirely unintelligible, 'I did not benumb you,' or 'I did not cramp you with my torpedo-touch'!

We must not omit to give a word of notice to Prebendary Huxtable's edition of the Epistle to the Galatians, which occupies the latter part of this volume. It is German in its lengthiness, occupying, with the Homilies, about four hundred pages, and perhaps somewhat ponderous in its leisurely exposition of the text of the Epistle, but is nevertheless laborious and orthodox, and cannot fail to fill a useful and honoured place in the series.

Since the above was written another volume of this *Commentary* has come to us, containing *Ephesians*, annotated by Rev. Professor Blaikie, D.D.; *Philippians*, by Rev. B. C. Caffin, M.A.; *Colossians*,

by Rev. G. G. Findlay, B.A. The volume is thus more than usually composite in its character; and surely the advocates of 'unsectarian Christianity' will welcome a volume contributed in equal proportions by a Presbyterian, an Anglican, and a Wesleyan. But, in point of fact, Mr. Caffin's brief annotations are far from emphasizing the Anglican positions; while the various Homilists, on the contrary, are careful to lose no opportunity to explain passages in *their* way, which is not that of the Church. Thus, on Philippians i. 1-2, we have immediately a gird at 'hierarchical usurpations,' and a suggestion that 'Philippian Christianity was fully organized,' because it had bishops and deacons. Evidently the writer has no idea that the Apostolate is an essential element in the Church; and in his view it must have been a very unnecessary step on the part of S. Paul to send Timothy to preside over an already 'fully organized' Church at Ephesus, and Titus to do the same thing in Crete. On the same page (p. 37) we find, 'A true Church and all its members must be in Christ Jesus,' which is the old error of the Cathari. In the same paragraph we find the writer beating aimlessly about the bush, not only in his assertion that 'the bishop and the deacon . . . were spiritually in the same state as the private members,' which is more than he or anyone can possibly know, but also that, 'unless their state had been identical, their offices would have been invalid'—an assertion as to which it would be hard to say whether the misunderstanding of the case, or the disregard of the bearing of the facts, and of the consequences that would ensue if the position taken up were accepted, be the greater. We should recommend the Homilist to read the twenty-sixth of the Articles of the Church of England, 'Of the Unworthiness of the Ministers, which hinders not the effect of the Sacrament,' which was levelled against a similar error current in the sixteenth century.

We find nothing, for the most part, but what we can assent to, in Mr. Caffin's notes. We observe that he rightly reads, with R. V., in ii. 9, 'gave unto Him THE Name which is above every name,' though he hardly makes the most, in his comment, of this verse, which would, one might suppose, inspire the most frigid commentator. His observations on ii. 12, 'work out your own salvation,' are terse and forcible.

A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ. By EMIL SCHÜRER, D.D., M.A., Professor of Theology at the University of Giessen. Being a Second and Revised Edition of a *Manual of the History of New Testament Times*. Vol. I. Division ii. Vol. II. Division ii. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.)

WE opened this work with considerable expectation and interest, which, we must say, have been to a certain extent disappointed. The title of the work naturally suggests something like Hausrath's *History of the New Testament Times*. Such a work would, or at least might, be very valuable to the student of the Gospels, as affording an *examen* of the circumstances with which these were contemporaneous. Dr. Farrar, especially, among writers of our own time, has set the example of illustrating the life of our Lord and His teachings from the political events which were being transacted, or by means of the cur-

rents of thought from opposite quarters, which met and surged around His ministry. Such a method, while it is open, of course, to the danger of empiricism, and is liable to misrepresent facts by colouring them, is always helpful to readers, in the precise degree in which the 'historical imagination' of the commentator enables him to *focus* the facts he collects on the lens of his own mind, and thus to produce a brilliant historical picture, from which the events of the Sacred Life stand out in high relief.

Such a work is not that of Dr. Schürer, so far as we are enabled to judge from the portions of it which lie before us. It has, indeed, the *dissecta membra* of such a work. The author has, with marvellous industry, collected a vast mass of materials of every kind, historical, geographical, and antiquarian, bearing on the manners and institutions of the Jewish nation; and even after the works of Ewald and Kuenen, his almost encyclopædic labours will bear away the palm for collecting with enormous industry all that is known on these subjects. Every page is a mine of curious and valuable information; and as the references and *ipsissima verba* are always given in the multitudinous footnotes, the work is of great value *of its kind*. The laborious compiler, however, has failed to weld his facts into an harmonious and artistic whole, so far as we have his work in our hands at present. It cannot fail to be consulted by the scholar and the antiquary; but it will survive, we should augur, more for the value of the materials amassed, than for any distinct and constructive use that has here been made of them. Hence we should advise the providing of a very full and adequate index, compiled with special care and skill, when the remaining volumes are issued; a step which will, as we think, ensure to the complete work a permanent usefulness. At present, of course, it is but a *torso*.

Analytical Notes on the First and Three Last of the Minor Prophets, for the use of Hebrew Students; with an Appendix on Dan. ix. 24-27. By the Rev. WILLIAM RANDOLPH, M.A., of St. John's College, Cambridge. (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, and Co. London: George Bell and Sons, 1885.)

THIS is not a work that requires, or indeed admits of, much criticism from us. The notes seem just a little *miscellaneous*, as if they were (what indeed they probably are) the records of actual lecture-work with students. It may be expected, therefore, that others who are studying these prophecies in the original Hebrew will find just the kind of assistance they need. Mr. Randolph's notes are obviously due to his own study, and he has not filled up his pages with citations from other writers. To this cause probably some of that *fragmentary* look on which we have remarked above is due. Mr. Randolph declares: 'It seems to me to be the duty of one who writes for such students to present the results of his own careful study in as clear and concise language as he is master of, without perpetual citations from other commentators.' And it is the merest justice to him to say that his work is well able to stand alone. Students, and especially lecturers in theological colleges, should take note of this book. The

notes are clear, brief, go promptly to the point, and, so far as we have observed, never avoid a difficulty. We do not know of *any* companion so thoroughly good and helpful to the difficult text of Hosea and Zechariah.

Étude sur l'Histoire des Sarcophages Chrétiens. Catalogue des Sarcophages Chrétiens de Rome qui ne se trouvent point au Musée du Latran. Par RENÉ GROUSSET. (Paris : Thorin, 1885.)

M. RENÉ GROUSSET has added a most valuable contribution to the *Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*; it is a pamphlet bearing upon an important branch of Christian archæology—namely, funereal monuments, tombs, and sarcophagi. The *brochure* is divided into two parts, the former one treating of the history of those monuments, whereas the latter is a complete catalogue of the sarcophagi existing in Rome, but not belonging to the Lateran museum. The epoch covered by M. Grousset's erudite researches extends from the third to the fifth centuries. The author's aim is to show, in the first instance, that the Christians did not, as several antiquarians, and the late M. Raoul-Rochette amongst them, have supposed, borrow from their heathen neighbours the use of sarcophagi, 'because they were unable to produce spontaneously and in an original manner the things they stood in need of.' In this case, as in many others, there was no necessity whatever for Christians to differ from the customs of the rest of the population, who still adhered to the worship of the old national deities. 'On the contrary,' (we quote M. Grousset) 'they were, on the whole, following the Jewish tradition; they manifested their respect for the mortal remains of their friends; they confirmed, so to say, the instinctive repugnance which the majority of believers entertained for the practice of cremation, which they deemed subversive of the faith in the resurrection of the dead.'

M. Grousset's proposition is this: Between the heathen society and the Christian one, we must not suppose that a divorce took place wide enough to leave no neutral ground, where the two elements could meet. The new faith had, no doubt, completely transformed man's inward nature, and imparted to the soul a new motive for action; but the follower of Jesus, besides being a Christian, was also a Roman, a citizen, a man of his time, bound by the same obligations as his heathen *compatriotes*, and subjected to the same necessities of everyday life. So, when the hand of death had taken away from him a wife, a mother, a daughter, a friend, he would naturally order a sarcophagus from the sculptor where the worshipper of Jupiter ordered his, taking care at the same time to select a monument containing no bas-reliefs of the deities which formed the pantheon of the classical world. Even excluding representations of men and women which might be supposed to figure Bacchus and Diana, Mars and Venus, &c. &c., there still remained a large number of subjects perfectly available to Christians, and capable of a symbolic interpretation in thorough accord with the articles of their faith—episodes of country life, vintage, harvest, the reapers with their sickles, the

shepherds surrounded by their flocks, and, though more seldom, hunting scenes. The *conjunctio manuum* imaging, on a tomb, the union of husband and wife, the well-known group where a person seated is reading from an unfolded *volumen* to a woman standing attentively before him; these and other similar themes were equally suited to heathens and to Christians, and, but for the inscription, it would be impossible to determine whether many a sarcophagus was that of a disciple of the Lord, or of a sectator of Zeus.

M. Grousset describes with much care the principal subjects selected by the early Christians for their funereal monuments. He shows the vague character of their original symbolism, and how in the earliest times it appealed to the imagination rather than to the senses. Later on, Biblical history supplied ready themes for the sculptor, and the only difficulty consisted in making a selection from the exhaustless variety of subjects. Then it was that Christian bas-relief, properly so called, rose into existence, assuming a character of its own, in contradistinction to the aesthetics of heathen antiquity.

Amidst the successive transformations which took place in the branch of art to which M. Grousset has directed our attention, it is curious to observe how persistently sculptors resort to the old time-honoured styles of decoration, and of undetermined symbolism. One of the most singular instances of the kind is the representation of a human figure giving food to a serpent, coiled round a pillar or column. Heathen tombs frequently exhibit this scene, which symbolises the *cultus* of Hygeia and of Esculapius. Now what more natural than that Christians contemplating such a group, should see in it the pictorial expression of a legend by which the prophet Daniel administered poison to the heathen serpent at Babylon? In like manner, and by the earliest transformation of thought, Orpheus became the saviour, and Prometheus the creator.

We must leave our readers to follow for themselves M. Grousset's ingenious views on the gradual evolution of Christian art, and say a few words about the second part of his pamphlet. Father Garrucci's *Storia dell' Arte Cristiana* already contains a goodly list of sarcophagi, which do not belong to the Lateran museum. Our author has been able to increase very materially this catalogue, so great is the crop of monuments belonging to early Christian art, and which either above or under ground fill the streets of the Eternal City. M. Grousset has given a brief enumeration of nearly two hundred specimens; some of them have never been published or described before. The catalogue, subdivided into five parts, comprises: (i) bas-reliefs of an indifferent character, but with Christian inscriptions; (ii) Sarcophagi with symbolic figures; (iii) Good Shepherds, *orantes*, &c.; (iv) pastoral scenes; (v) historical subjects. It is noteworthy that in several instances, scenes from the Old Testament are found in close proximity to episodes from the New; thus (No. 113) Moses striking the rock, represented twice, accompanies a mutilated bas-relief where our Lord appears, either giving to S. Peter the power of the keys, or reproving him on his denial.

In conclusion, M. Grousset's pamphlet should be read as a kind

of supplement to the works of Garrucci, Matz and Duhn (*Antike Bildwerke in Rom*), Marucchi (*Studi in Italia*), and Schreiber (*Die antiken Bildwerke*). It is an excellent model of what a catalogue of antiquities should be, and in several instances fac-similes of the inscriptions are added.

Pascal, Physicien et Philosophe. Par F. NOURRISSON, membre de l'Institut. (Paris : Perrin, 1885).

PASCAL is one of the few French writers about whom we are never tired of hearing ; like Montaigne he has studied human nature so thoroughly that every one of his utterances seems to wake up a chord in the reader's heart, with the peculiarity, however, that whereas the author of the immortal 'Essays' leaves us floating on the ocean of doubt, the great Jansenist thinker takes us to the only sure refuge against scepticism and despair.

Many attempts have been made at various times to define Pascal's true character, and to give us the key to that wonderful individuality ; M. Vinet, M. Sainte-Beuve, M. Cousin, M. Faugère, M. Havet, to name only a few recent Frenchmen, have studied from different points of view the *Pensées* and the *Lettres Provinciales*, but still it seems as if there was something more to be said, and M. Nourrisson in his turn steps forward with a most valuable series of essays on the great French philosopher. One of the chief points which engage his attention is the *vexata questio* of Jesuitism. It has always struck us that the qualification of *menteuses immortelles* applied to the 'Provincial Letters' is not undeserved, and that Pascal's violent onslaught upon the Jesuits is remarkably unfair. The best proof of our assertion, perhaps, is to be found in the attitude assumed by infidels of every country towards Louis de Montalte ; they hail him as one of their own *coterie* ; without having, themselves, taken the trouble to read a line of either Escobar or Father Bauny, they re-echo his eloquent but blind invectives, and say 'Hail, fellow, well met' to a thinker who would certainly have shunned their patronage, as a person in good health would shun the neighbourhood of a plague-stricken invalid.

'If the *petites lettres*,' says M. Nourrisson, 'after having been translated into Latin, Italian, Spanish, and English, still remain in point both of date, and of merit, one of the first monuments of the French language ; if they are justly quoted as a masterpiece of tactics, of invective, and of irony, it may be doubted whether they are creditable to Pascal's impartiality, much as they have contributed to bring into light his truly wonderful talent as a writer.'

This is exactly our feeling ; but fifty years ago who would have ventured to express it ? Who would have been bold enough to impugn the veracity of the *Lettres Provinciales*, at the time when Messrs. Michelet, Quinet, and Génin in the Sorbonne lecture-rooms were describing the Jesuits as the great enemies of civilisation and progress ? It is not too much to say that if the excitement about Pascal, considered as a controversialist, has somewhat subsided lately, the reason is simply because, for our contemporary *libres penseurs*, the enemy to be stamped out is not Jesuitism, but Christianity.

'Vainly are we told *ad nauseam*' (we still quote M. Nourrisson) 'that the *Provinciales* have freed human conscience from the bonds of scholasticism, served the cause of free enquiry, and struck mortal blows at a system of casuistry, equally corrupt and impudent. Vainly, even towards the end of his life, did Pascal delight in reassuring himself, if we may so say, by proud declarations. . . . Was it really from a knowledge of Escobar's writings that Pascal nailed for ever Escobar to the pillory? And if in the eyes of Louis de Montalte, Jesuitism was identified with Escobar, ought it not likewise, in all fairness, to have been represented by Francis Xavier, whose heroic devotedness had brought forth apostles and martyrs by thousands? Should it not have struck him that these apostles and martyrs were carrying to the most distant climes and the most barbarous nations, together with the knowledge of Christianity, the blessings of civilization, and the *prestige* of the French name?'

Let us speak out: If the Jesuits were detested, it was not so much on account of their system of casuistry, or of their moral teaching, as because they formed a compact, well-drilled, and well-organized body, taking their watchword from Rome, and carrying out the instructions they received from the Vatican, at a time when the Pope still wielded a power both real and dreaded. The 'Provincial Letters' are, even now, a favourite book with freethinkers, and yet what was the opinion entertained about them by Voltaire, the chief of the eighteenth-century unbelievers?

'The whole of the *Provinciales* rested upon a false foundation. The entire Society was cleverly made responsible for the extravagant opinions of a few Spanish and Flemish Jesuits. These opinions could have been found as easily in the writings of Dominican and Franciscan casuists. But the persons to be destroyed, the persons aimed at, were the Jesuits alone. Their enemies endeavoured to prove that they had formed a settled and preconceived plan of corrupting general morality—a plan which no sect, no society, has ever had, or can have. The simple question was not to be right, but to amuse the public.'

We have dealt at such length with the ever-interesting problem of Jesuitism, that we have only just space to mention the other contents of M. Nourrisson's excellent volume; they include a biographical chapter, an examination of Pascal's philosophy, an account of the influence which Descartes had upon him, and a most curious inquiry into the relations between him and the Chevalier de Méré. M. Nourrisson shows that although affecting great contempt for philosophy in general, and for Cartesianism in particular, Pascal was to all intents and purposes a Cartesian; if he repudiated philosophy, it was only in so far as it professed itself independent of revelation; and if he expressed himself so severely about human reason, it was from the deep-seated conviction that unaided reason cannot guide us to saving truth. M. Nourrisson's remarks on Condorcet's notes to Pascal are admirable; and alluding to the famous *amulette mystique*, he asks why that expression of strong religious convictions should excite greater surprise or more ridicule than the well-known outburst of feeling indulged in by Descartes, when the whole scope of his system unfolded itself before his mind.

Official Year-Book of the Church of England. (London : S.P.C.K., 1886.)

THIS useful book has reached the fourth year of its publication, and each year we have been enabled to point out that it has explored new fields of Church work, and brought within general knowledge a large amount of information concerning the religious and philanthropical efforts of Churchmen which were previously known to comparatively few. This year the editor seems to have been specially fortunate in placing a statement of the facts which he has collected in a more popular form, as well as in collecting accurate statements respecting a number of charities, which in previous volumes he had only casually mentioned, partially described, or omitted altogether. That this should have secured for the book a larger amount of attention than it had previously received from the newspaper press was only to be expected; and as the subject with which it deals is of special importance to Churchmen at the present time, it may be well to point out the improvements which have been effected, as well as to recommend in more general terms to our readers to acquire for themselves this valuable compendium of Church work. There are in the prefatory part of the book 'short summaries of facts recorded in this work,' or, in other words, in compendious form a statement of what has been expended during varying periods on Church extension, the restoration of cathedrals, the extension of the episcopate, elementary education, and of what has been collected on Hospital Sunday in the metropolis and provincial towns by Churchmen and the members of other religious bodies; besides this it tells the number of parishes constituted under the various Church Building Acts between 1868 and 1880, the number of clergymen ordained since 1872, and of persons confirmed; and it gives information about Missions held, Mission buildings erected, &c. Moreover, it furnishes us with an account of what was given by private benevolence last year, and of what has been given during the past quarter of a century, to exclusively Church charities, so far as the necessary information could be obtained; and we question whether so complete an account of what has been done by the munificence of Churchmen has ever before been collected from competent authorities, and made public. There is necessarily a considerable number of objects, religious and eleemosynary, to which large sums are annually contributed, about which it is impossible to obtain an accurate statement, or a statement at all, and it is well that it should be so. For whilst for purposes of Church defence and for the encouragement of faint-hearted people, it is desirable that the world should know what is being done in certain fields of religious work, it is not less desirable that the public gaze should not be turned on mere private charitable offerings, which many would shrink from making if there was any chance of what they had done being published abroad. What is thus summarized in the preface is afterwards more fully developed in succeeding pages. Moreover, we again find a description of what has been done during the last quarter of a century for the cause of Church extension in certain large towns. Those selected are Leicester, Nottingham, Bolton,

Barrow, and Rochdale, in which nearly three quarters of a million have been expended in providing additional church accommodation during that period ; and besides this there is an interesting history of what has been done in the way of building churches at Brighton since 1761, when it was a fishing village with 2,000 people, to the present time, when it is a large and handsome town with more than 100,000 inhabitants. This more detailed history of what has been done in places where the population has enormously increased is to be continued in future years till the efforts to meet the spiritual wants of all the great centres of industry have been dealt with. For the first time we have a list of existing orphanages ; whilst the statements with regard to reformatories, industrial schools, sisterhoods, penitentiaries, convalescent homes, and cottage hospitals have been thoroughly revised and made more complete than they have previously been. There is also a list of all the foreign chaplaincies held by clergymen of the Church of England ; which has been compiled with great care after correspondence with the holders of them, and includes the sources from which their income is derived, as well as the authority with which their nomination rests. To Churchmen travelling such a list must be valuable, as it enables them to form some idea concerning the ministrations which their own Church has provided for their edification in places where they may think of sojourning.

We have given the above particulars relative to the additions made to this year's issue of this useful book in the hope of securing for it a larger circulation, and also in the hope that its contents may be studied. It is no uncommon thing for people to complain unthinkingly of the shortcomings and apathy of the Church in neglecting to meet some crying want of the day, without in the least knowing what efforts are being made. With the possibility of obtaining accurate information respecting the various works that are being carried on by pious Churchmen in this carefully-compiled book there will be much less excuse than there has hitherto been for careless and injurious statements of the kind. At a time when there is so much talk of Church reform on the part of those who find it easier to complain of the neglect of others than to undertake self-denying tasks of usefulness themselves, it is no slight gain to be able to point to the practical works which are being carried out on all sides ; and it is a further advantage for people to know what benevolent institutions are in existence, that they may not fall into the snare of seeking to originate societies to promote objects for which provision is already being made, and so diminish the good, which might otherwise be effected, by an unnecessary multiplication of machinery. We feel that the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge deserves well of the Church for having lent its assistance in publishing this useful book, and that still greater thanks are due to its able and indefatigable editor, the Rev. F. Burnside.

The Endowments and Establishment of the Church of England. By the late J. S. BREWER, M.A. Second Edition, revised. Edited by LEWIS T. DIBDIN, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. (London : John Murray, 1885.)

THIS work was originally published in 1873. The first part, on Endowments, ought to make yet more clear what all well-informed persons know as a matter of course, though it is repeatedly denied by Liberationists, that the possessions of the English Church are not the gifts of the nation as such, but of individual benefactors; and that what in this respect it owes to the State is simply 'the protection of its own property.' There is in these seven chapters much useful information on such matters as the payment of tithes, the foundation of parochial churches, the acquisition by monasteries of rectorial rights, and the wretched impoverishment of the Church under the second and third Tudors. But we are surprised to observe that Mr. Brewer traces up the Anglo-Saxon parochial ministry to those clerics, referred to in Pope Gregory's long letter to Augustine, who 'could not remain single, and who therefore ought to marry, and be provided for outside the monastery (of Canterbury), but to be kept under ecclesiastical rule.' These men, as the original expressly says, were 'extra sacros ordines constituti' (Bede, i. 27); and their refusal to live 'single' would, according to the existing Church law, incapacitate them from promotion to holy orders. Mr. Dibdin adds to Mr. Brewer's text a useful note on the tripartite division of tithes, in which he meets the most telling argument for that division, as having obtained in ancient England, by suggesting that 'the alleged law of Ethelred' the Unready, given in Thorpe (i. 342), may be part of 'a private compilation of points of canon law published tentatively, and not recognized as possessing any legislative force'; and this, although it professes to speak with the authority of the king and the Witan.

The second part of the volume is spoilt by what, in colloquial language, we might call a 'fad,' viz. the proposition that Henry VIII. 'established the Church of England.' By this Mr. Brewer does not mean that Henry pulled down an old Church and set up a new one; he says expressly that nothing of the kind was thought of. What he means is that the English Church was then for the first time brought under royal or national 'control.' Clearly this is not the popular sense of the term. Mr. Brewer owns that it is not supported by the documents of the Reformation period; and we must add that it is not the natural or grammatical sense, for, on his own showing, what was thus 'established' was not the Church, but State supremacy over the Church; and when he quietly connects the verbs 'to restrain and control,' by means of a 'that is,' with the verb 'to establish,' he does but provoke a smile. There is a curious inconsistency in his treatment of the subject. Sometimes he speaks of 'Establishment' as having restored 'independence' to the Church, and of the advantage derived from the substitution of a 'natural sovereign' for an 'external' one; at other times he compares it to the 'damming up and contracting of the course of a river,' declares that the benefit was

'wholly on the side of the nation, not of the Church,' or charges the State with having been 'supremely indifferent to the interests of the Church itself.' So sometimes he idealizes the royal supremacy as if it were actually exercised by a personal 'Defender of the Faith,' disinters the old fiction about the 'mixta persona,' pleads for Hooker's theory of Church and State as not really obsolete in our days, and quotes, without verifying it, Hooker's unfortunate reference to a dictum of Innocent III., which was, in fact, merely a caveat against the undue extension of the jurisdiction of courts spiritual. At other times he treats the supremacy as really 'national,' makes the Church a 'function and representative of the nation in all things spiritual,' and asserts for 'everyone in the nation' an interest in the doctrine or discipline of the Church, even although 'no one' is now 'compelled to remain in its communion' (pp. 216, 250). Such language encourages the contention of some modern Church reformers, that all citizens should have their share of power over the Church's internal organization, even although legally released from obligations towards her faith or worship; in short, that they ought to 'have it both ways.' One is not surprised, after this, to find the title 'head of the Church' still assigned to the successor of the great queen who laid it aside; or to see the relation of non-established communities to State courts practically identified with that of the Church, although it is obvious that in the former case the State court does *not* pretend to be the apex of a system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

On the whole, although this 'second part' of the work has some good remarks, notably on the impossibility of separating belief from dogma, and on the far greater amount of harmonious fellow-feeling between clergy and laity here than that which prevails on the Continent, we fear that its republication will rather detract from than enhance the well-earned reputation of a laborious historical scholar. We must thank Mr. Dibdin for exhibiting, in a long note, the complexity of the conditions which in fact make up 'Establishment,' and for pointing out that 'the Crown does not claim spiritual jurisdiction,' and that, while 'legislation dealing with discipline' has been the work of Parliament alone, those matters of 'doctrine or ritual' which discipline has to guard have, 'with a few exceptions easily accounted for,' been settled by Convocation together with Parliament. But when he says that the Constitutions of Clarendon sanction 'an appeal from the ecclesiastical courts to the Crown,' it would have been as well to explain the purpose, and scope of that appeal. 'Si Archiepiscopus defuerit in iustitia exhibenda, ad dominum Regem perveniendum est postremo, *ut præcepto ipsius in curia Archiepiscopi controversia terminetur*, ita quod non debeat ultra procedi absque assensu domini Regis' (Wilkins, i. 435). The King is thus invoked to correct the Archbishop's negligence, and stir him up to do his duty—*not* to override his sentence. The matter is to be finally adjudicated, not in the King's court, but in the Archbishop's; and the last clause is meant to bar any appeal from Canterbury to Rome without the royal permission. This is not precisely the sort of 'appeal to the Crown' with which we are now familiar. Nor were cases of 'doctrine

or ritual' in question in 1164. (See *Eccles. Courts Commission Report*, pp. xix, xxiv.)

The Idea of God, as affected by Modern Knowledge. By JOHN FISKE. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1885.)

THIS little book is a vindication of Theism from a purely scientific standpoint. The rapidity of the growth of modern knowledge, though a sufficiently familiar topic of the day, has in truth been such as it is hard to realize. Mr. Fiske reminds us, for instance, that 'a fourth generation has barely had time to appear on the scene since Priestley discovered that there was such a thing as oxygen' (p. 51). And the achievements of chemical science during this brief interval have been paralleled or surpassed in almost every other department of human thought. A multitude of new sciences have sprung up, and in others our ideas have been revolutionized. It is a natural result that all our beliefs, however venerable, should be called in question, and none have been more persistently challenged than those which form the basis of religion. Now that so much to which we once unhesitatingly assented has been discarded or discredited, can we, it is asked, any longer believe in God? Mr. Fiske remarks with justice that an idea which does survive such tremendous revolutions of thought may well be believed to be permanent, and to answer to an eternal reality. For, as he argues, 'it is not likely that it can ever be called upon to pass a severer ordeal' (p. 61).

Mr. Fiske traces the Theistic idea to a twofold source. On the one hand, he tells us, the primitive man personified the forces and objects of nature. On the other hand he peopled the unseen world with ghosts. And according as one or the other of these conceptions became prominent, the form of monotheism which ultimately emerged was differently characterized. When a notion, however imperfect, of the unity of Nature was reached, a corresponding notion of a single Author and Ruler of the universe was likewise attained. And, again, the worship of ancestors gave rise to the idea of tribal and national deities, and conquest and extended empire prepared the way for the recognition of a Supreme and All-Sovereign God. But whereas the conception yielded by the former line of thought was that of a Deity immanent in the universe, acting in its phenomena and revealing Himself in its laws, the conception resulting from the latter was that of an anthropomorphic Being, remote from the world and governing it from outside. Mr. Fiske contends that it is this 'anthropomorphic theism,' as he calls it, which modern science utterly repudiates. With the other, or 'cosmic theism,' it has, he says, no quarrel. He finds both exemplified in the Christian Church, but he urges that it is in fact the conflict between these two ideas which has been erroneously regarded as a conflict between religion and science.

At the same time Mr. Fiske is careful to maintain that to eliminate all anthropomorphic elements from the idea of God is an impossibility. He holds that our notions of the Deity must always be inadequate: that, for instance, 'to ascribe what we know as human personality to the infinite Deity straightway lands us in a contradic-

tion, since personality without limits is inconceivable. But,' he adds, 'on the other hand, it is no less true that the total elimination of anthropomorphism from the idea of God abolishes the idea itself' (p. 135). He points out that those who would substitute for the conception of a Personal God that of an Infinite Power, are relying upon a notion ultimately derived from 'our subjective sensations of effort overcoming resistance,' and therefore are really no less anthropomorphic than others (p. 16). Hence while agreeing with Mr. Spencer that the Power manifested in the Universe is unknowable *in so far* as Infinite and Absolute, he holds that we cannot but regard it as akin to all that is highest and best in the human soul. And though we can only attain to a symbolic conception of the Deity, yet we are forced to conceive of God as a Spiritual and Moral Being.

We should carry this vindication of anthropomorphism further than Mr. Fiske. A true conception of Personality does not conflict with a true conception of Infinity. Personality indeed implies limitation, but not necessarily other than self-limitation. The realization of the absolute Self-consciousness is not conditioned by any existence external to, or independent of, the Deity. But the Christian doctrine of the Trinity leads us to recognize in the eternal Being of God just such principles of self-limitation as enable us to apprehend the fact of the Divine Thought and Love, without being in any way incompatible with Infinity.

In working out his conclusions Mr. Fiske treats the old-fashioned teleology of Paley and his school as wholly defunct, in which we do not entirely agree with him. But he urges nevertheless that 'the teleological instinct in man cannot be suppressed or ignored' (p. 137); and while repudiating final causes as instruments of investigation, he contends that the result of purely scientific inquiry is to reveal a well-defined dramatic tendency in the course of evolution. There is a manifest *purpose* in the progress of development, and not only does it point, like the older theology, to man as the head and crown of the creation, but 'the glorious consummation toward which organic evolution is tending is the production of the highest and most perfect psychical life' (p. 160). Nor is this all. The Power which rules the universe confessedly 'makes for righteousness,' and it is impossible to suppose that it does so blindly. Hence while contending that the doctrine of Evolution has rendered it impossible to rely upon the argument drawn from the adaptation of organ to function in individual cases, Mr. Fiske argues that as regards the universe as a whole it has introduced a higher and nobler teleology, leading us to refer the entire scheme of nature, not to a blind, unintelligent Power, but to a living God.

There is much that is admirable and suggestive in Mr. Fiske's book, and we can but regret that he has not seen his way to further conclusions. We find in his essay no recognition of any special revelation. The Idea of God is treated throughout as framed by the unaided efforts of the human mind interpreting the facts of nature. But if the conclusion thus reached is that the world is ruled by a Spiritual and Holy God, we should naturally expect to find that He

has revealed Himself to us. The Christian creed asserts that He has done so. But if this be the case, the question whether or not we may assign to Him this or that attribute assumes a different aspect. On grounds of pure philosophy we may be puzzled to know whether we can rightly think of God as Personal. But if He has disclosed Himself to us as a Father, who invites our prayers and assures us of His love, we have no right to dispute any longer. Our knowledge and our mental powers are alike insufficient to warrant us in deciding that God is not such as He affirms Himself to be.

Amiel's Journal. The Journal Intime of Henri-Frédéric Amiel. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by MRS. HUMPHRY WARD. Two vols. (London : Macmillan & Co., 1885.)

It will not be difficult for those who are well acquainted with a large and influential school of modern thought to comprehend the enthusiastic reception which has been accorded to *Amiel's Journal*. The book is a powerful and pathetic embodiment of what is most attractive and most dangerous in the philosophy which attempts to retain the essence whilst it rejects the distinctive doctrines of Christianity ; which, beneath a kindly and amiable exterior, cherishes an essentially sceptical spirit ; and which, in the full blaze of Christian truth that has stood the test of nineteen centuries, deliberately dwells in a feebleness of light than the religious philosophy of a Marcus Aurelius. To much of the admiration which the work has elicited we unhesitatingly subscribe. The circumstances of its composition have conspired to produce a book calculated to possess elements of lasting value. Given a man of varied knowledge, of wide culture and experience, of singularly introspective thought, and of keenly critical faculty—add to such gifts a life of learned leisure, and the society of gifted friends, which helped materially to give precision to his ideas and to the cultivation of a finished literary taste—let such a man be free from the distraction of domestic cares, so as to have abundant opportunity for composition, and be accustomed for thirty years in succession to write down the impressions produced on him by books, as well as the results of his rare powers of self-analysis—and we have all the materials in the thousands of sheets so produced, from which to select a volume of no ordinary character. Nor are we depreciating a book of exceptional artistic finish and of multifarious interest in questioning whether it is worthy to be the sole result of the talents and opportunities of its author.

The genesis of Amiel's mental history can scarcely be traced in his outward circumstances. Born in 1821, and left an orphan at an early age, 'at twenty he was already proud, timid, and melancholy.' From the college at Geneva he passed to Berlin, where, during perhaps the four most important and receptive years of his life—from 1844 to 1848—he spent what Mrs. Ward calls 'a free wandering student life,' and gained a wide experience of men, things, countries, peoples, books. On his return home he was appointed Professor of *Æsthetics* and French Literature at the Academy of Geneva, and

four years later he succeeded to the chair of Moral Philosophy, which he occupied until his death. The ostracism which the old Genevese families inflicted upon the nominees of the revolutionary government of M. Fazy was in Amiel's case tempered by the intimacy of such men as Edmond Scherer and Ernest Naville. Under such conditions it is not easy to discern the grounds of a temperament so morbid and unhealthy as Amiel's. It is a curious psychological study. Here is a man who longed for fame, for love, for rest of mind, for religious certainty, but who was too apprehensive of failure to concentrate his energies on his task, too afraid of making a mistake to give his whole heart to a woman, too distrustful of himself to rely upon his own convictions, too jealous of being cajoled by authority or desire to get free from merely provisional assent. The result, as may be imagined, was pitiful enough. 'I am afraid,' he writes, 'of an imperfect, a faulty synthesis, and I linger in the provisional from timidity and from loyalty. I have too much imagination, conscience, and penetration, and not enough character. The ideal poisons for me all imperfect possession.'

The *Journal* affords abundant proof of what high temper and quality was the spirit so tragically marred. It is of the nature of such a work that it is disconnected and discursive; but so perfect is the artistic finish of every page, and so clear and clean-cut both the thought and its expression, that the reader is borne along unweariedly to the close. A more quotable book, if we may use the expression, never was written, and we could fill page upon page with extracts of criticisms at once terse and felicitous; of vignette landscape like a poet's dream for beauty, accuracy, and subtlety combined; of maxims skillfully rounded; of philosophic thought deep, brilliant, and original. The cast of Amiel's mind was essentially religious, and he repeatedly uses expressions which suggest the hope that at length he is on the high road to faith, and then again he sinks as rapidly to almost naked scepticism. Nor is the secret of so terrible a failure in our judgment insoluble. Amiel's inward religious struggles, so far as we can learn from the *Journal*, were purely and exclusively speculative. We fail to trace in his life, not only any recognition of a divinely ordained authority to which he was bound to listen, but any practical exercise of the benevolence in which the example of Christ is, even unconsciously, followed, or any of the earnest devotion which craves divine teaching from 'the Father of lights.' Yet the following quotation will show that he discerned with unerring acuteness the true conditions under which alone the force of Christianity can be realized:—

'If philosophy is the art of understanding, it is evident that it must begin by saturating itself with facts and realities, and that *premature abstraction kills it*, just as the abuse of fasting destroys the body at the age of growth. *To understand is to possess the thing understood, first by sympathy and then by intelligence.* Instead, then, of first dismembering and dissecting the object to be conceived, we should begin by laying hold of it in its *ensemble*, then in its formation, last of all in its parts. . . . We must study, respect, and question what we want to know, instead of massacring it. We must assimilate ourselves to things and surrender

ourselves to them ; we must open our minds with docility to their influence, and steep ourselves in their spirit and their distinctive form, before we offer violence to them by dissecting them' (vol. i. p. 219).

Had Amiel been led to embrace Catholic truth, and had his heart been sustained by inward experience of its living power, he might have been the Pascal of his day, instead of bequeathing to a generation overburdened with doubt a legacy of hesitancy, uncertainty, and gloom.

To translate, it has been well said, is to pour an exceedingly volatile fluid from one vessel into another. Much of the aroma, the spirit, escapes in the process. This is eminently true of translations from the French. Of Mrs. Ward's translation we will only say that to those who are either unable to get hold of the original, or to understand it when they get it, it will prove as good a substitute as many translations, and better than most. Anyone, however, who compares it with the original will find it no exception to the truth embodied in the familiar saying—*Traduttori traditori*.

1. *History of England. Part I.: From the Earliest Times to the Death of Henry VII.* By F. YORK POWELL, M.A. (London : Rivingtons, 1885.)
2. *Early Chroniclers of Europe : England.* By JAMES GAIRDNER. (London : S.P.C.K., 1885.)

MR. YORK POWELL'S book is the first part of a history designed for the use of middle forms of schools, and brings its subject down to the old turning-point of 1509. Few men living have given more care than the author to the study of English constitutional history, or are able to speak with fuller knowledge of its earlier periods. The most striking feature of his work is the wide and varied use of chronicle and poem, and for this reason we have coupled it with Mr. Gairdner's volume, which will often supply the information wanted concerning a writer quoted by Mr. Powell. Read by itself, on the main lines, the History is charming ; and if on a second perusal reference be made to its clear maps and plans, the result will be far more than can possibly be wanted in ordinary schools. Indeed, the book is too valuable for that. Mr. Powell thinks and writes in old English undefiled ; so much so that he will hardly escape the charge of mannerisms, though he will be able for the most part to defend himself by worthy precedent. And his work compares well with the repetition of words, the turgid phrases, and sentences often obscure, which mar the erudition of Mr. Gairdner. To our mind, however, the periods of early English story are best seen under five divisions, such as were marked out by J. R. Green in his *Making of England* : first, when the settlements became kingdoms ; second, a union of all under the so-called Heptarchy ; third, the terrible time of the Danish invasion—a repetition with interest of the Engle and Saxon war ; fourth, the Anglo-Danish peace, on the wise Council and strong arms of Alfred and Athelstan ; fifth, the period thence till the quest of William the Norman. Mr. Powell makes six of these, with not so good an effect. His chapters on England under the Norman and Angevin

kings, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, are among the most interesting; while for explanation of the confused records of Richard II. we know no similar guide.

If fault be found with Mr. Gairdner's style, such at least cannot be charged against his subject-matter. Extracts and examples are all excellent; the most so to us being the passage, ably translated, from Eadmer, relating to the election of Anselm to the see of Canterbury (pp. 66-73). We ought further to say that 'England' is one of a series of the *Early Chroniclers of Europe*, and the conception of such a course reflects great praise on the editors of the S.P.C.K.

Some Characteristics of the Passion of our Most Holy Redeemer, considered as illustrating the Discipline of Life. By the Rev. W. R. FINCH, M.A. (Leicester: W. H. Lead, 1885.)

To deliver addresses such as were the originals of these essays must be a task of considerable difficulty. As the writer himself allows (p. 4), the Holy Week 'is not a time for much speaking; it is rather a time during which to keep silence—a time to think, not to talk.' And the way of the Cross has been so reverently though minutely followed by many a loving servant of Christ, that few travellers may hope to learn things new, or escape the charge of repetition if they speak again of the Marks of the Passion. Mr. Finch has avoided this reproach by dedicating his sermons 'to all, and they not a few,' to whom he is indebted for whatsoever may prove in this book 'to be other than commonplace.' He writes carefully and quietly of Endurance, Foreknowledge, Loneliness, and Willingness, and at the end of each address is a pointed lesson 'for the discipline of our lives.' A fifth essay, on Calvary, for Good Friday, though not quite equal to the others, is nevertheless of great force, and evidently of restrained emotion. The quotations in the little book are for the most part apt and good; but a strange mistake on p. 33 does 'violence' to the singular beauty of Keble's hymn in the *Christian Year* for Wednesday before Easter; and the verse itself is not in harmony with its surroundings. Nor do we like the fanciful printing of texts in italics, old-fashioned though it be. These, however, are small blemishes in an excellent work which we cordially commend for use in the approaching Passion-tide.

Dorothy Forster: a Novel. By WALTER BESANT. A New Edition. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1885.)

THIS is a very beautiful specimen of the historical novel; and, as far as we can see, it avoids that fault of injustice to historical characters which too often detracts from compositions of this kind. Mr. Besant has chosen for his theme the first of the two great Jacobite insurrections. 'The Fifteen' is certainly far inferior to 'the Forty-five' in splendour of drama and in unity of interest. The prince whose melancholy silence depressed the spirit of his Highlanders is very unlike the gallant youth in whom, as Mrs. Oliphant says in her inimitable study of his career, 'all the nobleness, patience, valour, and

courage of the old royal stock burst forth again into flower,' who within a few months absolutely won, and for years retained, the passionate love of thousands of Scotchmen. Mar, with his tergiversation and his incompetence, falls far short of Lord George Murray; Sheriffmuir is invested with grotesque rather than lofty associations; the extraordinary blundering of the English insurgents well-nigh chills our pity for the misery of the Preston surrender. Yet this uprising against the newlyenthroned Hanoverians, with which most of us must have first become acquainted through the concluding chapters of *Rob Roy*, has one figure more simply beautiful in its pure nobleness and loveableness than any which stands out on the later and broader scene—we mean, of course, James, Earl of Derwentwater. He is the hero of Mr. Besant's story; and those who read it need not apprehend that an historic original has been endowed, for the story's sake, with imaginary excellence. Of him it was said that 'the sweetness of his temper and disposition had so secured him the affection of all his tenants, neighbours, and dependents, that multitudes would have lived and died for him.' Mr. Besant, who has so carefully studied Northumbrian legends, might perhaps have made something more of the traditions relating to the tragedy of his death, and of the feeling excited against the wife who 'counselled him ill.' The heroine is charmingly conceived and described; full justice is done to the higher aspects of Lord Crewe's character; the little academic pedantries which appear in the talk of Mr. Hilyard remind one pleasantly of the Baron of Bradwardine. Historic probabilities appear to be well preserved in the conversations: here and there a slight lapse may be discerned. A Churchwoman of Queen Anne's reign would not have been ignorant that her Church, as well as the Roman, gave directions for 'fasting throughout Lent and on Fridays' (p. 150); nor would an Oxonian, so well informed as the sometime 'Terræ filius,' have spoken of 'the Thirty-nine Articles of the faith' (p. 152), nor, as a Lincoln College man, have talked of his 'president' instead of his 'rector' (p. 101). We heartily commend the book to those of our readers who retain their love for 'the Waverleys'; and we should not wonder if the perusal were to induce them to visit Bamborough, and look out from the castle walls on the lonely Farnes and the wild sea.

Golden Legends of the Olden Time. By JOHN STOUGHTON, D.D.
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1885.)

DR. STOUGHTON publishes this volume in order to 'interest young people' in the ecclesiastical legends of the Saints. His tone throughout is equitable, sympathetic, and Christianlike; and it is specially refreshing to find a conspicuous Nonconformist writer affirming, at the outset of his chapter on 'the Virgin Mary,' that

'as the Mother of our Lord, and the means of His miraculous Incarnation, and as an example of purity, humbleness, and devotion, she is pre-eminently worthy of our reverence. The extravagant homage paid her in mediæval and modern times by so many people has, since the sixteenth century, produced a reaction; and she who was saluted by the Angel Gabriel as "highly favoured," and as "blessed among women"—she who

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was to be overshadowed by the Holy Ghost, so that the Holy One born of her was called by the angel the Son of God, has really been robbed of the remembrance, the honour, and the love, which, on Scripture grounds, appear her rightful due' (p. 3).

He dwells on the witness borne by hagiology to some 'rather unpopular virtues,' of which

'a good many saints of old, with all their imperfections, were examples worthy of being studied by ourselves, who live in an atmosphere more suited to the cultivation of another class of qualities. . . . In canonizing saints, the Church canonized virtues unknown or disesteemed in the heathen world. . . . Monkish wonders may be as incredible as Pagan metamorphoses; but what a different spirit they often breathe!' (p. 349).

So, too, he points out 'that follies on the part of hermits and monks are at times corrected' (in these legends) 'by incidents of another order'; and a whole chapter is devoted to illustrations of non-monastic or domestic piety in mediæval Europe. S. Bernard, also, is described as having 'insisted, above all things, upon spiritual and practical religion' (p. 224). 'The legends encircling' the life of S. Francis of Assisi 'have their centre in a far-reaching sympathy with all the works of God'; and the story of the Stigmata is traced to possible 'physical impressions,' resulting from 'a state of religious fervour,' not to superstitious trickery on his part, or on that of 'his personal attendants,' who were 'sincere and earnest' men (p. 244).

There are some inaccuracies in this attractive book. The story of S. John's short sermon, 'Little children, love one another,' is but half told, the subsequent question and answer being omitted. Blaudina is said to have been a pious mother of children, whereas she was a poor weakly slave girl who is said to have acted as a mother to her fellow-martyrs. S. Columba is confounded (not, indeed, for the first time) with S. Columban, as is the death of S. Dominic with that of the Dominican Peter Martyr. There are several misprints of Latin words and proper names—e.g. 'Clara Valles,' 'Spouosa Christi,' 'Thomas' for the vocative 'Thoma,' 'Erkewald' for 'Erkonwald,' and 'Leo the Arminian.' We conclude by referring to two very beautiful passages on the spiritual significance of the world-famous legends of S. Christopher and of the Holy Grail (pp. 69, 141).

Dictionary of National Biography. Edited by LESLIE STEPHEN. Vol. V. BICHENO—BOTTESHAM. Vol. VI. BOTTOMLEY—BROWELL. (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1886.)

UNDER the able editorship of Mr. Leslie Stephen, whose name is a guarantee for honest and conscientious work, two more volumes of this valuable Dictionary of Biography have reached us since our last number. Though consisting of more than 900 pages in all, these volumes do no more than cover the ground between BICHENO and BROWELL. One of the heaviest demands on the judgment of an editor of such a work must be to determine the relative amount of space to be awarded to the different names which come before him. It is due to Mr. Stephen to state that we have observed in these

volumes no glaring instance of disproportion. As Churchmen we are glad to see on the list of contributors such names as those of the Rev. Canon Venables, the Rev. Canon Overton, the Rev. A. Jessopp, the Rev. Canon Dixon, and others, which justify the hope that ecclesiastical biography will be placed in competent hands. Two of the most interesting articles are those on Boswell (by the Editor) and on Lord Brougham, of whom it was said, 'that if he had only known a little law he would have known a little of everything.' A lady (Miss A. M. Clerke) seems to have charge of some at least of the articles on Physics and Astronomy. If we may judge from those which she has written on Robert Boyle, and on Bradley the Astronomer Royal, we have no reason to quarrel with the arrangement. An excellent feature of this Dictionary is the ample list of authorities at the end of each name. Is it through an oversight that the name of Dr. Bloomfield, the editor of the New Testament, is omitted?

The Anglican Pulpit of To-Day: Forty Short Biographies and Forty Sermons of Distinguished Preachers of the Church of England. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1886.)

THIS is an interesting volume enough. It is not the compiler's fault if some names, such as those of Canon Liddon and Canon Carter, and Dr. King, and others, are conspicuous by their absence. On the other hand, we do not see on what principle the Rev. Phillips Brooks, of Boston, is admitted into the series, though we give him a cordial welcome, and should have been indeed sorry to lose his noble sermon on Tolerance, which lustily elbows aside heaps of nonsense which have claimed acceptance under the protection of that much-abused word. The volume begins with the highest dignitaries, and runs the gamut from archbishops, bishops, deans, down to the 'inferior clergy,' some of whom are, as representatives of the Anglican pulpit, vastly 'superior.' We are glad to see from Dr. Benson's sermon on Missions that he is keenly alive to the necessity of building up native Churches and service-books in heathen lands, and to the folly of even wishing 'to transplant one's own dear mother Church to a climate where it will wither,' instead of striving 'so to master her principles and to enter into foreign intelligences as to raise up Churches truly native.' The compiler is a little hazy about some ecclesiastical arrangements. In the biographical notice of Dr. Lightfoot, the sermon by him which follows is stated to have been preached 'on his consecration,' but a note, on the same page, to the sermon itself states it to have been preached 'on his enthronement.' Does the editor not know the difference? It is sad to think that of the preachers named in this volume two (the Bishops of Ely and of Manchester) have been taken from us, and three (Canons Body, Knox Little, and Scott-Holland) are invalidated from overwork. It is interesting to compare the two sermons on 'Humility': one by Dr. Stubbs, the Bishop of Chester, and the other by Dr. Hatch, who showed *his* humility by ignoring the evidence of the New Testament in a course of lectures on 'The Organization of the Early Christian Churches'! On the whole this is a very interesting volume.

The Great Commentary of Cornelius à Lapide. Translated by THOMAS W. MOSSMAN, B.A., assisted by various scholars. S. John's Gospel and Epistles, 2 vols. (London: Hodges, 1886.)

THESE two volumes were only completed shortly before the death of the translator, and their issue has been considerably delayed in consequence. The remainder of the New Testament will be published under the editorship of the Rev. G. G. Ross, D.C.L. There are many who will be glad to have on their shelves a commentary so valuable as that of à Lapide in a compendious English dress. No attempt is made to adapt the Commentary to the teaching of the English Church. In chap. vii. vs. 37 there is a somewhat unhappy mistranslation: 'Christ wished to implant in the people, as they were departing, not merely a longing for Himself, and *doubts respecting His religion*, but to bring it keenly home to them.' On turning to the original we find the following: 'Voluit ergo Christus . . . toti populo abeunti sui desiderium ac de sua religione scrupulum, imo ingentem aculeum injicere.' Either *sua religio* refers to the religion of the people, or else *scrupulum* must be translated 'searchings of heart,' as in the 'scrupulum cordis' of the Vulgate (1 Sam. xxv. 31). We incline to the latter view.

1. *Sick-Bed Services, compiled from the Holy Scriptures and the Book of Common Prayer, with a Selection of Hymns.* By the late Canon HAWKINS, B.D. (London: S.P.C.K., n.d.)
2. *Manual for Sick Visitation, containing Prayers, Selections from Holy Scripture, Hymns, and Readings adapted to the Various States of Human Infirmary.* By the Rev. R. ADAMS. (London: Griffith, Farran, Okeden, and Welsh, 1885.)

WITH all due respect to the revered memory of one so universally beloved as the late Canon Hawkins, we doubt whether the S.P.C.K. has been well advised in reprinting a volume of 'Sick-Bed Services' which ignores the 'Service' for the Visitation of the Sick, and from the first page to the last makes no allusion to the Holy Communion beyond what is contained in a jejune note on the words in the Psalter, 'I will receive the cup of salvation' (p. 60).

No. 2 is a book of a far higher tone. Perhaps it may not be altogether fair to compare them, as one is intended for the use of the sick and the other more especially, though not exclusively, for that of the clergy. But this consideration need not mitigate our condemnation of a book which gives no place to the Holy Communion as a 'sick-bed service.' Mr. Adams in his very modest introduction rightly says, 'The visitation of the sick is the most important duty out of church which the clergy have to perform.' He wisely insists on 'decency and order' in the administration of Sick Communion. 'To minister to a sick person, as the writer saw in a curacy he held, in a short coat, using a cheese-plate as a paten, a black bottle as the flagon, and a wine-glass as the chalice, is not edifying' (p. xvii). The Selections from Holy Scripture, the Readings for the Sick, and the Hymns at the end make this on the whole a very use-

ful manual, though the Church tone might with advantage be somewhat higher.

Holy Week in Norwich Cathedral; being Seven Lectures on the several Members of the Most Sacred Body of our Lord Jesus Christ. By E. M. GOULBURN, D.D., D.C.L., Dean of Norwich. (London: Rivingtons, 1885.)

It is needless to say that this, like every work that has proceeded from the pen of the Dean of Norwich, teems with beautiful thoughts which testify to the genuine piety and literary culture of its venerable and accomplished author. The 'Members' which form the subject of the successive lectures are 'The Sacred Head,' 'The Hands,' 'The Feet,' 'The Eyes,' 'The Breast,' 'The Mouth,' 'The Side.' The last lecture contains some interesting remarks as to what part of our Lord's sacred Body was intended to be denoted by the word 'side.' 'Hymn writers and devotional authors,' he observes, 'often speak of it as if it were identical with the organ usually called the heart' (p. 225). The Dean prefers to take it as denoting the 'lateral region of the breast,' whether on the right or on the left side is not stated, though ancient art usually takes it to be on the right. We cannot do better than recommend this book for reading during Holy Week. Happy are they who by a blessed contagion catch some of the devotional spirit which animates every line of it.

The Last Days of our Lord's Ministry. A course of Lectures delivered in Holy Trinity Church, Coventry. By the Rev. W. F. HOOK, M.A. A new edition, with a Preface by the Rev. W. R. W. STEPHENS. (London: Griffith, Farran, Okeden, and Welsh, 1886.)

MORE than half a century has elapsed—*grande mortalitatis ævi spatium*—since these lectures were delivered in the Church of the Holy Trinity by its illustrious vicar. In those days, services were rarely held during the season of Lent, except on Ash Wednesday and Good Friday, so that Mr. Hook stands before us here as one of the earliest pioneers in the Church revival which was afterwards accomplished in earnest by the great Tractarian movement. These lectures have thus an historical interest, apart from the far higher value which they may claim on the ground of their intrinsic merit. Mr. Stephens has been well advised in issuing this reprint of Dean Hook's 'first literary venture.' In the present age 'of little leisure and much excitement' the sobriety of tone which these lectures exhibit may seem at first somewhat tame; but the reader will not go far before he finds his attention arrested by the evidence which meets him at every turn of no meagre learning and thought, and by the earnest appeals addressed to his heart and conscience.

The Throne of Eloquence: Great Preachers, Ancient and Modern. By E. PAXTON HOOD. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1885.)

THIS is one of the most amusing books we have met with for a long time. Once taken up, it is difficult to lay it down. It is written in plain vigorous English: abounds with wit and wisdom, is studded

with anecdotes, and amid all these lesser graces contains no small amount of very shrewd advice which preachers would do well to lay to heart. It is a posthumous publication, and is dedicated by the widow of the author to his co-religionist Mr. Spurgeon. It is to be followed by another volume on *The Vocation of the Preacher*. It is needless to state that Mr. Paxton Hood moves in a totally different plane from us, on all matters of doctrine and Church order, and the like; but for all that, his advice as to how best to reach the heart and conscience from the pulpit, and his illustrations from the practice of great preachers of all times are not by any means to be despised.

The Ministry of Mercy. Thirty-three Devotional Studies of the Gospel Miracles. By T. B. DOVER, M.A. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1886.)

THE contents of this volume well deserve the very great pains which the publishers have taken in getting it up. Seldom do we meet with sermons in such goodly array. The Gresham Press will soon rival the Chiswick if it can turn out such favourable specimens of paper and typography. We have spoken of sermons, but studies or meditations would be the more fitting name for these addresses, which, we are told, were for the most part spoken in a London church in the early mornings of Lent 1885. Their simplicity is only to be equalled by their reality. Reality is a great power. We feel instinctively that the author is not one of those who preach cream and live skimmed milk. We quote a short passage as a specimen:—

'Suspect any system, any form of Christianity when great and quick results are shown; be afraid of sensational prayer meetings where multitudes are instantly converted; your churches empty yesterday, full to-day because of some eloquent Apollos—all sudden movements, doubt them. The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation. There is no difficulty in producing mushroom growth; a powerful purse, or an exciting sermon, or a touching hymn may serve to effect a miracle; doubt it. In ninety-nine cases out of every hundred it hath no root in itself; in time of temptation they fall away. Numbers are no test of success; results can only really be tested at the Judgment Day. Religious statistics are the most untrustworthy of all; nothing bears reality and stability on the face but that which by slow and patient toil has reached perfection.'

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS, NEW EDITIONS, SERMONS, &c.

Bosworth's Clerical Guide and Ecclesiastical Directory (T. Bosworth and Co.) contains, in this year's issue, some new features of interest which enhance the value of this excellent work. The benefice list gives the dedication of each church so far as has yet been ascertained, and the date of the formation of each new district. A second series of the late Bishop Steere's *Notes of Sermons* (Bell and Sons), arranged in accordance with the Church's year, will meet, we doubt not, with as ready a welcome as its predecessor. *Poems*, by W. W. How, Bishop Suffragan of Bedford (Wells, Gardner, and Co.), might have undergone with advantage considerable pruning before they

were issued from the press—if indeed it was really necessary they should be issued at all, which we venture to doubt. Such pieces as *The Three Pundits*, *A Puzzling Question*, *The Babies Wood Turkey Cock*, and *Barmouth* may possibly be very funny, but they certainly are not *jeux d'esprit*. *The Trials of Jesus* (Skeffington) are seven discourses for Lent by the Rev. Baring Gould, and are intended to illustrate the various incidents which accompanied our Lord's appearance before Caiaphas, Pilate, and Herod.

Current Discussions in Theology by the Professors of Chicago Theological Seminary (Chicago, Fleming and Revell) seems to us to be a very useful book. The idea at any rate is excellent. It is intended to answer the question, What has been done in the different fields of sacred learning during the past twelve months? *The National Church of a Christian Nation* (Hatchards) is substantially an extra prize essay for the Peek Competition of 1872, by the Rev. W. A. Mathews. The writer has confined himself to showing the direct bearing which an Established Church has upon the National Life and Faith.

As we go to press another work by the same author and publisher has reached us, under the title *Constitutional Church Reform*, which seems to us to be a well-reasoned and temperate exposition of what the Church wants—and especially of what she does *not* want, which we hold to be quite as important—in that direction. 'There is no class of questions,' he wisely observes, 'on which hasty and ill-considered legislation may be more dreaded than those affecting the Church' (p. 25). We do not pledge ourselves to all the details recommended by Mr. Mathews (as, for example, on Church finance), but the principle of the book is so thoroughly sound that it ought to be in the hands of all who are interested in such matters. *Leaves from S. Augustine* (Burns and Oates) forms a thick but handy volume of nearly five hundred pages of translations of picked passages from various works of the Bishop of Hippo, by Mary H. Allies. Neither the Edinburgh nor the Oxford translation has been used or even referred to by the translator. 'The choice of passages and the translation itself are her own.' So far as we have tested it, we think no extraneous aid was needed. Many, we are sure, will be glad to possess in this compendious form gems of thought from so rich a mine. The book is divided into four parts: I. Personal; II. Doctrine in Daily Life; III. The Kingdom of our Lord on Earth; IV. Behind the Veil.

Dr. Heurtley has published a translation of the treatises in his valuable compilation *De Fide et Symbolo*, under the title *On Faith and the Creed* (Parker and Co.) The original went through three editions. The translation will appeal to a wider circle of readers. *Voiceless Teachers*, by Katherine Keene (Swan Sonnenschein and Co.), is a very charming book, intended for parochial use and to give some account of common flowers, with indications of what they teach.

Haileybury Chapel and other Sermons (Macmillan), by the Rev. G. E. Jeans, is in one respect, we imagine, unique, for it contains a sermon on Birds-nesting from the very apposite text Deuteronomy xxii. 6, 7. The opening sermon on Confirmation is very disappointing

in its treatment of that holy rite. It is, alas! anything but unique. Very different is the teaching contained in the Rev. H. Hollingworth's *Waiting for the Gift: a Few Plain Words to those who are about to be Confirmed* (Hayes), a most admirable manual which cannot be too extensively circulated.

A Guide to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament (George Bell), by the Rev. Edward Miller, is a calm and judicial *résumé* of facts which will be of great use in arriving at sound conclusions on the Revised Text and the Revised Version of the New Testament. No easy matter this, amid 'the din of heated partizanship on either side, at Chichester or at Cambridge. We are glad to welcome a third edition of *Plain Church Teaching for Week-days throughout the Year* (Masters and Co.). It is stated to be specially intended for cottage reading, and it has the merit of being simple in style, without any of that repulsive tone of condescending to adapt itself to the meanest capacity, which is a not uncommon feature of devotional or other books designed for the use of the poor. A very interesting biography, which comes to us recommended by no less an authority than that of Canon Mason, will be found in *Told for a Memorial, the Story of Mary Ann* (Nisbet). She was an old woman in Cornwall, of whom Canon Mason says in his Preface: 'The visits which I was allowed to pay to Mary Ann were not many, but they are among the most valued treasures of my life.' *The Lighthouse of S. Peter and other Addresses* (Nisbet), by the Rev. A. N. Malan, contains wholesome doctrine set forth with pith and point. We are especially pleased with one entitled 'Are you Saved?', exposing the folly, or worse, of that almost blasphemous query.

We conclude with inviting attention to three little books which may be helpful in kindling suitable thoughts during the coming Holy Week. We must own to a little disappointment with the Rev. H. B. Hyde's *Holy Temple Lenten Meditations on the Inner Life* (Skeffington). This, however, is largely due to the somewhat extravagant terms in which Archdeacon Watkins couches his introduction to it. *The Seven Last Words* (Skeffington), by the Rev. T. B. Dover, have the charm of great simplicity, which is singularly wanting in Mr. Hyde's effusions. Mr. Dover speaks of the 'three hours' service' as having become the common property of the Church in England. It seems, however, to be very generally forgotten that the seven words were uttered not during 'three hours,' but during 'six.' The service now so generally used is founded on a figment! *Good Friday Meditations on the Seven Words from the Cross* (S.P.C.K.), by the Rev. J. C. Bellett, the translator of Pelliccia, do not offer many features of interest. The suggested 'version,' 'Lady, behold thy son,' can scarcely, we think, be called very felicitous. It is, however, a comfort to find that the compilers of the 'Revised Version,' who seem to take a pleasure (especially in the New Testament) in making wanton alterations for no purpose whatever but to jar on the feelings of the reader, have in this case let the Authorized Version alone.